G.R. No. 252739 - Dissenting Opinion

G.R. No. 252739, April 16, 2024,
♦ Decision, Hernando, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Leonen, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Inting, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Lopez, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Singh, [J]

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 252739, April 16, 2024 ]

XXX,1 PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DISSENTING OPINION

LOPEZ, M., J.:

The majority upheld the conviction of XXX for psychological violence committed against his wife. The majority ratiocinated that "in instances of marital infidelity, the requirement of specific criminal intent to cause mental and emotional suffering is already satisfied at the moment the perpetrator commits the act of marital infidelity."2 Moreover, the majority concluded that the law "looks at the effects of a certain act or omission against a woman or their child, rather than the motive of the offender."3

I dissent.

The betrayal between husband and wife is anathema to the sanctity of marriage and the moral values of the family. The act of engaging in extramarital sexual affairs is punishable as adultery and concubinage under certain circumstances. The marital infidelity of the husband may also constitute psychological violence if intentionally adopted to cause mental or emotional anguish and public ridicule or humiliation against his wife and children. This opinion examines the anatomy of the crime of "psychological violence resulting from marital infidelity" and applies the totality of circumstances approach to determine the criminal liability of the accused.

For proper reference, there is a need to revisit the facts of the case.

In 1999, Spouses XXX and AAA got married and resided in ███████. They were blessed with a son.4 XXX rented a condominium unit in ███████ because he often had to work out of town and would come home to ███████ during weekends and holidays.5 In 2015, XXX transferred to another condominium unit with his son who was about to start his college education. On July 16, 2016, AAA was informed by her co-worker that a certain EEE sent her messages and photographs through social media showing that their family car was parked in another house where XXX was allegedly keeping his mistress. Intrigued AAA connected directly with EEE who replied "Alam mo ba na ang asawa mo ay may asawa dito? May kinakasamang babae dito? Na may anak pa sila na four years old? lalaki." AAA inquired about the address and EEE answered "Dito sa ███████." At that time, AAA was with XXX but she could not stop crying because of her husband's marital infidelity. XXX asked what was wrong but AAA just requested him to accompany her to the church for mass.6

On July 19, 2016, AAA requested her mother and family friend BBB to seek assistance from the barangay to locate the address that EEE gave. After finding the place, AAA saw their family car parked outside a house. AAA and BBB knocked and a helper opened the gate. BBB asked for the owner of the vehicle and pretended that it was blocking the driveway. YYY went out minutes later. Thereafter, AAA grabbed YYY and shouted "Ilabas mo yung asawa ko." YYY was shocked while AAA repeatedly demanded XXX to come out. BBB and AAA's mother proceeded inside the house and warned XXX that they would report him to his office. XXX then came out and AAA slapped him on the face. XXX tried to calm AAA and pleaded "Ma, wag dito! Nakakahiya!" However, AAA rebuked XXX and retorted that he had no respect for their relationship. A police mobile later arrived and pacified the commotion. A little boy also ran towards XXX and called him "Daddy." At that instance, A.AA confirmed that XXX and YYY have a child together. Dismayed, AAA remarked to XXX "May anak ka talaga ano?" The police officers then escorted XXX and AAA to the barangay. Thereat, XXX admitted to AAA that he is the father of YYY's child.7 Meanwhile, BBB returned to YYY's house to get her car. BBB asked YYY how long she and her child had been staying in the area to which she responded "hindi pa naman katagalan." YYY also told BBB that she knew that XXX had a wife. Subsequently, AAA expressed to XXX her hopes to save their marriage but their relationship became irreconcilable after the incident.8

Accordingly, XXX was charged with violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004, for psychological violence resulting from marital infidelity before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) docketed as Criminal Case No. R-MKT-17-00580-CR:9

On July 19, 2016[,] or prior thereto, in ███████, the Philippines, accused, being the husband of complainant [AAA], did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kept a mistress, thereby causing upon complainant mental and emotional anguish, in violation of the aforesaid law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.10 (Emphasis supplied)

XXX denied the accusation and claimed that he met YYY sometime in 2011 when they had a one-night stand. After six months, YYY informed XXX that she was pregnant. XXX first saw his child with YYY the day after she gave birth. XXX acknowledged the paternity of the child and signed the birth certificate. YYY explained to XXX that she would understand if he would be unable to support their child because of his economic situation. Also, XXX had to ask permission from YYY for available dates to see their child. XXX next visited the child three months after he was born, and he only got to see the child three to four times a year. On these occasions, XXX met the child at malls and restaurants because YYY seldom allowed him to visit their house. XXX clarified that he was at YYY's house on July 19, 2016 only to see his child. Additionally, XXX also pointed out that he is not paying the rent of YYY's house and that he has no capacity to maintain a mistress. He is earning a meager salary of PHP 14,000.00 a month which he used to pay for the utilities of the condominium where he and his son with AAA were staying. As supporting evidence, XXX submitted his certificate of employment and bill payments for the condominium utilities.11

On November 17, 2017, the RTC convicted XXX of psychological violence and ruled that he caused mental and emotional anguish upon AAA by keeping YYY as his mistress. The RTC held that the prosecution proved the existence of an extramarital affair when XXX signed the birth certificate of his child with YYY. XXX admitted siring the child after having an intimate encounter with YYY. The RTC noted the testimony of BBB to whom YYY confessed her relationship with XXX and the statement of the barangay desk officer that XXX has no more interest in salvaging his relationship with AAA. The RTC observed that XXX was wearing his undershirt, denim pants, and slippers when he came out of YYY's house. This raised suspicion on the claim that XXX visited the child only three to four times a year since he would not be that comfortable with a woman he was intimate with for just one night:12

The prosecution has sufficiently established the existence of an extramarital affair, as seen from the birth certificate of accused's child with [YYY] where the former affixed his signature as recognition of filiation. Accused himself admitted to siring the child after having an intimate encounter with [YYY].

Apart from the affair, the testimony of the barangay desk officer affirmed that accused was no longer interested in his marriage to complainant, and even suggested that they live separately while the latter was willing to exert efforts into salvaging their relationship. The desk officer attested to the complainant's emotional state during the confrontation at the barangay hall, as she was present when the parties tried to talk things over.

The testimony of private complainant's family friend, meanwhile, had the opportunity to talk to [YYY], the alleged mistress, who admitted that she and accused have been in a relationship for a considerable period of time.

. . . .

Based on the Court's observation of private complainant's behavior and manner of testifying, the anguish can readily be seen during her narration of the events that transpired and the emotion shown by complainant could not have resulted in an exaggeration of her feelings, considering that accused himself admitted to committing marital infidelity that resulted in the birth of his child with [YYY].

. . . .

While he denies giving support to [YYY] or their child, accused's admission of siring a child with a woman other than his wife was enough to establish the cause of private complainant's distress.

Accused denials of the existence of any present romantic relationship between him and [YYY] cannot be given credence as the same is self-serving testimony, uncorroborated by any other evidence. The fact that he was comfortable enough to wear his undershirt and slippers at the time of the confrontation arouses suspicion as to his claim that he only got to visit the child three to four times a year, at the whim of [YYY]. Logic dictates that one would not be too cozy with a woman he was intimate with for only one night and who would only let him inside the house on rare occasions.

. . . .

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused [XXX] is found GUILTY of the charge of violation of Republic Act No. 9262, Section 5(i) and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for two (2) years, four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

In addition to imprisonment, accused [XXX] is ORDERED to (a) pay a fine in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS ([PHP] 100,000.00); and (b) undergo mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and report compliance to the Court, as set forth in the last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9262.

SO ORDERED.13 (Emphasis supplied)

Dissatisfied, XXX elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) docketed as CA G.R. CR No. 40938.14 On November 8, 2019, the CA affirmed the RTC's finding that XXX is guilty of psychological violence committed against his wife:15

It should be emphasized that the offense alleged in the Information dated 29 December 2016 is appellant's act of "causing upon complainant mental and emotional anguish", while the allegation that he "kept a mistress" merely constitutes the mode of commission of the offense under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262.

Thus, appellant's argument that "[t]here was no showing that[,] at any time between their one-time sexual encounter in 2011 and the incident on 19 July 2016[,] appellant held, maintained, supported, or took care [of] [YYY] as his mistress" merits no consideration, as the element of the offense which needs to be proved is the fact that appellant caused private complainant mental and emotional anguish, and there is no requirement that appellant must have held, maintained, supported, or took care of the putative mistress in order to be liable for inflicting psychological violence on private complainant.

As the RTC pointed out in the assailed Decision, "the anguish of private complainant was apparent during her emotional breakdown while narrating the circumstances that led ... to the confrontation between her and [appellant] on July 19, 2016", and "[s]he was hurt by the confirmation of her suspicions that [appellant] had been unfaithful during their marriage and that he disregarded her effort to keep their family together."

. . . .

The appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 17 November 2017 rendered by Branch 144 of the Regional Trial Court, ████████████████ in Crim. Case No. R-MKT-17-00580-CR is AFFIRMED in toto.

IT IS SO ORDERED.16

XXX sought reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this Petition17 for Review on Certiorari. XXX argues that the prosecution merely established that the July 19, 2016 incident actually transpired and that he has a lovechild with YYY. Yet, these are insufficient to prove that XXX kept a mistress to intentionally cause psychological violence against his wife AAA. XXX insists that he and YYY only had a one-night sexual encounter. There is no proof beyond reasonable doubt that XXX maintained an illicit affair with YYY. The CA and the RTC reversibly erred in concluding that XXX's admission of siring a child with another woman was enough to cause psychological distress on the part of his wife.18 In contrast, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), maintains that the prosecution established all the elements of psychological violence. The marital infidelity of XXX is the proximate cause of AAA's mental and emotional anguish.19

XXX must be acquitted. The corpus delicti for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 or psychological violence resulting from marital infidelity was not fully established.

The constellation of criminal law has long divided crimes into mala in se or acts wrong in themselves, and mala prohibita or acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them. This distinction is important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is done. The rule is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether the law was violated. A common misconception is that all mala in se crimes are found in the Revised Penal Code (RPC), while all mala prohibita crimes are provided by special penal laws. However, there may be mala in se crimes under special laws,20 and mala prohibita crimes defined in the RPC.21 The Court explained that the proper approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes is the determination of the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act. If the punishable act or omission is immoral in itself, then it is a crime mala in se; on the contrary, if it is not immoral in itself, but there is a statute prohibiting its commission by reasons of public policy, then it is mala prohibita.22 Applying this approach, it is clear that violence, regardless of form and means, is inherently depraved and immoral. Hence, psychological violence under Republic Act No. 9262 is a crime mala in se that requires proof of the accused's criminal intent.

Similarly, criminal law is not solely subjective but complementarily objective. The proof of corpus delicti is indispensable in the prosecution of crimes.23 The term corpus delicti refers to the body or substance of the crime, or the fact of its commission.24 It consists of the criminal act and the accused's agency in the commission of the act. In other words, corpus delicti primarily describes the act (objective) and the agent (subjective) in relation to the actus reus and the mens rea of a crirne. Actus reus pertains to the external or overt acts or omissions included in a crime's definition while mens rea refers to the accused's guilty state of mind of criminal intent. The mens rea which is subjective must conform with the actus reus which is objective. The confluence of these elements requires a direct causal relationship to sustain the crime committed. The formula is "corpus delicti = actus reus + mens rea." Particularly, the comprehensive anatomy of actus reus can be summarized as: "actus reus = act/omission + circumstances + results/consequences."25 Corollary, the actus reus of Republic Act No. 9262's penal provisions may be analyzed using this framework as follows:

Republic Act No. 9262's Actus Reus =

Acts/Omissions
(Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9262) + Circumstances
(Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9262) + Results/Consequences
(Section 3 in relation to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9262)

Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9262 refers to the specific acts of violence committed against women and children:

Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.—The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;

(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;

(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;

(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or to desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:

(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody or access to her/his family;

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support;

(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;

(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity or controlling the victim's own money or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common money, or properties;

(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions;

(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation directed against the woman or her child or her/his immediate family;

(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:

(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;

(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;

(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his will;

(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child; and

(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9262 illustrates the different forms of violence and enumerates the circumstances surrounding the criminal acts. Section 3 likewise necessitates that the commission of the specific acts results in violence, whether physical, sexual, psychological, or economic suffering,

Section 3. Definition of Terms.—As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. (Emphasis supplied)

In relation to Section 3, the provisions of Section 6 impose the penalties according to the crime committed, thus:

Section 6. Penalties.—The crime of violence against women and their children, under Section 5 hereof shall be punished according to the following rules:

(a) Acts falling under Section 5(a) constituting attempted, frustrated or consummated parricide or murder or homicide shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. If these acts resulted in mutilation, it shall be punishable in accordance with the Revised Penal Code; those constituting serious physical injuries shall have the penalty of prision mayor; those constituting less serious physical injuries shall be punished by prision correccional; and those constituting slight physical injuries shall be punished by arresto mayor.

Acts falling under Section 5(b) shall be punished by imprisonment of two (2) degrees lower than the prescribed penalty for the consummated crime as specified in the preceding paragraph but shall in no case be lower than arresto mayor.

(b) Acts falling under Section 5(c) and 5(d) shall be punished by arresto mayor;

(c) Acts falling under Section 5(e) shall be punished by prision correccional;

(d) Acts falling under Section 5(f) shall be punished by arresto mayor;

(e) Acts falling under Section 5(g) shall be punished by prision mayor;

(f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished by prision mayor.

If the acts arc committed while the woman or child is pregnant or committed in the presence of her child, the penalty to be applied shall be the maximum period of penalty prescribed in the section.

In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the amount of not less than One hundred thousand pesos ([PHP] 100,000.00) but not more than Three hundred thousand pesos ([PHP] 300,000.00); (b) undergo mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to the court.

Anent the "mens rea" of the crime, a distinction must be made between general intent and specific intent. General criminal intent pertains to the dolo required under Article 426 of the RPC or the accused's purpose to do an act prohibited by law regardless of the result. On the other hand, specific criminal intent refers to the particular intent comprising the definition of the crime. In this regard, the specific intent of the crime of violence against women and children must be framed to the actual purposes mentioned in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9262.

In this case, XXX was charged with violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 or psychological violence resulting from marital infidelity when he "unlawfully and feloniously kept a mistress, thereby causing upon complainant mental and emotional anguish." The Court enumerated the elements of psychological violence under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262:27

(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;

(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and

(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children or similar such acts or omissions.28 (Emphasis supplied)

The first and second elements refer to the "circumstances" described in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9262. The third and fourth elements pertain to the specific "acts" that the accused committed corresponding to those enumerated in Section 5 of the law. Also, the third element evinces the mens rea, which is the specific intent to cause "mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation" resulting from the infliction of some form of violence to the woman or her child. A violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 requires a causal connection between the actus reus and the mens rea. Otherwise, no crime of violence against a woman or her children under this provision is committed. As regards the actus reus, the surrounding "circumstances" that the offended party is a woman and that the accused and the victim are husband and wife were undisputed. However, the evidence of the prosecution fell short of proving the specific "act," "results/consequences," and "mens rea" constituting the crime.

Verily, what Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 criminalizes is not marital infidelity per se but psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering. Differently stated, it is violence inflicted under such circumstances that the statute seeks to outlaw. Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the various acts by which psychological violence may be committed. Moreover, depending on the circumstances of the spouses and for a myriad of reasons, the illicit relationship may or may not even be causing mental or emotional anguish to the wife.29 As Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen pointed out in his Opinion, not all forms of pain and suffering experienced in intimate relationships automatically translate to psychological abuse. SAJ Leonen emphasized that courts must exercise a certain level of judicial restraint to decide whether the facts presented constitute marital infidelity as psychological violence. This is because not all kinds of suffering within the context of intimate relationships should be considered psychological violence. Marital infidelity should be punished under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 only when used as a coercive tactic to dominate, manipulate, or intimidate the other partner thereby maintaining the power imbalance between the couple.

More importantly, Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 must not focus only on the consequences of marital infidelity. In the doctrinal case of Acharon v. People,30 the Court En Banc held that "[f]rom the plain meaning of the words used, the act punished by Section 5(i) is, therefore, dolo in nature — there must be o concurrence between intent, freedom, and intelligence, in order to consummate the crime." The Court in Acharon unanimously voted to acquit the accused for failure of the prosecution to prove his intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish upon his wife. As such, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to show that the accused performed these acts or omissions with the willful intent to cause the victim psychological suffering. Also, it is outright judicial legislation to consider psychological violence as malum prohibitum and delete the specific intent necessary to complete the corpus delicti which is indispensable in the prosecution of crimes.31 Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa aptly discussed in his Opinion the legal consequences and practical situations if marital infidelity per se would be penalized as psychological violence. Justice Caguioa expounded that the intent necessary to give rise to criminal liability is expressed in Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262—"to cause mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child." The Court cannot correct, expand, or supplant by reading into the law what is not written therein—nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Otherwise, the nature, duration, and extent of "marital infidelity" will effectively be up to the private complainant. It would be the height of incongruence for the Court to say that a penal provision would have different constitutive elements depending on the circumstances.

Indeed, the ponencia maintains an inconsistent position that marital infidelity is a form of psychological violence with the qualification that it must result in mental or emotional anguish. This makes the application of the law more subjective and equivocal. The majority even started with an erroneous premise that "marital infidelity is inherently immoral and depraved under prevailing societal, cultural, and religious norms."32 This is not entirely true and accurate. Notably, the Philippines is one of the few countries that still considers marital infidelity as a criminal offense. The legislative proposals to decriminalize adultery and concubinage acknowledged that they constitute matrimonial offenses that violate the marriage contract, hence, the liability should only be civil in nature. The existing laws that penalize marital infidelity invade the rights of consenting adults to their privacy and amount to excessive State interference in the private lives of its citizens.33 In many foreign jurisdictions, the crime of marital infidelity has been abolished or declared unconstitutional for infringing the rights to privacy and sexual selfdetermination, equal protection guarantees, and human rights treaties.34 A similar approach will usher the Court into a period of renaissance and conscious reawakening that marital infidelity, unless intentionally employed as an instrument of violence, is a private concern between two consenting adults and does not involve a breach of security and peace of the people at large.

The ponencia becomes more ambivalent in trying to make a comparison between marital infidelity and the crimes of homicide and murder.35 It is not correct that specific intent to kill is "conclusively" presumed from the fact of the victim's death. Rather, the fact of death raises only a "disputable" presumption since the killing may be a product of culpa or a negligent act. Furthermore, killing is inherently wrong, unlike marital infidelity which is morally wrong. Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting in his Opinion likewise made an inappropriate analogy between psychologic.al violence resulting from marital infidelity and Article 68 of the Family Code on the obligations of the husband and wife.36 Suffice it to say that psychological violence is a crime while a breach of marital obligations is only civil in nature. I also do not subscribe to the theory of Associate Justices Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, Jhosep Y. Lopez, and Maria Filomena D. Singh that Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 must focus only on the consequences of marital infidelity and that the "vantage point must lie from the eyes of those the law seeks to protect, never from the eyes of those we protect them from or against."37 As explained in the framework of the anatomy of crimes, the "results/consequences"are merely an aspect of actus reus along with "acts/omissions" and "circumstances." The mens rea or criminal intent is indispensable to compose the corpus delicti.

Hence, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to show that the accused performed the acts or omissions with the willful intent to cause the victim psychological suffering. Otherwise, the crime will be completely subjective entirely dependent on the allegations and personal feelings of the private complainant. This is precisely why this Opinion dissected the corpus delicti of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262—to save the courts from a blanket ruling that marital infidelity is equivalent to violence against women and children. To punish marital infidelity per se as violence against women and children effectively discriminates against married men and constitutes a transgression of the equal protection clause. The distinction between married and unmarried men is not germane to the purpose of Republic Act No. 9262, which is to protect all women in intimate relationships, marriage or otherwise, from violence by their male partners. The realities of this world reveal that marital infidelity may be committed by both men and women. The effects of marital infidelity do not impact only the wives but also the husbands. Incompatible with the majority's hypothesis, if the situation is reversed, the aggrieved husbands cannot possibly "exact the full measure of retribution" since the wives who committed marital infidelity may only be guilty of adultery under our present state of laws. There is no parallel legislation like Republic Act No. 9262 where abused husbands may find succor although men are likewise not immune from mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule, or humiliation.

It is likewise false for the ponencia to state that specific criminal intent to cause psychological violence is "virtually impossible to ascertain, being purely a mental process that may be easily modified at a person's whim."38 Criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts lest the courts speculate about the determination of the accused to commit the crime. Thus, the Court must consider the entire factual setting surrounding each case of marital infidelity to determine the evil intent to cause psychological violence which refers to the means employed by the perpetrator, and the mental or emotional anguish which pertains to the effect caused or the damage sustained by the offended party. In other words, marital infidelity must be purposely adopted to cause psychological violence upon the wife and her children.

In Araza v. People,39 the Court convicted therein petitioner of psychological violence after he left his wife and maintained an illicit affair with another woman. Petitioner intentionally left his wife groping in the dark without any explanation or mature conversation causing her emotional and psychological distress.40 Moreover, the wife narrated how she received information about petitioner's affair with his paramour that led to the filing of the complaint for concubinage. Despite the complaint being settled, petitioner resumed the affair with his paramour. Petitioner also admitted that he was fully aware that his wife experienced emotional and psychological suffering because of his decision.41 In Reyes v. People,42 therein petitioner was charged by his wife with the crime of bigamy when he cohabited and married another woman who bore him four children.43 Thereafter, petitioner stopped supporting his wife who got sick with various illnesses such as hypertension, cardio-vascular disease, diabetes, and osteoarthritis. The Court held that petitioner committed psychological violence against his wife when he suddenly stopped giving her financial support which caused her to suffer emotional and mental anguish.44 Petitioner's denial of financial support is designed to subjugate and control his wife, either to pressure her to withdraw the bigamy case or dissuade her from pursuing it, or at least, to discourage her from filing additional cases against him.45

In Villalon v. People,46 the Court affirmed the guilt of therein petitioner for psychological violence through repeated verbal abuse against his wife and public display of marital infidelity. Petitioner and his wife would always argue about his illicit affair with another woman and would hurl invectives at her saying "ang bobo mo naman, hindi ka marunong umintindi." Petitioner admitted to his in-laws that he was having an affair with another woman but promised to end it and focus his attention on his family. However, this did not happen as petitioner ended up abandoning his family. Later, petitioner and his wife reconciled and assured her that he already left his mistress. Yet, petitioner and his wife quarreled on the same issues as before and he would say hurtful words to her such as "gago," "maarte," "tanga," "bobo," "hindi marunong umintindi," "mukhang pera," " mandarambong ang pamilya," "putang-ina," and "walang laman ang utak." Eventually, petitioner left his wife and returned to his mistress. He then posted on social media his intimate relationship with his mistress as shown in pictures of them embracing each other and in their exchange of sweet messages.47

In XXX[243049] v. People,48 therein petitioner had been romantically involved with another woman and had a child with her despite being married for about 17 years to his wife. He even gave allowances to his mistress. The marital infidelity of petitioner has spawned a series of fights that left his wife emotionally wounded. From then on, petitioner and his wife never lived under the same roof again.49 Thereafter, petitioner texted his wife threatening her "tama ayaw ko [makipag]-away sau gay sira na buhay ko wag mo pilitin idamay ko kau wala akong takot sira na ulo ko baka di ko makontrol kung ano magawa ko sa inyo.(awÞhi(" The wife feared for her life and the safety of her minor children resulting in the filing of the criminal case against petitioner.50 The Court affirmed the rulings of the CA and the RTC that the prosecution duly established the fact of petitioner's infidelity as psychological abuse inflicted upon his wife who suffered mental arid emotional anguish.51

In XXX[241390] v. People,52 therein petitioner drove his wife away from their house and brought his mistress into the conjugal home to live with his children. Furthermore, the mental anguish suffered by the wife was compounded by public ridicule and humiliation because of news and gossip about the philandering ways of her husband.53 Lastly, in XXX[250219] v. People,54 the prosecution established therein petitioner's marital infidelity, cohabitation with his paramour who even bore him a child, and abandonment of his wife and child who suffered psychological trauma and deep hurt because her father had another family and loved another woman other than her mother.

In the above cases, the Court convicted the husbands not because of marital infidelity per se but based on their evil intent and the psychological trauma and deep hurt that their wives suffered due to the illicit relationship. The marital infidelity of the husband was coupled with other significant factors ranging from the abandonment of the family and cohabitation with the paramour in another place, eviction of the wife and children from the family home, deprivation of financial support, keeping a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, repeated verbal abuse and threats against the wife and her children, resumption of the affair with the paramour, and public display of marital infidelity. These attendant circumstances proved that the husband purposely caused psychological violence upon his wife. However, the factual milieus in those cases are far different from XXX's case. The prosecution miserably failed to establish with proof beyond reasonable doubt the accusations that XXX kept a mistress and that he intentionally caused mental or emotional anguish to his wife.

First, XXX did not abandon AAA and their son. XXX and his son are living in a condominium unit in Manila and would go home to his wife during weekends and holidays because his employment requires him to work out of town. XXX remains present for his family. He attends to the needs of his son and pays for their utility bills and expenses. He has never forsaken his family or deprived them of financial and emotional support. Second, XXX's act of signing the birth certificate of his lovechild is not proof that he maintained an illicit relationship with YYY. At most, this is part of XXX's commitment to acknowledge the paternity of the child upon learning that YYY was pregnant. XXX regrets his mistake but still chooses to be a father to his child with YYY. He kept this a secret but for a good reason. Further, he even endured the pain of not seeing his child with YYY who controlled and limited the number and time of his visits. At any rate, the stigma of illegitimate filiation of a child must never be construed and weaponized as evidence of a crime. Illegitimate children are only collateral victims purely irrelevant to the misdeeds of their parents. After all, it is neither the fault of the children nor their choice to be illegitimate. The Court must be keenly sensitive to protect the children, both legitimate and illegitimate, from the unfortunate consequences of the infidelities of their parents.

Third, the prosecution did not present EEE, who allegedly informed AAA that XXX was keeping a mistress, as a witness. There is also nothing in the testimony of BBB where YYY supposedly confessed her extramarital affair with XXX. Apparently, BBB only asked YYY how long she and her child had been staying in the area to which she responded "hindi pa naman katagalan. "In any event, the account of BBB is hearsay because the original declarant YYY was neither placed under oath or affirmation nor subjected to cross-examination. It was BBB who conveyed to the trial court the incriminatory statements that YYY allegedly made. Hearsay testimony is devoid of probative value. It is an immemorial rule that witnesses can testify only as to their own personal perception or knowledge of the actual facts or events. Their testimony cannot be proof as to the truth of what they learned or heard from others.55 The admission of hearsay evidence in a criminal case would be tantamount to a violation of the rights of the accused:

We have held that in criminal cases, the admission of hearsay evidence would be a violation of the constitutional provision that the accused shall enjoy the right to confront the witnesses testifying against him and to cross-examine them. A conviction based alone on proof that violates the constitutional right of an accused is a nullity and the court that rendered it acted without jurisdiction in its rendition. Such a judgment cannot be given any effect whatsoever especially on the liberty of an individual.56 (Emphasis supplied)

Fourth, the RTC's extrapolation about XXX's outfit in relation to the commission of the crime is speculative. The RTC cannot conveniently rely on the sole observation that XXX was wearing comfortable clothes to prove that he is cohabiting with YYY. The sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is without rudder or compass.57 Distrust and suspicion, no matter how strong, should not be permitted to sway judgment.58 Fifth, it bears emphasis that infidelity per se is not a crime under Republic Act No. 9262 unless the husband deliberately used it to cause psychological violence to his wife and children. It must be clarified that this doesn't refer to sheer unfaithfulness but to deceitful and false-hearted infidelity purposely employed to cause psychological violence. Lastly, the filing of the criminal complaint is a mere afterthought when XXX and AAA's marital relationship becomes irreconcilable. Taken together, there is reasonable doubt whether XXX's actions caused mental or emotional anguish and public ridicule or humiliation to his wife. These circumstances also negate XXX's intent to cause his wife psychological violence.

To end, I would like to highlight the ponencia's statement that "not all instances of extramarital relationships inflict mental or emotional suffering to the other spouse."59 This reasoning is highly self-contradictory and incompatible with the thrust of the majority that marital infidelity is a form of psychological violence. Paradoxically, the majority's deduction validly supports the proposition that there must be a direct causal connection between the marital infidelity of the husband (actus reus) and the criminal intent to cause psychological violence upon the wife (mens rea). The ponencia cited "estranged relations" and "consciously consenting spouses" as specific situations where marital infidelity will not result in psychological violence. To further the discourse, I propose that the following factors must likewise be considered in future cases involving psychological violence such as the length and reason for the separation of the parties, mutual guilt or the fact that the victim was already in another relationship, the pardon, acquiescence, condonation on the part of the victim and/or reconciliation and compromise agreement between the spouses, civility between the parties, and the motive for filing the complaint, i.e. revenge or hate. These circumstances that negate evil intent to cause psychological violence or create reasonable doubt about whether the complained acts caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule, or humiliation should be taken liberally in favor of the accused.

Marital infidelity may have transpired during a period when the husband and wife have accepted the hopeless and dysfunctional dynamics of their relationship. The spouses may have decided to move forward and accept the fate of their defunct marriage. Circumstances showing that the victim did not suffer psychological distress as a result of the infidelity should be taken strongly against the criminal charge. No less than the liberty of the accused is at stake. While often challenging and viewed with strict scrutiny by the ardent crusaders of key social legislations, the Court's commitment to liberty follows the dictates of the Constitution. The Court must always endeavor to bridge the meaning of the libertarian tenets with the realities of our time consistent with the State policy to address violence committed against women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution. The Court must prevent spouses from using the law to compel their partners to remain in a loveless marriage or to punish them in cases of failed expectations and lost hopes. Either scenario already exhibits a lost freedom that we should feel sensitive about. Incarceration can ruin a person's life. The restorative aspect of the law will be swapped for retribution.

On this point, I reiterate that in our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.60 The inherent weakness of the accused's defenses does not operate to relieve the prosecution of its responsibility to prove the crime itself.61 Suffice it to say that the guilt of the accused must rest not on the weakness of his defenses but on the strength of the evidence against him.62 Criminal laws are not abstract concept but pure definitive norms that restrict human conduct and must be construed strictly against the state. Whether marital infidelity constitutes the crime of psychological violence must be understood in its legal context and not based on the personal anguish or feelings of the offended parties. Any doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. All told, the prosecution's evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and the accused is entitled to an acquittal.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition and acquit XXX of the criminal charge.

Footnotes

1 The identity of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise their identity, and those of their immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610 (1192). An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, and for Other Purposes; Republic Act No. 9262 (2004). An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC (2004). Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children.

2 Ponencia, p. 15.

3 Id. at 19.

4 Rollo, p. 23.

5 Id.

6 Id. at 23-24.

7 Id. at 24-26.

8 Id. at 27-28.

9 Id. at 22.

10 Id. at 22.

11 Id. at 29-31.

12 Id. at 22-35. The Decision was penned by Presiding Judge Liza Marie R. Picardal-Tecson of Branch 144, Regional Trial Court, ███████.

13 Id. at 32-35.

14 Id. at 36-48.

15 Id. at 65-79. Penned by Associate Walter S. Ong and concurred in by Associate Justices Ricardo R. Rosario (now a Member of this Court) and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles of the Ninth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

16 Id. at 77-79.

17 Id. at 9-18.

18 Id.

19 Id. at 100-110.

20 An example is plunder under Republic Act No. 7080, as amended.

21 An example is technical malversation.

22 Dungo v. People, 762 Phil. 630, 659 (2015) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].

23 People v. Oliva, 395 Phil. 265, 275 (2000) [Per J. Pardo, First Division].

24 Rimorin, Sr. v. People, 450 Phil. 465, 474 (2003) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

25 Criminal LAW, JANET LOVELESS 38 (5th ed., 2016). See also J. M. Lopez, Concurring Opinion in Acharon v. People, G.R. No. 224946, November 9, 2021 [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].

26 REV. PEN. CODE, art. 4 provides that "[c]riminal liability shall be incurred: (1) by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended; and (2) by any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means."

27 Dinamling v. People, 761 Phil. 356, 373 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].

28 Id.

29 AAA v. BBB, 823 Phil. 607, 621 (2018) [Per J. Tijam, First Division].

30 G.R. No. 224946, November 9, 2021 [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].

31 People v. Oliva, 395 Phil. 265, 275 (2000) [Per J. Pardo, First Division].

32 Ponencia, pp. 15-16.

33 Philippine Commission on Women, Women's Priority Legislative Agenda for the 18th Congress, Repealing the Revised Penal Code provisions on Adultery and Concubinage, available at https://pcw.gov.ph/assets/files/20I9/10/PCW-WPLA-PB-02-Repeal-of-RPC-provisions-on-Adulteryand-Concubinage-AEB.pdf?x23702 (last accessed on August 17, 2023).

34 Philippine Commission on Women, Women's Priority Legislative Agenda for the 18th Congress, Repealing the Revised Penal Code provisions on Adultery and Concubinage, available at https://pcw.gov.ph/assets/files/2019/07/PCW-WPLA-Policy-Brief-3-Adultery-Concubinage.pdf (last accessed on August 17, 2023). In 1947, Japan abolished adultery as a crime in the spirit of providing equal rights for women. In 1996, Guatemala struck down the punishment for marital infidelity based on equality guarantees and human rights treaties. In 2005, Haiti decriminalized adultery in the context of eliminating discrimination against women. In 2007, Uganda overturned the adultery law that penalized women for adultery while leaving their male partners unpunished. In 2011, Mexico abolished and decriminalized adultery to condemn a crime historically construed to allow men to hold women as property. In 2015, South Korea struck down a 62-year-old law that made adultery a criminal act. The decision whether to maintain marriage should be left to the free will and love of people. All European nations have decriminalized adultery and, while it is not considered a criminal offense in most Western parts, it may still have legal consequences, especially in divorce proceedings. Adultery is also not a crime in Canada and China but a valid ground for divorce. Adultery has also been decriminalized in most of the Latin American countries and in Australia.

35 Ponencia, p. 16.

36 Ponencia, p. 17.

37 Ponencia, p. 18.

38 Ponencia, p. 18.

39 882 Phil. 905 (2020) [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division].

40 Id. at 923.

41 Id. at 926-927.

42 855 Phil. 991 (2019) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].

43 Id. at 998.

44 Id. at 1004.

45 Id. at 1006.

46 G.R. No. 234520 (Notice), February 28, 2018.

47 Id.

48 887 Phil. 161 (2020) [Per J. Delos Santos, Second Division].

49 Id. at 165.

50 Id. at 165-166.

51 Id. at 170.

52 G.R. No. 241390, January 13, 2021 [Per J. Delos Santos, Third Division].

53 Id.

54 G.R. No. 250219, March 1, 2023 [Per J. Hernando, First Division].

55 People v. Estibal, 748 Phil. 850, 877 (2014) [Per J. Reyes, Third Division].

56 People v. Mamalias, 385 Phil. 499, 513 (2000) [Per J. Puno, First Division].

57 People v. Asis, 439 Phil. 707, 728 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc], citing People v. Marquita, 383 Phil. 786, 708 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; People v. Aquino, 369 Phil. 701, 726 (1999) [Per Curiam, En Banc]; and People v. Geron, 346 Phil. 14, 29 (1997) [Per J. Romero, Third Division].

58 People v. Torre, 263 Phil. 458, 461 (1990) [Per J. Paras, Second Division], citing People v. Ramos, 245 Phil. 759, 760-761 (1988) [Per J. Padilla, Second Division].

60 People v. Cabaya, 411 Phil. 616, 630 (2001) [Per J. Buena, Second Division], citing People vs. Villagonzalo, 308 Phil. 231, 247 (1994) [Per J. Regalado, Second Division].

61 People v. Pajes, 632 Phil. 157, 170 (2010) [Per J. Perez, Second Division], citing People v. Ola, 236 Phil. 1, 17 (1987) Per J. Cortes, En Banc].

62 People v. Gomez, 345 Phil. 195, 200 (1997) [Per J. Romero, Third Division].

CONCURRING OPINION

LOPEZ, J., J.:

"Let marriage be held in honor among all, and let the marriage bed be undefiled, for God will judge the sexually immoral and adulterous." — The Holy Bible, Hebrews 13:4 (ESV)

I concur with the ponencia that the guilt of XXX for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

However, I wish to elucidate certain points in order to emphasize further why specific intent to cause mental or emotional anguish or psychological suffering on the victim need not be proved before the perpetrator may be made to account for his wrongful act. Hence, I write this concurring opinion.

On the presumption of innocence and the application of related canons of construction

No less than the Bill of Rights as embodied in the Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven.1 The main and perhaps the more known effect or consequence of such presumption is that the prosecution has the onus probandi of establishing the guilt of the accused.2 The other effect of such presumption is that when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to him or her, the more lenient interpretation in favor of the accused is to be adopted.3 Such rule of lenity is known as the pro reo doctrine.4 Accordingly since the resolution of the case at hand cannot proceed without reconciling the seemingly overlapping provisions of the various parts of Republic Act No. 9262 as it pertains to psychological violence in the context of marital infidelity, the matter of pro reo's applicability or non-applicability must first be elucidated to determine whether there is any doubt affecting those provisions that may or may not be interpreted in favor of the accused.

All parts of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled so that effect may be given to each and every part and that conflicting intention in the same statute is never to be supposed or so regarded, unless forced upon the court by an unambiguous language.5 In other words, every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context in that "every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment."6 Thus, the various provisions of an act should be read so that all may, if possible, have their due and conjoint effect without repugnancy or inconsistency.7

Here, XXX was charged with violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, which reads:

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. – The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

....

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children.

In Dimamling v. People,8 the elements of violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 were enumerated as follows:

(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;

(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and

(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children or similar acts or omissions.9 (Citations omitted)

Essentially, as what this Court did in the case of Araza v. People,10 Section 5(i) must be related to Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 9262, which defines "psychological violence" as those referring "to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity."11

Noticeably, a glance at Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 9262 would show that there are two scenarios of acts or omissions involving "mental or emotional suffering" which the law considers as psychological viole ce: (1) "causing;" and (2) "likely to cause." The first scenario refers to those acts or omissions that have actually been consummated, while the second scenario refers to those that are "likely" or probable, and not even required to be consummated.

At this juncture, it must be emphasized that psychological violence is a result that is personal to the offended party and which arises by reason of the acts committed by an offender. Thus, the perspective of the offended party, not the intent of the offender, must be given primary significance. This finds support from the very reason why Republic Act No. 9262 was enacted — to promote the protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.12 Also, the legislative deliberations on the precursor bills of Republic Act No. 9262 show that one of the impetus for the passing of this law is to elevate women on the same plane as men in terms of protection in law, recognizing the incongruence of treatment accorded to women in adulterous relationships with regard to married men who are sexually unfaithful. The legislative deliberations elucidate this point:

Ms. MAUREEN PAGADUAN (Executive Director, Women's Legal Bureau)[.]

....

Yung una ho, sinasabi na yung anti-AWIR bill violates the equal protection clause and the gender neutrality provision of the Constitution because it does not extend its protection to men. Ito yung pinakamalakas na resistance. Ang sa amin ho ang tingin namin the anti-AWIR bill does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The equal protection clause presupposes a situation wherein all the parties to the controversy are similarly situated with the same power, resources and ability. However, social conditions and culture have subjected women to abuse and violence more than men Kaya nga yung CEDAW, yung Conven[t]ion on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, focus on what they call gender-based violence.

Philippine Constitutional Law also recognize the validity of class legislation or that which applies to a specific group or class of people only provided that such class legislation is based on reasonable classification.

The four criteria for a reasonable classification have been squarely met by the anti-AWIR bill:

First, the bill rest on substantial distinctions. Men and women are afforded different degrees of protection under Philippine law and society. In intimate relationships, Philippine society still condones sexual infidelity by men. Hindi pa ho nababago iyan. And allows them to exercise an inordinate amount of power over their wives, girlfriends, and lovers. Siguro nararamdaman ng marami sa atin iyan. Philippine law also remains bias against women. The most glaring example of this legislative bias in favor of men and against women is the discrepancy in the crime of marital infidelity committed by husbands and wives, both as to the conditions for its commission and the penalties imposed. Mas malala sa babae, siempre.

Second, the classification is therefore germane to the purpose of the law. By granting women with a legal arsenal for their protection, the bill merely seeks to address this legal and societal inequalities by providing women in particular with a weapon to counteract the [inequality] of their situation.13 (Emphasis supplied)

....

MS. AURORA JAVATE-DE DIOS (Chairperson, National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women)[.]

Just on that point about whether or not the law addresses men and women equally. I think we are essentially dealing with a law ... with a problem of inequality. A while ago, our Chairperson was saying that men and women cannot be equal. I slightly disagree with that because our ... while women and men are unequal because of historical and structural inequalities, the point about having laws, legislation and policies to improve the plight of women is precisely to equalize their situation.

Now, the violence against women bill that is before us precisely addresses that very serious problem of inequality[.]14 (Emphasis supplied)

REP. ANGARA-CASTILLO ... What we are saying is that the reason we want focus on a bill against abuse or violence against women especially in intimate relationships is because there is a gap in legislation covering that particular situation and the fact that there is really a distinction between violence against women and violence against men. In the gender base violence contemplated in the anti-AWIR bill, we are saying that women are violated or abused because they are women. It's like a ... parang a position of superiority of the man over the woman. This is what distinguishes the violence committed against the man or against the woman. You've got to get that distinction, that basis for that distinction is a gender base violence ... that is not covered by any existing legislation[.]15 (Emphasis supplied)

As Republic Act No. 9262 has levelled the playing field, wives now can come to its succor to seek redress for their husbands' marital infidelity without the need to prove the stringent requirements under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code on concubinage, as it is enough that it be shown that they suffered mental or emotional anguish by reason of their husbands' marital infidelity.

In Araza, this Court articulated this legislative intent:

Psychological violence is an indispensable element of violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262. Equally essential is the element of emotional anguish and mental suffering, which are personal to the complainant. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while emotional anguish or mental suffering are the effects caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. The law does not require proof that the victim became psychologically ill due to the psychological violence done by her abuser. Rather, the law only requires emotional anguish and mental suffering to be proven. To establish emotional anguish or mental suffering, jurisprudence only requires that the testimony of the victim to be presented in court, as such experiences are personal to this party.16 (Citations omitted)

It bears emphasis that psychological violence pertaining to marital infidelity under Section 3(c) is punished under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 if the act, among others, "[c]aused mental or emotional anguish ... to the woman or her child."

It is clear from the foregoing that the means employed for violation of Section 5(i) can be found under Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 9262, while the effect is that stated under Section 5(i) of the Act.

Focusing on the means employed, marital infidelity is clearly enumerated as one of the acts of psychological violence, which is an act that causes or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering. This finds support in XXX v. People17 which unequivocally held that marital infidelity is one of the forms of psychological violence.18 In this case, there is no denial that XXX became romantically involved with another person outside of his marriage with AAA. He even admitted having a love child because of such romantic involvement. Whether it was proven to have occurred only once or at several occasions, this is no doubt marital infidelity.

Also, the Information specifically stated that XXX was being charged for keeping a mistress. It would not be amiss to point out that keeping a mistress is a form of marital infidelity. Such an act presupposes not only the act of keeping a mistress but of having a mistress in the first place. A mistress is someone who has a romantic involvement or extramarital sexual relationship with someone who is married. Indeed, it is not easy to prove the fact of having and keeping a mistress as these relationships are usually kept hidden from the public's view, moreso, with the family of the guilty party. However, there becomes a glaring evidence of such an extramarital relationship, as when a love child is born out of such an affair. This fact was already admitted by XXX as, in fact, he claimed that what happened was only a one-night stand.

With respect to the deliberate act of causing mental or emotional anguish, while it may be true that XXX did not abandon his family as he attended to their needs, and even had to endure the pain of not seeing his child with YYY, still, the fact of having an extramarital affair remains. Engaging in a relationship, moreso, sharing an intimate moment, requires the consent of two individuals. Under the law, the husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect, and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.19 It is the husband and wife, who are joined by marriage, who should be romantically involved with one another. Sharing such an intimate moment with another person other than one's spouse, especially when voluntarily done, goes against not just legal but also moral obligations, and without question, harm, if not destroy, the emotional well-being of the victim.

Moreover, the causal connection between the marital infidelity of XXX and the mental and emotional suffering of AAA cannot be denied. As the legal wife, AAA had every right to expect fidelity and devotion from XXX. Her actuations from the moment she heard of tales of his infidelity clearly demonstrate the torment she experienced both mental and emotional, as a consequence of XXX's conduct. To recall, when AAA received information on XXX's extramarital affair on July 16, 2016, she lost no time in seeking assistance to locate the address she was told her husband and his mistress were staying. On July 19, 2016, she confirmed the veracity of the information she received. On said date and at the given address, she came face to face with both her husband and his paramour. To make matters worse, she found out that he sired a child with his paramour. Soon after that, on December 29, 2017, a case for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 was filed against XXX. The fact that AAA immediately checked on the truth of what she heard about XXX indubitably established that she experienced betrayal, devastation, mental and emotional anguish from such news, which was later confirmed to be true. Had she been unaffected, she would have acted indifferently, which is not the case here.

Besides, even assuming arguendo that XXX did not intend to cause mental or emotional anguish on AAA by committing marital infidelity, he would not be able to pass through the requirement of" likely to cause mental or emotional suffering" as included in the definition of what is "psychological violence" under Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 9262. It stands to reason that marital infidelity is one of the most difficult situation a couple may go through. Any information relating to such an infidelity between married couples would undoubtedly cause, and is likely to cause, mental or emotional suffering. To argue otherwise would be to allow a spouse to commit infidelity and ignore its consequences, which presents a rational infirmity as freely consenting to the sexual infidelity of one's spouse is not in accord with "superior logic of ordinary human experience,"20 as well as not consistent with the "inviolable" nature of marriage espoused in Article XV, Section 2 of the Constitution, which the State has the duty to protect. It is unnatural for a person in his or her right mind to allow his or her spouse to engage in sexual relations with another person. More, it is not for this Court to alter the traditional view of marriage practices as protected by Congress by coming out with a ruling that erodes basic family values, if it is to respect the constitutionally-ordained principle of separation of powers. These matters are best left to the people to address through their elected representatives.21 Thus, as it relates to the case at hand, whatever is repugnant to the standards of human knowledge, observation, and experience becomes incredible and must lie outside judicial cognizance.22

Further, in the absence of any other circumstance presented by XXX, to look further into his intention after the one-night stand, could lead to a disregard of the emotional suffering of AAA. Instead of intently examining the requirement of emotional suffering from the perspective of AAA, the intention of XXX would have to be given a weightier consideration. To stretch the effect of giving too much weight into the intention of XXX could lead to asking if AAA consented to such an infidelity. However, it is customarily unusual for a person to freely give consent for his or her spouse to have sexual relations with another. In any event, the prosecution was able to show that AAA had suffered mental and emotional anguish, especially during the July 19, 2016 encounter, as a result of XXX's marital infidelity.

Overcoming the presumption of innocence and evidentiary burdens

Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.23 To do this, the prosecution must establish a "prima facie case" or one "which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain a prosecution or establish the facts, as to counterbalance the presumption of innocence and warrant the conviction of the accused."24 Once the prosecution overcomes the presumption of innocence by proving the elements of the crime and the identity of the accused as perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence then shifts to the defense.25 It now becomes incumbent upon the accused to adduce evidence to meet and nullify, if not overthrow, the prima facie case against him or her.26 In Bautista v. Sarmiento,27 this Court explained:

When a prima facie case is established by the prosecution in a criminal case, as in the case at bar, the burden of proof does not shift to the defense. It remains throughout the trial with the party upon whom it is imposed — the prosecution. It is the burden of evidence which shifts from party to party depending upon the exigencies of the case in the course of the trial. This burden of going forward with the evidence is met by evidence which balances that introduced by the prosecution. Then the burden shifts back.28 (Citation omitted)

In this case, the prosecution was able to establish a prima facie case of marital infidelity and the commission of psychological violence by XXX against AAA. Thus, the burden of evidence to prove that the elements or acts constituting the offense charged subject herein are absent or lacking has shifted to the accused.

However, XXX did not meet the required burden of evidence to redeem himself from conviction. Here, save for his bare claim that a single casual sexual encounter or a "one-night-stand" is not enough to prove that he intended to inflict mental and emotional anguish on AAA, XXX did not present any evidence, or at least proffered a reasonable and convincing explanation, to disprove the means of commission of the offense and the emotional suffering of AAA. Bare and unsubstantiated allegations do not constitute substantial evidence and have no probative value.29 As a result, XXX failed to overthrow, or at least equalize,30 the prima facie case established by the prosecution in order that he might secure a judgment of acquittal.

In sum, XXX's petition must be denied because: (1) his unlawful act of causing mental and emotional anguish was successfully established by his own admission and by the prosecution's evidence; and (2) he did not overcome the prima facie case established by the prosecution that, as an effect to his act, AAA suffered mental and emotional anguish. On its fore, the case may present an inherent unfairness, treading along the bounds of what is violative of the Equal Protection Clause, due the ipso jure criminal liability being imposed on the husband based solely on the "likelihood" of causing mental and emotional anguish on the part of the wife. However, such is not the lis mota or even the issue here which necessitates a novel approach to the interpretation of Republic Act No. 9262 on the matter of psychological violence through the act of marital infidelity. Perhaps either this Court in another proceeding raising the Equal Protection Clause ramifications, or Congress in the exercise of its plenary power to enact some remedial legislation, can correct the perceived unfairness. But it is not for this Court in this proceeding to undertake that task, especially by way of interpretation absent any constitutional ground.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the Petition and AFFIRM the conviction of petitioner XXX for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262.

1 Collao v. People, G.R. No. 242539, February 1, 2021 [Per J. Delos Santos, Third Division].

2 People v. Pagal, 886 Phil. 570, 654 (2020) [Per J. Gesmundo, En Banc].

3 Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales Vda. de Carungcong v. People, 626 Phil. 177, 200 (2010) [Per J. Corona, Third Division].

4 See Pulido v. People, G.R. No. 220149, July 27, 2021 [Per J. Hernando, En Banc].

5 People v. Garcia, 85 Phil. 651 (1950) [Per J. Tuason, En Banc].

6 Philippine International Trading Corporation v. COA, 635 Phil. 447, 454 (2010) [Per J. Perez, En Banc]. (Citation omitted)

7 Lichauco & Company, Inc. v. Apostol, 44 Phil. 138, 148 (1922) [Per J. Street, En Banc].

8 761 Phil. 356 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].

9 Id. at 373.

10 882 Phil. 905, 917 (2020) [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division].

11 Id. at 917. (Emphasis supplied)

12 Republic Act No. 9262, sec. 2 provides:

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security[.]

13 Minutes of the Meeting of the House Committee on Women, February 19, 2002, pp. 8-11.

14 Minutes of the Meeting of the House Committee on Women, August 27, 2002, p. 19.

15 Id. at 21-22.

16 Araza v. People, 882 Phil. 905, 917 (2020) [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division].

17 G.R. No. 250219, March 1, 2023 [Per J. Hernando, First Division].

18 Id. at 10. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of this Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.

19 FAMILY CODE, art. 68.

20 See Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil, 1198, 1219 (1999) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division].

21 See Separate Opinion of J. Delos Santos in Almonte v. People, 878 Phil. 628, 1078 (2020) [Per Curiam, En Banc].

22 People v. De Guzman, 690 Phil. 701, 712 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].

23 Franco v. People, 780 Phil. 36, 43 (2016) [Per J. Reyes, Third Division].

24 Cometa v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 1187, 1196 (1999) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division]. (Citation omitted)

25 People v. Abdula, 843 Phil. 706, 721 (2018) [Per J. Gesmundo, Third Division].

26 Bautista v. Judge Sarmiento, 223 Phil. 181, 185 (1985) [Per J. Cuevas, Second Division]. (Citation omitted)

27 223 Phil. 181 (1985) [Per J. Cuevas, Second Division].

28 Id. at 185.

29 LNS International Manpower Services v. Padua, Jr., 628 Phil. 223, 224 (2010) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].

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