G.R. No. L-26112, October 4, 1971,
♦ Decision,
Villamor, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion,
Barredo, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion,
Teehankee, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion,
Concepcion, [CJ]
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26112 October 4, 1971
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, MIGUEL TOLENTINO, SR., ZOILA DE CHAVEZ, DEOGRACIAS MERCADO, MARIANO PANTOJA, GUILLERMO MERCADO, AGAPITO REYES, ISIDRO BESAS, LEONA LACHICA, ELENO MACALINDONG, DIONISIO MACALINDONG, DOROTEO SARA, JOAQUIN CAUNCERAN, VIRGILIO AGUILAR, FELIX DUMAN, PIO BACULI, ANTERO APOLINAR, FLAVIANO CURZADO, ROSENDO IBAÑEZ, ARCADIO GONZALES, FELIX BORJA and BLAS BASCO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JAIME DE LOS ANGELES, Judge, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BATANGAS, Branch III, Balayan, Batangas; AYALA Y CIA. AND/OR HACIENDA CALATAGAN and ALFONSO ZOBEL, respondents.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I concur. On the whole, I agree with the main opinion, but I would like to explain my reasons for doing so. Incidentally, I believe it is not amiss for me to state first why I have taken part in this case notwithstanding my having been co-signer of the basic petition herein, as Solicitor General then.
The fact that as Solicitor General, I co-signed with petitioner Tolentino the petition in this case made me hesitate at first to take part and vote in the disposition of the present incidents. On second thought, however, (a) realizing that this is one of the matters that have been purposely deferred to await the completion of the membership of the Court, and (b) discerning from the manifestation of counsel for said petitioner of January 30, 1969, shortly after Mr. Justice Teehankee and the writer joined this Court, which submits "for the convenience of the Court, especially of those new members who have not participated in any of the incidents relative to the matter under consideration (naturally, including me) a brief history of this case," that there would be no objection on their part to my participation herein, much less, has petitioner asked for my inhibition, and (c) above all, it being evident that even when the water co-signed the petition herein, it could not have been his intention to own and support any allegation or theory of petitioner Tolentino favorable exclusively to said petitioner's private interest, since it would be officious and illegal for any Solicitor General to represent and take common cause with any party on points in which such party's interests are separate and distinct from those of the Republic, hence the winter's signature under the petition was for and on behalf exclusively of the Republic, I have opted to act with the Court here.
It should be clear to anyone that the joinder of the Republic and Tolentino as co-petitioners in this case did not necessarily put them in the same shoes; the personality of the Republic in this case is rooted in its being plaintiff and prevailing party in G.R. No. L-20950 while that of Tolentino is in his being intervenor and, as such, also a prevailing party therein; as to the separability of their respective interests in this case, it is possible that Tolentino cannot succeed if the Republic fails, but the Republic can succeed even if Tolentino does not; so, it is obvious, there are matters in which Tolentino may be interested but wherein the Republic is not and cannot be interested, but this does not mean they cannot file a common pleading alleging their respective separate interests, which is exactly what was done in this case. In other words, the common petition did not make the Solicitor General the counsel of Tolentino as to matters in which his interest is separable from that of the Republic, which is exactly the case with respect to the damages claimed by Tolentino in the pending incidents. It cannot be said, therefore, that as to these incidents the writer is acting in a case in which he has been counsel, within the contemplation of Section 1 of Rule 137. Furthermore, it is recalled that the legal staff of the Solicitor General's Office firmly recommended against the office taking part in this case and it was only on the insistence of petitioner Tolentino to allege in the petition certain matters affecting the Republic that helped prevail upon me to co-sign the petition. As far as the Solicitor General's Office was concerned, it would have gone along with the order of Judge de los Angeles that the writ of execution is unnecessary until after any of the present title holders have refused to surrender their titles for cancellation or the Register of Deeds has refused to cancel the corresponding titles. Be that as it may, at the present stage of the proceedings, all matters affecting the Republic in this case have already been resolved, the judgment in this case ordering Judge de los Angeles to issue the writ of execution for the cancellation of the annulled titles being now final and executory because respondents have not asked for reconsideration in respect thereto, and there being nothing before the Court in the present incidents that could directly or indirectly affect either favorably or adversely any interest of the Republic, it is believed that there can be neither legal, ethical nor moral grounds for me to refrain from acting and voting as a member of the Court here.
Coming now to the incidents submitted for the Court's resolution, I take it that the problem commonly posed by them has its root in the following basic antecedent facts:
In Civil Case No. 373 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, entitled Republic of the Philippines versus Ayala y Cia., et als., with Miguel Tolentino as plaintiff-intervenor, which was an action to annul the titles of the defendants over certain lands in Calatagan, Batangas claimed to be portions of the territorial waters of the public domain and to recover possession thereof, with damages, the said court of first instance rendered judgment over the pen of Judge Damaso S. Tengco on June 2, 1962 as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(a) Declaring as null and void Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9550 (or Exhibit "24") of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Batangas and other subdivision titles issued in favor of Ayala y Cia. and/or Hacienda de Calatagan over the areas outside its private land covered by TCT No. 722, which, including the lots in T-9550 (Lots 360, 362, 363 and 182) are hereby reverted to public dominion.
(b) Ordering Defendants Antonino Dizon, Lucia Dizon, Adelaida Dizon Reyes, Consolacion Dizon Degollacion, Artemio Dizon, Ruben Dizon, Amorando Dizon and Zenaida Dizon, to vacate Lot 360 in favor of Intervenor Miguel Tolentino;
(c) Ordering all the defendants to jointly and severally pay Intervenor Miguel Tolentino compensatory damages in the sum of P3,000.00 a year per hectare of Lot 360 from March 11, 1954, until he is placed in lawful possession of the said area;
(d) Restraining and enjoining all the defendants from further acts of ownership and possession over Lots 360, 362, 363 and 182 of Psd-40891;
(e) Ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay the costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In the appeal taken to this Court from said decision by the losing parties docketed as G.R. No. L-20950, the following judgment was rendered on May 31, 1965:
WHEREFORE, thus modified, the decision of the lower court appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs.
After this judgment became final and the case was remanded to the trial court, upon motion of petitioner Tolentino, the said court, respondent Judge Jaime de los Angeles, presiding, ordered the issuance of a writ of execution and pursuant thereto, bank deposits and real properties of respondents Alfonso Zobel and Ayala y Cia. and the Hacienda Calatagan were garnished and levied upon. Whereupon, said respondents filed a motion to quash the said writ of execution, which motion the court promptly acted upon by ordering the temporary suspension of the writ. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of this order. In their opposition to this motion said respondents raised as a main issue that neither the judgment of the trial court nor that of this Court, both hereinabove quoted, adjudged them liable for the damages claimed by petitioner Tolentino and even assuming that the trial court's decision had made them so liable, they were later absolved together with the Dizons by the modificatory decision of this Court. On the other hand, petitioner Tolentino contended that (1) "the decision of the Supreme Court is perfectly clear and needs no extraneous interpretation; and (2) that any doubt that may arise at the extent and purport of the modification made by the Supreme Court of the lower court's decision may be resolved by a perusal of the body of the Supreme Court's decision and of the decision of the lower court." (Par. 14, pp. 6-7, Petition in this Case).
Resolving the issues thus raised by the parties, on February 2, 1966, the trial court issued the order now under review, the pertinent portions of which read thus:
From the above-contentions of the parties, it is thus obvious that their present controversy merely hinges on the interpretation of the decision of the lower court.
Principally, the parties disagree on whether or not the dispositive portion of the lower court's decision requiring all the defendants to pay the intervenor compensatory damages had been only modified or revoked in toto. It is the contention of the plaintiff that a perusal of the decision of the Supreme Court will clearly disclose that only the defendants Dizons were absolved from the payment of compensatory damages although aside from said defendants Dizons, the decision of the lower court has also ordered Ayala y Cia., Hacienda Calatagan and/or Alfonso Zobel to jointly and severally pay intervenor compensatory damages. Plaintiff concludes therefore, that following the decision of the Supreme Court, the Ayala y Cia., Hacienda Calatagan and/or Alfonso Zobel must now pay intervenor Miguel Tolentino the compensatory damages awarded to him by the lower court.
However, it is the considered opinion of this Court that the interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision cannot be made by a mere mathematical process of subtraction but rather by understanding its rulings which will control in the interpretation of the decision. For instance, it cannot be disputed that the decision by the Supreme Court lays from only three principal things namely: (1) areas found to be portions of the foreshores, beach, or of the navigable river itself are not capable of registration and their inclusion in the certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title on the registrant (2) purchasers who relied on the efficacy of their certificate of title, cannot be considered possessors in bad faith until the legality of their said titles had been finally determined; (3) possessors in good faith cannot be held liable for damages suffered by other parties on account of their possession of the property.
As regards the first ruling, the parties properly understood its application to the case at bar. However, as regards the second and third rulings there is a difference of opinion between the parties. Plaintiffs are of the belief that defendants Ayala y Cia., Hacienda Calatagan and/or Alfonso Zobel has been found to be possessors in bad faith and therefore liable in the payment of damages.
This Court cannot share with this belief of the plaintiff and intervenor. Nowhere in the decision of the Supreme Court is there such a pronouncement. On the contrary, it will be remembered that after the promulgation of the said decision on May 31, 1965 plaintiff and intervenor filed a motion for reconsideration wherein they insisted that all the defendants be declared possessors in bad faith and liable for compensatory damages. They tried to prove by lengthy reference to the findings of the lower court that Ayala y Cia., Hacienda Calatagan and/or Alfonso Zobel are possessors in bad faith. However, said motion for reconsideration was denied by the Supreme Court. Moreover, the Supreme Court, in citing the case of Dizons vs. Rodriguez, et al., in its decision of May 31, 1965, reiterated the principle that holders of certificate of title are considered possessors in good faith until after the legality of their certificate of title had been finally determined. Indeed, to hold Ayala y Cia., Hacienda Calatagan and/or Alfonso Zobel possessors in bad faith and liable for compensatory damages from March 1954 would run counter against the very principles laid down in the repeatedly mentioned decision of the Supreme Court. This is so because these defendants would be paying for the produce of the properties which according to the Supreme Court, their co-defendants Dizons had a perfect right to hold and enjoy, they being possessors in good faith and for value.
WHEREFORE, the writ of execution dated December 27, 1965 is hereby revoked and the notice of garnishment dated January 3, 1966 is ordered lifted.
In the decision of this Court of June 30, 1967, it was held:
The basic facts are not disputed. Respondents seek to justify the orders complained of upon the ground that the dispositive part of our decision in Case G. R. No. L-20950 is rather vague and requires a clarification, because:
... Since defendants Dizons were held not liable for the alleged damages, it follows that the joint and several character of the obligation imposed by this Honorable Court was extinguished, because the other defendants herein will no longer be able to claim from defendants Dizons the share which corresponds to the latter (2nd par. Art. 12l7, Civil Code.)
This contention is absolutely devoid of merit. To begin with, Art. 1217 of our Civil Code, cited by respondents, refers to the effect of payment by one of the solidary debtors. No such payment having been made in the case at bar, said Article is clearly inapplicable thereto. The only provision which respondents might have had in mind (on the assumption that their reference to Art. 1217 was due merely to a misprint) is Art. 1215 of said code, reading:
... Novation, compensation, confusion or remission of the debt, made by any of the solidary creditors or with any solidary debtors, shall extinguish the obligation, without prejudice to the provisions of article 1219.
The creditor who may have executed any of these acts, as well as he who collects the debt, shall be liable to the others for the share in the obligation corresponding to them.
Neither is this Article in point. The aforementioned decision of this Court cannot be regarded as remitting a solidary obligation of the Dizons, because, as possessors in good faith, they were and are entitled by law to retain the property in question, until the indemnity due to them is paid. In other words, they were never under obligation to pay damage to Tolentino, either jointly or solidarity and, hence, there was no solidary obligation on their part that could have been remitted. The decision of the Court of First Instance holding all of the defendants herein jointly and solidarity liable for the payment of said damages, did not create a solidary obligation. It was no more than an attempt to declare the existence of said obligation, which attempt — not the solidary obligation — was frustrated by our decision establishing that such obligation did not and does not exist.
In this connection, it should be noted that the dispositive part of the decision of the lower court, which was the object of the appeal in G.R. L-20950, provided:
WHEREFORE, judgmental is hereby rendered as follows:
(a) Declaring as null and void Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9550 (or Exhibit "24") of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Batangas and other subdivision titles issued in favor of Ayala y Cia and/or Hacienda de Calatagan over the areas outside its private land covered by TCT No. 722, which, including the lots in T-9550 (lots 360, 362, 363 and 182) are hereby reverted to public dominion;
(b) Ordering defendants Antonio Dizon, Lucia Dizon, Adelaida Dizon Reyes, Consolacion Dizon Degollacion, Artemio Dizon, Ruben Dizon, Amorando Dizon, and Zenaida Dizon, to vacate lot 360 in favor of Intervenor Miguel Tolentino;
(c) Ordering all the defendants to jointly and severally pay intervenor Miguel Tolentino compensatory damages in the sum of P3,000.00 a year per hectare of lot 360 from March 11, 1954, until he is placed in lawful possession of the said area;
(d) Restraining and enjoining the defendants from further ownership and possession over lots 360, 362, 363 and 1,82 of Psd-40891; and
(e) Ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay the costs. (CFI-Decision, Civil Case No. 373, June 2, 1962; Defendants' Record on Appeal, pp. 259-260).
This decision was affirmed by us, except as regards subdivision (c) thereof, which should be deemed modified so as to read, in effect, as follows:
(c) Ordering all the defendants, except the Dizon to jointly and severally pay intervenor Miguel Tolentino compensatory damages in the sum of P3,000.00 a year per hectare of lot 360 from March 11, 1954, until he is placed in lawful possession of the said area;
and, except also, insofar as the Dizons have, — pursuant to the decision, as amended — the right of retention therein stated.
It may not be amiss to add that it is the ministerial duty of respondent Judge to order the issuance of the writ of execution of the aforementioned decision, as modified by this Court, even if said respondent entertained the doubts pointed out in the orders complained of.
Respondents' motion for reconsideration of this decision was denied, hence, the three motions now for resolution.
Upon a review of all relevant matters and after mature deliberation, I agree with the majority of the Court in that the basic position of respondents in their second motion for reconsideration and supplemental second motion for reconsideration is well taken and that taking all pertinent circumstances into account and giving due regard to all considerations, both legal and equitable, the decision of this Court of May 31, 1965 in G.R. No. L-20950 may not be construed or understood as holding respondents Ayala y Cia and Alfonso Zobel liable for the damages claimed by petitioner Miguel Tolentino.
To begin with, it cannot be reasonably maintained that to determine the import and extent of the said judgment, only its dispositive part and that of Judge Tengco' of June 2, 1962, both above-quoted may be taken into account. Neither can it be successfully contended that law and jurisprudence rule out entirely the consideration of any portion, of the bodies thereof. With respect, for instance, to the judgment of this Court, it is plainly obvious that nobody would be able to tell how the decision of the lower court has been modified, if the bare words alone of the dispositive portion thereof saying, "Wherefore, thus modified, the decision of the lower court appealed from is hereby affirmed," were to be considered.
Nor is the judgment or dispositive portion of Judge Tengco's decision entirely free from ambiguity as to the very matter in dispute in the present case. For its better understanding and because We have noted that the same has, not been always accurately quoted in the various and voluminous papers in the records, We have carefully examined the original of said decision and We quote the same again as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(a) Declaring as null and void Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9550, (or Exhibit "24") of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Batangas and other subdivision titles issued in favor of Ayala y Cia and/or Hacienda de Calatagan over the areas outside its private land covered by TCT No. 722, which, including the lots in T-9550 (Lots 360, 362, 363 and 182) are hereby reverted to public dominion.
(b) Ordering Defendants Antonino Dizon, Lucia Dizon, Adelaida Dizon Reyes, Consolacion Dizon Degollacion, Artemio Dizon, Ruben Dizon, Amorando Dizon and Zenaida Dizon, to vacate Lot 360 in favor of Intervenor Miguel Tolentino;
(c) Ordering all the defendants to jointly and severally pay Intervenor Miguel Tolentino compensatory damages in the sum of P3,000.00 a year per hectare of Lot 360 from March 11, 1954, until he is placed in lawful possession of the said area;
(d) Restraining and enjoining all the defendants from further acts of ownership and possession over Lots 360, 362, 363 and 182 of Psd-40891; and
(e) Ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay the costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
As can be seen, paragraph (b) clearly refers, because of the mention of their names, to none other but the defendants Antonino, Lucia, Artemio, Ruben, Amorando and Zenaida, all surnamed Dizon and Adelaida Dizon Reyes and Consolacion Dizon Degollacion Paragraphs (c) and (d), on the other hand, do not make reference to any defendant by name but merely says "all the defendants". Examined by itself alone, the said phrase "all the defendants" would admittedly mean all those named as defendants in the complaint, which would necessarily include Ayala y Cia and Alfonso Zobel. Considering, however, that it is in dispute able that Ayala y Cia and Alfonso Zobel could not have been committing any of the lots enumerated, namely Lots 360, 362, 363 and 182 of Psd-40891, at the time of the filing of the complaint, much less when the judgment was rendered, inasmuch as they had already sold the same when this suit was began, and the only ones exclusively exercising such rights then were the Dizons, one is left wondering if Judge Tengco could have had in mind in paragraph, (d) to enjoin also the defendants Ayala y Cia and Alfonso Zobel who could not have been committing the acts, he was ordering to be enjoined.
The argument, therefore, that the phrase "all the defendants" used in paragraph (c) necessarily includes the defendants Ayala y Cia and Alfonso Zobel is untenable. Such contention would make the same phrase "all the defendants" employed in paragraphs (c) and (d) signify differently for each of said paragraphs. That would be absurd. On the other had there would be consistency and uniformity in the use of said phrase, if it were to be understood as referring in both paragraphs only to the defendants Dizons. Indeed, it is more likely that His Honor inadvertently omitted the word "said" between the words "the" and "defendants" in the paragraphs in question, or perhaps, His Honor must have meant to say "all these defendants."
Besides, in paragraph (e), His Honor makes reference only to "the defendants" and not to "all of the defendants". And yet, this is precisely the paragraph that does contemplate all the defendants, the Dizons, Ayala y Cia and Alfonso Zobel, for the simple reason that since all of them have lost, Ayala y Cia and Alfonso Zobel, by virtue of paragraph (a) and the Dizons by virtue of paragraphs (b), (c) and (d), all of them are naturally liable for the costs. It is apparent then that there is looseness in Judge Tengco's language that creates room for uncertainty as to the exact import of the judgment, if read by itself without regard, to the considerations discussed by His Honor. In fact, unless all the paragraphs of said judgment are construed together, having in view the corresponding pronouncements in the body of the decision, they would even appear to be lacking in consistency.
Moreover, the punctuations used by His Honor are seemingly significant. It is to be noted that paragraph (a) ends with a period, whereas the other paragraphs end with semi-colons. His Honor appears to have separated in the judgment the matter of title from those of possession and the exercise of the lights of ownership. Thus, paragraph (a) is concerned exclusively with the question of title and paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) all refer to possession and the commission of the acts of ownership only. This is tantamount to the segregation of the judgment against all the defendants, including Ayala and Zobel, in so far as the nullity of their respective titles is concerned in paragraph (a) from the judgment against the Dizons only in regard to the possession of an acts of ownership over the disputed lands in paragraphs (b), (c) and (d).
At best, therefore, if show it can be argued that the words used in the judgment are in themselves clear and definite, there is no doubt that they suffer from latest ambiguity literally. While ordinarily, the phrase "the defendants" and "all the defendants" are unequivocal and have a readily comprehensible uniform import, yet when examined in the light of the actual facts contemplated in the other portions of the respective paragraphs wherein they are used in this judgment, they cannot possibly convey, as already explained, the same meaning or connotation in all of the said paragraphs.
Accordingly, to be able to do justice and equity to all concerned, there is imperative need to depart in this case from the usual rule confining resort only to the dispositive parts of the decisions concerned. This is justified by precedents1 and even petitioner does not entirely exclude this possibility.2 More, as will be explained anon, the provision of the Constitution of the Philippines regarding the form of judgments constitutes the conclusion and findings of facts and law of the court as integral parts of the judgment, so that the judgment must be in accordance therewith,3 hence it can be said that there is constitutional warrant to examine the other parts of a decision whenever it is necessary to determine the meaning of its dispositive part.
Be that as it may, in the case at bar, it is more important to consider the full length and breadth of the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-20950 than of the appealed decision of the trial court. After all, it is the more authoritative and final one. Since the said judgment modified that of the trial court, the decisive question is, how was said judgment modified?
To answer this question, the following portions of the decision are pertinent.
We have gone over the evidence presented in this case and found no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. It has been established that certain areas originally portions of the navigable water or of the foreshores of the bay were converted into fishponds or sold by defendant company to third persons. There is also no controversy as to the fact that the said defendant was able to effect these sales after it has obtained a certificate of title (TCT No. 722) and prepared a "composite plan" wherein the aforesaid foreshore areas appeared to be parts of Hacienda Calatagan. Defendants-appellants do not deny that there is an excess in area between those delimited as boundaries of the hacienda in TCT No. 722 and the plan prepared by its surveyor. This, however, was justified by claiming that it could have been caused by the system (magnetic survey) used in the preparation of the original titles, and anyway the excess in area (526 hectares, according to defendants) is within the allowable margin given to a magnetic survey.
But even assuming for the sake of argument that this contention is correct, the fact remains that the areas in dispute (those covered by permits issued by the Bureau of Fisheries) were found to be portions of the foreshores, beach, or of the navigable water itself. And, it is an elementary principle of law that said areas not being capable of registration, their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title on the registrant. See G. R. No. L-8654, Dizon, et al. vs. Bayona, et al., April 28, 1956; also L-20300-01 & L-20355-56, Dizon, et al. vs. Rodriguez, etc., et al., April 30, 1965.) In the present case, as the lots covered by TCT No. T-9550, issued in the names of defendants Dizons (and which were purchased by the latter from defendants Ayala y Cia, and/or Alfonso Zobel) were found to be portions of the foreshore or of the territorial waters, the lower court committed no error in rendering judgment against said defendants and ordering the reversion of said properties to the public dominion.
However, as we have ruled in the case of Dizon, et al, vs. Rodriguez, etc., et al., (Said purchasers who relied on the efficacy of their certificate of title, cannot be considered possessors in bad faith until after the legality of their said titles has been finally determined.) there being no showing that defendants Dizons are not purchasers in good faith and for virtue, they have a right to retention of the property until they are reimbursed of the necessary expenses made on the land, which must properly be established and determined. It also follows that as such possessors in good faith, the defendants Dizons cannot also be held liable for damages allegedly suffered by other parties on account of their possession of the property.
In view of the foregoing, the revocation of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction previously issued by the lower court, and the suspension of the delivery of possession of the properties to plaintiff and intervenor Tolentino, were in order.
WHEREFORE, thus modified, the decision of the lower court appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
As can he seen, the lower court's resolution of the question of nullity of the titles of all the defendants was affirmed in toto. With respect to the matters of possession and damages, however, again, it must be said that the above-quoted portions of the decision, by themselves alone, are rather ambiguous. It is said therein that "there being no showing that the Dizons are not purchasers in good faith and for value, they have a right to retention if the property until they are reimbursed of the necessary expenses made on the land." Nothing, however, appears on the face thereof as regards the consequences of the finding of good faith on the part of the Dizons upon the joint and solidary liability of the Ayala y Cia and Alfonso Zobel with the Dizons, which, it is now alleged, the lower court found and declared in its judgment. Likewise, as petitioner himself points out, it is not stated who is supposed to make the required reimbursement to the Dizons. Indeed, unless closely studied and properly understood, the decision of this Court would appear to be vague even incomplete. The truth, however, is that the said decision did set the guide post for the complete comprehension of the modification it has made of the decision of the trial court, irrespective of what meaning might be derived from the latter. This Courts decision definitely says, "as we have ruled in the case of Dizon, et al. vs. Rodriguez et al."4 the Dizon are possessors in good faith, they have the right of retention until reimbursed and they need, not pay any damages. Indeed, these points: (1) who are possessors in good faith in situations like those at bar; and (2) who is supposed to reimburse possessors in good faith like the Dizons, were squarely upon in that decision in the Rodriguez case. These were the holdings of this Court there:
On the matter of possession of plaintiffs-appellants, the ruling of the Court of Appeals must be upheld. There is no showing that plaintiffs are not purchasers in good faith and for value. As such title-holders, they have reason to rely on the indefeasible character of their certificates.
On the issue of good faith of the plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals reasoned out:
The concept of possessors in good faith given in Article 526 of the Civil Code and when said possession loses this character under Art. 528, needs to be reconciled with the doctrine of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title. Such reconciliation can only be achieved by holding that the possessor with a Torrens Title is not aware of any flaw in his Title which invalidates it until his Torrens Title is declared null and void by final judgment of the Courts.
Even if the doctrine of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title were not thus reconciled, the result would be the same, considering the third paragraph of Art. 526 which provides that:
ART. 526. ...
Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith.
The legal question whether plaintiffs-appellants' possession in good faith, under their Torrens Titles acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the case and from the moment their Titles are declared null and void by the Courts, is a difficult one. Even the members of this Court were for a long time divided, two to one, on the answer. It was only after several sessions, where the results of exhaustive researches on both sides were thoroughly discussed, that an undivided Court finally found the answer given in the next preceding paragraph. Hence, even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that the Supreme Court would find that the law is not as We have stated it in the next preceding paragraph and that the plaintiffs-appellant made a mistake in relying thereon, such mistake on a difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith. Hence, their possession in good faith does not lose this character except in the case and from the moments their Torrens Titles are declared null and void by the Courts.
Under the circumstances of the case specially where the subdivision plan was originally approved by the Director of Lands, we are not ready to conclude that the above reasoning of the Court of Appeals on this point is a reversible error. Needless to state, as such occupants in good faith, plaintiffs have the right to the retention of the property until they are reimbursed of the necessary expenses made on the lands.
With respect to the contention of the Republic of the Philippines that the order for the reimbursement by it of such necessary expenses constitutes a judgment against the government in a suit not consented by it, suffice it to say that the Republic, on its own initiative, asked and was permitted to intervene in the case and thereby submitted itself voluntarily for the jurisdiction of the court.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in all respects, without costs.
Thus, it is clear that while the decision in G.R. No. L-20950 does not say so in so many words, the questions posed in the present case were not really left unanswered thereby.ℒαwρhi৷ A closer examination of the said decision reveals that the main issue now before Us was actually resolved therein. It will be noted that in said decision this Court quoted and adopted the reason and holding of the Court of Appeals in its decision then under review regarding the reconciliation between the concept of possessors in good faith under the Civil Code, on the one hand and the doctrine of indefeasibility of a torrens title, on the other. From such holding of the Court of Appeals, adopted by this Court, the inescapable conclusion is that this Court's finding in G.R. No. L-20950 that the Dizons are possessors in good faith, carries with it the lack of bad faith of Ayala y Cia and Alfonso Zobel. In other words, since their Torrens Titles served to shield the Dizons from any stigma of bad faith, the same legal rule must obtain as respects any imputation of bad faith against Ayala y Cia and Zobel. There is no reason why the reliance of the Dizons upon the indefeasibility of their Torrens Titles should vary in its effect from the reliance of Ayala y Cia and Zobel, or, for that matter, of any other person upon theirs. Indeed, the fact that this Court pointedly added to the considerations invoked by the Court of Appeals the observation that the subdivision plan of Ayala y Cia and Zobel was approved by the Bureau of Lands, a circumstance relevant only to the good or bad faith of Ayala y Cia and Zobel but not to that of the Dizons, indicates abudantly that in the mind of this Court there is no disparity between the position of the Dizons and the original title holders, Ayala y Cia and Zobel. In consequence, on the assumption that Ayala y Cia and Zobel were contemplated by Judge Tengco as included in the phrase "all the defendants" in paragraph (c) of his judgment, I hold that the modification of the lower court's decision has the effect of absolving not only the Dizons but also the other defendants, Ayala y Cia and Alfonso Zobel not because of Articles 1217 and 1219 of the Civil Code invoked by said defendant respondents, but for the reason that justice and equity demand that the reference by this Court to the ruling in Dizon vs. Rodriguez, supra, should apply equally to all the defendants who by the common circumstances that they all have Torrens Titles, must be deemed to be similarly situated. In other words, in view of the reference made by this Court to the doctrine of good faith of holders of Torrens Titles in the Rodriguez case, it is inconceivable that the Dizons, on the one hand, and Ayala y Cia. and Zobel, on the other, may be treated differently.
Incidentally, it may be added that decision also resolved, by such reference to and alliance of the decision of the Court of Appeals, the question of who is obliged to make the required reimbursement to the Dizons As a matter of fact, by such reference and, affirmance, that decision also pointed out for what and to whom herein respondent might be held liable, and, definitely, it is not for damages, but for reimbursement of necessary expenses, and not to petitioner, but to the Dizons.
To be sure, it is not clear to me how respondents Ayala y Cia and Zobel can be considered to have been adjudged by Judge Tengco as liable for damages to petitioner Tolentino when there is not one ward in the body of the decision regarding any privity between petitioner and said respondents, not to speak of any finding of fact or conclusion of law therein in reference thereto His Honor held that petitioner Tolentino is entitled to the limits received by the Dizons during the period of their possession subsequent to the filing of Tolentinos application for lease, citing in this respect Petargue vs. Zorilla, 92 Phil. 5,5 but there is complete silence as to the part in said liability whether joint or several, or, merely joint, of the other defendants. As earlier indicated, the Constitution and the Rules of Court require courts of record to state in their decisions "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which (they are) based" (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution; Section 1, Rule 36). The apparent purpose of these provisions, is precisely to insure that judgment have definite bases in fact and in law, so much so that without such conclusions and findings, a decision becomes, if not invalid, at least, subject to return to the lower court so that the judge may make the necessary findings and conclusions. In a case, therefore, as the one before Us, wherein there are several defendants and the findings of fact and conclusions of law made in the decision refer only to some but not to all of the defendants, a judgment therein saying, in the dispositive part, that it is against the defendants, without particularizing any of them, or even if it were expressly against "all" the defendants, is to be deemed a judgment exclusively against the defendants as to whom there are findings and conclusions in the body of the decision and, surely, not against all of them. This, I submit, is the view most consistent with the intent and spirit of the Constitutional mandate, the purpose of which is to avoid arbitrary and unintelligent decisions. The judge may err in his findings and conclusions, that would not affect the validity of his decision; but a judgment without any stated bases in fact and law, in violation of the Constitutional injunction, should never be accorded the status of an enforceable judicial act.
The view I have thus taken of the main question before Us — that is, what exactly is the judgment to be executed by respondent judge — makes it unnecessary for Us to determine what exactly is the intent of Judge Tengco's decision in so far as the liability of the respondents Ayala y Cia and Zobel is concerned. As already explained, I believe that this resolution should be based mainly on the judgment of this Court in G.R. No. L-20950 and the doctrine in Rodriguez it has adopted by express reference, including, of course, what both of these two decisions necessarily imply, without attempting in any way to alter or modify the latter, since admittedly such endeavour is not legally permissible. The cause for the heated and extended debate and sharp differences of opinion during our repeated deliberations on the present motions, regarding the true import and exact sense of the decision of Judge Tengco is thus avoided. In this way, the Court is also relieved from having to pass on any matter of substantive law, particularly, the point as to whether or not these respondents can be held liable for damages to petitioner on the theory that the acquisition by them of their title which incorporated the lands in question was a tortious act even as to said petitioner, inspite of the fact that at the time petitioner came into the picture by filing his application for lease, respondents had already conveyed the said lands to the Dizons, as well as the fact that petitioner knew, when he so applied for lease rights, that respondents had already existing titles over said property and that, therefore, controversy regarding the validity of said titles was inevitable, since petitioner's application was premised, on the other hand, on the assumption that the lands in question are public lands. Parenthetically, in this connection and as additional argument against the merits of petitioner's claim, I seriously doubt the propriety, at least, in equity, of awarding damages to one who, for all practical purposes, has wittingly acquired something that is controversial. In any event, delving into such matters at this stage would amount to somehow reopening the main case, which cannot be legally done anymore.
After this opinion was prepared, Mr. Chief Justice Concepcion and Mr. Justice Teehankee submitted their separate dissenting opinions. It is but fitting that proper respects be paid to said opinions, formidable as they are and displaying once more as they do the industry and sagacity of their authors.
The most important point to be noticed in both dissenting opinions is that the same seem to give more importance to what is submitted in them to be the correct interpretation or construction of the dispositive portion of the decision or of the judgment of Judge Tengco than to the proper understanding of the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-20950. That the meaning attributed by the distinguished dissenters to the judgment of Judge Tengco may have rational basis cannot be denied. The arguments advanced in both dissenting opinions on this point amply demonstrate this. I reiterate, however, that such discussion is not decisive of this case. In fact, whatever discussion there is in this opinion of the true import of the Tengco judgment, the same is not intended to be the ratio decidendi thereof. The only purpose of such discussion is to emphasize that the language of the judgment of Judge Tengco is not as happy and as unequivocal as it should have been, and that there being possible debate as to its exact import, it is justifiable to resort to a construction thereof in the light of the other portions of the whole decision. Stated differently, I hold that it is not imperative, in deciding the present incidents, to indulge in any effort to determine the precise terms of the Tengco decision, considering that the modificatory decision of this Court can itself be adequately understood, independently of what His Honor might have intended to mean, and since, after all, the latter is the one enrolling, the dissection of the Tengco judgment is of very little relevance.
As already stated, I held that because of the reliance by Mr. Justice Barrera in G.R. No. L-20950, on the doctrine in his decision in Dizon vs. Rodriguez, supra, regarding the effect of the issuance of a Torrens title upon the question of the good or bad faith as possessor and/or owner of the land described therein of the person to whom it is issued there can be no way of applying to respondents Ayala and Zobel who were also Torrens title holders like the Dizons, a different yardstick from that applied to the latter. Accordingly, it is but reasonable, if not inevitable, to conclude that upon the authority of the decision of Mr. Justice Barrera in Rodriguez, the position of Ayala and Zobel in their briefs in G.R. No. L-20950 on this point had been upheld. Of course, it can be said that there is no explicit statement to this effect in this Court's decision, but can it not be equally said that such eloquent silence only paralleled by Judge Tengco's not making any express and unambiguous holding as to the supposed liability of the respondents Ayala and Zobel in his decision? In other words, if it is fair to conclude that merely because Judge Tengco made findings of fact from which the illegality of the inclusion of the areas of the sea herein in question within the Ayala title or titles might be deduced it was no longer necessary for him to make any express holding that such inclusive was made by said respondents in bad faith or that they had, thereby committed a tortious act for which they should be liable to petitioner Tolentino, irrespective of whether they had acted in good faith or in bad faith, it should also he logical and reasonable to hold that by merely referring to the ruling in Dizon vs. Rodriguez, supra, to the effect that bad faith can be imputed to the holder of a Torrens title only from the time of the judicial declaration of the nullity of such title, this Court had virtually consider the respondents Ayala and Zobel as not having been in bad faith until their titles were annulled, which was when the decision of this Court was promulgated and after the Dizons were already the ones holding said titles. More specifically, if Judge Tengco's reference to "all the defendants" in the dispositive part of his decision can be understood as including the respondents Ayala and Zobel only because there are findings of fact which would justify such a conclusion, notwithstanding that he has made no express holding as to their liability, much less the nature thereof, why would it be untenable to consider this Court's judgment which says "thus modified" as inclusive of the absolution of the said respondents from any possible liability under the lower court's judgment, since, as above demonstrated, there is ample legal basis for such absolvitory holding? In any event, it is to be noted that nowhere in the dissenting opinions is the position of the majority on this point regarding the import and effect of the ruling in Rodriguez discussed, much less refuted.
The point of res adjudicata discussed in the dissents not escaped my attention. Neither am I overlooking the point of the Chief Justice regarding the dangerous and inimical implications of a ruling that would authorize the revision, amendment or alteration of a final and executory judgment. I want to emphasize that my position in this opinion does not detract a whit from the soundness, authority and binding force of existing doctrines enjoining any such modifications. The public policy of maintaining faith and respect in judicial decisions, which inform said doctrines, is admittedly of the highest order. I am not advocating any departure from them. Nor am I trying to put forth for execution a decision that I believe should have been rather than what it is. All I am doing is to view not the judgment of Judge Tengco but the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-20950, as it is and not as I believe it should have been, and by this opinion, I would like to guide the court a quo as to what, in my honest view, is the true and correct meaning and implications of the decision, of this Court, not that of Judge Tengco's.
True, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Teehankee, the respondents Ayala and Zobel did raise the issue of what is the import of Judge Tengco's decision in their brief in G.R. No. L-20950, but it is entirely a different matter to say that Mr. Justice Barrera's decision overruled the contention of respondents in respect thereto. Precisely, that is the issue in this case, and for the reasons set forth above, it is my considered view that, on the contrary, they were upheld, at least impliedly, hence the point of res adjudicata would seem to have no invulnerable basis here.
In conclusion, I hold that respondent Judge acted in accordance with law and sound discretion in issuing the order complained of. Herein respondent judge's ruling which, in effect, held that respondents Ayala y Cia. and Alfonso Zobel have not been adjudged by this Court liable for damages allegedly suffered by petitioner is correct, hence, the latter has no right to, an execution in the sense prayed for by him. I vote to grant respondents' motion for reconsideration and to deny petitioner Tolentino's motion.
Footnotes
1 Villones vs. Nable, et al., 85 Phil. 43; Siari Valley Estates Inc. vs. Lucasan, et al., 102 Phil. 390; De Ralla vs. Director of Lands, 83 Phil., 491.
2 Par 14, pp. 6-7, Petition in this case quoted earlier.
3 Sec. 12, Art. VIII, Constitution of the Philippines; Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. I, pp. 510-511.
4 G. R. Nos. L-20300-01 & L-20455-56, supra. These cases involve exactly similar circumstances as the present case, except that the Dizons were the ones who initiated the judicial action to confirm their possession of the lands therein in question.
5 It is not true that the ruling in the case of Petargue vs. Zorilla supra, is to the effect that an applicant for lease of a public land is entitled to juridical possession thereof from the date he files his application and that, therefore, he may recover damages from the one in actual possession of the land applied for until such possession is surrendered to him (We do not believe that such is the sense of that decision. Indeed, such interpretation of the ruling in that case does not appear sound and is pregnant with fearful possibilities of opportunies and graft. It is essentially inequitable. More accurately, what this Court held was this:
"1. PUBLIC LANDS; JURISDICTION OF COURT THEREON; FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER Courts have jurisdiction to entertain an action of forcible entry instituted by a bona fide applicant of public land, who is in occupation and peaceful possession thereof and who has introduced improvements, against one who deprives him of the possession thereof before award and pending investigation of the application."
Surely, this ruling does not imply that if an applicant is not in possession, he is entitled to damages from the time he files his application up to the date he actually secures possession of the land applied for.
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