G.R. No. L-32546, October 17, 1970,
♦ Decision,
Makasiar, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion,
Reyes, Acting [CJ]
♦ Concurring Opinion,
Makalintal, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion,
Castro, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion,
Fernando, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion,
Barredo, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion,
Teehankee, [J]
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32546 October 17, 1970
ANACLETO D. BADOY, JR., petitioner,
vs.
JAIME N. FERRER, Chairman, CESAR MIRAFLOR, and LINO M. PATAJO, Members, Commission on Elections, respondents.
G.R. No. L-32551 October 17, 1970
ANACLETO D. BADOY, JR., petitioner,
vs.
JAIME N. FERRER, Chairman, CESAR MIRAFLOR, and LINO M. PATAJO, MEMBERS, Commission on Elections, respondents.
Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr. in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., dissenting:
I find it difficult to agree with the Court's holding that the provision in question is a reasonable restraint of the freedom of the press guaranteed by the Constitution. Indeed, touching as it does on the right of a candidate in an election to campaign for his own victory, I regard this provision more repugnant to the Constitution than those I have heretofore voted to strike down as unconstitutional in the cases of Gonzales v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-27833, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA 835, and Imbong v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-32432, September 11, 1970.
In the Gonzales case, I expressed my position in regard to legislations of the nature of the one now before Us this wise:.
... Lest I be misunderstood, however, as being an ultra-activist, it should be clear at the outset that in holding that the above prohibitions contained in the statute in question are violative of the Constitution, my stand is limited to my fundamental conviction that the freedoms of speech, of the press and of peaceful assembly and redress of grievances are absolute when they are being exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed. I hold neither candle nor brier for licentious speech and press, but I recognize no power that can pre-censor much less forbid, any speech or writing, and any peaceful assembly and petition for the redress of grievances, the purpose of which is no more than to express one's belief regarding the qualifications or lack of them, the merits and the demerits of persons who are candidates for public office or of political parties vying for power, as well as the principles and programs of government and public service they advocate, to the end that when voting time comes the right of suffrage may be intelligently and knowingly, even if not always wisely, exercised. ... (27 SCRA 835, 924)
Withal, since the election herein involved is that of delegates to the constitutional convention called to amend the existing Constitution, the more it is imperative that all the rights of all candidates and voters should be unrestricted and unimpaired. We should decry the apparent lack of interest exhibited by our people in past plebiscites held in connection with proposed constitutional amendments, as attested by the comparatively low percentage of voters who have taken part therein, for in a matter of such grave importance as the amendment of the fundamental law, it is naturally better that the stamp of approval or disapproval should be sufficiently reflective of the will of the greatest number possible. Surely, the provision here disputed, does not improve the situation. Rather it gives more reason for people to shy away from the coming elections because it has increased the difficulties of the means of communication between the candidates and the electorate.
I recognize the necessity of keeping electoral campaign practice within bounds that will insure the true expression of the popular will and generally, as I have manifested in past opinions, to Congress should be conceded the choice of the means that should be adopted towards that end. It is contended that it is the purpose of the enactment in question to equalize, as much as possible, the availability of the press, meaning newspapers, magazines and other publications to all candidates as a means of campaigning, so that the rich candidates may not have undue advantage over the poor candidates in the use of paid advertisements.
Without committing myself as to the validity of such attempt at compulsory equality for all candidates, I do not believe in imposing upon the rich candidates more restrictions on their liberties, just because they are rich which is not a sin, than the limitation of their expenses and those on their behalf to not more than P32,000.00. Even if this limitation is in itself a little questionable, considering its inadequacy due to the high costs of everything at present, I am ready to yield in respect thereto, since it seems that a one-year-salary limitation has been with us for such a long time already and may be considered as already sanctioned and accepted by all to be more or less reasonable from the point of view of its proportion to the emoluments of the office at stake. I cannot agree, however, that beyond this, the candidates who can afford should be placed under other restrictions with respect to the way they will spend the P32,000.00. Worse, under the provision in question, a candidate is not only restrained and regulated in the expenditure of his P32,000.00 by merely limiting the kind of advertisement or publication he may make on behalf of his candidacy. Under the said provision, he is also compelled to include in his propaganda, with equal prominence as his own, the names of all his opponents. In other words, there is an element of odious compulsion in this provision, for it makes it unlawful and punishable with imprisonment and other accessory penalties, the failure of a candidate to spend his own money to advertise with equal prominence the candidacy of his adversaries whenever he advertises his own candidacy. It is perhaps not far beyond reasonableness to restrict the advertisements of a candidate in the interest of remedying an evil Congress may recognize, but it is to me clearly unreasonable, nay unjust and oppressive, to compel a candidate not only to give quarters to his adversary, but to practically help the latter by giving his name equal prominence as his own. It must be borne in mind that the primary objective of a candidate in an election is to win over his opponents and to require him, under pain of suffering imprisonment and/or other penalties, to spend his own money in order precisely that his opponents may be publicized with equal prominence as himself is, to my mind, an intolerable infringement of one's freedom to pursue a legitimate objective by ordinarily lawful means.
Going to another consequence of the enactment in question, it is a matter of public knowledge that there are hardly any paid advertisements or publications of candidates in the newspapers. (We need not mention unpaid ones because one has to depend on the generosity of the publishers for these.) It is indeed understandable that candidates should hesitate or refuse to submit themselves to the imposition of the law. The result is that there is dearth of information regarding the candidates among the electors. This is bad. As I see it, the application of the disputed provision is producing a greater evil than the one purportedly being remedied. In this connection, I would like to reiterate what I said in the Gonzales case:.
... I like to reiterate over and over, for it seems this is the fundamental point others miss that genuine democracy thrives only where the power and the right of the people to elect the men to whom they would entrust the privilege to run the affairs of the state exist. In the language of the declaration of principles of our Constitution, "The Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." (Section 1, Article 11) Translating this declaration into actuality, the Philippines is a republic because and solely because the people in it can be governed only by officials whom they themselves have placed in office by their votes. And it is on this cornerstone that I hold it to be self-evident that when the freedoms of speech, press and peaceful assembly and redress of grievances are being exercised in relation to suffrage or as a means to enjoy the inalienable right of the qualified citizen to vote, they are absolute and timeless. If our democracy and republicanism are to be worthwhile, the conduct of public affairs by our officials must be allowed to suffer incessant and unabating scrutiny favorable or unfavorable, everyday and at all times. Every holder of power in our government must be ready to undergo exposure any moment of the day or night, from January to December every year, as it is only in this way that he can rightfully gain the confidence of the people. I have no patience for those who would regard public dissection of the establishment as an attribute to be indulged by the people only at certain periods of time. I consider the freedoms of speech, press and peaceful assembly and redress of grievances, when exercised in the name of suffrage, as the very means by which the right itself to vote can only be properly enjoyed. It stands to reason, therefore, that suffrage itself would be next to useless if these liberties cannot be untrammelled whether as to degree or time.
I cannot help but feel apprehensive that with the restrictions and imposition laid down by Republic Act 6132, the constitutional convention in which many pin their hopes for the betterment of this country may not be as representative of the true will of the majority of our people. It is my considered view that what We really need is not curtailment of the rights of the candidates and voters but, on the contrary, more freedom for all of then, in order that there may be the maximum of information regarding the qualifications and issues of the candidates. Only then can We hope to have better results in our elections. Again, I would like to reiterate the views I expressed in this regard in the Gonzales case:.
My brethren view the problem before, Us as one calling for the reconciliation of two values in our chosen way of life — individual freedom, on the one hand, and public welfare, on the other. I do not see it that way. To my mind, if the freedoms of speech, press, peaceful assembly and redress of grievances in regard to the right to vote can be impinged, if not stifled, by standards and limitations fixed by those who are temporarily in power, I would regard those freedoms as no freedoms at all, but mere concessions of the establishment which can be reduced or enlarged as its convenience may dictate. Of what use can such kind of freedom be?
Taking all circumstances into account, it is entirely beyond my comprehension, how anyone could have conceived the idea of limiting the period of electoral campaigns in this country, when what we need precisely is more intelligent voting by the greater portion of our people. I do not believe our mass media have reached the degree of efficiency in the dissemination of information needed to enable the voters to make their choices conscientiously and with adequate knowledge of the bases of their decisions. I am not convinced that at this stage of our national life we are already prepared to enjoy the luxury of abbreviated electoral campaigns, unless we are inclined to forever have with us the areas of political bossism, apparent statistical improbabilities and politico-economic blocs and even politico-religious control which we have in varying degrees these days and which will naturally continue as long as our people are not better informed about the individual worth of the, candidates for or against whom they vote. I dare say that there is enough reason to hold that if mistakes have been committed by our people in the selection of their elective officials, it is because the information needed to serve as basis for intelligent voting have not fully reached all segments of the population. Inadequacy of reliable information among the voters, regarding the qualification of the candidates and the relevant circumstances of the election they are taking part in can be the greatest bane of popular suffrage.
ℒαwρhi৷
I do not find anything objectionable in the portion of the provision which would enable all candidates to take advantage of what is called Comelec space. I believe this is a step in the right direction. As to the rest, however, of Section 12(F) of Republic Act 6132, the provision in dispute, for the reasons stated above, I vote to declare the same unconstitutional.
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