THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 249681. August 31, 2022 ]
ESTATE OF MURRAY PHILIP WILLIAMS, AS REPRESENTED BY DENIS MICHAEL STANLEY, PETITIONER, V. WILLIAM VICTOR PERCY, RESPONDENT.
CONCURRING OPINION
CAGUIOA, J.:
I concur with the ponencia. The petition must be denied and the right of the respondent against double jeopardy should be upheld.
Brief review of the facts
The case stemmed from a complaint-affidavit1 for carnapping and estafa filed by Denis Michael Stanley (Stanley), on behalf of the estate of Murray Philip Williams (Williams), against respondent William Victor Percy (Percy).2
In the complaint-affidavit, Stanley alleged that prior to Williams' death, the latter entrusted two of his cars to Percy for safekeeping. When Stanley demanded the return of the vehicles, Percy failed to do so.3
On June 30, 2016, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Olongapo issued a Resolution4 recommending the filing of criminal charges for two counts of carnapping against Percy. Thus, two Informations dated August 22, 2016 were filed against Percy, which Informations were consolidated and raffled to Branch 72 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City (RTC).5
Pre-trial and trial ensued. The prosecution presented its documentary and testimonial evidence, rested its case, and made a formal offer of its evidence.6 Percy then filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to
Evidence, followed by the corresponding Demurrer to Evidence.7
In an Order8 dated October 16, 2018, the RTC granted Percy's Demurrer to Evidence. The RTC ruled that the prosecution failed to satisfy the required quantum of evidence to convict Percy of two counts of carnapping.9
Without securing the conformity of the People through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), Stanley filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 (Petition) before the Court of Appeals (CA). He asserted, as a sole ground, that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting Percy's demurrer to evidence "DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED AND DESPITE ALL AVAILABLE JURISPRUDENTIAL PRECEDENTS."10
In the first assailed Resolution11 dated April 14, 2019, the CA dismissed the Petition due to Stanley's failure to serve a copy of the Petition to Percy at his current and complete address. Stanley filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the CA had in fact acquired jurisdiction over the person of Percy because the latter filed a Comment to Petition dated March 18, 2019 (Comment). In the said Comment, Percy sought the outright dismissal of the Petition on the ground that only the People, through the OSG, may question an acquittal in a criminal case. Through the second assailed Resolution12 dated September 26, 2019, the CA denied Stanley's motion for reconsideration.13 Hence, the present petition.
The ponencia finds that the CA validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of Percy as Percy had voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the CA when he filed the Comment.14 Nonetheless, the ponencia dismisses the case because the Petition was filed before the CA without the conformity of the OSG15 and, more importantly, because an order granting a demurrer to evidence is a judgment on the merits and is tantamount to an acquittal. Any attempt to overturn an acquittal contravenes an accused's right against double jeopardy.16
The ponencia was correct that the Petition will violate Percy's right against double jeopardy
I fully concur with the ponencia in denying the present petition and in recognizing the right of Percy against double jeopardy.
The right against double jeopardy is enshrined under Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that"[n]o person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act."
Jurisprudence provides that for the right against double jeopardy to attach, the following requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.17
With regard to the first element, for a first jeopardy to attach, there must be:
(1) a valid indictment,
(2) a court of competent jurisdiction,
(3) the arraignment of the accused,
(4) a valid plea entered by the accused, and
(5) the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination of the case without the accused's express consent.18
As regards the fifth requisite, it is important to stress that it contemplates three separate circumstances, namely (a) acquittal of the accused, (b) conviction of the accused by final judgment, and (c) dismissal or termination of the case without the accused's consent. Moreover, when the first jeopardy is terminated due to the acquittal of the accused, "our rules on criminal proceedings require that a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation. This is referred to as the 'finality-of-acquittal' rule."19
As with most rules, however, the finality-of-acquittal doctrine is not without exception. As I have explained in my ponencia in Marwin B. Raya and Shiela C Borromeo v. People of the Philippines,20 "[t]he finality-of acquittal doctrine does not apply when the prosecution - the sovereign people, as represented by the State - was denied a fair opportunity to be heard. Simply put, the doctrine does not apply when the prosecution was denied its day in court - or simply, denied due process."21
The reason for this is because when the prosecution is deprived of due process, it could be said that the judgment of acquittal was void, which thereby means that the first jeopardy had not been validly terminated. As the second element for the right to attach is not yet present, then there could be no violation of the right against double jeopardy when an appellate court "reverses" a judgment of acquittal which resulted from a denial of the prosecution's right to due process. This explains why it is said that only through this narrow and limited exception would the remedy of certiorari be allowed without offending the constitutional right against double jeopardy.
The foregoing discussions mean that not every error in the trial or evaluation of the evidence by the court in question that led to the acquittal of the accused would be reviewable by certiorari. Borrowing the words of the Court in People v. Ang Cho Kio,22 "[n]o error, however flagrant, committed by the court against the state, can be reserved by it for decision by the [S]upreme [C]ourt when the defendant has once been placed in jeopardy and discharged, even though the discharge was the result of the error committed."23
Applying the foregoing to the present case, the right of Percy against double jeopardy had already attached. To illustrate, Percy was indicted on the basis of two (2) criminal Informations for carnapping filed before the RTC which had jurisdiction over the case. Percy was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge. During trial, the prosecution was able to present all its documentary and testimonial evidence and formally offer the same to the RTC. The prosecution, therefore, was afforded its day in court. Thereafter, Percy filed a demurrer to evidence which the RTC granted. As aptly stated by the ponencia, the grant of the demurrer "is a judgment on the merits and is tantamount to an acquittal."24 Thus, there was a valid termination of the first jeopardy, and the Petition before the CA was a constitutionally offensive second jeopardy as it pertains to the same offense as the first jeopardy. As illustrated above, all the requisites for the right to attach are present in this case.
To end, I express my full agreement with the ponencia's finding that the Petition attempts to circumvent the finality-of-acquittal rule in a belated guise of questioning only the civil aspect of the criminal case, i.e., "seeking to protect the rights of the Estate of Williams insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned."25 The assignment of error in the Petition made one solitary contention: that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting Percy's demurrer to evidence "despite the fact that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the crime charged and despite all available jurisprudential precedents."26 The entirety of the Petition likewise only contends that the trial court erred in its evaluation of the prosecution's evidence when it granted the demurrer to evidence.27 Clearly, the Petition sought to appeal the acquittal in the criminal case, in contravention of Percy's constitutional right against double jeopardy.
Based on these premises, I vote to DENY the present petition.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 76-81.
2 Ponencia, p. 2.
3 Id.
4 Rollo, pp. 132-135.
5 Ponencia, pp. 2-3.
6 Id. at 3.
7 Id.
8 Rollo, pp. 315-329.
9 Ponencia, p. 3.
10 Id. at 4.
11 Rollo, pp. 35-38.
12 Id. at46-47.
13 Ponencia, pp. 4-5.
14 Id. at 8.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 10.
17 People v. Judge Declaro, 252 Phil. 139, 143 (1989).
18 Marwin B. Raya and Shiela C. Borromeo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 237798, May 5, 2021, p. 15.
19 Chiok v. People, et al., 774 Phil. 230, 248 (2015).
20 Supra note 18.
21 Id. at 16.
22 95 Phil. 475 (1954).
23 Id. at 480.
24 Ponencia, p. 10.
25 Id. at 9.
26 Id.
27 Id.
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