G.R. No. 244433 - Concurring Opinion

G.R. No. 244433, April 19, 2022,
♦ Decision, Rosario, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Perlas-Bernabe, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Leonen, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Concurrence, Lazaro-Javier, [J]

ANTONIO R. CRUZ AND LORETO TERESITA CRUZ-DIMAYACYAC, AS HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES DR. PROGEDIO R. CRUZ AND TERESA REYES, PETITIONERS, VS. CARLING CERVANTES AND CELIA CERVANTES SANTOS AND ALL PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER THEM, RESPONDENTS.

I submit this Concurring Opinion only to expound on the nuances of the twin requirements for mandatory referral set forth in Section 50-A of Republic Act No. (RA) 6657,1 as amended by RA 9700,2 the elements constitutive of an agrarian dispute which falls under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), and the nature of evidence required to establish its existence.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari (Petition) stems from a complaint for unlawful detainer (Complaint) filed by petitioners Antonio R. Cruz and Loreta Teresita Cruz-Dimayacyac (collectively, petitioners), as heirs of the late spouses Progedio R. Cruz and Teresa Reyes (Spouses Cruz), against Carling Cervantes, Celia Cervantes Santos and their successors-in-interest (collectively, respondents).3

The Complaint concerns a parcel of agricultural land situated in Bulacan (subject property). Spouses Cruz are the owners of the subject property, while respondents are the heirs of the late Isidro Cervantes (Isidro), the alleged tenant of Spouses Cruz.

The Complaint was dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court of Plaridel, Bulacan (MTC) on the ground of lack of jurisdiction based on the October 28, 2016 Certification issued by Engineer Emmanuel G. Aguinaldo of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office of the DAR (DAR-PARO) characterizing the Complaint as an agrarian dispute cognizable by the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB).4 This dismissal was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),5 and later, the Court of Appeals6 (CA). Hence, this Petition.

In the main, the Petition calls on the Court to determine whether the dismissal of the Complaint was proper. However, to aid the discussion that follows, it is fitting to further break down the main issue into two sub-issues — first, whether the MTC erred in referring the Complaint to the DARPARO for initial determination of the nature of the dispute involved; and second, whether the MTC erred in relying upon the DAR-PARO's determination.

Like the ponencia, I find that the MTC correctly referred the case to the DAR-PARO based on the concurrence of the twin requisites for mandatory referral set forth in Section 50-A of RA 6657, as amended.

Be that as it may, I find that the MTC gravely erred when it relied on the determination of the DAR-PARO despite the clear lack of substantial evidence to support such determination. In turn, this error resulted in the unwarranted dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, I join the ponencia's order to reverse said dismissal and remand the Complaint for further proceedings.

RA 6657 vests the DAR with primary jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over the implementation of agrarian reform, subject to narrow exceptions, thus:

Hence, under Section 50-A, referral to the DAR shall be mandatory when: (i) there is an allegation from any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature; and (ii) one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant.

In Chailese Development Co., Inc. v. Dizon8 (Chailese) the Court clarified that unlike the first requisite which only requires an allegation by any of the parties that the case involves an agrarian dispute, the second requisite requires proof, thus:

The Court's ruling in Chailese, particularly with respect to the requisites for mandatory referral, was subsequently reiterated in Dayrit v. Norquillas10 (Dayrit), a recent case decided by the Court en banc.

In this regard, it should be stressed that the legislative intent to require, in relation to the second requisite, proof that one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant is clear from the congressional records.

As stated, the mandatory referral mechanism was incorporated in RA 6657 through RA 9700. In turn, RA 9700 is the result of the consolidation of two bills — House Bill No. 4077 and Senate Bill No. 2666.

In the original draft of the House version filed on May 5, 2008, the first paragraph of Section 50-A was worded as follows:

The mandatory referral mechanism did not appear in the original draft of the Senate version. Nevertheless, it was later incorporated as Section 13 after the period of committee amendments.12 The first paragraph of Section 13 adopted the following language:

The House and Senate versions were later reconciled through the Bicameral Conference Committee (BCC). Following a series of meetings, the BCC submitted its Conference Committee Report recommending that the reconciled version be approved.14 The result was the final enrolled version which is now known as RA 9700. To reiterate, the first paragraph of Section 19 of RA 9700 reads:

The language of the House and Senate versions, as well as the final reconciled version all indicate the legislative intent to: (i) require the concurrence of the first and second requisites to trigger mandatory referral to the DAR; (ii) make a distinction between the treatment of the first and second requisites; and finally, (iii) require "proof" that one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant (as opposed to mere general allegation thereof), for the second requisite to concur.

Nevertheless, while it is clear that "proof" that one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant should be submitted to the MTC for the aforesaid second requirement to concur, prevailing law and jurisprudence appear to be silent on the kind of proof that must be adduced. On this score, I submit that such "proof" is composed of specific and clear allegations showing the indispensable elements of tenancy, coupled with any and all kinds of documents which, on their face, tend to show that such tenancy relationship exists between the parties, and that one of the parties is indeed a farmer, farmworker, or tenant. In particular, the indispensable elements of tenancy which must be specifically alleged and supported by documents, if any, are: "(1) [t]hat the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee."15

It should be borne in mind that the mandatory referral mechanism is meant precisely to avert situations where the regular court proceeds to try an agrarian dispute over which it has no jurisdiction. It stands to reason then that the kind of proof that should be deemed sufficient by the MTC to establish the second requisite should be such that require only a facial assessment or determination that would indicate to a reasonable mind that a tenancy relationship does exist between the parties and that one of the parties is indeed a farmer, farmworker, or tenant. This is so because to require a higher standard of proof would necessarily result in protracted proceedings before the referring court and would thus negate the very purpose of the mandatory referral mechanism which is to afford DAR, precisely because of its expertise, the opportunity to make a determination on the nature of the dispute involved.

To reiterate, plain and unsupported allegations that one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant will not suffice. For the second requisite to concur, there must be specific and clear allegations showing the indispensable elements of tenancy, coupled with documents which, on their face, tend to show that a tenancy relationship in fact exists between the parties, such that one of them stands as landowner, and the other, as farmer, farmworker, or tenant.

In this case, the MTC appears to have premised its referral to the DAR on the specific allegations made in respondents' Answer, as well as the annexes thereto, thus:

Recognizing the expertise of the DAR over the subject matter, and the mandate of Section 50-A of RA 6657, as amended, the MTC thus referred the Complaint to the former:

Here, respondents clearly and vehemently alleged that the Complaint constitutes an agrarian dispute over which the DAR has jurisdiction.

Moreover, the statements in respondents' Answer constitute sufficient and clear allegations showing the elements of tenancy and were supported by documents annexed to their Answer. Specifically, respondents alleged that: (1) their father Isidro was the tenant of petitioners' parents who, at the time, were the owners of the subject property; (2) the subject property is agricultural land; (3) petitioners' parents consented to the tenancy relationship inasmuch as they received compensation therefor as allegedly shown by the tally sheet and the handwritten receipt presented by respondents as evidence; (4) the alleged tenancy relationship yielded the production of various agricultural crops; and (5) the subject property was personally cultivated by Isidro, and subsequently, by respondents.

In all, these constitute proof that the twin requirements for mandatory referral concur.

Nevertheless, while the MTC correctly referred the Complaint to the DAR in accordance with Section 50-A of RA 6657, as amended, it incorrectly relied on the DAR-PARO's determination in this particular case.

DAR Administrative Order No. 03-1118 (DAR AO 03-11) details the procedure for the determination of jurisdiction concerning cases on referral. Its relevant sections state:

From the foregoing, it is clear that upon referral, the DAR-PARO is required to conduct a summary investigation to ascertain the relevant facts and make an initial determination as to whether the case so referred is an agrarian dispute based on the testimonies of the parties' witnesses, their evidence, and/or position papers. Thereafter, it must issue a Certification stating its initial determination which "shall state the findings of fact upon which the determination by the PARO" is based.

Here, the October 28, 2016 Certification issued by the DAR-PARO states, in full:

The foregoing Certification, on its face, utterly fails to comply with the standards set forth in DAR AO 03-11. The Certification is bereft of any reference to the relevant facts on which its determination is based. Worse, the Certification leaves the courts with absolutely no basis to ascertain the evidence from which its findings were drawn. Simply stated, the DAR-PARO Certification told the MTC nothing that it did not already know prior to referral. Thus, when the MTC adopted the DAR-PARO's Certification in toto and dismissed the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction, this constituted grave error.

To reiterate, the mandatory referral mechanism is a procedural tool through which the DAR is given the first opportunity to determine whether a case falls within its jurisdiction. Its determination, however, is recommendatory in nature and remains subject to judicial recourse. This is clear from Section 12 of DAR AO 03-11:

As stated, while courts are bound to comply with the referral mechanism upon concurrence of the twin requisites in Section 50-A of RA 6657, they are not necessarily bound to accept the recommendation where, for instance, such determination (i.e., the DAR-PARO Certification) is clearly violative of the procedures and requirements set by DAR AO 03-11. Stated otherwise, the referring courts must still assess the recommendation of the DAR in light of the evidence presented during the latter's summary investigation. While the findings of quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are generally entitled to respect, this general rule does not hold in cases where such findings are contrary to, or unsupported by, the evidence on record.

On this score, it bears emphasizing that under RA 6657, the findings of fact of the DAR shall only be final and conclusive if they are based on substantial evidence.20 Thus, in cases where the DAR's recommendation rests on shaky foundations, the referring court must make its own determination and take cognizance of the case in question should it appear to be one which falls squarely within its general jurisdiction.

Again, an "agrarian dispute" falling under the primary jurisdiction of the DAR is defined under RA 6657 as follows:

Here, respondents vehemently claim that a tenancy relationship existed between their father Isidro and petitioners' parents, Spouses Cruz. As basis, respondents solely rely on: (i) the tally sheet issued by Adelia Rice Mill identifying Isidro as "kasama" of petitioners' late mother Teresa Reyes Vda. de Cruz; and (ii) a handwritten receipt issued by one Kapitan Peping Villalon acknowledging Isidro's payment for "Buwis sa Bakuran".

However, as keenly observed by Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, there is nothing in these documents which would suggest that Spouses Cruz consented to the alleged tenancy relationship or that the parties agreed to share in the harvests, considering that Spouses Cruz neither signed these documents, nor participated in their issuance.24 Clearly, the third and sixth elements of tenancy are absent.

As well, the tenor of these documents does not indicate the circumstances surrounding their issuance and how these relate to the alleged tenancy agreement. Did Spouses Cruz authorize Isidro to remit harvests to Adelia Rice Mill on their behalf? Did Kapitan Peping Villalon have any authority to accept "buwis" on Spouses Cruz's behalf? On which dates were these documents issued? In the absence of substantial evidence which tend to shed light on these matters, these vague and uncorroborated documents cannot be taken as sufficient proof of a tenancy relationship between Spouses Cruz and Isidro. Accordingly, I find that the Complaint remains an ordinary ejectment case which falls under the jurisdiction of the MTC.1a⍵⍴h!1

For these reasons, I vote to GRANT the present Petition and REMAND the Complaint to the Municipal Trial Court of Plaridel, Bulacan for further proceedings.