EN BANC
[ A.M. No. 19-01-15-RTC, April 18, 2023 ]
IN RE: CONDUCTED REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN BRANCH 24, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, CABUGAO, ILOCOS SUR, UNDER HON. RAPHIEL F. ALZATE, AS ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
DIMAAMPAO, J.:
I submit this Concurring and Dissenting Opinion to discuss my views on the manner of imposition of penalties under A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC1 entitled "'Re: Further Amendments to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court."
I join the majority's view in setting aside the original penalty of dismissal, with the attendant accessory penalties, imposed against respondent Judge Raphiel F. Alzate, and that the same must be substituted with a less severe administrative penalty in the form of a five-year suspension. Nevertheless, I dissent on the imposition of an additional fine of P200,000.00 in consideration of his previous administrative liability.
I expound.
Succinctly, the ponencia exonerated Judge Raphiel F. Alzate from the charges of blatant violation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC involving Case Nos. 925-KC, 924-KC, 921-KC, and 928-KC, specifically, in determining the parties' compliance with the jurisdictional requirements in nullity of marriage cases, and allegations of swift and worry – free decision in Case No. 894-KC, after finding that such was not warranted by the factual and legal circumstances attending the said cases.2 However, he was held liable for gross neglect of duty in violation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC for: (1) deciding five cases, namely, Case Nos. 925-KC (Cherry A. Gatchalian v. Roel M. Gatchalian), 894-KC (Grace V. Torres v. Gerald S. Torres), 15-828 (Lenie Cabintoy Agbilay vs. Reysel Agbilay), 15-829 (Declaration of Void Marriage of Gaudencio Urbano Jr. And Vernalyn Bueno) and 15-848 (Louie Luico vs. Baby Rose Reyes) without conducting a pre-trial; and proceeding with the disposition of (2) two cases, i.e., 15-850, (Aleli Historillo-Salido vs. Keith Rosario-Salido) and 875-KC (Beverly Tica v. Jesus Fantastico) without awaiting the reports on the possible collusion of the parties.3
The ponencia incipiently imposed suspension in the aggregate period of five years, broken down as follows:
For Judge Alzate's failure to await the submission of "no collusion" reports in two cases, we deem it proper to impose the penalty of suspension for 10 months with regard to Civil Case No. 15-850, (Aleli Historillo-Salido vs. Keith Rosario-Salido) and another 10-month suspension for Civil Case No. 875-KC (Beverly Tica v. Jesus Fantastico).
For his failure to conduct pre-trial in Case Nos. 925-KC (Cherry A. Gatchalian v. Roel M. Gatchalian), 894-KC (Grace V. Torres v. Gerald S. Torres), 15-828 (Lenie Cabintoy Agbilay vs. Reysel Agbilay), 15-829 (Declaration of Void Marriage of Gaudencio Urbano Jr. And Vernalyn Bueno), and 15-848 (Louie Luico vs. Baby Rose Reyes), on the other hand, a corresponding eight month suspension for each case is proper.4
First off, the suspensions corresponding to each of the above cases are imposed pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 140, as amended. Under the said provision, serious administrative offenses may be meted with any of the following penalties:
(a) Dismissal from service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Supreme Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
(b) Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than six (6) months but not exceeding one (1) year; or
(c) A fine of more than ₱100,000.00 but not exceeding ₱200,000.00
Plainly, Section 17 indicates that the three sanctions are alternative in nature. As evinced by the disjunctive word "or", the Court has the discretion to determine which among these penalties should be inflicted on the erring judicial personnel.5
On the other hand, the imposition of separate penalties for each offense was made in view of the clear mandate under Section 21.6 This is a departure from the previous rule of imposing the penalty corresponding to the most serious offense under Section 55 of the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RACCS) in the event that a person is found liable for two (2) or more different offenses.7 Notably, Section 21 adopted the Court's pronouncement in Boston Finance and Investment Corp. v. Gonzalez8 where it was recognized that the "multiplicity of penalties to be imposed on judges and justices is consistent with the higher level of decorum expected from them."
Under the foregoing premises, the ponencia's imposition of a total of five-year suspension for the multiple administrative infractions of Judge Alzate is in keeping with the current rules in administrative cases. Such aggregation is simply the result of the straightforward applications of Section 17 vis-ŕ-vis Section 21 of Rule 140, as amended.
Apart from the five-year suspension, however, a fine of P200,000.00 was likewise included by the ponencia. This resulted from the discovery that Judge Alzate had been previously reprimanded in A.M. No. RTJ-20-2576 for failing to inhibit himself from acting on his wife's application for notarial commission, viz.:
In addition, the Court notes that in A.M. No. RTJ-20-2576 dated January 29, 2020, Judge Alzate was reprimanded with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely for failing to inhibit himself from acting on his wife's application for notarial commission. Since this is already the second time that Judge Alzate has been found to be administratively liable, we find it proper to impose a fine of PHP200,000.00 to deter him from committing the same or similar acts in the future.9
The ponencia proffers that the imposition of such fine "is not found in A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC nor imposed based thereon but in the exercise of the Court's discretion as a form of deterrence"10 which is allowed under Article VIII, Section 1111 of the Constitution.
In my humble view, the inclusion of the P200,000.00 "as a form of deterrence" should not be sanctioned by the Court, lest it defeat the institutionalization of a "complete, streamlined, and updated administrative disciplinary framework" which served as an impetus for the Court to amend and update Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to the ponencia's thesis, I submit that it is precisely the codification of Rule 140 that serves as the deterrence to the commission of administrative infractions by the members, officials, employees, and personnel of the Judiciary. Rivetingly, the Court's approval of the amendments to Rule 140 is anchored, among others, on Article VIII, Section 11 of the Constitution.
The following whereas clauses of A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC are telling:
WHEREAS, under Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, "[t]he Supreme Court x x x [has] administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof”;
WHEREAS, under Section 11, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, "[t]he Supreme Court en banc x x x [has] the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon;
WHEREAS, Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution vests upon the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning the pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts;
WHEREAS, in accordance with its constitutional authority, the Supreme Court is empowered to issue or amend the rules for the proper discharge of its administrative and disciplinary functions over all Members, officials, employees, and personnel of the Judiciary;
x x x x
WHEREAS, Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe was assigned by Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo to conduct a comprehensive review and revision of Rule 140, which is envisioned to institutionalize a complete, streamlined, and updated administrative disciplinary framework for the entire Judiciary that is wholly independent from the Civil Service rules, harmonizes existing jurisprudence, and is uniformly applicable to all cases, regardless of when the infractions are committed;
In dealing with administrative cases, the Court therefore no longer needs to look outside the provisions of the said rule and resolve pending controversies based on any other standard. Rule 140 was crafted for this purpose. A contrary postulation therefore serves as an admission that the said framework is insufficient. This, however, is far from the truth. In fact, as will now be discussed, Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 140, as amended, squarely apply to the present case.
At this juncture, it is crucial to highlight the nature of the ₱200,000.00 fine. As earlier intimated, the ponencia holds that the same is on account of his previous reprimand in A.M. No. RTJ-20-2576. There is thus no quibbling that the said fine is an aggravating circumstance. On this score, Section 19 considers "[a] [f]inding of previous administrative liability where a penalty is imposed, regardless of nature and/or gravity," as an aggravating circumstance.
Appositely, Section 20 of Rule 140, as amended, establishes the manner of imposition of penalties in the presence of modifying circumstances. Thus:
If one (1) or more aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances are present, the Supreme Court may impose the penalties of suspension or fine for a period or amount not exceeding double of the maximum prescribed under this Rule.
If one (1) or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the Supreme Court may impose the penalties of suspension or fine for a period or amount not less than half of the minimum prescribed under this Rule.
If there are both aggravating and mitigating circumstances present, the Supreme Court may offset each other.
The ponencia recognizes the applicability of the foregoing sections in the instant case.12 This notwithstanding, it justifies the addition of a fine on the ground that "there is nothing in the annotations [to A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC] which restricts the Court from imposing a fine as an additional penalty to address the presence of an aggravating circumstance proportionally."13 Additionally, it posits that it is "not good law to restrict the constitutional power of the Court to discipline officers and staff in the Judiciary on the basis of specific exigent circumstances at play in particular cases or when circumstances warrant special measures to meet them, as in the case at bar."14
I respectfully diverge from the majority's view and submit that the presence of an aggravating circumstance, such as the finding of previous administrative liability, should only have the effect of increasing the suspension or fine initially imposed for the subject offense. It cannot be used, however, as a basis to introduce an administrative penalty of a different nature to that initially inflicted.
The annotations on A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC illustrate how a modifying circumstance affects the final penalty against an erring judicial personnel:
If the Supreme Court opts to impose the penalty of dismissal, then this provision will be of no effect since it only contemplates instances wherein the imposable penalty is suspension or fine.
If the Supreme Court opts to impose the penalty of suspension or fine:
x x x x
(b) If at least one (1) aggravating circumstance is present, e.g.1aшphi1, "previous commission of an offense, regardless of nature and/or gravity," then the Supreme Court may increase the period or amount of the imposable penalties to up to double of the maximum prescribed under this Rule. This means that Supreme Court is now permitted to penalize the respondent under a higher threshold i.e., impose an increased period of suspension for up to 2 years, or an increased fine in an amount up to ₱400,000.00.15
Verily, in the event that only an aggravating circumstance is present, the penalty initially imposed against the respondent may be increased to not more than double of the period or amount deemed proper by the Court, as the case may be. This is the clear and unmistakable import of the said Section. A suspension resulting from a serious offense may thus be increased for up to two years, while a fine may be increased up to ₱400,000.00. Significantly, this is but a natural and necessary consequence of the fact that a suspension and fine are distinct penalties from each other.
Aside from the above elucidation, I submit that the ponencia's analysis does not hold water when Section 20 is examined in its entirety. For one, the ponencia's theory only applies when what is initially imposed is a suspension. It cannot be applied when what the Court initially imposes is a fine, given that such reasoning would allow for a peculiar situation in which the aggravating circumstance may be meted the more serious penalty of suspension. For another, the ponencia's postulation cannot be logically implemented when the case calls for the mitigation of an offense. A penalty of suspension, for instance, cannot be mitigated other than by decreasing such suspension. Simply put, there is no such thing as a negative suspension or a negative fine.1aшphi1
As a final point, this construction i.e., that Section 20 cannot be used to introduce an administrative penalty of a different nature to that initially imposed, does not stifle the Court's discretion in the determination of the final sanction when modificatory circumstances are present. It would still have a free hand in determining the same within the ranges provided under the Rule 140. Moreover, the free exercise of the Court's disciplinary power is further accentuated by Section 21, which permits the imposition of the penalties of dismissal from service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as may be determined, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporations, should the aggregate of the imposed penalties exceed five (5) years of suspension.
In sooth, the present Rule 140, as amended, is an adequate deterrent to the commission of administrative offenses of the members, officials, employees, and personnel of the Judiciary. So too, is it a framework which allows the Court to exercise its discretion within the confines of the provisions of Rule 140, which it crafted pursuant to its constitutional powers.
All told, I vote to grant the Motion for Reconsideration and impose against Judge Raphiel F. Alzate the lesser penalty of suspension in view of the dismissal from service.
Footnotes
1 Dated February 22, 2022.
2 Id. at 41-51.
3 Id. at 54.
4 Id. at 55.
5 See Annotations to A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC. Available at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/04-26-2022-6.pdf last accessed on April 16, 2023.
6 SECTION 21. Penalty for Multiple Offenses. — If the respondent is found liable for more than one (1) offense arising from separate acts or omissions in a single administrative proceeding, the Court shall impose separate penalties for each offense. Should the aggregate of the imposed penalties exceed five (5) years of suspension or P1,000,000.00 in tines, the respondent may, in the discretion of the Supreme Court, be meted with the penalty of dismissal from service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as may be determined, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits.
7 See Annotations to A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC. Available at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wpcontent/uploads/2022/11/04-26-2022-6.pdf last accessed on April 16, 2023.
8 A.M. No. RTJ-18-2520, October 9, 2018.
9 Ponencia, p. 55.
10 Id. at 56.
11 The Members of the Supreme Court and judges or lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reached the age or seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
12 Ponencia, pp. 56-57.
13 Id. at 57.
14 Id.
15 See Annotations to A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC. Available at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/04-26-2022-6.pdf last accessed on April 16, 2023.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
