G.R. No. 230784 - HEIRS OF ANGEL YADAO, NAMELY: RUFINA YADAO, ETHERLYN YADAO-YASAÑA, RYANTH YADAO, RUTH ANN YADAO-MANGIBUNONG, DINA JOYCE YADAO-INES, AND ANGEL YADAO, JR.; HEIRS OF JOSEFINA IDICA-YADAO, NAMELY: LOURDES YADAO-APOSTOL AND AURORA YADAO; HEIRS OF OFELIA YADAO-NACENO, NAMELY: TEODULFO NACENO, JR., AILEEN NACENO AND IRMA NACENO-AGPAOA, petitioners, versus HEIRS OF JUAN CALITINA,1 NAMELY: HOSPICIO CALITINA,2 JR., ANICETO CALITINA,3 AND FLORIDA CALITINA,4 respondents.
DISSENTING OPINION
CAGUIOA, J.:
The main controversy in the case at bar is set against the backdrop of an alleged 31-year-old sale of Lot 1087 of Cadastre 317-D, located at Barangay Taggat Norte, Claveria, Cagayan with a total area of 1,797 square meters and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-479(S) (subject property) in favor of the predecessors-in-interest of petitioners Heirs of Angel Yadao, namely: Rufina Yadao, Etherlyn Yadao-Yasaña, Ryanth Yadao, Ruth Ann Yadao-Mangibunong, Dina Joyce Yadao-Ines, and Angel Yadao, Jr.; Heirs of Josefina Idica-Yadao, namely: Lourdes Yadao-Apostol and Aurora Yadao; and Heirs of Ofelia Yadao-Naceno, namely: Teodulfo Naceno, Jr., Aileen Naceno and Irma Naceno-Agpaoa (petitioners), and the legal ramifications of said alleged sale as against the claims for reconveyance of the heirs of the registered owner of the subject property, Juan Calitina, or herein respondents Heirs of Juan Calitina, namely: Hospicio Calitina, Jr., Aniceto Calitina, and Florida Calitina (respondents).
On the one hand, respondents submit that the subject property rightfully belongs to them by virtue of succession, and that petitioners merely unlawfully possess the same on the basis of an unproven contract of sale. On the other hand, petitioners counter that they are the rightful owners of the subject property either (i) by virtue of the Contrata and the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale (DoAS) entered into between Juan Calitina's common-lawwife Casiana Dalo, the former's illegitimate or non-marital children Jose Calitina (Jose) and William Calitina (William), and Josefina and Domingo Yadao, or otherwise (ii) by acquisitive prescription, for having been in possession of the subject property for over 30 years.
Branch 12, Regional Trial Court of Sanchez Mira, Cagayan (RTC) ruled for respondents and found them the absolute owners of the subject property through succession, and ordered petitioners to restore possession of the subject property to the former. It found that there was no evidence to prove the alleged sale in favor of Angel Yadao, considering that the Contrata was not notarized, and the DoAS was entered into by Casiana Dalo (Casiana) who was unauthorized to do so given that she was only the common-law wife of Juan Calitina. It also ruled out acquisitive prescription since the subject property was covered by the Torrens title in the name of respondents' predecessor-in-interest.5
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's findings of fact and law,6 and held that since acquisitive prescription cannot apply to registered lands, respondents were the lawful owners of the subject property and therefore had the right to recover the same.7
The ponencia grants the petition, reverses the RTC and the CA, dismisses the complaint of respondents, and declares petitioners as the owners of the subject property. With respect to respondents' assertion of lack of jurisdiction, the ponencia finds that petitioners are already estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the case since estoppel bars a party from challenging jurisdiction in an unjustly belated manner and after having actively participated during trial. With respect to the application of acquisitive prescription, it reminds that this rule is unavailing against the registered owner and his/her hereditary successors.1a⍵⍴h!1
The ponencia further holds that by virtue of extinctive prescription, respondents may no longer recover the subject lands from petitioners since their claim has also prescribed and the series of sales between them and petitioners' predecessors (as evidenced by the Contrata and subsequent DoAS) are declared valid. It finds that respondents are barred by extinctive prescription from assailing petitioners' possession on the ground of fraud or mistake, since petitioners have possessed the subject land since 1962 and respondents only sued them for recovery of said possession in 1993 or 31 years after.
In sum, the ponencia's central findings are that (1) subject property was sold by all of Juan Calitina's heirs in its entirety; and (2) the second exception to the application of extinctive prescription does not apply, since all of Juan's known heirs signed off on the Contrata.
First, with respect to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, I fully agree that pursuant to this Court's nuanced discussion in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,8 while a court's jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time during the course of the proceedings, the principle of estoppel by laches nevertheless operates to prevent a challenge on the court's jurisdiction in a belated manner that betrays unjustness or malice.9 In the instant case, the ponencia correctly notes that petitioners here already fully participated in the proceedings knowingly, and only raised the matter of lack of jurisdiction after all, except one witness, had testified in the trial court. Given this participation, petitioners cannot later question the jurisdiction they demonstrably submitted to without reservations earlier in the proceedings.
I similarly concur with the ponencia's discussion that acquisitive prescription may not apply to the subject property since it is covered by a Torrens title, as provided for under Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.10 It rightly recalls that ownership and possession of registered land may not be obtained by prescription regardless of the length of time of one's physical occupation and exercise of juridical rights over the same.11
I am, however, unable to subscribe to the ponencia's ruling that extinctive prescription applied against respondents' claim. I must disagree with the ponencia's ruling that the same operated as a bar on the part of respondents' claim of rightful ownership, and consequently concludes with a declaration that petitioners are the lawful owners of the entire 1,797-square-meter subject property. This main reservation rises from crucial but unascertained factual considerations, so that while it appears that the Contrata may have very well conveyed a property from the known heirs of the deceased registered owner Juan Calitina, i.e., Hospicio Calitina, Sr. (Hospicio, Sr.), Jose, and William, in favor of Josefina Yadao, the records of the case remain either silent or equivocal on whether the subject property was indeed sold in its entirety.
Contrary to the ponencia's determination, what finds support in the records of the case is the legal conclusion that what was lawfully conveyed to Josefina Yadao, if any, was at best a portion of the subject property, and not the whole of it, as petitioners so claim. Consequently, with respect to the unsold/unconveyed portions of the subject property, the same cannot be deemed to have been lawfully conveyed to petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, and therefore are not covered by the applicability of the extinctive prescription.
To my mind, what is decisive is the lack of any factual support for the legal conclusion that the subject property was sold in its entirety by all the heirs of Juan Calitina. In this regard, I maintain my submission that the silence or uncertainty of details in the records, as well as the failure on the part of petitioners to discharge their burden of proving the identity of the property so claimed as provided for in Article 434 of the Civil Code,12 leads to no other supportable deduction than that which holds that only a 400-square-meter portion of the subject property was certainly sold.
First and preliminarily, with respect to the appreciation of documentary evidence submitted by petitioners, I fully agree with the consistent factual finding of both the RTC and the CA that respondents here, as holders of a Torrens title over the subject property, submitted a superior documentary evidence as compared to the Contrata and the notarized but unregistered DoAS.13 It appears that the ponencia's reliance on the Contrata and the DoAS may be unsupported by the fact that the subject property, for all 31 years when petitioners were in possession of the same, nevertheless remained covered by a Torrens title in the name of the registered owner, and that the Torrens title is superior in probative weight to an unnotarized Contrata and an unregistered DoAS.1âшphi1
In addition, as observed by the CA, the tax declarations offered by petitioners to prove their ownership and lawful possession of the subject property not only fail to advance their claim but, to my mind, further weaken it. As the CA notes, the inconsistencies in terms of area and boundaries between the tax declarations offered by petitioners and the Torrens title covering the subject property and referred to in the Contrata and the DoAS were the same, to wit:
There are also certain disparities between the Tax Declarations [petitioners] presented and the Torrens title of the disputed land. A careful scrutiny of the Tax Declarations showed that it lacks the description of the property particularly the Certificate of Title No. of the property to be taxed. It is also interesting to note that the area of the property in the tax declarations is only 400 square meters whereas the area covered by the OCT No. 479(S) is 1,797 square meters. Also, the boundaries stated in the tax declarations are different from the boundaries stated in the Torrens title. Verily, the glaring dissimilarities in the Tax Declarations and the OCT No. 479(S) cast doubt on the evidentiary value of [petitioners'] evidence to prove that they indeed own the land in dispute.14
What the foregoing observations appear to support is that the tax declarations which petitioners offered to prove their ownership over the subject property refer to either an entirely different piece of land, or merely a portion of the subject property.
Second, regarding the value of the Contrata and the DoAS with respect to proving petitioners' claim, crucial is the additional observation that the Contrata and the DoAS either fail to evidence petitioners' claim, or otherwise explicitly contradict it. With respect to the exact contents of the Contrata which was written in the Ilokano language, the same have nevertheless been appreciated by both lower courts as insufficient to prove that the entire subject property, including Hospicio, Sr.'s share in the same, had been conveyed to Josefina Yadao by virtue of said document.
It is also worth observing that the Contrata did not indicate the land area of the property being sold therein, but only the Lot number and four boundaries. It must be said that the indication of boundaries is not clear as to whether said boundaries are those of the entire cadastral lot, or boundaries found within the cadastral lot with respect to a portion thereof that is being sold.
A study of the contents of the DoAS, the document purported to confirm the conveyance earlier embodied in the Contrata, shows that only one party signed thereon as the vendor, i.e., Casiana, the common-law-wife of Juan Calitina. Even presuming the DoAS is valid and duly executed, Hospicio, Sr., the only marital child of the registered owner, affixed his signature thereon not as a vendor but as a mere witness to the sale between Casiana as the vendor, and Josefina Yadao as the vendee. Even the very contents of the DoAS itself provide that only Casiana, purporting to be the absolute owner of the property subject of the said Deed, was selling. It cannot be concluded, therefore, that Hospicio, Sr. also sold his share of the subject property through the DoAS, since he did not sign the same as a vendor but only as a witness thereto, to wit:
DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
I, CASIANA DALO CALITINA, widow, of legal age, Filipino and resident of Bo. Taggat, Claveria, Cagayan, hereinafter called the VENDOR, and JOSEFINA I. YADAO, of legal age, Filipino, married to Domingo Yadao, both are residents of Bo. Taggat, Claveria, Cagayan, hereinafter called the VENDEE;
WITNESSETH:
That for and in consideration of the sum of EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS (P850.00) Philippine Currency, to me in hand paid by the VENDEE JOSEFINA I. YADAO DOES HEREBY SELL, TRANSFER, AND CONVEY unto said Josefina I. Yadao, his heirs and assigns that certain parcel of land situated in Bo. Taggat, Claveria, Cagayan which is more particularly described as follows to wit:
RESIDENTIAL LOT declared under the Cadastral Survey in Claveria as Lot No. 1087. Bounded on the North by Seashore and Taggat Creek, on the East by Seashore, on the South by Fausto Udac now Rafael Guimayen, with an area of 1,797 sq.m. 400 sq.m., more or les, assessed at P80.00 as described under Tax Declaration No. 41054-a.
Of which I am the absolute owner free from all liens and enumbrances. That the said described parcel of land has not been registered under Act No. 496 now under the Spanish Mortgage Law, the parties having agreed to register under the provision of Act No. 3344.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have agreed to sign their hand in the Municipality of Claveria, Province of Cagayan, Philippines this 13th day of October, 1962.
| (signed) |
(signed) |
| CASIANA DALO CALITINA |
JOSEFINA I. YADAO |
| VENDOR |
VENDEE |
| Signed in the presence of: |
|
|
Hospicio Calitina |
|
Jose Calitina |
|
Honorio M. Salvatore15 |
Still more and contrary to petitioners' submissions, the typewritten contents of the DoAS indicate that the size of "1,797 sq.m." was clearly crossed over, after which the land size of "400 sq.m." was typewritten and indicated. This categorically shows that the execution of the said DoAS evidently contemplated only a 400-square-meter property for conveyance, and not one which covered 1,797 square meters, which is the entire area of the subject property.
Based on the foregoing, it reasonably appears that even if the Court were to grant the validity of the Contrata and the DoAS, said documents do not prove a valid conveyance of the entire 1,797-square-meter subject property, but only a 400-square-meter portion thereof.
The fact that what was sold to petitioners' predecessor-in-interest was only a portion of the subject property and not the whole of it is further evidenced by the previously noted fact that, as observed by the CA, the tax declarations submitted by petitioners as proof of their lawful ownership only cover 400 square meters of the 1,797-square-meter subject property. Consequently, if the Contrata and the DoAS did convey the subject property, it reasonably supports the assumption that what Casiana, Jose and William conveyed was only the 400-square-meter portion of the same.
The fundamental point of inquiry therefore becomes this: Did petitioners prove that Josefina Yadao, their predecessor-in-interest, purchase all 1,797 square meters of the subject property?
This question must be answered in the negative.
Specifically, what is supported by the evidence on record as well as the testimonies of respondents is that said documents only prove the conveyance to petitioners' predecessors-in-interest of only a portion of the subject property. It is important to note here that it is undisputed that Juan and Casiana were never married, and at the time of the execution of the Contrata and the DoAS, the registered owner was also survived by Hospicio Calitina, Sr., as the only son of spouses Juan Calitina and Nicetas Calitina.
It is crucial as well to note that petitioners' presentation of the Contrata, the DoAS and the tax declarations, which appear to cast doubt as to the exact identity of the property involved in their claim, must be individually and altogether taken as admissions against their very interest, as provided for in Section 4, Rule 129 in relation to Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, viz.:
Rule 129
Section 4. Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or written, made by the party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
Rule 130
Section 26. Admission of a party. — The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
More particularly, admissions against interest have been jurisprudentially described as those that "[afford] the greatest certainty" of disputed facts especially when they are not disputed or qualified by the offeror/s, as held in BP Oil and Chemicals International Philippines, Inc. v. Total Distribution & Logistics Systems, Inc.,16 to wit:
x x x The fact is, TDLSI indeed admitted the existence of Exhibit "J." Thus, Exhibit "J" can be considered as an admission against interest. Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity with or identified in legal interest with such party, and are admissible whether or not the declarant is available as a witness. An admission against interest is the best evidence that affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute, based on the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself unless such declaration is true. It is fair to presume that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is his fault if it does not. No doubt, admissions against interest may be refuted by the declarant. In this case, however, respondent failed to refute the contents of Exhibit "J."17
To be sure, the Contrata, the DoAS and the tax declarations were all offered by petitioners — and all of them show that, at best, only a total of 400 square meters had been sold. This is contrary to, and belies, their claim that Josefina Yadao bought the entire 1,797 square meters of subject property.
On account of this, I submit that petitioners here failed to discharge their primary burden of proving the identity of the property they are claiming, i.e., failure on their part to show that what was conveyed to Josefina Yadao was the entire 1,797-square-meter subject property, and not only a 400-square-meter portion thereof.
Contrary to the ponencia's holding, therefore, I respectfully submit that while it may have taken respondents 31 years to file a judicial action on their claim to the subject property, the same cannot be considered barred by extinctive prescription since it falls within one of the two exceptions to the application of said rule.
Specifically, the ponencia mentions that the given facts of the case may only give rise to an exception from the application of extinctive prescription if either of the two scenarios is obtained: (i) if the respondents, as heirs of the registered owner, are in actual possession of the subject property; or (ii) if the conveyance of the subject property to petitioners in this case was unlawful, void or otherwise non-existent.
On this score, I submit that although the first exception is not obtained, since petitioners have been in actual possession of the subject property since 1962, the second exception, i.e., the unlawful, void or non-existent conveyance applies, as has been shown by the important factual observations above. Particularly, as the ponencia itself notes,18 where there was no lawful conveyance of the lot to the party in possession or the conveyance was void or non-existent and the lot continues to be under the name of the original registered owner, the action to recover the same of the heirs of the registered owner does not prescribe.1âшphi1
Third, with respect to the remaining estimated 1,397 square meters of the subject land, or the portion of the subject property that remains after the conveyance of the 400-square-meter portion, the ponencia finds that although the conveyance thereof was not evidenced by the documentary proof offered by petitioners, the same nevertheless also already belonged to petitioners either (i) by virtue of either a prior sale of spouses Dolores Calitina19 (Dolores) and Hospicio, Sr. in favor of Domingo Yadao, or (ii) by constructive trust.
The ponencia relies on the testimony of Dolores where she admitted that she and her husband, Hospicio, Sr., sold their house to Domingo Yadao.20 It is worth noting, however, that nowhere in the testimony of Dolores did she provide that said sale conveyed the whole of the remaining 1,397 square meters of the subject property. In fact, the succeeding statements of Dolores in the same testimony belie such a presumption, since she also testified that after they sold their original house to Domingo Yadao, they subsequently built a new house in the same subject property, and only had it transferred later on, viz.:
Q: Why did you sell that house?
A: They [Domingo Yadao] came to ask us to be used [sic] as a boarding house of Domingo Yadao, Sir.
Q: Since you sold the house, naturally you x x x left the same?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And where did you go?
A: That same lot, we built another house, sir.
Q: That house x x x, is it still standing on the land in suit?
A: The house is no longer there because Mr. Lim had a log pond on the other side of the road and our house was an obstruction, so Mr. Lim had our house transferred.21
What the testimony of Dolores indicates is that although they sold the house and presumably the lot where it stood to Domingo Yadao, they did not sell the entire subject property, otherwise she and her husband Hospicio, Sr. would not have been able to construct a new house thereon.
In similar logic, with respect to the remaining 1,397-square-meter portion, it also cannot be said that acquisitive prescription applied in favor of petitioners' ownership of the same. As the ponencia categorically ruled,22 adverse ownership of a registered property cannot be gained through this means, and the registered owner, albeit not in physical possession of the subject property, is nonetheless not ruled out and foreclosed from getting it back through the passage of time as the registered owner may resort to remedies to recover the property.
All told, I am inclined to disagree that petitioners have duly proven their right of ownership over the property and that respondents may no longer prove their claim to the same right. Instead, it appears that petitioners have failed to prove that the subject property in its entirety has been validly conveyed to their predecessors-in-interest, and that respondents' right to assert their claim survives.
There is therefore, to my mind, no impermeable legal basis for the Court to grant this petition and deem respondents barred from vindicating their claim to the subject property.
Based on these premises, I vote to DENY the petition.
Footnotes
1 "Caletina" in some parts of the record.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Ponencia, p. 8.
6 Id. at 9.
7 Id.
8 131 Phil. 556 (1968).
9 Ponencia, p. 12.
10 AMENDING AND CODIFYING THE LAWS RELATIVE TO REGISTRATION OF PROPERTY AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, issued June 11, 1978. Section 47 provides:
SECTION 47. Registered Land Not Subject to Prescription. — No title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
11 Ponencia, p. 12.
12 Republic Act No. 386, Art. 434 provides:
ARTICLE 434. In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim.
13 Rollo, p. 57.
14 Id. at 57-58. Emphasis supplied.
15 Records, p. 372
16 805 Phil. 244 (2017).
17 Id. at 260-261. Emphasis supplied.
18 Ponencia, p. 15.
19 Supra note 1.
20 Rollo, p. 102.
21 Id. at 102-103. Emphasis supplied.
22 Ponencia, p. 12.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
