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G.R. No. 250307, February 21, 2023,
♦ Decision, Gesmundo, [CJ]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Leonen, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Lopez, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Kho, [J]

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[ G.R. No. 250307 February 21, 2023 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, VS. ROBERT UY y TING, ONG CHI SENG* @ JACKIE** ONG or ARCHIE, CO CHING KI*** @ CHAI ONG, TAN TY SIAO, GO SIAK PING, JAMES GO ONG @ WILLIAM GAN, Accused, ROBERT UY y TING, Accused-Appellant.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

KHO, JR. J.:

I concur in the result.

Accused-appellant Robert Uy y Ting (Uy), who was hired as driver by co-accused Willie Gan (Gan), should be acquitted in both: (i) Criminal Case No.1179-V-03 for Illegal Transportation of Dangerous Drugs, as defined and penalized under Section 5 in relation to Section 26 (b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165; and (ii) Criminal Case No. 1180-V-03 for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, as defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.

By force of legal fiction, Uy's co-accused in Criminal Case No. 1180-V-03 — particularly, Gan, the lessee of the warehouse where the 119.080 kilograms of methamphetamine hydrochloride and the 111.200 kilograms of chloromethamphetamine hydrochloride were seized — must regrettably be acquitted for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 in accordance with Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In this regard, I write this Opinion to explain the reasons behind my concurrence with the ponencia in the acquittal of Uy and Gan.1aшphi1

With respect to Uy, it is my considered view that he should be acquitted of the foregoing crimes charged on the grounds that: first, the elements of the crimes charged were not established beyond reasonable doubt; and second, the prosecution miserably failed to prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti of the foregoing cases have been adequately preserved.

As to Gan, who did not appeal his conviction by the trial court that imposed a penalty on him that is substantially lower than what the law clearly provides for illegal possession of large amount of dangerous drugs, the acquittal of his co-accused Uy on the latter ground would benefit him.

I.

In every criminal conviction, the prosecution is required to prove two (2) things beyond reasonable doubt: first, the fact of the commission of the crime charged, or the presence of all the elements of the offense; and second, the fact that the accused was the perpetrator of the crime.1

Under Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules on Evidence, "[p]roofbeyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind."

In Macayan, Jr. v. People,2 the Court, through Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (now Senior Associate Justice), reiterated that the requirement of proving an accused's guilt by proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases is rooted on the presumption of innocence accorded to all by no less than the Constitution, to wit:

An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees. Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution which protects the accused from conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden the accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and he would be entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of proof as, excluding the possibility of error, produce absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the offense charged.3

Relatedly, in People v. Claro,4 the Court, through Associate Justice (and eventual Chief Justice) Lucas P. Bersamin, elucidated on what constitutes "reasonable doubt", as follows:

[Reasonable doubt] is not mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in such a condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge. The burden of proof is upon the prosecutor. All the presumptions of law independent of evidence are in favor of innocence; and every person is presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty. If upon such proof there is reasonable doubt remaining, the accused is entitled to the benefit of it by an acquittal. For it is not sufficient to establish a probability, though a strong one arising from the doctrine of chances, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the contrary; but the evidence must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty; a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. This we take to be proof beyond reasonable doubt; because if the law, which mostly depends upon considerations of a moral nature, should go further than this, and require absolute certainty, it would exclude circumstantial evidence altogether.5 (Emphases in the original)

Guided by the foregoing, I am of the view that the prosecution failed to establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt the elements of the crimes charged in both Criminal Case No.1179-V-03 and Criminal Case No.1180- V-03, which thus, necessitates the acquittal of Uy in both crimes.

In Criminal Case No. 1179-V-03, the Prosecution Failed to Establish Beyond Reasonable Doubt the Fact that Uv was Transporting Illegal Drugs.

"The essential element of [Illegal Transportation of Dangerous Drugs] is the movement of the dangerous drugs from one (1) place to another. To establish the guilt of the accused, it must be proved that: (1) the transportation of illegal drugs was committed; and (2) the prohibited drugs exists."6

In this regard, jurisprudence provides that "the very act of transporting [dangerous drugs] is malum prohibitum punishable under RA 9165,"7 and as such, "the fact of transportation [of dangerous drugs] need not be accompanied by proof of [the accused's] criminal intent, motive, or knowledge of the contents thereof'8 and that "proof of ownership and intent are not essential elements of the crime of [Illegal Transportation of Dangerous Drugs]."9

The foregoing notwithstanding, there are cases wherein the Court has clarified that: first, an uncorroborated claim of an accused of lack of knowledge that he/she had dangerous drugs in his possession is insufficient; and second, to warrant an acquittal, the accused must show that his/her act of transporting the package containing dangerous drugs inside the vehicle was done without the intent to possess, i.e., without knowledge that what he/she possessed was a dangerous drug.10

In this regard, in People v. Quijano,11 the Court, through Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, expounded on animus possidendi, to wit:

Animus possidendi is a state of mind. It is determined on a case-­to-case basis taking into consideration the prior and contemporaneous acts of the accused and the surrounding circumstances. It must be inferred from the attendant events in each particular case. A mere unfounded assertion of the accused that he or she did not know that he or she had possession of the illegal drug is insufficient. Animus possidendi is then presumed because he or she was thereby shown to have performed an act that the law prohibited and penalized. Possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation. Consequently, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi.

Evidence to be given credence must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. The issue of credibility, when it is decisive of the guilt or innocence of the accused, is determined by the conformity of the conflicting claims and recollections of the witnesses to common experience and to the observation of mankind as probable under the circumstances. There is no test to the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation, and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside of judicial cognizance.12 (Emphasis supplied)

In criminal cases where animus possidendi is an issue, the same must likewise be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. To reiterate, it is settled that "[i]n this jurisdiction, no less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required to support a judgment of conviction. While the law does not require absolute certainty, the evidence presented by the prosecution must produce in the mind of the Court a moral certainty of the accused's guilt. When there is even a scintilla of doubt, the Court must acquit."13

In this case, it is well to note the following circumstances which led to Uy's arrest, which in turn, resulted in the filing of Criminal Case No. 1179-V-03 against him:

1. Uy was hired by Gan as a mere part-time driver;

2. While he helped Gan to look for a warehouse to lease, he was not a co-lessee thereto and there is no showing that he was privy to the dealings that Gan engaged in insofar as the operations of the warehouse is concerned, as evinced by his claims that he never visited nor heard the conversations that Gan had with the latter's associates;

3. The only knowledge that he has with the operations of the warehouse is that he saw a container van deliver several furniture and drums of soap labeled with "Bleaching Powder";

4. He had not driven for Gan from October 2003 to November 9, 2003;

5. On November 10, 2003, when Gan suddenly contacted him to go to McDonald's in South Supermarket along McArthur Highway in Valenzuela City, to retrieve the red Mitsubishi Lancer car provided to him, and drive it to the warehouse, Uy presumably did so in accordance with his duties as part-time driver;

6. At the warehouse, Gan loaded a box in the backseat and rode in the car with him;

7. Gan instructed Uy to drop him off at a nearby Mercury Drug Store and bring the car back to McDonald's; and

8. Upon arrival at McDonald's, the apprehending officers proceeded to arrest him and he even questioned them as to the reason/s for his arrest.14

The totality of these circumstances shows that Uy had no knowledge — and hence, absence of animus possidendi — that the contents of the box that Gan had put in the backseat indeed contained dangerous drugs. It could very well be that Uy, as a part-time driver whom his employer had not contacted for a while, was just eager to follow the latter's instructions, not knowing that to do so would lead to his arrest.

In this relation, the equipoise rule provides that "where inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two [(2)] or more interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his[/her] guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction."15

Thus, in view of the reasonable doubt as to the existence of animus possidendi taking into consideration the applicability of the equipoise rule, Uy must be acquitted in Criminal Case No. 1179-V-03 for Illegal Transport of Dangerous Drugs.

In Criminal Case No. 1180-V-03, the Prosecution Failed to Establish All the Elements of the Crime Charged.

The elements of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 are: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.16

In this regard, case law instructs that "[p]ossession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. Constructive possession, on the other hand, exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when the latter has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his or her right to exercise control and dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with another.17

Here, the ponencia correctly pointed out that the prosecution failed to prove the crucial element of possession with respect to Uy, either actual or constructive, considering that:

1. there is no actual possession as Uy was already in police custody when the warehouse containing dangerous drugs was searched on November 11, 2003; and

2. there is likewise no constructive possession, considering that Uy was neither the owner nor the lessee of such warehouse.18

As such, Uy's acquittal in Criminal Case No. 1180-V-03 is proper as well.

The Prosecution Failed to Establish that the Integritv and Evidentiary Value of the Corpus Delicti in Criminal Case No. 1180-V-03 were Properly Preserved.

To sustain a conv1ct10n for violations of RA 9165, it is of utmost importance to establish with moral certainty the identity of the confiscated drug. To remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, it must be shown that the substance recovered from the accused is the same substance offered and identified in court.19 Failing to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, and hence, warrants an acquittal.20

Under ordinary circumstances, the prosecution must show an unbroken chain of custody over the dangerous drugs seized. It must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug, from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.21 Chain of custody means the duly recorded, authorized movements, and custody of the seized drugs at each stage, from the moment of confiscation to the receipt in the forensic laboratory for examination until it is presented to the court.22 Currently, the chain of custody rule for illegal drug cases is found in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 with the other links supplied by jurisprudence.

However, under exceptional circumstances—particularly, in instances where the illegal drugs seized are of a considerable volmne—the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drugs may be proven by evidence other than through the chain of custody rule.

In this regard, I find it fitting to reiterate my views in my Opinions in both People v. Casa (Casa)23 and People v. Nisperos (Nisperos),24 the relevant portions of which identically read:

The Second Proviso in Section 21 of RA 9165 as amended by Section 1 of RA 10640, states:

"Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items."

In People v. Luna, the Court provided for two (2) requisites before the prosecution can invoke the Second Proviso in order not to render void and invalid the seizure and custody of the confiscated drugs, to wit:

1. The existence of "justifiable grounds" allowing departure from the rule on strict interpretation; and

2. The integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team.

Under the first requisite, before the prosecution can invoke the Saving Clause in order to allow departure from the strict interpretation of the chain of custody rule in illegal drugs cases, the apprehending officer/team should recognize the deviations or lapses made in the chain of custody and that they are able to justify the same before the trial court.

In this connection, I most respectfully submit that the trial court should consider the justifications offered by the apprehending officer/team and evaluate them in the light of the actual circumstances attendant from the time of seizure of the drugs up to the presentation of the same in court as evidence.

One of the circumstances that the trial court should consider whether the chain of custody rule should be strictly construed against the prosecution is the weight and/or amount of the illegal drugs seized from the accused.

As early as in Mallillin v. People (Mallillin), which involved "two (2) plastic sachets of methamphetamine hydrochloride [or] 'shabu' with an aggregate weight of 0.0743 gram, and four empty sachets containing 'shabu' residue x x x," the Court explained the rationale why strict compliance of the chain of custody rule is being required in relation to the weight and/or amount of the illegal drug seized, to wit:

Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty, together with the fact that the same is not authorized by law. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. Essential therefore in these cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. Be that as it may, the mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the substance illegally possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.

While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibit's level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering—without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not—dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.

Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives. Graham v. State positively acknowledged this danger. In that case where a substance later analyzed as heroin—was handled by two police officers prior to examination who however did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it was in their possession—was excluded from the prosecution evidence, the court pointing out that the white powder seized could have been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking powder. It ruled that unless the state can show by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into the possession of police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition, testimony of the state as to the laboratory's findings is inadmissible.

A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subiect to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering, alteration or substitution of substances from other cases—by accident or otherwise—in which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratorv testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with.(emphases and underscoring supplied)

Pursuant to Mallillin's instructions, the Court has consistently ruled in a catena of cases that trial courts should exercise strict or heightened scrutiny when minuscule amounts of illegal drugs are presented into evidence, which I fully agree with. This is because in instances when minuscule amounts of illegal drugs are involved, the probability of tampering, alteration, substitution, exchange or switching of the illegal drugs is at its highest — the very evil sought to be prevented by the chain of custody rule. As explained by the Court in People v. Olarte, "[n]arcotic substances, for example, are relatively easy to source because they are readily available in small quantities thereby allowing the buyer to obtain them at lower cost or minimal effort. It makes these substances highly susceptible to being used by corrupt law enforcers to plant evidence on the person of a hapless and innocent victim for the purpose of extortion. Such is the reason why narcotic substances should undergo the tedious process of being authenticated in accordance with the chain of custody rule." This provides the rationale of the chain of custody rule.

On the other hand, if the illegal drugs offered as evidence involve large amounts of illegal drugs, I respectfully submit that the trial court should judiciously determine, based on the evidence of the prosecution and the circumstances of each case, whether there is a high probability of tampering, alteration, substitution, exchange or switching of the same.

In the event the trial court is fully satisfied that the probability of tampering, alteration, substitution, exchange or switching of the large amount of iilegal drugs offered in evidence is highly unlikely, which is a question of fact, I respectfully submit that strict compliance of the four (4) links in the chain of custody rule should be dispensed with, as the rationale for its application disappears

In this instance, the justifiable ground referred to in the first requisite of the Saving Clause will now consist of the large amount of illegal drugs itself, considering that, as proven by the prosecution to the full satisfaction of the trial court, the same could not have been tampered, altered, substituted, exchanged or switched. The continued application of strict compliance of the four (4) links in the chain of custody rule when large amounts of illegal drugs are involved goes against the intent and purpose of RA 9165, as amended.1aшphi1

Notwithstanding my submission that the required strict observance of the chain of custody rule should be dispensed with if the trial court is satisfied that the probability of tampering, alteration, substitution, exchange or switching of the large amount of illegal drugs offered in evidence is highly unlikely, I submit that the second requisite of the Saving Clause — that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team — must nevertheless still be proven and established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt as proof of corpus delicti by credible evidence other than through the strict application of the chain of custody rule to justify the conviction of the accused and the severe penalties to be imposed upon the accused under RA 9165, as amended.

x x x x

3. The Saving Clause - in case of any lapse or deviation from the chain of custody rule:

a. The prosecution must acknowledge the lapse or deviation and p!:esent a justification therefor. If the deviation is justified and the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, the justified deviation shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.

b. In cases involving large amount or volume of illegal drugs, the trial court should judiciously determine, based on the evidence of the prosecution, whether there is a high probability of tampering, alteration, substitution, exchange or switching of the same. If the trial court determines that the probability of tampering, alteration, substitution, exchange or switching of the drugs offered in evidence is highly unlikely, which is a question of fact, the required strict compliance of the four (4) links in the chain of custody rule should be dispens d with. However, the second requisite of the Saving Clause — that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team — must still be established by the prosecution as proof of corpus delicti by credible evidence other than through the strict application of the chain of custody rule.25 (Emphases, italics, and underscoring in the original)

Thus, while I agree with the ponencia that the "x x x law itself, R.A. No. 9165, as amended, makes no distinction between large or small amounts of seized drugs in applying the procedural safeguards in Sec. 21,"26 jurisprudence, as I previously cited and explained in my Opinions in Casa and Nisperos, cleariy provided that when only minuscule amounts of illegal drugs are involved, trial courts should exercise strict or heightened scrutiny — meaning, the trial courts should require full compliance with the chain of custody rule. On the other hand, if large amounts of illegal drugs are involved, I respectfully reiterate my arguments in Casa and Nisperos that the rationale for the application of the chain of custody disappears.

To reiterate, the Saving Clause under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 as amended by Section 1 of RA 10640 may be invoked if both of the following requisites concur: (1) the existence of "justifiable grounds" allowing the departure from the rule on strict interpretation; and (2) the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team.27

Applying my views in Casa and Nisperos to the instant case, the justifiable ground referred to in the first requisite of the Saving Clause is the colossal volume of dangerous drugs recovered in Criminal Case No. 1180-V-03. To be sure, Criminal Case No. 1180-V-03 involves 119.080 kilograms of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu and 111.200 kilograms of chloromethamphetamine hydrochloride. There is no doubt that the illegal drugs involved are colossal. Considering its colossal volume, it is highly unlikely that the illegal drugs seized could have been tampered, altered, substituted, exchanged or switched.

As regards the second requisite, it is well to reiterate that per guideline 3b as may be gleaned above, in cases that involve a large amount of drugs — as in this case — the trial court is tasked to determine whether the probability of tampering, alteration, substitution, exchange or switching of the seized drugs is highly unlikely. As stated earlier, it is highly unlikely that the large volume of drugs involved in this case could have been tampered, altered, substituted, exchanged, or switched. Thus, and as stated earlier, the four (4) links of the chain of custody should be dispensed with, as the justification for its strict compliance disappears.

To avoid any misunderstanding, the non-applicability of the chain of custody rule to large amount of illegal drugs does not necessarily mean that the prosecution is already excused in proving the existence of the illegal drugs itself — the corpus delicti. In compliance with the second requisite of the Saving Clause — in order to establish the corpus delicti — the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs must still be established by the prosecution by credible evidence, which can be done by evidence other than through the strict application of the chain of custody rule.

In this case, it is noted that there is no such determination made by the trial court. However, such lack of determination should not preclude the prosecution from establishing the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs in Criminal Case No. 1180-V-03 for the simple reason that at the time these cases were being tried, there was yet no proper guidelines on this. Nevertheless, it is posited that even if the prosecution is allowed to prove the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs by credible evidence other than through the strict application of the chain of custody rule, the records of the case show that the prosecution still failed to prove the same.

As regards the November 11, 2003 incident subject of Criminal Case No. 1180-V-03, the prosecution alleged that SOCO28 operatives made an itemized report of the purported drugs seized from the warehouse; and that the raiding team took various photographs during the actual raid of said warehouse. However, and as aptly noted by the ponencia, not only did the prosecution fail to present as evidence such report of the SOCO operatives, the photographs themselves do not even clearly show the purported seized drugs. Verily, outside of the testimonies of the police officers who conducted the raid, there is nothing that would prove that the purported drugs seized from the warehouse raid are the same drugs that were presented to the trial court.29 Again, this militates against a finding of preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the illegal drugs seized that is required for the applicability of the second requisite of the Saving Clause. As such, Uy's acquittal in Criminal Case No. 1180-V-03 must ensue.

III.

Uv's Acquittal in Criminal Case No. 1180-V-03 Should he Extended to his Co-Accused, Gan.

It is recognized that Uy's acquittal in Criminal Case No. 1180-V-03 will necessarily raise questions as to whether the Court may extend such acquittal insofar as his co-accused therein, i.e., Gan, is concerned.

Regrettably, I answer in the affirmative.

Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:

Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused -

(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter. (Underscoring supplied)

Case law instructs that for this provision to apply, the evidence against and conviction of the accused who appealed and the accused who did not must be inextricably linked.30

As may be gleaned above, Uy's acquittal in Criminal Case No. 1180-V-03 rests on two (2) grounds, namely: (a) the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the crime charged; and (b) the prosecution failed to prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti of the crime charged had be n preserved.

As regards the first ground, the same is not applicable to Gan. To reiterate, this ground essentially states that Uy should be acquitted, considering that: (a) there is no actual possession as Uy was already in police custody when the warehouse containing dangerous drugs was raided on November 11, 2003; and (b) there is likewise no constructive possession, considering that Uy was neither the owner nor the lessee of such warehouse. In contrast, the evidence against Gan is that he is the actual lessee of the warehouse where the dangerous drugs were found, and hence, actual and/or constructive possession of such drugs may be validly attributed to him.

However, the second ground for Uy's acquittal is applicable to Gan, considering that there is only one corpus delicti involved in Criminal Case No. 1180-V-03, particularly, the purported drugs seized from the warehouse raid. Notwithstanding the earlier conviction of Gan by final judgment for illegal possession of illegal drugs as the lessee of the warehouse where the illegal drugs were seized, Uy's acquittal on this ground operates to extend such acquittal insofar as Gan is concerned as well, pursuant to Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Otherwise stated, Gan should also be acquitted in Criminal Case No. 1180-V-03.

IV.

On a final note, I fully share the frustration of the ponencia on the final outcome of these cases — the acquittal of all the accused — particularly since the charges against all the accused before the trial court involved large amount of illegal drugs.

The stark ignorance of arresting and/or investigating officers to perform the basic evidence gathering work to establish the corpus delicti; the failure of the prosecution to perform its minimum prosecutorial duties — undeniably, the prosecution dropped the ball in handling these cases, particularly when the prosecution did nothing to appeal the patently erroneous penalty imposed by the trial court on Gan, and finally, the trial court, in imposing a penalty of imprisonment against Gan of merely 12 years and 1 day as minimum to 14 years and 8 months as maximum and a fine when the law clearly provides a penalty of life imprisonment are truly appalling.

It appears that there is an unseen hand manipulating the pillars of our criminal justice system. Let us cry for our beloved country.

ACCORDINGLY, I VOTE to ACQUIT: (a) Robert Uy y Ting in Criminal Case No. 1179-V-03; and (b) Robert Uy y Ting and James Go Ong @ William Gan @ Willie Gan in Criminal Case No. 1180-V-03.

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Footnotes

1 See Franco v. People, 780 Phil. 36 (2016) [Per J. Reyes, Third Division], citing People v. Santos, 388 Phil. 993, 1004 (2000) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division].

2 756 Phil. 202 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

3 Id., citing Boac, et al. v. People, 591 Phil. 508 (2008) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division].

4 808 Phil. 455 (2017) [Per J. Bersamin, Third Division].

5 Id., citations omitted.

6 People v. Baterina, G.R. No. 236259, September 16, 2020 [Per J. Lazaro-Javier, First Division]; citations omitted.

7 Id.

8 Id., citing People v. Marilla, 726 Phil. 244,252 (2014) [Per J. Perez, Second Division].

9 Id., citing People v. Noah, G.R. No. 228880, March 6, 2019 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

10 See People v. Del Mundo, 418 Phil. 740 (2001) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division] and People v. Baludda, 376 Phil. 614 (1999) [Per J. Purisima, Third Division].

11 G.R. No. 247558, February 19, 2020 [Per J. Lazaro-Javier, First Division].

12 Id.

13 People v. Lumikid, G.R. No. 242695, June 23, 2020 [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division], citing Aliling v. People, 833 Phil. 146 (2018) [Per J. Caguioa, Second Division].

14 See ponencia, pp. 3-7.

15 People v. Floresta, G.R. No. 239032, June 17, 2019 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division].

16 People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 252886, March 15, 2021 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division], citing People v. De Dios, G.R. No. 243664, January 22, 2020 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division].

17 People v. Quijano, supra note 11, citing People v. Tira, 474 Phil. 152, 173-174 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc]. See also ponencia, pp. 16-17.

18 See ponencia, pp. 16-17.

19 See People v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 235658, June 22, 2020 [Per J. Gesmundo, Third Division].

20 See People v. Gamboa, 833 Phil. 1055 (2018) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division], citing People v. Umipang, 686 Phil. 1024, 1039-1040 (2012) [Per J. Sereno, Second Division].

21 See People v. Alvaro, 823 Phil. 444 (2018) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division], citing People v. Viterbo, 739 Phil. 593 (2014) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division].

22 See People v. Del Rosario, supra.

23 G.R. No. 254208, August 16, 2022 [Per CJ Gesmundo; En Banc].

24 G.R. No. 250927, November 29, 2022 [Per J. Rosario, En Banc].

25 See my Concurring and Dissenting Opinions in People v. Casa (G.R. No. 254208, August 16, 2022) and People v. Nisperos G.R. No.250927, November 29, 2022).

26 Ponencia, pp. 19-20.

27 See People v. Luna, 828 Phil. 671 (2018) [Per J. Caguioa, Second Division]; citations omitted.

28 "S.O.C.O.: Scene of the Crime Operatives" was an investigative docudrama television program based on real life police investigations undertaken by forensic experts.  (last accessed March 8, 2023)

29 See ponencia, pp. 23-24.

30 See People v. Fulgado, G.R. No. 246193, February 19, 2020 [Per J.J. Reyes, Jr., First Division]; People v. Lumaya, 827 Phil. 473 (2018) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division]; People v. Valdez, 703 Phil. 519 [Per J. Bersamin, Special First Division] (Resolution); People v. Rodriguez, 395 Phil. 876 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].

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