G.R. No. 211146

G.R. No. 211146, April 11, 2023,
♦ Decision, J Lopez, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Singh, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Leonen, [J]

SECRETARY PROCESO J. ALCALA, AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, AND AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL FOOD AUTHORITY COUNCIL, AND THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, REPRESENTED BY COMMISSIONER JOHN PHILLIP P. SEVILLA, PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE JUDGE CICERO D. JURADO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 11, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN MANILA, DANILO G. GALANG, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE ST. HILDEGARD GRAINS ENTERPRISES, AND IVY M. SOUZA, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE BOLD BIDDER MARKETING AND GENERAL MERCHANDISE, RESPONDENT.

The issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is considered an extraordinary event, being a strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy,1 and must be grounded on the existence of a clear and unmistakable right. Thus, the power to issue the writ "should be exercised sparingly, with utmost care, and with great caution and deliberation."2 The failure to observe these safeguards constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

This Court are two consolidated Petitions for Certiorari with Applications for Injunctive Relief,3 which (1) assail various orders issued by respondent Regional Trial Court (RTC) judges, preliminarily enjoining various district collectors from seizing, holding, and detaining private respondents' rice shipments, due to lack of National Food Authority (NFA) import licenses, and (2) seek to restrain the RTC judges from proceeding with full-blown injunction hearings on the district collectors' NFA to seize, hold, and detain the imports.

Sometime in 2013, private respondent Joseph Mangupag Ngo (Ngo) entered into an agreement to buy imported rice from Starcraft International Trading Corp. (Starcraft), a corporation registered under Philippine laws. The shipments from Thailand were covered by 15 bills of lading and were set to arrive at the port of Davao City on various dates in October 2013 and November 2013. Based on the agreement between Ngo and Starcraft, the ownership over the Rice Shipments will be transferred to Ngo upon payment of the amount stipulated as the down payment therein. Accordingly, Ngo made payments in the aggregate amount of PHP 21,132,000.00 representing the down payment for the rice shipments in the Bills of Lading.4 In the process of the release of the rice shipments from customs custody, Ngo was informed that the rice shipments could be released by the Bureau of Customs (BOC)—District Collector because they were imported without the necessary import permits from the NFA.5 Ngo reasoned with the BOC that an import permit was not necessary for rice shipments because such was considered a quantitative restriction6 on the import of agricultural products, which was prohibited under the World Trade Organization (WTO)—Agreement on Agriculture.

Historical background on the WTO Agreement on agriculture and the Philippines' special treatment for rice

The Philippines became a founding Member of the WTO as the Marrakesh Agreement entered into force on January 1, 1995.7 The WTO provides a common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations in matters related to multilateral and plurilateral trade agreements annexed thereto.8 It spells out the principles of liberalization and permitted exceptions thereto, sets out Members' commitment to lower customs tariffs and trade barriers, and outlines dispute settlement procedures.9

It was on the same year that the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was negotiated, culminating in the subject Agreement on Agriculture. Notably, one of the preambulatory clauses of the Agreement on Agriculture declared its "regard to non-trade concerns, including food security and the need to protect the environment; having regard to the agreement that special and differential treatment for developing countries is an integral element of the negotiations, and taking into account the possible negative effects of the implementation of the reform program on least-developed and net food-importing developing countries."10

Annex 5, Part B of the Agreement on Agriculture allowed special treatment for a primary agricultural product that is a predominant staple in the country's traditional diet—and following the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, the Philippine government obtained a special treatment for rice in 1995 ("Special Treatment"), set to expire on December 31, 200411 (first concession). This first concession was extended to July 30, 2012, through a Certification of Modifications and Rectifications12 of the Philippines' schedule of commitments (second concession). Paragraph 5.1 of this second concession stated that "[a]ny continuation of special treatment for rice shall be contingent on the outcome of the [Doha Development Agenda] negotiations[.]"13

On March 20, 2012—seeing as the Doha Development Agenda negotiations would not be completed before the second concession would lapse—the Philippine government submitted a Request for Waiver on Special Treatment for Rice of the Philippines (Request for Waiver),14 including a Draft Decision15 seeking a third concession proposed to expire on June 30, 2017. The Request for Waiver submitted to WTO stated the following justifications for this request:

In the ensuing WTO sessions, the Council for Trade in Goods simply noted the Request for Waiver, and the Philippine government reported on ongoing negotiations and consultations with other interested members.17 At the time these Petitions were filed, the Request for Waiver had yet to be definitely resolved.18 It was only on July 24, 2014, pending these certiorari proceedings, that the WTO released a Decision on Waiver Relating to Special Treatment for Rice of the Philippines,19 allowing a third concession until June 30, 2017 for the special treatment of rice.

On the domestic plane, as early as 1972, then-President Ferdinand Marcos passed Presidential Decree No. 4, later amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 699 and 1485, "Proclaiming the Creation of the National Grains Authority and Providing Funds Therefor." Under Section 6(a)(xii) thereof, the National Grains Authority, the predecessor of the NFA,20 was authorized to establish rules and regulations on the importation of rice, and to license, impose, and collect fees and charges for said importation.

In 1996, Republic Act No. 8178, or "An Act Replacing Quantitative Import Restrictions on Agricultural Products, Except Rice, With Tariffs, Creating the Agricultural Competitiveness Enhancement Fund, And For Other Purposes" was passed. With the explicit exception of rice, Section 2 of the law mandated the use of tariffs in lieu of non-tariff import restrictions to protect local producers of agricultural products, and Section 4 repealed various laws or provisions prescribing quantitative import restrictions or those empowering government bodies to impose such restrictions.

The powers of the NFA, formerly the National Grains Authority (NGA) included the following:

(xii) to establish rules and regulations governing the importation of rice and to license, impose and collect fees and charges for said importation for the purpose of equalizing the selling price of such imported rice with normal prevailing domestic prices. (Emphasis supplied)

On March 22, 2013, the NFA issued Memorandum Circular No. AO-2K13-03-003 with the subject "General Guidelines in the Importation of Well-Milled Rice Under the Country Specific Quota (CSQ) of 163, 000 MT for the Year 2013" ("2013 NFA Rice Importation Guidelines").21 In line with the government's policy of allowing the private sector to participate in rice importation when needed, the NFA allocated a total import volume of 163, 000 metric tons of rice from the stated source countries of Thailand, China, India, and Australia. The import volume was to be allocated to importers on a first come, first served basis, at a minimum of 2,000 metric tons and a maximum of 5,000 metric tons per importer for the year 2013. The 2013 NFA Rice Importation Guidelines provided that all interested NFA-licensed importers may apply to import by submitting the enumerated company documents, obtaining a Certificate of Eligibility, payment of duties/tariffs, obtaining a Notice of Allocation, submitting the enumerated shipment documents, and ultimately obtaining the Import Permit on a per bill of lading basis.22

On December 5, 2013, Ngo filed a Complaint for Permanent Injunction with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction23 before Branch 16, RTC, Davao City, docketed as Civil Case No. 35,354-2013. He asserted in his complaint that although the Philippines filed a request with the WTO for a 5-year extension of the Special Treatment, such extension was not yet granted as of the date of his complaint. He alleged that the withholding of his rice shipments cost him expenses with respect to demurrage and storage fees, among others.24 Ngo asserted that he had a legal right over the rice shipments pursuant to his agreement with Starcraft. He became the owner of the rice shipments upon payment of the down payment and had the right to cause the release of the rice shipments and to take possession and custody thereof.25

Significantly, Ngo claimed that the WTO Special Treatment was the only source of the Philippines' right to impose quantitative restrictions by way of import permits and import quotas.26 Claiming irreparable injury as the further detention of the rice shipments can cause to his good business reputation, Ngo prayed that the district collector lift the restrictions on his imports and be preliminarily and permanently enjoined from seizing or holding these from implementing any hold orders, and doing any act that would prejudice Ngo while the propriety and validity of its actions are still subject to judicial determination.27

On January 14, 2015, private respondent Danilo G. Galang (Galang), filed a similar Complaint28 making identical allegations and praying for substantially similar reliefs as Ngo. Galang alleged that during the course of his business, he had dealings with Ivy M. Souza (Souza) who was a rice trader, importer and sole proprietor of Bold Bidder Marketing and General Merchandise. In December 2013, Galang entered into an agreement with Souza, with the latter agreeing to sell Galang the rice shipments imported by her and were to be discharged in the Port of Manila. Ownership was allegedly transferred to Galang upon his payment for the rice shipments. The BOC refused to release Souza's rice importations because they were made without import permits from the NFA, hence, illegal under the 2013 NFA Rice Importation Guidelines. The Complaint filed by Galang was directed against the District Collector of the Port of Manila and filed before Branch 11, RTC, Manila City, docketed as Civil Case No. CV-14-131261.

In Civil Case No. 35,354-2013, Judge Emmanuel C. Carpio (Judge Carpio) found that, considering the expiry of the second concession on June 30, 2012, the District Collector of the Port of Davao's authority to seize and detain Ngo's shipments was disputable, which was an issue that required a full-blown hearing. Granting the preliminary injunction,29 Judge Carpio disposed in his assailed Order30 in this wise:

Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. CV-14-131261, following the approved bond of 10 Million Pesos posted through Visayan Surety and Insurance Corporation, Judge Cicero D. Jurado, Jr. (Judge Jurado) deemed a preliminary injunction necessary since the District Collector of the Port of Manila's continued detention of Galang's rice shipments constituted a material invasion of the latter's rights.33 In the Amended Order,34 Judge Jurado ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction:

On February 24, 2014, Secretary Proceso J. Alcala (Alcala), as Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and Chairperson of the NFA, as well as the BOC, represented by Commissioner John Phillip P. Sevilla (Sevilla) (petitioners), filed a Petition for Certiorari with application for TRO, Status Quo Ante Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before this Court. Upon the filing of the petition in G.R. No. 211146, this Court issued a Resolution36 temporarily restraining Judge Carpio from implementing the assailed issuances and from further proceeding with the injunction hearing.37 Following this Court's directive, Judge Carpio issued a March 18, 2014 Order suspending the proceedings in Civil Case No. 35,354-2013.

Thereafter, this Court issued a Resolution,38 consolidating the petition in G.R. No. 211375 with G.R. No. 211146, and likewise preventing Judge Jurado from implementing his assailed orders and from continuing with the injunction proceedings.39

Following the above issuances, Ngo and Galang each filed an Urgent Motion and/or Manifestation for the Release of Perishable Goods (Rice) Under Bond,40 stressing that the prolonged detention by the BOC of the rice shipments will result to their deterioration, spoilage, and wastage. This Court denied these urgent motions in its Resolution as follows:41

Private respondents Ngo, Galang, and Souza all sought the reconsideration of the Resolution.43 However, in another Resolution,44 this Court denied reconsideration, ruling that they merely appealed to equity while the law clearly directs the BOC to proceed with its mandate, and that they had not even clearly shown their legal right to the rice shipments. This Court expressed its inclination to rule on the main Petitions only after exhaustively going through the parties' submissions.

On September 30, 2014, petitioners filed with this Court a Manifestation stating45 that the WTO had released a Decision on Waiver Relating to Special Treatment for Rice of the Philippines,46 allowing a third concession from July 1, 2012 until June 30, 2017.

Much later in the proceedings, after this Court required the parties to move in the premises,47 petitioners filed a Compliance and Manifestation,48 pointing out that, on February 14, 2019, President Rodrigo Duterte signed into law Republic Act No. 11203, entitled "An Act Liberalizing the Importation, Exportation and Trading of Rice, Lifting for the Purpose the Quantitative Restriction on Rice, and for Other Purposes." Petitioners conceded that Republic Act No. 11203 amended Republic Act No. 8178, thus no longer subjecting rice imports to quantitative restrictions, and instead allowing only tariffication of such commodity. This development notwithstanding, petitioners emphasized that these petitions must still be resolved since Republic Act No. 11203 took effect on March 5, 2019, whereas the subject rice shipments were imported sometime in 2013, when Republic Act No. 8178 had not yet been amended, and the 2013 NFA Rice Importation Guidelines was in full effect, where NFA import licenses were still required. Thus, although Republic Act No. 11203 had already superseded the 2013 NFA Rice Importation Guidelines,49 if only to properly scrutinize the assailed orders, this Court should appreciate the implications of this issuance during the time it was in effect.

Petitioners primarily assert that public respondents Judge Carpio and Judge Galang committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding private respondents' argument that no NFA import permits were necessary for the subject rice shipments. Petitioners claim that they had the requisite standing to file such petitions as they were real parties in interest in the case. They claim that public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the writ of preliminary injunction despite the private respondents' failure to demonstrate a clear and unmistakable legal right that ought to be protected by the courts, and the failure to establish an injury that is irreparable, which is understood in jurisprudence as unquantifiable. Additionally, they contended that public respondents, in granting the said injunctions, effectively allowed a collateral attack on the 2013 NFA Rice Importation Guidelines, contravening the presumption of regularity accorded to it. They claim that the private respondents cannot anchor their claim of rights on the WTO agreements as only member states may bring suits in relation to any violation thereof. On the procedural aspect, petitioners claim that direct resort to this Court's jurisdiction was proper because of the urgent matters of national interest involved.50

In contradicting the instant Petitions, private respondents Galang and Souza raised several procedural concerns. They assert that DA Secretary Alcala and Bureau Commissioner Sevilla were not original parties against whom the civil cases were filed and against whom the Preliminary Injunction subject of this case was issued. They also question the propriety of filing a Petition for Certiorari before this Court, for alleged failure to demonstrate grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents and for disregard of the hierarchy of courts. They further assert that petitioners were not deprived of due process as the district collectors of the ports of Manila, north harbor and south harbor, were duly notified of the complaint and the hearings on the application for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction. Finally, they insist that the imminent damage or injury caused to them is irreparable. Additionally, in their Joint Memorandum,51 they appended the WTO's Introduction of Harmonized System Changes into WTO Schedules of Tariff Concessions on January 1, 1996, which demonstrates that retroactive effects of waiver decisions must be explicitly provided for, while the WTO's waiver decision on rice imports provided no such retroactivity.52

Ngo raised substantially the same arguments as Galang and Souza. He argued in his Comment53 that the 2013 NFA Rice Importation Guidelines was invalid at the time the District Collector enforced it, as it was not filed with the University of the Philippines Office of the National Administrative Register; and that then-Justice Secretary Leila De Lima actually issued a legal opinion to Secretary Alcala, upon the latter's request, advising that the NFA could no longer require import licenses as the June 30, 2012 waiver extension had lapsed.

In his Comment,54 Judge Carpio proffered that in determining whether the writ of preliminary injunction was properly issued, the fundamental issue is whether, after the June 30, 2012 deadline of the waiver extension, the NFA still had the authority to require licenses for rice imports.

Whether the instant case is rendered moot and academic with the enactment of Republic Act No. 11203; and

Whether Secretary Proceso Alcala and Commissioner John Philip Sevilla have legal standing to institute the instant petitions for certiorari despite the fact that they were not original parties in the civil cases at the court a quo.

On the substantive aspect, the central issue for this case is whether public respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writs of preliminary injunction against the District Collectors' seizure and detention of private respondents' rice shipments. This can be resolved by threshing out the sub-issue of whether private respondents have established a clear legal right in esse to import rice at the time of this controversy.

We are well aware of the multifarious legal interests involved in the instant factual milieu and its entanglement between several timeless concerns such as the nation's food security and international free trade vis-à-vis protectionist policies.

We make explicit, however, that it is not within the province of this Court to comment on the benefits and disadvantages of either of the above economic policies as these are dynamic issues that is better left to the wisdom of the Executive branch, headed by the Chief Executive, who likewise stands as the country's chief architect for foreign policy.55

This Court has no intention of venturing outside the narrow path of determining the existence of a grave abuse of discretion. Any extensive and substantive discussion herein—on the nature of the WTO Agreement, its differentiated treatment between developed and developing countries, and its dispute settlement mechanisms; the principle of pacta sunt servanda; the political question doctrine; the President's plenary power to manage international relations; fundamental rights and property rights; statutory construction of Republic Act No. 9178—is deemed necessary only because of the deep sub-issue as to whether private respondents met the requirement of having a clear and unmistakable right.

The enactment of Republic Act No. 11203 does not render the instant case moot and academic

The rule is that a case becomes moot when the resolution of the issue would no longer serve a practical value. This was explained in Express Telecommunications Co. Inc. v. AZ Communications, Inc.56 as follows:

At first glance, it would appear that the instant Petitions may have already been mooted by the enactment of Republic Act No. 11203, as well as the issuance of the Resolution,58 which held that the BOC, not being covered by the injunctions issued by this Court, may proceed with the exercise of its mandate in accordance with law.

Nonetheless, courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.59

The instant case falls under the fourth exception. The Philippines' second concession expired on June 30, 2012, while a third concession was granted only on July 24, 2014. Consequently, an interval occurred within which the Philippines was not covered by an exemption from the pertinent provisions of the WTO. During this period, several rice shipments would have to pass by the District Collectors who may have relied on the provisions of 2013 NFA Guidelines on Rice Importation. As such, it is reasonable to believe that those similarly situated will bring a similar action as in the instant case. There is thus, a necessity to resolve the instant case and lay to rest the pending issues.

Petitioners Alcala and Sevilla have legal standing to institute the instant petitions for certiorari

Private respondents aver that petitioners do not have legal standing to initiate the instant Petitions for Certiorari, in view of the fact that the only parties impleaded in the original complaints were the District Collector of the Port of Manila for Civil Case No. CV-14-131261; and the District Collector of the Port of Davao for Civil Case No. 35,354-2013.

First, the Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides who may be considered as parties in interest:

Section 2. Parties in interest. — A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. (2a)

We agree with the position of the petitioners that both District Collectors impleaded in the injunction proceedings are officers within the BOC, one of the petitioners in this case. The injury to be suffered by the BOC is the infringement of its mandate to "implement an effective revenue collection by preventing and suppressing smuggling and the entry of prohibited imported goods."60 The BOC was appropriately represented in the present case by its Commissioner, Sevilla.

The other petitioner, Alcala, was the former Secretary of DA. Given that the complaint for injunction clearly questioned the requirement of import permits under the 2013 NFA Guidelines on Imported Rice, the mandate of the NFA was likewise attacked. As the Chairperson of the NFA Council pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 4, Alcala was an appropriate representative for the filing of this case.

In order to determine the propriety of the issued preliminary injunction, it is imperative to begin with Rule 58, Section 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended:

On the procedural aspect, Section 4 of the same Rule indicates, among others, that a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order may be granted only when the application shows facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded, and a bond is executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay to such party or person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto.

The existence of a right in esse is the first requisite. Case law provides that a right in esse is one that is clear and unmistakable, and one clearly founded on or granted by law, or is enforceable as a matter of law.62 It is not enough to merely allege a right. The existence of a right to be protected, as well as the violative acts against which the writ is sought to be issued, must be established.63

At the outset, it bears stating that private respondents did not in fact possess the import permit as required by the NFA. Ngo admitted this in his Judicial Affidavit64 before the permanent injunction case in the RTC:

The same is true for Galang, who admitted in his testimony before the trial court66 that the reason given by the Bureau of Customs for refusing to release his rice shipments was the absence of the NFA import permit.67

Given these facts, did private respondents have a clear and unmistakable right in law to import rice regardless of the knowledge, assessment, and approval of the NFA which results in its issuance of an import permit?

Importation is defined as the act of bringing in of goods from a foreign territory into Philippine territory, whether for consumption, warehousing, or admission.68

Based on the above definition, there is nothing about importation that will justify its classification as a clear and unmistakable right that is clearly founded on or granted by law, much less as a fundamental right.

A review of the laws involved—including, under the doctrine of incorporation,69 the WTO and its appendices—would also negate the establishment of such right.

We emphasize that the issue before this Court is narrowly drawn on the propriety of the public respondents' issuances of writs of preliminary injunction and the factual and legal bases relied upon in doing so.

To be clear, it has never been the mandate of the judicial department to grant rights to individuals. Especially in injunctive proceedings, plaintiffs must be able to prove that such right already exists. With regard to the deregulated importation of rice, private respondents posit that the WTO serves as their source of rights. We hold, however, that questions pertaining to import quotas, would fit into practically all the identifiers of a political question under the classic case of Baker v. Carr,70 namely:

This case concerns the subject matter of import quotas. Central to the 2013 NFA Guidelines for Rice Importation was the NFA's establishment of a Country Specific Quota (CSQ) of 163, 000 MT, where the import volume was to be allocated to importers on a first-come, first-served basis. No less than the Constitution provides a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue of import quotas to a coordinate political department:

This provision had been the subject of a previous controversy before this Court. In the 2005 case of Southern Cross Cement Corp. v. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Phils.,73 this Court emphasized the inherent power of the legislature over the subject matter of import quotas of foreign goods:

Needless to say, it is not within the province of this Court to accord rights—such rights must be clearly provided by Congress, and proven to apply to the claimant.

Presidential Decree No. 4, later amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 699 and 1485, created the National Grains Authority, predecessor of the NFA75 which was authorized to establish rules and regulations on the importation of rice, and to license, impose, and collect fees and charges for said importation.

The enactment of Republic Act No. 8178 on March 28, 1996 provided a regime of quantitative restriction for rice imports despite the mandatory tariffication of other agricultural products:

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is the policy of the State to make the country's agricultural sector viable, efficient and globally competitive. The State adopts the use of tariffs in lieu of non-tariff import restrictions to protect local producers of agricultural products, except in the case of rice, which will continue to have quantitative import restrictions. (Emphasis supplied)

Further, Republic Act No. 8178 expanded the powers of the NFA to include the establishment of rules for licensing, importing and collection of fees and charges for rice importation:

A review of Republic Act No. 8178, enacted after the Philippines' concession to the WTO Agreement, reveals that it does not contain any sunset clause to indicate that the effectivity of the quantitative restrictions on rice were contingent on external events outside the scope of the text of the law, i.e., the grant or denial by the WTO of the Philippines' requests for special treatment. To hold the contrary—that an expiry date on the effectivity of laws may be based on external, global events—would produce a significant amount of instability to the State.

It was on the basis of this authority that the NFA issued the subject 2013 NFA Rice Importation Guidelines, which provided that all interested NFA-licensed importers may apply to import by submitting the enumerated company documents, obtaining a Certificate of Eligibility, payment of duties/tariffs, obtaining a Notice of Allocation, submitting the enumerated shipment documents, and ultimately obtaining the Import Permit on a per bill of lading basis.

Given legal foundations behind the NFA's requirements, this Court would be hard-pressed to declare the existence of a clear and unmistakable right to import rice regardless of adherence to the guidelines set by the NFA, which acted according to its mandate.

To be clear, in upholding the requirement of having an import license permit, as supported by Republic Act No. 8178, this Court is in no way intending to violate our obligations under the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda which mandates that "international agreements must be performed in good faith."76 As Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh astutely stated—in ruling that the NFA had such authority, this Court does not seek to embarrass the Philippines in the international stage. Rather, it must reframe its perspective as a domestic court, resolving domestic issues, taking into consideration the country's international commitments.77

Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier emphasized that the President's power in dealing with international relations is plenary in the sense that only express limitations circumscribe this power.78 To cite the recent case of Esmero v. Duterte:79

As the sole organ of our foreign relations and the constitutionally assigned chief architect of our foreign policy, the President is vested with the exclusive power to conduct and manage the country's interface with other states and governments. Being the principal representative of the Philippines, the Chief Executive speaks and listens for the nation; initiates, maintains, and develops diplomatic relations with other states and governments; negotiates and enters into international agreements; promotes trade, investments, tourism and other economic relations; and settles international disputes with other states.80 (Emphasis supplied and citation omitted)

We cannot overlook the fact that negotiations were initiated by the Executive branch before the lapse of the second concession and were pending approval during the same period. As Justice Lazaro-Javier further remarked, the injunctive orders issued by Judge Carpio and Judge Jurado were clearly out-of-step with the legal doctrine that textually commits foreign relations exclusively to the President and his or her subalterns.81

Between the power of the executive department to negotiate with the WTO as they deem fit, and the power of the judicial department to affirm the existence of rights based on the WTO instruments, there is no reason in this case to unduly aggrandize the latter, and in effect, diminish the former.

In any case, the WTO Agreement itself provides justification for the executive's course of action in maintaining status quo while awaiting the decision on their request for a third concession, a request which was made before the lapse of the second concession. For example, consideration given by the WTO Agreement to developing companies has already been the subject of discourse by this Court, which, in the case of Tañada v. Angara,82 cited the practice of "decision-making by consensus"83 in the WTO Agreement and the availability of waivers for obligations under Article IX, Sections 1 and 3 thereof. As discussed by this Court:

In said case, this Court proceeded to enumerate examples of the built-in mechanisms in the WTO that protect developing countries with regard to tariff reductions, domestic subsidies, export subsidies, and unfair foreign competition by member states, thus:

In the same way that the WTO provides assurances to developing countries in the aspects of tariff reductions, domestic subsidies, export subsidies, and unfair foreign competition, there are special considerations with regard to the rules on market access,86 which is the pertinent issue in this case. The Agreement on Agriculture provides the following general rule and exception with regard to market access:

The second paragraph recognizes instances where market access may be increased, effectively restricting the importation of certain goods, and refers to Annex 5 of the same document. The relevant Section under Annex 5, in turn, explicitly provides an exception for agricultural products which are considered as a predominant staple in the traditional diet in developing countries, following certain conditions as stated. We reproduce the Section extensively in order to demonstrate the complex and collegial nature of the negotiations and decision-making processes which result in the grant of a special treatment:

Paragraph 8 of Annex 5, Section B in the provision quoted above mentions a timeline for the initiation and completion for negotiations regarding the special agreement. It bears noting, however, that when the Philippines was granted an extension of seven years, or until 2012, it was also bound by the provisions of the Extension Agreement which stated that "any continuation of special treatment for rice shall be contingent on the outcome of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA)."89 As it turned out, however, the Doha Development Agenda negotiations were not completed before June 30, 2012. The Philippines' concurrence to the seven-year extension was likewise premised on the understanding that the outcome of the Doha Development Agenda negotiations would provide an alternative special mechanism that would cushion any negative impacts of liberalization on rice on its food and livelihood security.90 This prompted the Philippines to submit a request to the WTO Council on Trade in Goods for the continuation of its special treatment for rice91 and to continue its talks with the other countries to support its request for a waiver, resulting in the eventual Decision on Waiver Relating to Special Treatment for Rice of the Philippines,92 allowing a third concession until June 30, 2017.93

Certainly, the simplistic approach by private respondents to the Philippines' relationship with the WTO and its member countries was a disregard of the complexities and intricacies that accompany trade and international relations.

As aptly observed by Senior Associate Justice Marvic M. V. F. Leonen, the WTO, its Agreement on Agriculture and its Annexes, do not provide unilateral fines or penalties to be meted out by the WTO or other member countries for any derogation therefrom.

Further, the WTO follows a dispute settlement mechanism, as detailed in Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement for94 the Dispute Settlement Understanding which covers disputes concerning the violation of trade rules, i.e., "situations in which a Member considers that any benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under the covered agreements are being impaired by measures taken by another Member[.]"95 The Dispute Settlement Understanding provides for a supranational dispute settlement mechanism, under which Member-States are the interested parties precisely because the disputes pertain to official actions by other Member-States that detract from their undertakings under the WTO Agreement and related instruments. The WTO itself gives an overview of this framework in this manner:

It can be gleaned from above that the trade rules provided in the WTO Agreement are highly contextualized, qualified, and consultative. This is further compounded by the inherent dynamic nature of trade agreements, ever evolving according to multifarious factors such as geopolitics, local productivity, exchange rates, inflation, and demand. When understood in this context, private respondents' brazen act of importation without a permit during the gap of the second concession's expiry and the grant for the third concession was clearly a gamble that they made at their own risk.

It is likewise important to understand the key principles97 of the WTO which specifically include "support for less developed countries" in the recognition that over three-quarters of WTO members are developing economies or in transition to market economies.98

Private respondents assert that by virtue of their ownership of the subject rice shipments, they have a clear legal right to the injunctive relief.

Assailing this, petitioners highlight the fact that the bills of lading were in the name of Starcraft instead of Ngo in Civil Case No. 35,354-2013; whereas in Civil Case No. CV-14-131261, the bills are named under Bold Bidder Marketing and General Merchandising instead of Galang. Both sets of bills are marked "non-negotiable."

We clarify this point. A bill of lading operates both as a receipt, reciting the details of the goods shipped; and as a contract, naming the contracting parties, including the consignee, and fixing the rights and obligations assumed.99 It operates as an agreement to transport and deliver the goods at a specified place to a person named or on his or her order.100 As such, it is merely a convenient commercial instrument designed to protect the importer or consignee.101

The non-negotiability of the bills of lading is material only for purposes of identifying to whom the shipper will release the cargo. It becomes relevant particularly in instances of multiple claimants of the shipments. In no way does it preclude the consignee from transferring ownership over the shipments, even prior to delivery, as Ngo and Starcraft did pursuant to their Agreement, and as Galang and Souza likewise transacted. In resolving ownership, non-negotiability of a bill of lading does not defeat private respondents' rights.

In this case, the Agreement in Civil Case No. 35,354-2013 pertains to a sale by Starcraft and purchase by Ngo of rice shipments. Pursuant to Article 4 therein, "[t]itle to the Goods shall be transferred from the Seller to the Buyer upon payment of the down payment for the Goods on a per sales order/shipment basis." Meanwhile, Article 5 therein indicates that, while Starcraft is authorized to process the release of the shipments from the BOC, Ngo, as the owner, is not precluded from taking initiative in the manner he deems appropriate to secure such release. Undisputed from the records of Civil Case No. 35,354-2013 are Ngo's testimony and exhibits102 showing that he had already paid for the rice shipments, prompting the transfer of title to him.

Nevertheless, while the private respondents may have established their ownership, such right remains subject to the limitations of public law or, in the private sphere, the rights of other individuals. Time and again, we have pronounced that the right to property has a social dimension, allowing the State to step in for general welfare. This was eloquently explained by this Court in Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. The Department of Social Welfare and Development103 concerning State-mandated senior citizen discounts:

The policy goals as stated in Presidential Decree No. 4, and subsequently, Republic Act 8178, refer to the promotion of the integrated growth and development of the grains industry, for the end of continuous food supply to the nation.105 The actions of the District Collectors under the BOC therefore cannot be impeded as these were well aligned with the mandate of the NFA, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 4, Republic Act No. 8178.

Fundamental rights are those that serve as a pre-requisite for the exercise of other rights. A perusal of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights would reveal that such determined fundamental rights refer to those that edify the dignity and worth of the human person. Basic examples for this include the right to life, liberty, and security of the person, as well as the right to be free from slavery or the right to be free from cruel punishment. Certainly, the importation of rice does not fall within this classification requiring a higher degree of protection from government encroachment.

Thus, where the right asserted by a plaintiff in an injunction complaint is doubtful or disputed, a preliminary injunction is not proper.106 With the failure of Ngo and Galang to establish a right in esse, it becomes clear that they are not entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction.

In the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction, jurisprudence provides the threshold of grave abuse of discretion:

Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law.107 (Citation omitted)

Utmost prudence is required in the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. As established by this Court, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is considered an "extraordinary event," being a "strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy."108 Thus, the power to issue the writ "should be exercised sparingly, with utmost care, and with great caution and deliberation."109 The failure to observe these safeguards constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

In light of the nature of the case, public respondents gravely abused their discretion by relying solely on Ngo and Galang's proof of ownership over the shipments. It is difficult to overlook how public respondents issued these assailed orders in the face of subsisting laws and regulations:

While this begs the counter-argument that the WTO's free-trade policies should have reigned, it is reasonable to expect public respondents to have considered the following legal principles involved in Ngo and Galang's complaint:

In light of the above analysis, there being no clear and unmistakable right in esse that was invaded resulting in an irreparable injury, it behooves this Court to dissolve the writs of injunction granted by the RTC in Civil Case No. 35,354-2013 and CV-14-131261. We reiterate Olalia v. Hizon113 with regard to the issuance of preliminary injunctions:

It has been consistently held that there is no power the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation and sound discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuance of an injunction. It is the strong arm of equity that should never be extended unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages.

Every court should remember that an injunction is a limitation upon the freedom of action of the defendant and should not be granted lightly or precipitately. It should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands it.114

ACCORDINGLY, the Petitions for Certiorari in both G.R. Nos. 211146 and 211375 are hereby GRANTED. This Court REVERSES:

1. The December 12, 2013 and December 13, 2013 Orders, as well as the December 13, 2013 Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by respondent Judge Emmanuel C. Carpio in Civil Case No. 35,354-2013; and

2. The January 23, 2014 and February 27, 2014 Orders, the February 28, 2014 Amended Order, and the January 24, 2014 Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by respondent Judge Cicero D. Jurado, Jr. in Civil Case No. CV-14-131261.

Consequently, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued in favor of Danilo G. Galang and Joseph Mangupag Ngo in Civil Case No. CV-14-131261 and Civil Case No. 35,354-2013, respectively, are DISSOLVED.

Gesmundo, C.J., Hernando, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, Dimaampao, Marquez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concur.