G.R. No. 278353 - Separate Concurring Opinion

G.R. No. 278353, July 25, 2025,
♦ Decision, Leonen, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Hernando, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Inting, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Zalameda, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Gaerlan, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Lopez, [J]

SARA Z. DUTERTE, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY FERDINAND MARTIN G. ROMUALDEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REGINALDO S. VELASCO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, RESPONDENTS.

ATTY. ISRAELITO P. TORREON, ATTY. MARTIN DELGRA III, ATTY. JAMES T. RESERVA, ATTY. HILLARY OLGA M. RESERV A, J. MELCHOR QUITAIN, JR., LUNA MARIA DOMINIQUE S. ACOSTA, BAI HUNDRA CASSANDRA DOMINIQUE N. ADVINCULA, AL RYAN S. ALEJANDRE, DANTE L. APOSTOL, SR., CONRADO C. BALURAN, JESSICA M. BONGUYAN, LOUIE JOHN J. BONGUYAN, PILAR C. BRAGA, JONARD C. DAYAP, EDGAR P. IBUYAN, JR., RICHLYN N. JUSTOL-BAGUILOD, MYRNA G. DALODO-ORTIZ, DIOSDADO ANGELO JUsNIOR R. MAHIPUS, BONZ ANDRE A. MILITAR, ALBERTO T. UNGAB, TRISHA ANN J. VILLAFUERTE, LORENZO BENJAMIN D. VILLAFUERTE, JESUS JOSEPH P. ZOZOBRADO III, DARWIN G. SALCEDO, RODOLFO MANDE, KRISTINE MAY JOHN ABDUL MERCADO, LORD OLIVER RAYMUND MONFERO CRISTOBAL, AND LORD BYRON MONFERO CRISTOBAL, PETITIONERS,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HOUSE SPEAKER FERDINAND MARTIN G. ROMUALDEZ AND SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO, RESPONDENTS.

At the outset, it is imperative to state that the verba legis rule must be observed in constitutional interpretation. That is, the words in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.1 No law, however, can account for all possible permutations of a situation. The interstices, or the gaps in the law, are bridged by Our decisions which set precedent. This is how courts participate in the formulation of laws. Even, as We weave through the interstices, new developments force Us to rethink, and reexamine whether Our previous solutions remain, relevant.

When, this Court issued its rulings in Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives2 (Francisco) and Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice3 (Gutierrez), We formulated, a definition of "initiation" to prevent the first impeachment complaint filed, before the House of Representatives from immediately qualifying as the bar to forestall any other impeachment complaint. An initiated impeachment complaint required the conjunction of the filing of a complaint and the referral of such complaint to the Committee on Justice. We assumed that future events would run their usual course; We did not foresee a situation where the operation of the one-year bar would be triggered, effectively preventing a first impeachment complaint from finishing these required steps.

As We are confronted with a different set of facts, We find that a rigid application of Our previous pronouncements do not facilitate the intended purposes of the one-year bar; which are to prevent undue or too frequent harassment and to allow Congress to accomplish its principal task of legislation. As the rulings stand, there is nothing to prevent this gap from being exploited. One may conceivably rely on the current interpretations of initiation and a subsequent ministerial, referral, to instigate the filing of a clearly detective impeachment complaint to put the one-year bar into effect. We find Ourselves at the interstices once again to seek solutions to mend this gap. It is realized that a ministerial referral produces the same result as a first-to-file initiation. They both leave the act of initiation to the complainants and ignore the constitutional mandate that the House of Representatives has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

Thus, We are called to examine the Constitution's provisions and this Court's relevant pronouncements on the impeachment process and their impact on the factual situation before Us.

The referral of the fourth impeachment complain to the Senate terminated the first three impeachment complaints and effectively prevented their initiation

Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution provides the necessary guidelines in the conduct of impeachment proceedings.

All paragraphs in Article XI, Section 3 use the word "shall." The word "shall" connotes a mandatory order or an imperative obligation—pointing to a command that must be given a compulsory meaning.4 The use of the modal verb "shall" in Article XI, Section 3(2) and (3) signifies a command, to the House of Representatives to perform and accomplish certain acts within a specified period:

The Constitution clearly intended the House of Representatives to act on a verified impeachment complaint within a given period. It expressly provided the number of session days when a specific act must be done or accomplished. Out of the five enumerated steps above, case law tells us that steps one and two should be accomplished together to qualify as an initiation of an impeachment complaint. However, Our previous rulings failed, to account or the possibility of inaction which renders impossible the accomplishment of step two.

In December 2024, there were three impeachment complaints filed against Vice President Sara Duterte (VP Duterte) under the mode provided, in Section 3(2). Despite the multiple filings, there is no evidence in the records to suggest that the House of Representatives completed its constitutional duties. The House secretary general only referred the three impeachment complains to the House speaker on the tenth session day. The eventual adjournment of the session effectively prevented the other steps, i.e., referral to the proper committee, and submission of a committee report and resolution for consideration of the plenary.

The House of Representatives found itself in a situation wherein it could, no longer validly act on the three impeachment complaints after February 5, 2025.5 The ponencia illustrated the effect of the concept of a session day to show that February 5, 2025 was the tenth session day for the inclusion of the three impeachment complaints in the Order of Business.6

On the same date as the transmittal of the three impeachment, complains to the Houses Speaker, members of the House of Representatives attended a caucus to sign another impeachment complaint. A total of 215 out of its 306 members, exceeding the constitutional requirement of 1/3 of the Members of the House of Representatives, signed the fourth impeachment complaint. The fourth impeachment complaint against VP Duterte was filed under the mode in Section 3 (4).

All four impeachment, complaints were read in the Additional Reference of Business on February 3, 2025,7 but only the fourth impeachment complaint was endorsed to the Senate.8 The first three impeachment complaints were immediately transmitted to the Archives.9 The transmittal of the fourth impeachment complaint to the Senate was used by the House of Representatives to justify the archival of the first three impeachment complaints.10 At this point, any action on the first three impeachment complaints would already be beyond the constitutionally mandated 10 session days for inclusion in the Order of Business.11

Francisco has determined that "initiation" takes place by "the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House."12 In defining "to initiate," Francisco also distinguished "impeachment case" from "impeachment proceeding," thus:

Under the Francisco definition of initiation, the first three impeachment complaints filed under Section 3(2) have not been initiated because there was no referral to the House Committee on Justice. As the first three impeachment complaints did not initiate any impeachment case, the fourth impeachment complaint was not placed under the one-year bar. It is the fourth impeachment complaint filed under Section 3(4) that initiated the impeachment proceedings.

The ponencia took Francisco's determination of initiation further. It ruled that the inaction of the House of Representatives in the 19th Congress led to the effective termination of the three impeachment complaints, and commenced the running of the one-year bar.14

I concur with the ponencia's refinement of Francisco's determination, of initiation. As a result, I likewise agree with the ponencia's conclusion that the termination of the three impeachment complaints barred the fourth impeachment complaint, and the Senate did not acquire jurisdiction to constitute itself into an impeachment court.

The House of Representatives has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment

We now seek to find a balance between, the House of Representative's exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment and the seeming ministerial referral to the Committee on Justice after an impeachment complaint has been included in the Order of Business.

The Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House of Representatives during the 19th Congress (House Impeachment Rules) provide the procedure of initiating a complaint as follows:

A footnote in Section 2 explains that the Supreme Court decision in Francisco states that impeachment proceedings are initiated upon filing of the complaint and/or resolution and its referral to the Committee on Justice.

The House Impeachment Rules echoes the Constitution in its ministerial duty to refer the matter to the speaker and, subsequently, to the Committee on Justice. As mentioned above, this practice detracts from Article XI, Section 3(1), which grants the House of Representatives exclusive power to impeach.

In line with its sui generis character, the House of Representatives has the authority to facially examine, for sufficiency in form, and substance, any impeachment complaint included in its Order of Business prior to the referral, of said complaint to the Committee on Justice. This facial examination may be done by the Committee on Rules or by a sub-committee created for this specific purpose, consistent with power of the House of Representatives to promulgate its own rules. A decision for or against referral may be subsequently voted by the plenary. This intermediate step retains the House of Representatives' discretion to initiate and prevents any automatic operation of the one-year bar. It is also consistent with the Rules of the House of Representatives on Precedence of Motions.15

Since only the House of Representatives has the "exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment," the same body should also have the discretion to decide whether a defective impeachment complaint should be referred to the Committee on Justice. When the Constitution stated "which shall be included in the Order of Business within 10 session days, and referred, to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter," it was only imposing a period within which the plenary must make an initial decision on an impeachment complaint. If the plenary determined that the impeachment complaint is, on its face, insufficient in form, and substance, then the House of Representatives should not be obligated to refer it to the Committee on Justice and trigger the one-year bar.

It cannot be emphasized, enough that if We accept the propositions that once an impeachment complaint is filed with the secretary general of the House of Representatives and that such should be automatically referred to the Committee on Justice, then the power to initiate the impeachment proceedings rests on the complainant. Viewing referral as a ministerial duty removes the power to initiate from the House of Representatives. To be sure, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to allow the House of Representatives to make an initial determination regarding an impeachment complaint's sufficiency before being referred to the Committee on Justice:

MR. DAVIDE: Under the impeachment rules of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, an impeachment charge may be filed by a Member of the Batasan either by a verified complaint or an ordinary resolution, and must forthwith be calendared within three session days from its filing. It would not even require a certification by the Speaker as to its correctness in form. But in the matter now of a complaint filed by an ordinary citizen, would it be immediately calendared also, or shall it pass the Speaker for him to determine the correctness in form of the complaint?

MR. ROMULO: We leave that to the procedures of the House.16 (Emphasis supplied)

The foregoing clearly shows that referral to the Committee on Justice is not ministerial on the part of the House of Representatives. Indeed, it is allowed to make an initial determination of an impeachment complaint's sufficiency in form before referring the same to the Committee on Justice, pursuant to the House's exclusive power to initiate impeachment proceedings and promulgate its own rules on impeachment.

To rule otherwise would weaponize the filing of utterly baseless impeachment complaints for the sole purpose of triggering the one-year bar and prevent the filing of legitimate ones. This is precisely why the framers of the 1987 Constitution allowed the House of Representatives to set up a filtering mechanism against baseless impeachment complaints and inoculate the people against the political machinations of a few savvy ones.

Multiple impeachment complaints may be validly referred to the Committee on Justice at the same time. A simultaneous referral is counted as only one initiation. This was Our ruling in Gutierrez, where We also underscored the importance of the one-year bar:

Gutierrez identified this period before the impeachment complaint's inclusion in. the Order of Business as one of deliberation, with the House using its discretion to decide whether to make the proper referral. In the current situation, one may take the unpopular perspective that: the 'House of Representatives' seeming inaction on the first three impeachment complaints served as a mantle of protection to VP Duterte and saved her from the burden of having to answer allegations against her more than once. With the limitation set by Francisco's definition of initiation and the undersigned's proposal, it is no longer conceivable that an impeachable official's time and energy may be fully occupied by answering baseless complaints. Similarly, the House of Representatives is allowed, to carve out space to predetermine worthy complaints and to conduct its principal business of legislation.