G.R. No. 257610 - Dissenting Opinion

G.R. No. 257610, January 24, 2023,
♦ Decision, Lopez, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Gesmundo, [CJ]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Leonen, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]

CATALINA G. LEONEN-PIZARRO, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

I vote to sustain the constitutionality of the phrase "a person who has lost his bid for elective office in the immediately preceding election" stated in Republic Act No. 7941, also known as the "Party-List System Act", Section 8, thus:

SECTION 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. – Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5) from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.

A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned. (Emphasis supplied)

Consequently, respondent Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in providing for the same qualification when it issued Commission on Elections Resolution No. 10717, or the "Rules And Regulations Governing: (1) Political Conventions; (2) Submission of Nominees of Groups or Organizations participating under the Party-List System of Representation; and (3) Filing of Certificates of Candidacy and Nomination of and Acceptance by Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties or Coalitions of Political Parties in Connection with the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections", Sections 5(d) and 10, thus:

Article VIII, Section 5(1) of the Constitution states that this Court has "original jurisdiction over ... petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus." Jurisdiction, however, must be distinguished from justiciability, and it is justiciability that will ultimately determine whether this Court ought to take cognizance of a case assailing the constitutionality of the statute, as explained in Lagman v. Ochoa, Jr.:1

The requirement of justiciability is explicitly provided in the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

For a proper exercise of judicial review, the Court must find the following essential requisites of justiciability to be present: "first, there must be an actual case or controversy; second, petitioners must possess locus standi; third, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself."3

An actual case or controversy exists when there is "a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic[.]"4 A case ceases to present a justiciable controversy when it has become moot and academic due to supervening events:

Furthermore, a party who impugns the constitutionality of a statute must have legal standing or locus standi:6

A party will have no legal standing "[u]nless one's constitutional rights are affected by the operation of a statute or governmental act."8

Here, the petitioners directly filed before this Court consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition seeking to nullify the phrase "a person who has lost his bid for elective office in the immediately preceding election" in Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7941 and Sections 5(d) and 10 of Commission on Elections Resolution No. 10717.

In G.R. No. 257610, petitioner Glenn Quintos Albano alleges to have previously ran and lost in his bid as city councilor of Taguig City in the May 13, 2019 election, and to being the second nominee of party-list Talino at Galing ng Pinoy for the May 9, 2022 elections.9 He claims "actual threatened injury" on his right to be a nominee due to the qualification that a party-list nominee must not have lost in his or her bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election.10 In UDK 17230, petitioner Catalina G. Leonen-Pizarro also claims that her right to be nominated as party-list representative is threatened by the same provision, since she lost in her bid as mayor of Supiden, La Union in the May 13, 2019 elections, and she is the first party-list nominee of party-list Arts Business and Science Professionals.

There is no actual controversy here, as this case is now moot and academic. The questioned Commission on Elections Resolution No. 10717 pertains to the Rules and Regulations governing: (1) Political Conventions; (2) Submission of Nominees of Groups or Organizations Participating under The Party-List System of Representation; and (3) Filing of Certificates of Candidacy and Nomination of and Acceptance by Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties or Coalitions of Political Parties in connection with the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections. Since the May 9, 2022 elections had been concluded, and the party-list winners and its nominees had been proclaimed, petitioners can no longer claim to be affected by the provision as nominees of their party-lists.

Besides, petitioners do not have legal standing to file the Petitions. They anchor their right to assail the constitutionality of the law on their "threatened" right to become nominees of their party-lists or the "actual threatened injury" they will sustain if they are not nominated. However, petitioners did not sufficiently establish the direct injury they sustained, or will sustain, when they were not nominated by their party-lists. Even if they became a party-list nominee, it does not mean that their party will win, and they will become party-list representatives. Their alleged right is therefore speculative or conditional. Moreso when there is no constitutional right to run for or hold public office.11

Furthermore, petitioners justify their direct resort to this Court and their legal standing on the allegation of "transcendental importance" on the issue involved.12 However, mere invocation of "transcendental importance", without more, should not warrant consideration of the Court:

This Court is not a forum to appeal political and policy choices made by the Executive, Legislative, and other constitutional agencies and organs. This Court dilutes its role in a democracy if it is asked to substitute its political wisdom for the wisdom of accountable and representative bodies where there is no unmistakable democratic deficit. It cannot lose this place in the constitutional order. Petitioners' invocation of our jurisdiction and the justiciability of their claims must be presented with rigor. Transcendental interest is not a talisman to blur the lines of authority drawn by our most fundamental law.14

For failure to show that there still exists an actual controversy or that petitioners have legal standing, the present Petitions should have been dismissed outright.

However, even if we rule on the substantive arguments, the Petitions should still be denied.

The Constitution mandates that no person shall "be denied the equal protection of the laws." The right to equal protection of the laws enshrined in our Constitution requires that all persons, under similar circumstances and conditions, shall be treated alike:15

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.16 (Emphasis in the original)

The equal protection of the laws, however, do not prohibit legal classification, provided there is reasonable classification: (1) based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; (2) germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) applicable equally to each member of the same class, thus:

The legislature is granted wide leeway in providing classification, as long as it is not unreasonable and unfounded:

Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's classification. To this we answer, that this is the prerogative of the law-making power. Since the Court finds that the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it cannot declare that the act transcends the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.

Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis.18 (Emphases supplied)

In Dumlao v. Commission on Elections,19 this Court found as not violative of the equal protection clause the provision in the law disqualifying a 65-year old elective local official, who retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, from running for the same office from which he had retired, thus:

[I]n the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for the very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit such denial. Persons similarly situated are similarly treated.

In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What it proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those belonging to the same class. The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even if at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies.20 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

In Fariñas v. Executive Secretary,21 this Court held that there was no violation of the equal protection clause in Congress' repeal of a provision of a law pertaining to elective officials only, because substantial distinctions exist between elective officials and appointive officials:

Over time, three tests of judicial scrutiny were developed to determine reasonableness of classification:

Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to determine the reasonableness of classifications. The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i) interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes. The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a classification does not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications based on gender and legitimacy. Lastly, the rational basis test applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two tests.23 (Emphasis in original, citations omitted)

I have expounded on these tests in my Separate Opinion in Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City:

In People v. Jalosjos,25 this Court, applying strict scrutiny, found that election to the position of congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement:

In Kabataan Party-List v. Commission on Elections,27 this Court applied the strict scrutiny test since the biometrics validation requirement in the law affects the right of suffrage, and held that the regulation passed the strict scrutiny test:

The strict scrutiny test has also been used when the regulation involves a "suspect class" defined as "a class saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process."29

In Central Bank v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,30 this Court applied the strict scrutiny test upon finding that the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas rank-and-file employees represent the politically powerless, and held that continued operation and implementation of the last proviso of Article II, Section 15(c) of Republic Act No. 7653 discriminated against the said employees warranting its declaration of unconstitutionality:

In Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles,32 this Court also applied the standard of strict scrutiny test "for it perceive[d] in the subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs" and the Constitution gives special protection to labor.

I submit that the strict scrutiny test should be used to determine whether there is reasonable classification in the Legislature's passage of the Party-List System Act, more particularly the assailed portion of Section 8, that is "[t]he list shall not include ... a person who has lost his bid for elective office in the immediately preceding election."

A democratic and republican state is founded on an election, which reflects and expresses the sovereign and genuine will of the people.33 Thus, the opportunity to run for public office, and the rights and privileges arising from being elected, is governed and regulated by law.34 Still, the opportunity to run and be elected for public office touches on two fundamental freedoms, those of expression and of association:

To democratize political power and give chance to political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections, the Constitution provides for the party-list system, and corollary, gives the voter the right to elect two representatives in the House of Representatives—one for his or her legislative district and another for his or her party-list group.36 Undisputedly, there are substantial distinctions between a district representative or party-list representative, as clearly provided for in the Constitution:

There are clear differences in terms of representation between those elected from legislative districts and those elected through the party-list system, as I explained in my Separate Opinion in Atong Paglaum, Inc:37

The party-list system envisions genuine political parties to evolve in order to achieve effective representation in the Congress and in effect, help the nation realize being a "democratic and republican state."39 It aims to give representation and expression of interests and advocacies, which may not be within the main focus of those who represent legislative districts:

To have an effective representation, to take part in the conduct of public affairs, to vote and to be elected, and to have access to public service are subsumed under the right to electoral participation, provided in our international obligations under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR):

Since the party-list system involves the fundamental principle of our nation and touches on the fundamental rights to electoral participation, freedom of expression and association, the strict scrutiny should be used to determine whether there is reasonable classification in the law.

Moreover, there is suspect class involved, or "a class saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process."42 These are the groups, whose interests and advocacies may not be within the main focus of those who represent legislative districts historically, crying out for representation but relegated to a position of political powerlessness due to our history of favoring popular and pedigreed individuals in electoral exercises.

I submit that using strict scrutiny, the assailed portion of Section 8 of the Party-List System Act, particularly "[t]he list shall not include ... a person who has lost his bid for elective office in the immediately preceding election," is constitutional and not violative of the equal protection clause. There is reasonable classification for those who have lost in their bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election, so as to prohibit them from becoming party-list nominees, contrary to petitioners' claim.43

The strict scrutiny test requires that there be a compelling state interest and that the means employed to effect it are narrowly-tailored—being the least restrictive means for effecting the invoked interest.44 In Pamatong v. Commission on Elections,45 this Court held that the State could exclude nuisance candidates, or those candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office, due to the compelling interest to ensure that the electoral exercises are rational, objective, orderly, and credible:

Similarly, in my view, persons who have lost their bid for elective office in the immediately preceding election should be excluded as nominees of their party-list, due to the State's compelling interest to "guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature" as stated in the policy statement of The Party-List System Act:

SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.

Indeed, it is the policy of the State to broaden electoral opportunities and possible representation of interests in Congress, through the party-list system, such that even those who could not win in the legislative district elections will be given a fair chance to enter and to have a voice in Congress. Thus, those who lost in the previous elections are not necessarily prohibited from becoming party-list nominees, but only those who ran and lost in an elective office in the immediately preceding elections are singled out by the law. This is the least restrictive means for effecting the invoked compelling interest. As pointed out by respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, those who lost in the immediately preceding elections "will be more inclined to seek alternative ways to secure public office" and use the party-list as a mechanism to secure public office after having lost in such elections.47 The ponente likewise pointed out that the purpose would be to limit, discourage, and disallow the abuse of the party-list system as a fallback measure for traditional politicians to serve in an elective position.48 Thus, to allow those persons who just ran and lost in the immediately preceding election to be nominated in the immediately succeeding election will patently run counter to the law's policy and intent, as it will be unlikely to enhance the "chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature."

Therefore, the assailed provision prohibiting a person who has lost his bid for elective office in the immediately preceding election from becoming a party-list nominee was sufficiently justified as it was indeed narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling state interest of establishing a "a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives" and was demonstrably the least restrictive means in promoting that interest—only those who lost in the immediately preceding election are prohibited from being nominated.

In any case, all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute, being an act by the Legislature, approved by the Executive:

This court is not unmindful of the fundamental criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. "The question of the validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative department of the government itself." And a statute finally comes before the courts sustained by the sanction of the executive. The members of the Legislature and the Chief Executive have taken an oath to support the Constitution and it must be presumed that they have been true to this oath and that in enacting and sanctioning a particular law they did not intend to violate the Constitution. The courts cannot but cautiously exercise its power to overturn the solemn declarations of two of the three grand departments of the government. Then, there is that peculiar political philosophy which bids the judiciary to reflect the wisdom of the people as expressed through an elective Legislature and an elective Chief Executive. It follows, therefore, that the courts will not set aside a law as violative of the Constitution except in a clear case. This is a proposition too plain to require a citation of authorities.49 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

The presumption of constitutionality can only be overcome by sufficient proof of clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution:

A party challenging the law must present concrete evidence and convincing argument of arbitrariness:

In failing to present concrete evidence and convincing argument of arbitrariness, petitioners patently failed to discharge the burden to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the phrase "a person who has lost his bid for elective office in the immediately preceding election" stated in Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7941.

Consequently, respondent Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in also providing that the list of nominees shall not include those "who has lost his [or her] bid for an elective office in the May 13, 2019 National and Local Elections" in its issued Commission on Elections Resolution No. 10717, or the "Rules And Regulations Governing: (1) Political Conventions; (2) Submission of Nominees of Groups or Organizations participating under the Party-List System of Representation; and (3) Filing of Certificates of Candidacy and Nomination of and Acceptance by Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties or Coalitions of Political Parties in Connection with the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections."

"There is grave abuse of discretion when the respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of [its] judgment, as when the assailed order is bereft of any factual and legal justification."52 In Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,53 the Commission on Elections promulgated its "Rules on Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-List Groups/Organizations Participating in the 10 May 2010 Automated National and Local Elections" by virtue of the mandate of the Party-List System Act, under Sections 8 and 9, vesting the Commission on Elections with jurisdiction over the nomination of party-list representatives and prescribing the qualifications of each nominee.

Since the Party-list System Act was enacted, the Commission on Elections by virtue of its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws54 issued Rules and Regulations governing Submission of Names of Nominees under the Party-List System, among other rules, for the National and Local Elections, specifically: Resolution No. 3307-A for the May 2001 elections; Resolution No. 6320 for the May 2004 elections; Resolution No. 7084 for the May 2007 elections; Resolution No. 8807 for the May 2010 elections; Resolution No. 9366 for the May 2013 elections; Resolution No. 9984 for the May 2016 elections; and Resolution No. 10420 for the May 2019 elections. The mentioned Resolutions included the assailed phrase in the present Petitions as a limitation to the list of nominees to be submitted by the party-lists.55

Based on the above reasons, there is factual and legal justification for respondent Commission on Elections' issuance of Resolution No. 10717, providing that the list of nominees of the party-lists shall not include those "who has lost his [or her] bid for an elective office in the May 13, 2019 National and Local Elections." Therefore, respondent Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.