G.R. No. 259520 - Separate Concurring Opinion

G.R.No. 259520, November 5,2024,
♦ Concurring Opinion, Gesmundo, [CJ]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Zalameda, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Singh, [J]

I agree with the ruling in the ponencia that Maria Lina P. Quirit-Figarido (Maria Lina) lacks legal capacity to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Edwin L. Figarido (Edwin). The conclusion stems from the fact that Maria Lina and Edwin knowingly contracted a bigamous marriage. Hence, Maria Lina is neither an "aggrieved" or "injured" spouse, nor is she an innocent spouse.

This ruling is anchored primarily on A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," as well as the cases of Juliano-Llave v. Republic1 (Juliano-Llave) and Fujiki vs. Marinay (Fujiki),2 which purport to clarify the application of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.[]3 (Emphasis supplied)

Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2 (a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife" — it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.4 (Emphasis in the original.)

To further anchor its ruling, the ponencia refers to the Rationale for the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders (Rationale for the Rules), which states that an action for the declaration of nullity of a void marriage may be filed solely by the "aggrieved or injured spouse."

Given that the Rationale for the Rules is the only explicit basis cited for appending the restrictive terms of "aggrieved" and "injured" to the spouse that possesses legal standing and again, which terms do not appear in the actual text of Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it is worth reviewing the cases that discuss its application.

The case of Enrico v. Heirs of Spouses Medinaceli (Enrico)5 provides a quotation from the pertinent portion of the Rationale for the Rules:

The case of Enrico cited the Rationale for the Rules in a situation where the heirs of the first marriage assailed the subsequent marriage of Eulogio (who was deceased at the time of the case) and Lolita, for allegedly having been entered into without a marriage license, which would render it void.

There, the Court held that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied, as the marriage between Eulogio and Lolita had been celebrated under the Family Code. It must be emphasized that the Rationale for the Rules was relevant in Enrico as it specifically provided that the compulsory or intestate heirs may not file a petition for declaration for nullity of marriage. Thus, the heirs were precluded from filing an action for declaration of nullity of marriage, as clearly explained in the Rationale for the Rules. In any case, as pointed out in Enrico, the Rule alone is sufficient, it being clear and unambiguous that only "the husband or the wife" may file the petition.

Enrico, and the same passage from the Rationale for the Rules, were then cited in Juliano-Llave.7 In Juliano-Llave, the wife of former Senator Tamano, Zorayda, filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of the marriage between Tamano and Estrellita on the ground that it was bigamous. One of the contentions of Estrellita was that Zorayda had no legal standing because "only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage."8 The Court referred to and quoted the same passage from the Rationale for the Rules (citing Enrico) as support for the following statements:

It should be noted, at this point, that the pronouncements of Fujiki on this issue clearly constitute obiter dicta. Fujiki categorically states that "[t]he Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country."11 The situation just described is precisely the very situation that was before the Court in Fujiki.

Regardless of the characterization of the statements in Fujiki as obiter, the statements in Juliano-Llave are admittedly on point with the current case.

It cannot be overemphasized that the actual text of Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not include the terms "aggrieved" or "injured." These restrictive terms appear only in the Rationale for the Rules. It was only in Juliano-Llave that the Court expounded on the terms "aggrieved" and "injured," and held that the interpretation that "only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage" does not apply if the ground is bigamy. As for Fujiki, as stated earlier, it should be considered obiter dicta as regards the pertinent issue despite its attempts to bolster and in fact further restrict the rule enunciated in Juliano-Llave.

Not only is the text of Section 2(a) of A.M.(awÞhi( No. 02-11-10-SC already clear on its face, referring to a husband or a wife, but the Rationale for the Rules purports to add the restrictive terms of "aggrieved" or "injured" without defining the same. As such, the ruling in Juliano-Llave was forced to carve out a jurisprudential exception in cases of bigamy based on its own interpretation.

It is submitted, therefore, that the more reasonable and equitable interpretation is that in cases where a marriage is sought to be declared void on the grounds of bigamy, legal standing to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage includes the innocent spouse in the bigamous marriage and the spouse in the prior and subsisting marriage. Such a rule would preserve the spirit of Juliano-Llave's reasoning, without precluding, perhaps unfairly, an innocent spouse in a bigamous marriage from seeking to correct their civil status. This interpretation is also consistent with the ruling in Juliano-Llave. To recall, while that case granted standing to the prior spouse, it did not rule that the spouses of the bigamous marriage lacked standing to file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, not least because such a ruling would be obiter.

Further, the statement in Fujiki that attempts to rule explicitly that "the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law," which can be viewed as an even more restrictive interpretation than that propounded in Juliano-Llave, is, without certainty, devoid of precedential value.

It is true, of course, that Article 40 of the Family Code provides that "[t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." It is not clear, however, that there was a legislative intent to, in cases of bigamy, restrict standing to seek such final judgment to the aggrieved spouse of the valid prior marriage only, and to the exclusion of the innocent spouse in the bigamous marriage, in the manner that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does (as seemingly explained by the Rationale for the Rules, and, in turn, as clarified by Juliano-Llave and doubled down on by Fujiki).

Concededly, the facts of the present case state that Maria Lina knew that her marital status with Ho Kar Wai posed an obstacle to her relationship with Edwin.12 Hence, Maria Lina is not an innocent spouse and is ineligible to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. As Edwin is also a guilty spouse, and Ho Kar Wai has already divorced Maria Lina, there exists no spouse with legal capacity to file the petition. The Petition was, therefore, correctly denied.

I submit, therefore, that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC should be amended to better reflect and crystallize the rule that the ponencia seeks to lay down categorically. Precisely, I respectfully propose that the aggrieved or injured spouse of the prior subsisting marriage or the innocent spouse in a bigamous marriage may file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. This would appear to be a more elegant solution to address why Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC so clearly reads one way, but the Rationale for the Rules, as laboriously clarified by jurisprudence, requires that it be read differently in cases of bigamy.

For, as stated in Enrico, "[w]hen the language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is required."13 As procedural rules are explicitly within the Court's domain, it would be a service to the public to render the language of the rule clear, so that no explanation, by way of carving out labored jurisprudential exceptions, is required.