[ G.R. No. 230171, September 27, 2021 ]
ILDEFONSO TV PATDU, JR., REBECCA S. CACATIAN, AND GERONIMO V. QUINTOS, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, AND FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE-OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, RESPONDENTS.
CONCURRING OPINION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
I concur. The petition for certiorari filed by petitioners Ildefonso T. Patdu, Jr., Rebecca S. Cacatian, and Geronimo V. Quintos (petitioners) before the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the Office of the Ombudsman's (Ombudsman) finding of probable cause against them was correctly dismissed since it was filed before the wrong court. Petitioners should have instead filed their certiorari petition before the Supreme Court. I note that while the supervening filing of the Informations before the Sandiganbayan may have rendered the issue moot,1 nonetheless, ruling on such issue remains permissible under the capable of repetition yet evading review, and guidance to the bench, bar and publ c exceptions.2
I.
As background, petitioners insist that the CA should have taken cognizance of their petition filed before it in light of the Court's ruling in Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals3 (Carpio-Morales), where the Court struck down as unconstitutional the second paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770,4 or uThe Ombudsman Act of 1989" (Section 14, par. 2), which reads:
Section 14. Restrictions. — No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an ivesjgation be ig conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings oi'the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners claim that the said provision applies to all decisions or findings of the Ombudsman, and not only those rendered in administrative cases. Hence, since Section 14, par. 2 was entirely struck down, petitioners posit that they properly filed their petition assailing the Ombudsman's determination of probable cause before the CA, and not the Supreme Court.
To recount, Carpio-Morales struck down Section 14, par. 2 because it "ban[ned] the whole range of remedies against issuances of the Ombudsman, by prohibiting: (a) an appeal against any decision or finding of the Ombudsman, and (b) 'any application of remedy' (subject to [a Rule 45 appeal to the Supreme Court]) against the same."
To recount, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 states that "[n]o court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law."
As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 bans the whole range of remedies against issuances of the Ombudsman, by prohibiting: (a) an appeal against any decision or finding of the Ombudsman, and (b) "any application of remedy" (subject to the exception below) against the same. To clarify, the phrase "application for remedy," being a generally worded provision, and being separated from the term "appeal" by the disjunctive "or", refers to any remedy (whether taken mainly or provisionally), except an appeal, following the maxim generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda: general words axe to be understood in a general sense. By the same principle, the word "findings," which is also separated from the word "decision" by the disjunctive "or", would therefore refer to any finding made by the Ombudsman (whether final , or provisional), except a decision.
The subject provision, however, crafts an exception to the foregoing general rule. While the specific procedural vehicle is not explicit from its text, it is fairly deducible that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 excepts, as the only allowable remedy against "the decision or findings of the Ombudsman," a Rule 45 appeal, for the reason that it is the only remedy taken to the Supreme Court on "pure questions of law," x x x5
Accordingly, the Court concluded that "by confining the remedy to a Rule 45 appeal, the provision takes away the remedy of certiorari, grounded on errors of jurisdiction, in denigration of the judicial power constitutionally vested in courts."6
Moreover, "the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770's extremely limited restriction on remedies is inappropriate since a Rule 45 appeal — which is within the sphere of the rules of procedure promulgated by this Court — can only be taken against final decisions or orders of lower courts, and not against 'findings' of quasi-judicial agencies."7 In this regard, Congress impinged upon the rule-making power of the Court; thus, it was held that "Congress cannot interfere with matters of procedure; hence, it cannot alter the scope of a Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory 'findings' issued by the Ombudsman."8
Furthermore, "the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 also increased th[e] [Supreme] Court's appellate jurisdiction, without a showing, however, that it gave its consent to the same[;]"9 hence, it violated Section 30,10 Article VI of the Constitution.
In fine, Section 14, par. 2 was struck down since its restrictive limitation of Ombudsman remedies to a Rule 45 appeal to the Supreme Court: (a) denigrated judicial power by taking away the remedy of certiorari against the decisions and findings of the Ombudsman; (b) interfered in the Court's rule-making power by mandating a Rule 45 appeal against "findings" of a quasi-judicial agency, albeit interlocutory in nature; and (c) increased the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, without its advice and concurrence.
While the Court in Carpio-Morales did not explicitly qualify whether or not the striking down of Section 14, par. 2 was pertinent only to decisions and findings of the Ombudsman in administrative cases, the Court, in the subsequent case of Gatchalian v. Office of the Ombudsman11 (Gatchalian), took the opportunity to clarify that indeed Section 14, par. 2 was struck down relative to its application to administrative cases only. The ponencia correctly relied on Gatchalian as basis for denying the present petition.
In Gatchalian, the Court explained the particular context in which the Carpio-Morales case was decided, i.e., an administrative case filed before the Ombudsman. Hence, it is within this context that the Court's striking down of Section 14, par. 2 should be viewed:
In the Morales case, what was involved was the preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman against Jejomar Binay, Jr. (Binay) in an administrative case filed against the latter. The preventive suspension order was questioned by Binay in the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO). The CA then granted Binay's prayer for a TRO, which the Ombudsman thereafter questioned in this Court for being in violation of Section 14 of R.A. 6770, which provides:
x x x x
Relying on the second paragraph of the abovequoted provision, the Ombudsman also questioned the CA's subject matter jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari filed by Binay.
The Court in Morales applied the same rationale used in Fabian, and held that the second paragraph of Section 14 is unconstitutional:
Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against "decision or findings" of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus - similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 - attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence, it is therefore concluded that the former provision is also unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman's posturing, Fabian should squarely apply since the above-stated Ombudsman Act provisions are in pari materia in that they "cover the same specific or particular subject matter," tihat is, tihe maimer of judicial review over issuances of the Ombudsman.
x x x x
Thus, with the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, the Court, consistent with existing jurisprudence, concludes that the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SPNo. 139453 petition.12 (Emphases supplied)
Notably, the petitioners in this case raise essentially the same argument raised in Gatchalian, which was therein found to be untenable:
Gatchalian argues that the consequence of the foregoing is that all orders, directives, and decisions of the Ombudsman — whether it be an incident of an administrative or criminal case — are now reviewable by the CA.
The contention is untenable.
The Court agrees with the CA that the Morales decision should be read and viewed in its proper context The Court in Morales held that the CA had subject matter jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed therein because what was assailed in the said petition was a preventive suspension order, which was an interlocutory order and thus unappealable, issued by the Ombudsman. Consistent with the rationale of Estrada, the Court held that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was proper as R.A. 6770 did not provide for an appeal procedure for interlocutory orders issued by the Ombudsman. The Court also held that it was correctly filed with the CA because the preventive suspension order was an incident of an administrative case. The Court in Morales was thus applying only what was already well-established in jurisprudence.(Emphases supplied)
Further, the Court, in Gatchalian, observed that there was no categorical abandonment of the rulings in Kuizon v. Desierto15 (Kuizon) and Estrada v. Desierto (Estrada), wherein it was expressed that, as a procedural rule, "[t]he remedy of aggrieved parties from resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman finding probable cause in criminal cases or non-administrative cases, when tainted with grave abuse of discretion, is to file an original action for certiorari with this Court and not with the Court of Appeals."16
More significantly, Gatchalian insightfully observed that "the rule that decisions or orders of the Ombudsman finding the existence of probable cause (or the lack thereof) should be questioned through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed with the Supreme Court was laid down by the Court itself in the cases of Kuizon, Tirol Jr., Mendoza-Arce v. Ombudsman, Estrada, and subsequent cases affirmins the said rule. The rule was, therefore, not anchored on Section 14 of R.A. 6770, but was instead a rule prescribed by the Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers."17 Thus, "[t]he declaration of unconstitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 6770 was x x x immaterial insofar as the appellate procedure for orders and decisions by the Ombudsman in criminal cases is concerned." In Gatchalian:
A thorough reading of the Morales decision, therefore, would reveal that it was limited in its application — that it was meant to cover only decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. The Court never intimated, much less categorically stated, that it was abandoning its rulings in Kuizon and Estrada and the distinction made therein between the appellate recourse for decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative and non-administrative cases. Bearing in mind that Morales dealt with an interlocutory order in an administrative case, it cannot thus be read to apply to decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in non- administrative or criminal cases.
xxxx
It is thus clear that the Morales decision never intended to disturb the well-established distinction between the appellate remedies for orders, directives, and decisions arising from administrative cases and those arising - from non-administrative or criminal cases.
xxx Section 14 of R.A. 6770 was declared unconstitutional because it trampled on the rule-making powers of the Court by 1) prescribing the mode of appeal, which was by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, for all cases whether final or not; and 2) rendering nugatory the certiorari jurisdiction of the CA over incidents arising from administrative cases.
The unconstitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 6770. therefore, did not necessarily have an effect over the appellate procedure for orders and decisions arising from criminal cases precisely because the said procedure was not prescribed by the aforementioned section. To recall, the rule that decisions or orders of the Ombudsman finding the existence of probable cause for the lack thereof) should be questioned through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed with the Supreme Court was laid down by the Court itself in the cases of Kuizon, Tirol Jr., Mendoza-Arce v. Ombudsman, Estrada, and subsequent cases affirming the said rule. The rule was, therefore, not anchored on Section 14 of R.A. 6770, but was instead a rule prescribed by the Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers. The declaration of unconstitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 6770 was therefore immaterial insofar as the appellate procedure for orders and decisions by the Ombudsman in criminal cases is concerned. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, to recap, since Section 14, par. 2 (which restrictively mandated the remedy from the Ombudsman rulings directly to the Supreme Court via Rule 45) was struck down in Carpio-Morales relative to its application to administrative cases, and not to non-administrative/criminal cases, the prevailing procedural rules remain distinguished as follows: (a) Ombudsman rulings in administrative cases cannot be directly elevated to this Court but must be either appealed or (if interlocutory in nature) assailed by certiorari to the CA, whereas (b) Ombudsman rulings in non- administrative/criminal cases can be - and in fact, should be - directly elevated to this Court by certiorari only.
II.
At this juncture, I find it instructive to point out that the foregoing procedural rules ultimately stem from the Court's rule-making power. Kuizon and Estrada, as well as the Carpio-Morales doctrines are practically extant manifestations of the Court's exercise of its rule-making power because through these rulings, the Court laid down how Ombudsman cases are to be judicially assailed. Of course, the rule-making power of the Court is not absolute; it must still be exercised within the confines of the CA and the Supreme Court's jurisdiction as conferred by law under the parameters of the statute and the Constitution. The dynamic relation between judicial power, jurisdiction, and the Court's rule-making power was discussed in Carpio-Morales as follows:
Judicial power, as vested in the Supreme Court and all other courts established by law, has been defined as the "totality of powers a court exercises when it assumes jurisdiction and hears and decides a case." Under Section 1, Article VIU of the 1987 Constitution, it includes "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
x x x x
Judicial power is never exercised in a vacuum. A court's exercise of the jurisdiction it has acquired over a particular case conforms to the limits and parameters of the rules of procedure duly promulgated bv this Court. In other words, procedure is the framework within which judicial power is exercised. In Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General, the Court elucidated that "[t]he power or authority of the court over the subject matter existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began. Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority; it simply directs the manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not exercised in conformity with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter."
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court.(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Being procedural in nature, the Court has the power to alter the framework of remedies set in assailing Ombudsman rulings, as per Kuizon and Estrada, as well as Carpio-Morales, among others. In this regard, Carpio-Morales poignantly discussed that "[t]he prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure solely belongs to the Court, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of government:"
xxx [T]he prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure solely belongs to the Court, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of government. On this score, the Court described its authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure as exclusive and "[o]ne of the safeguards of [its] institutional independence."
That Congress has been vested with the authority to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts under Section 2, Article VIII supra, as well as to create statutory courts under Section 1, Article VIII supra, does not result in an abnegation of the Court's own power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure under Section 5 (5), Article VIII supra. Albeit operatively interrelated, these powers are nonetheless institutionally separate and distinct, each to be preserved under its own sphere of authority. When Congress creates a court and delimits its jurisdiction, the procedure for which its jurisdiction is exercised is fixed by the Court through the rules it promulgates.21
Since the Court has the power to alter procedural rules, and since the pertinent doctrines in Carpio-Morales, Kuizon, and Estrada effectively set procedural rules as above-discussed - to my mind — it necessarily follows that the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not altogether precluded from modifying or abandoning, in the future, the procedural framework in which Ombudsman rulings — both administrative and non- administxative/criminal ¦ are judicially assailed, provided that such exercise stays within jurisdictional limitations.
Although much has been said about the remedial framework relative to Ombudsman rulings in Carpio-Morales and Gatchalian, the Court has yet to express the underlying rationale behind the differentiated treatment between administrative and non-administrative/criminal cases. While it is clear that these rules are procedural in nature and thus, fall within the purview of the Court's rule-making power, the question as to "why does the Court, as a matter of procedural policy and prerogative, allow direct resort from Ombudsman rulings to it only in non-administrative/criminal cases, and not in administrative cases?" has yet to be rationally discussed. Thus, I find it opportune to offer my thoughts on this unaddressed matter for future guidance.
III.
Section 9 (3). of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (BP 129),22 otherwise known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," provides that the CA has "[ejxclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgements, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commission." Pursuant thereto, Rule 43 a mode of appeal - was created.
Section 1 of Rule 43 states that such mode of appeal "shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions."
Section 1. Scope. - This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Invention Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Case law holds that "[a]n administrative agency performs quasi-judicial functions if it renders awards, determines the rights of opposing parties, or if their decisions have the same effect as the judgment of a court"23
When the Ombudsman renders a ruling in an administrative case and hence pronounces administrative liability and metes the corresponding penalty, it clearly exercises a quasi-judicial function because its decision is determinative and has the same effect as a court judgment; hence, the Ombudsman's final rulings in this respect are susceptible to a Rule 43 appeal to the CA. Since appellate jurisdiction on final administrative rulings lies with the CA, it is necessarily implied that Ombudsman administrative interlocutory orders assailable by certiorari may be filed before the same.24
On the other hand, when the Ombudsman renders a ruling in a non-administrative/criminal case (i.e., a preliminaiy investigation resulting in a determination of probable cause), It does not exercise a quasi-judicial function. Jurisprudence instructs that "[i]n a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of an accused. The prosecutor only determines 'whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.' As such, the prosecutor does not perform quasi-judicial functions."25 In Santos v. Go,26 it was elucidated that:
[t]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
Though some cases describe the public prosecutor's power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this is true only to the extent that, like Quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court, and the similarity ends at this point. A quasi-judicial body is as an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions such that its awards determine the rights of parties, and their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. Such is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file an information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary of Justice is reviewing the former's order or resolutions.27(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Since the Ombudsman's determination of probable cause as a result of its preliminary investigation is not considered as an exercise of a quasi- judicial function, it is not subject to a Rule 43 appeal. In fact, insofar as the Ombudsman is concerned, this determination is inappealable.
To my mind, this variance in the appellate permissibility to the CA is the policy justification as to (a) why direct recourse to the Court in administrative cases is not allowed, and on the flipside (b) why direct recourse to the Court in criminal cases is allowed. Because a Rule 43 appeal is an available remedy in administrative cases, Ombudsman rulings in such cases should be elevated first to the CA and hence, should not be directly filed before this Court. In contrast, because a Rule 43 appeal is not available in non-administrative/criminal cases, Ombudsman rulings in such cases cannot be elevated to the CA; hence, the only remaining recourse is directly to this Court To be clear, this latter recourse to the Court is not an appeal, but certiorari, which is an original action. In this regard, it deserves mentioning that "a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or independent action based on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and it will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.29
IV.
Parenthetically, it should be clarified that although the Ombudsman's determination of probable cause is not susceptible to Rule 43 or any appeal for that matter, it is not completely insulated from judicial review. The Court's expanded judicial power allows it to "determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." Thus, while the Ombudsman does not exercise a quasi-judicial function when it determines the existence of probable cause, the Court can still review such determination through certiorari under the lens of grave abuse of discretion.30
When it comes to certiorari, it is acknowledged that the Regional Trial Courts, the CA, and the Supreme Court have concurrent original jurisdiction. However, this concurrent original jurisdiction is circumscribed by the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Indeed, "the original jurisdiction this Court shares with the Court of Appeals and regional trial courts is not a license to immediately seek relief from this Court. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus must be filed in keeping with the doctrine of hierarchy of courts."31
Case law states that "[t]he doctrine of hierarchy of courts is grounded on considerations of judicial economy." In Ha Data Tawahig v. Lapinid (Ha Datu Tawahig), citing Aala v. Mayor Uy:33
The doctrine on hierarchy of courts is a practical judicial policy designed to restrain parties from directly resorting to this Court when relief may be obtained before the lower courts. The logic behind this policy is grounded on the need to prevent "inordinate demands npon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction," as well as to prevent the congestion of the Court's dockets. Hence, for this Court to be able to "satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter[,]" it must remain as a "court of last resort." This can be achieved by relieving the Court of the "task of dealing with causes in the first instance."" (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Ha Datu Tawahig further observes that "[a]pplying this doctrine is not merely for practicality; it also ensures that courts at varying levels act in accord with their respective competencies."35
However, as in eveiy general rule, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts admits of exceptions. After all, it is a matter of Court policy based on practical and judicial economy considerations. Among these exceptions where direct resort to the Supreme Court on certiorari is allowed are "when the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ;" "when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law;" "when the petition includes questions that may affect public welfare, public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice", and "when the appeal was considered as an inappropriate remedy", viz.:
[T]he doctrine on hierarchy of courts is not an inflexible rule. In Spouses Chua v. Ang, this Court held that "[a] strict application of this rule may be excused when the reason behind the rule is not present in a case[.]" This Court has recognized that a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction may be warranted in exceptional cases as when there are compelling reasons clearly set forth in the petition, or when what is raised is a pure question of law.
In a fairly recent case, we summarized other well-defined exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. Immediate resort to this Court may be allowed when any of the following grounds are present: (1) when genuine issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed immediately; (2) when the case involves transcendental importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4) when the constitutional issues raised are better decided by'this Court; (5) when time is of the essence; (6) when the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ; (T) when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; (8) when the petition includes questions that may affect public welfare, public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice; (9) when the order complained of was a patent nullity; and (10) when the appeal was considered as an inappropriate remedy. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)36
All of these four exceptions attend when it comes to the certiorari review of non-administrative/criminal cases of the Ombudsman; hence, "[ijmmediate resort to this Court may be allowed." In this case, the review sought is against an act of a constitutional organ, where there is no available appeal or any other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Furthermore, the weightier consequences of a criminal proceeding (inasmuch as it involves a person's liberty) vis-a-vis an administrative case, permits direct recourse to this Court as demanded by the broader interests of justice. In fact, due to the impending possibility of a warrant of arrest being issued, it may be also said that the matter falls within the "time is of the essence" exception as well.
Therefore, in contrast to the framework of remedies when it comes to administrative cases, direct resort to this Court through certiorari against non- administrative/criminal Ombudsman cases is the proper procedural rule. Hence, as manifested by existing case law: (a) Ombudsman rulings in administrative cases cannot be directly elevated to this Court but must be either appealed or (if interlocutory in nature) assailed by certiorari to the CA, whereas (b) Ombudsman rulings in non-administrative/criminal cases should be directly elevated to this Court by certiorari. The above-discussed legal nuances justify the distinction.
