G.R. No. 278353 - Concurring Opinion

G.R. No. 278353, July 25, 2025,
♦ Decision, Leonen, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Hernando, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Inting, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Zalameda, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Gaerlan, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Lopez, [J]

SARA Z. DUTERTE, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY FERDINAND MARTIN G. ROMUALDEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REGINALDO S. VELASCO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, RESPONDENTS.

ATTY. ISRAELITO P. TORREON, ATTY. MARTIN DELGRA III, ATTY. JAMES T. RESERVA, ATTY. HILLARY OLGA M. RESERV A, J. MELCHOR QUITAIN, JR., LUNA MARIA DOMINIQUE S. ACOSTA, BAI HUNDRA CASSANDRA DOMINIQUE N. ADVINCULA, AL RYAN S. ALEJANDRE, DANTE L. APOSTOL, SR., CONRADO C. BALURAN, JESSICA M. BONGUYAN, LOUIE JOHN J. BONGUYAN, PILAR C. BRAGA, JONARD C. DAYAP, EDGAR P. IBUYAN, JR., RICHLYN N. JUSTOL-BAGUILOD, MYRNA G. DALODO-ORTIZ, DIOSDADO ANGELO JUsNIOR R. MAHIPUS, BONZ ANDRE A. MILITAR, ALBERTO T. UNGAB, TRISHA ANN J. VILLAFUERTE, LORENZO BENJAMIN D. VILLAFUERTE, JESUS JOSEPH P. ZOZOBRADO III, DARWIN G. SALCEDO, RODOLFO MANDE, KRISTINE MAY JOHN ABDUL MERCADO, LORD OLIVER RAYMUND MONFERO CRISTOBAL, AND LORD BYRON MONFERO CRISTOBAL, PETITIONERS,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HOUSE SPEAKER FERDINAND MARTIN G. ROMUALDEZ AND SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO, RESPONDENTS.

The importance of impeachment as a tool of accountability cannot be overstated. As Prof. Edward Corwin, a leading expositor of the United States Constitution (from where our constitutional provisions on impeachment were lifted), puts it, "impeachment is the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of democracy."1 Impeachment is a device that maintains the true essence of a representative government.2

The 1987 Philippine Constitution states that "[t]he Philippines is a democratic and republican State; Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them."3 Impeachment embodies this declaration by questioning the legitimacy of the impeached public officer in the light of his/her alleged misconduct in office.4 The process will determine whether or not the governed (or the people), through their representatives (the Senators), would still allow the impeached public officer to remain in office.5 This is the reason why the impeachment trial is lodged in the Senate and not in the Supreme Court.

Impeachment plays a vital role in the checks and balances of the three branches of the government. It is the mechanism by which the Legislature may check the Executive and the Judiciary. Nevertheless, as powerful as it is, impeachment does not rob and should not rob impeachable public officers of their rights. Public officers do not lose their rights as citizens when they assume public office. The principle that no person shall be deprived of their life, liberty, or property except by 'the law of the land,' or its synonym, 'due process of law' is older than written constitutions.6

In this regard, I concur with the eloquent ponencia of Senior Associate Justice Marvic Leonen that impeachment is not a purely political proceeding and that the Bill of Rights, especially the due process clause, applies to the entire impeachment process.7 Considering that Vice President Sara Duterte's (VP Sara) right to due process was violated, the fourth Articles of Impeachment transmitted to the Senate is indeed null and void.

In Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice,8 (Gutierrez), the Court declared that, "[i]ndubitably, an impeachment is not a judicial proceeding, but rather a political exercise."9 This sentiment is maintained in Rep. of the Phils. v. Sereno10 and Re: Letter of Mrs. Corona Requesting Grant of Retirement/Benefits to the Late Former C.J. Corona and Her Claim Under [Republic Act] No. 9946.11 The ponencia now abandons this view. The ponencia rules that impeachment is not solely a political process. It is a sui generis constitutional process, that is, primarily legal but with political characteristics.12

I agree. It is further my humble submission that impeachment is "quasi-judicial and quasi-political."13 It is political, on the one hand, because the right to accuse is exclusively given to the House of Representatives (HOR), and the right to try and decide is given to the Senate and not to the Supreme Court.14 On the other hand, it is judicial because the Senate, acting as the impeachment court, would determine the guilt or innocence of the accused, and the senators are required to be under oath or affirmation.15

Consequently, the judicial aspect of impeachment partakes a penal nature; that is, impeachment is akin to a criminal proceeding.16 Article XI, Section 3(6) and (7) of the 1987 Constitution use the word "convicted," which is ordinarily associated with a criminal case.17 Three of the grounds for impeachment are well-defined criminal offenses such as treason, bribery, and graft and corruption.18 The penalty for impeachment also carries with it perpetual disqualification from any office in the government—a punishment provided under the Revised Penal Code.19 The stigma of being convicted in a criminal proceeding arising from a common crime obtains in an impeachment trial. Not only is the position of the impeached public officer at stake, but also their reputation and the possibility of future employment in the government. As then Senator Mirriam Defensor-Santiago quipped, "conviction on impeachment is a stunning penalty, the ruin of a life."20

Significantly, the framers of the 1987 Constitution see impeachment as essentially a political act; albeit, with a procedure analogous to a criminal proceeding. The exchange of Mr. Maambong and Mr. Romulo during the 1986 Constitutional Convention is instructive, thus:

From the foregoing, it is clear that the Philippine concept of impeachment involves a commixture of political and judicial components.23

The ponencia is groundbreaking as it addresses categorically, for the first time, the issue of whether the due process clause of the Constitution applies to impeachment proceedings.

Gutierrez is the first case where the respondent in an impeachment proceeding raised a violation of her right to due process. Former Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez (OMB Gutierrez) filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court, primarily questioning the constitutionality of the simultaneous referral of the HOR of two impeachment complaints filed against her to the Committee on Justice. "She anchored her claim on the alleged violation of the one-year bar rule and the due process clause of the 1987 Constitution."24

OMB Gutierrez alleged that the proceeding before the Committee on Justice headed by then Representative Niel Tupas, Jr. (Rep. Tupas) was tainted with partiality and haste, thus effectively depriving her of a proceeding before an impartial tribunal. She narrated that Rep. Tupas was the subject of an investigation she was conducting, while his father had been charged by her under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. In addition, she maintained that she was denied due process by the delay in the publication of the Impeachment Rules. The said Rules was published only after a day that the Committee on Justice ruled that the impeachment complaints filed against her were sufficient in substance.25

The Court tacitly acknowledged OMB Merceditas' right to due process when it did not shy away from resolving her claim of denial of the right. It found OMB Gutierrez's allegations of "bias and vindictiveness as bereft of merit,"26 just as it also rebuffed her contention regarding the need for publication of the House Impeachment Rules. The Court explained that unlike in inquiries in aid of legislation wherein the 1987 Constitution explicitly requires the publication of its rules, the rules on impeachment need only to be "promulgated" and "when the Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific method of promulgation," the court itself is in no position to take a specific mode.27

Subsequently in Chief Justice Corona v. Senate of the Philippines,28 former Chief Justice C. Renato Corona (CJ Corona) filed a Petition for Certiorari and prohibition before the Court, claiming that his right to due process was being violated during the impeachment proceedings as certain Senator-Judges had lost the cold neutrality of impartial judges. However, during the pendency of the case, the impeachment trial ended with the conviction of CJ Corona.(awÞhi( Thus, the Court no longer resolved the due process issue and dismissed the petition on the ground of mootness.

The present case marks the third time that violation of due process rights is alleged in an impeachment case. Petitioners argue that VP Sara was not given prior notice, and other members of the House were deliberately excluded. They also questioned whether members of the House were required to determine the sufficiency in form and substance of the impeachment complaint or the existence of probable cause before signing.29 Respondents denied violation of VP Sara's due process right. They asserted that petitioners' arguments are misplaced as impeachment does not implicate life, liberty, or property, as public office is not a vested right. VP Sara would also be given an opportunity to respond to the charges against her before the Senate sitting as an impeachment court.30

The ponencia found that the right to due process of VP Sara was violated. It held that the HOR is mistaken in believing that the verification and signature of at least one-third of its members are sufficient to meet due process of law. It underscored that due process applies to all stages of the impeachment process.31 The impeachment proceeding would be scrutinized based on the HOR's compliance with procedural due process, which includes notice and hearing, an impartial tribunal, and a decision supported by facts and evidence.32

The ponencia is correct. It is high time for the Court to make a clear ruling on the applicability of due process in impeachment proceedings, as well as what constitutes the same.

To my mind, the very nature of due process as a fundamental right speaks in favor of its application in impeachment proceedings. First, due process of law is not only guaranteed by the Philippine Constitutions but also by international instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which the Philippines is a signatory. The UDHR provides that "no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."33 The ICCPR conveys that, ". . . everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law."34

Second, the right to due process antedates any written constitution in the world and is considered an "inalienable right of every man and woman that cannot be brushed aside either in time of peace or in time of war."35

Third, public office may be considered as a property right in a limited sense in the context of security of tenure. Hence, the right to due process could rightfully be invoked.36

Fourth, the framers of the 1987 Constitution contemplated that due process of law shall be observed in impeachment proceedings, thus:

Corollary, it is apparent from the foregoing that the framers of the Constitution gave leeway to the HOR and the Senate to formulate their own rules for impeachment. Hence, the Constitution provides that "[t]he Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section."38 However, in creating their respective rules, the two chambers of the Congress are expected to ensure that the right to due process of the public officer is observed.

As pointed out in the ponencia, Article XI, Section 3(2) and (3) of the Constitution, constituting the first mode of impeachment, and Rule II of the House Rules on Impeachment of the 19th Congress (House Rules) provide a comprehensive procedure39 observing procedural process. The provision reads:

I observe that the House Rules is silent as to the procedural due process in place when the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the HOR. Nevertheless, as the ponencia suggests, at the very least, the HOR should have given the respondent, VP Sara in this case, a copy of the draft Articles of Impeachment and its accompanying evidence and an opportunity to respond thereto within a reasonable period. Thereafter, the draft articles of impeachment, its accompanying evidence, and the comment of respondent should be made available to all the members of the HOR. There should be some moment of deliberation allowing each member to be heard. After the foregoing, the draft impeachment would be transmitted to the Senate upon the vote of one-third of the members of the HOR.40

Here, as admitted by the HOR in their Compliance before the Court, VP Sara was not given the opportunity to be heard in relation to the fourth Articles of Impeachment transmitted to the Senate. The HOR posits that neither the Constitution nor the House Rules imposes any requirement of prior opportunity to be heard: (1) before Members constituting at least one-third of the HOR may file a verified complaint for impeachment; or (2) before transmitting to the Senate the Articles of Impeachment filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the HOR.41

At the risk of repetition, the fundamental right to due process applies in all proceedings. Impeachment is not an exception. Due process of law does not distinguish between a private citizen and a public servant. If in disciplinary actions against non-impeachable/ordinary public officers, due process is guaranteed, the more reason that it should be applied in the case of impeachable public officers who occupy positions of greater responsibility in the government.

Whatever the kind of proceedings may be, the violation of the constitutional right to due process, substantive or procedural, would render the entire proceedings null and void. Thus, the Court opined that:

The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation of a party's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right to due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. This rule is equally true in quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings, for the constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process is unqualified by the type of proceedings (whether judicial or administrative) where he stands to lose the same.42 (Emphasis supplied)

In fine, due to the HOR's violation of VP Sara's right to due process, the fourth Articles of Impeachment is null and void. The Senate, sitting as an Impeachment Court, has no jurisdiction over the transmitted Articles of Impeachment.