SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 2301711, September 27, 2021 ]
ILDEFONSO TV PATDU, JR., REBECCA S. CACATIAN, AND GERONIMO V. QUINTOS, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, AND FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE-OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
HERNANDO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari2 assails the August 4, 2016 Resolution3 and February 21, 2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 146382. The CA resolutions dismissed a petition for certiorari, which assailed the August 4, 2014 Resol it ion and March 17, 2015 Joint Order of respondent Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) in OMB-C-C-08-0201-E, for lack of jurisdiction. The OMB Resolution5 and Joint Order6 found probable cause for the filing of criminal cases for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No, (RA) 30197 as amended, and Malversation through Falsification8 against petitioners Ildefonso T. Patdu, Jr. (Patdu), Rebecca S. Cacatian (Rebecca), and Geronimo V. Quintos (Quintos) (collectively, petitioners), together with several other government officials and one private individual.9
The Factual Antecedents:
This case arose from a complaint10 filed by the OMB Field Investigation Office (FIO) against Iloilo Second District Representative Judy J. Syjuco (Representative Syjuco), Technical Education and Skills Development Authority Director-General Augusto Syjuco, Jr. (Syjuco, Jr.), Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) Management Division Inspector Marcelo P. Desiderio, Jr. (Desiderio), DOTC Management Technical Inspector Danilo M. Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa), and Domingo Samuel Jonathan L. Ng (Ng), proprietor of West Island Beverages Distributor (West Island), for Estafa, Falsification of Public Documents, and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.11
A supplemental complaint12 was filed by the FIO to include DOTC Storekeeper III Antonio D. Cruz (Cruz) as respondent for the same charges.13 Likewise, the FIO, charged DOTC Secretary Leandro Mendoza (Secretary Mendoza), DOTC Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) Chairman Domingo A. Reyes, Jr. (Reyes), BAC Vice Chairman Elmer A. Soneja (Soneja), BAC members Director III Cacatian, Director III Patdu, Legal Officer V Quintos, and Venancio G. Santidad (Santidad) with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.14
The filing of the foregoing resulted from the investigation conducted by the FIO pursuant to a complaint-affidavit filed by Iloilo Provincial Administrator Manuel P. Mejorada.15
The Complaints:
Through a letter dated. December 15, 2004, Representative Syjuco informed Secretary Mendoza that the Department of Budget Management (DBM) issued special allotment release orders (SARO) in the total amount of P6,249,528.00. for the purchase of communications equipment for Region VI.16 She also requested to avail of an alternative method of procurement allowed by the implementing rales of RA 918417, otherwise known as the Government Procurement Reform Act. to facilitate the purchase.18 On December 21, 2004, a day after Secretary Mendoza received the letter, the BAC issued a resolution recommending the purchase of communications equipment for Region VI through direct contracting,19 This was approved by Secretary Mendoza.20
On December 23, 2004, Ng submitted his quotation for 1,582 units of Nokia 1100 cellphone model.21 He noted that the items will be delivered to Representative Syjuco's district office in Iloilo.22 In his quotation, Ng allegedly- enclosed a Distribution Certification issued by Smart Communications, Inc. (Smart) stating that West Island was assigned as its exclusive distributor in areas that include the entire Second district of Iloilo.23 However, it was alleged, that this certification was issued only on January 4, 2005, several days after the award of the contract to West Island on December 28, 2004.24 In addition, West Island is only a distributor of Smart Value Credits or Smartload as provided in its Marketing Distributorship Agreement with Smart.25
It was further claimed that Purchase Order DOTC-2004-12-250 for the purchase of the cellphone units was already prepared even before the contract was awarded to West Island. This resulted from a personal follow up by Representative Syjuco to Santidad.26
The documentary requirements were allegedly prepared in haste in order to beat the December 31, 2004 deadline, otherwise, the SAROs will expire and the allotment will revert to the general funds.27
On February 22, 2005, West Island received the purchase order.28 On the same day, Dela Rosa, the DOTC management technical inspector, issued a Technical Inspection Report stating that the cellphone units have been delivered, inspected, and found to be working properly.29 This was corroborated by Desiderio, the DOTC management division inspector, in his Inspection Report.30 Cruz, the storekeeper, also issued a certificate of acceptance of the units.31 West Island, for its part, issued a delivery receipt and a charge invoice for the cellphone units in the amount of P6,248,900.00.32
It was claimed, however, that Ng received payment without delivering the cellphone units.33 Manuel Perez (Perez), the head of Sales Strategies and Systems of Smart, in his affidavit, stated that West Island was never an exclusive distributor for the company; and it did not make any purchase of Nokia 1100 cellphone units therefrom.34
Mayor Isabelo Maquino (Mayor Maquino) of Santa Barbara, Iloilo also executed an affidavit, in which he denied receiving any cellphone units from the DOTC and signing any Invoice Receipt of Property.35
Counter-Arguments of
Petitioners and Other
Respondents (in the OMB):
Secretary Mendoza, in his Consolidated Counter-Affidavit, argued that his acts cannot be characterized with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. He did not favor West Island or any other specific person and he approved the BAC resolutions in good faith.36 On the assumption that Direct Contracting was not proper in this instance, its adoption did not create liability on their part under Section 65 of RA 9184,37 He added that there was nothing unusual in Ng's letter even if the certification was dated January 4, 2005 subsequent to the award of the contract to West Island, as Ng could have actually released his letter to DOTC only on January 4, 2005.38 Secretarv Mendoza also presented the defense that he enjoys presumption of regularity in the discharge of his public functions,39 Lastly, he argued that there was no allegation and proof that he acted in conspiracy with the other respondents in perpetrating the offenses charged.40
Representative Syjuco and Syjuco, Jr. asserted that they did not hold, release, pay, and receive the communications equipment and had no control over the disbursement of the amounts under the SAROs.41 They claimed that it was the DOTC BAG, which adopted the alternative method of procurement.42 There was no injury to the government because there was documentary proof that the cellphone units were indeed delivered to the DOTC, moreover, DOTC would not have paid if the equipment were not delivered.43 They also claimed that they were neither close to Ng nor privy to any of his transactions, they denied preparing Ng's certification dated January 4, 2005 and participation in the preparation of the Invoice Receipt of Property which allegedly contained the forged signature of Mayor Maquino.44 The extent of Representative Syjuco's participation was limited to the preparation of the letter dated December 15, 2004 that informed Secretary Mendoza of the issuance of the SAROs and recommended the adoption of an alternative method of procurement.45
Santidad alleged that his signing of the resolutions as then provisional member of the BAC was not attended by manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence as there was no clear inclination on his part to favor West Island, Ng, or any specific person.46 He claimed that as it was his ministerial duty to affix his signature on the invoice receipt; he relied in good faith on the technical inspection report issued by the DOTC inspection officials, and on the certificate of acceptance issued by Cruz.47 Santidad also stated that he cannot be cxpected to personally inspect the cellphone units because that duty belonged to the Inspection Management Divisions.48 Lastly, he contended that the complaints did not clearly allege specific acts that show conspiracy.49
Cruz, the storekeeper, countered that his participation here was the preparation and forwarding to management of a request for inspection (with the necessary documents), and the signing of a certificate of inspection as the items were already inside a padlocked container van ready for shipment to Iloilo.50 He insisted that he repeatedly requested Santidad to go to Iloilo to inspect the items and to witness the signing of the invoice receipt but to no avail as no travel orders were issued.51
Petitioners, together with BAC Vice Chairman Soneja, in their Joint Counter-Affidavit, argued that the BAC, in issuing the board resolution recommending adoption of direct contracting, relied on the recommendations of a technical working group (TWG).52 The TWG issued a memorandum recommending the adoption of direct contracting with the condition that Section 50(c)53 of the implementing rules of RA 9184 be sufficiently complied with.54 It also found West Island to be the exclusive distributor of Smart in Panay.55 They claimed that a director in the DOTC Procurement, Supply, and Property Management Service certified that West Island has no sub-dealers in Panay selling at a lower price, and that no suitable substitute can be obtained from other suppliers in the locality.56 The BAC even posted in the DOTC website a notice to resort to an alternative mode of procurement.57 They claimed that the resolution dated December 21, 2004 was not issued in haste because it determined in good faith whether Representative Syjuco's request was tenable by referring the matter to the TWG.58 The impending expiration of the SAROs on December 31, 2004 was not the main consideration for the issuance of the resolution.59 On the matter of the Smart Distribution Certificate, petitioners posited that the date January 4,2005 appears to be a typographical error because it was enclosed in Ng's letter dated December 23, 2004.60 On the allegation that the resolution was issued ahead of the certification, petitioners contended that this observation is erroneous as the same was a reiteration of a similar certification already issued, which served as basis for the TWG's recommendation to the BAC.61 Lastly, petitioners argued that mere issuance of resolutions did not necessarily entail that the BAC acted with manifest partiality, bad faith, or gross negligence in the performance of their duties.62
Findings and Muling of the
Ombudsman:
In its August 4, 2014 Resolution,63 the OMB found probable cause to charge petitioners together with Representative Syjuco, Secretary Mendoza, Reyes, Soneja, Santidad, Desiderio, Dela Rosa, and Ng, with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, and Malversation through Falsification. The OMB found that these individuals, conspired with each other through seemingly separate but collaborative acts to defraud the government.64 It found that the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 were present. The first and second elements were not in issue, while the third and fourth elements were shown by the concerted acts of the charged individuals.
The OMB noted that under RA 9184, public bidding is the general rule while alternative methods may be resorted to only in highly exceptional cases and when justified by the conditions provided in the law and rules.65 Direct Contracting, therefore, may be resorted to by the procuring entity for goods sold by an exclusive dealer or manufacturer, which does not have sub-dealers selling at lower prices, and for which no substitute can be obtained at more advantageous terms for the government.66
The OMB ruled that the TWG already knew even before the DOTC received Representative Syjuco's letter that direct contracting was the method to be used for the purchase of the equipment.67 In the same vein, petitioners, as well as Secretary Mendoza and Santidad, acceded to Representative Syjuco's letter and TWG's recommendation despite the absence of any condition that would justify resort to direct contracting.68 There was no determination by the TWG that the communications equipment was necessary for Region VI—this determination, as stated by the OMB, is essential before the BAG can conclude that resort to direct contracting is proper.69 Further, the OMB found the assertion that West Island was an exclusive distributor of Smart in the area hardly convincing, because the cellphone units were sourced from and even inspected in the office of Smart in Makati City, only to be subsequently delivered to Iloilo.70 It would have been more advantageous for the government to have contracted directly with Smart Makati City or any other manufacturer or dealer therein.71 Further, the stipulations that prices may change without prior notice and that units will be subject to availability in Ng's quotation defeat the condition that the terms of the contract should be more advantageous to the government.72 In other words, petitioners and the other public officials resorted to Direct Contracting because of the need for communications equipment, yet they awarded the contract to West Island, which had not assured that units were indeed available.73
On the contention that petitioners, as well as Soneja, were misled by Ng's certification, the OMB emphasized that it cannot be the case as they are required to exercise all the necessary prudence to ensure that the most advantageous price and terms for the government is obtained.74 The OMB added that fraud is too obvious for them to be misled: the requisition, issue voucher, and the purchase order were approved before the awarding of the contract to West Island. In addition, the Smart Distribution Certification was issued after the award of the contract. This also showed that the award of the contract preceded Ng's quotation, which was supposedly part of the initial steps of the process.75
The OMB also found that there was no actual delivery of the cellphone units.76 Both inspection reports, the certificate of acceptance, and the invoice receipt were falsified.77 The OMB gave credence to Mayor Maquino's affidavit, wherein he stated that he did not receive any cellphone units from DOTC, and that he did not sign any invoice receipt therefor.78 Mayor Maquino's statements were corroborated by Perez, Smart's head of sales, when he stated that no cellphone units were purchased by West Island during the relevant period, and that the serial numbers of the units allegedly purchased by West Island matched those that were already sold by Smart to other parties.79
The OMB then concluded that despite all these anomalies in the procurement, Ng still received payment for the fictitious delivery of cellphone units.80
Likewise, the OMB ruled that the foregoing also amounted to Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents.81
The charges against Secretary Mendoza are dismissed by reason of his death, the charges against Syjuco, Jr. are likewise dismissed for insufficiency of evidence against him.82
The OMB, in a separate Resolution dated August 4, 2014, also ruled that petitioners and the other public officials charged in the criminal cases are guilty of grave misconduct and serious dishonesty, warranting the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from service.83
Petitioners, on their own, moved for the reconsideration84 of the criminal aspect of the OMB Resolution, This, however, was denied by the OMB in its Joint Order85 dated March 17, 2015. In the Joint Order, the OMB also took the opportunity to amend its previous Resolutions to include storekeeper Cruz86 among the individuals to be charged with the violation, of RA 3019 and Malversation through Falsification.
The dispositive portion, as amended in the Joint Order, of the OMB Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, finding probable cause to prosecute respondents 2nd District of Iloilo Representative Judy J. Syjuco. DOTC BAC Chairman Domingo A. Reyes, Jr., Vice-Chairman Elmer A. Soneja and members Director III Rebecca S. Cacatian, Director III Ildefonso T. Patdu, Jr., Legal Officer V Geronimo V. Quintos, Director III Venancio G. Santidad, DOTC Inspector Marcelo P. Desiderio, Jr., DOTC Technical Inspector Danilo M. Dela Rosa, Storekeeper III Antonio D. Cruz and private respondent Domingo Samuel Jonathan L. Ng for Malversation through Falsification and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, let an Information for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and Information for Malversation through Falsification be filed against them before the Sandiganbayan.
The charges against DOTC Secretary Leandro R. Mendoza are dismissed by reason of his death on October 7,2013.
The charges against TESDA Dir, Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr. are dismissed for insufficiency of evidence against him.
SO ORDERED.87
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari88 before the CA to assail the criminal aspect of the OMB Resolution and the Joint Order.
Meanwhile, on October 18,2016, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed before the Sandiganbayan two separate Informations charging petitioners and the other respondents in the OMB proceedings with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, and Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents.89
Ruling of the Court of Appeals;
In its August 4, 2016 Resolution, the CA dismissed the petition outright for having been filed with the wrong court. It reasoned that the remedy to assail the OMB's findings of probable cause in criminal cases is by filing an original action for certiorari with this Court.90 It ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of a case elevated from the OMB. The CA explained that it has jurisdiction over decisions in administrative disciplinary cases only, which can be assailed via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.91
Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution.
In its February 21,2017 Resolution, the CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration92 and elaborated its discussion on jurisdiction. It added that the second paragraph of Section 14 of RA 6770,93 which states that "No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law," has been declared unconstitutional in Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals94(Carpio-Morales) for increasing this Court's appellate jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence.95 The CA explained that this invalidation does not mean that all kinds of remedies from the decisions or findings of the OMB may now be brought to the CA; with respect to probable cause findings in criminal cases, the remedy is still with this Court.96 It held that Carpio-Morales affirmed and retained the applicability of Fabian v. Desierto97 (Fabian), which served as basis for the current rule that the OMR's findings of probable cause in criminal cases may be assailed via a petition for certiorari filed with this Court.98 This rule has not been abandoned in Carpio-Morales.99 Thus, petitioners in the instant case should have gone to this Court instead of the CA.
Petitioners now assail these CA Resolutions by filing the instant petition for review on certiorari with this Court. They contend that the invalidation of the second paragraph of Section 14 in Carpio-Morales is all encompassing as the Court did not make a distinction on whether the ruling is exclusively applicable to: administrative cases.100 Hence, the ruling in Carpio-Morales likewise applies to findings of probable cause in criminal cases.101 Petitioners add that the CA's reliance on the Fabian case is misplaced because the same never categorically stated that the remedy to assail findings of probable cause is via a petition for certiorari before this Court.102 Nonetheless, there were other cases where it was affirmed that the remedy to assail findings of probable cause is through the; said remedy before this Court.103 Petitioners claim, however, that the striking down of the second paragraph of Section 14 of RA 6770 necessarily abandoned the earlier rulings on the remedy to assail findings of probable cause.104 The appellate court, therefore, has jurisdiction upon observance of the doctrine on hierarchy of courts.
On the merits, petitioners claim that the OMB gravely abused its discretion in finding probable cause to hold them criminally liable, because conspiracy among the perpetrators was not established to hold petitioners liable.105 They add that as BAC members, the determination of their commission of overt acts for establishing conspiracy should be confined in the bidding and qualification phases of the procurement process.106 They also insist that they have done their jobs and the TWO and their subordinates in good faith.107 Lastly, petitioners claim that the OMB arbitrarily delayed the resolution of their case, thereby violating their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.108
Petitioners ultimately pray for the remand of the case to the CA by reinstating the petition for certiorari filed therein.109 In the event that the CA has no jurisdiction, they pray for this Court to rule on the merits by nullifying the assailed OMB Resolution and Joint Order for being rendered with grave abuse of discretion.110
Respondents OMB and FIO, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their Comment.111 Respondents argue that Carpio-Morales has no application in the instant case, because its doctrine is limited to administrative cases.112 They contend that the findings of probable cause are cognizable by this Court via Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground of the OMB's grave abuse of discretion.113 As this Court has jurisdiction over the instant case, respondents add that petitioners lost their remedy when they filed their petition for certiorari with the CA.114
On the merits, respondents assert that there was no grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause against petitioners. They argue that the OMB afforded all parties ample opportunity to be heard and it is not incumbent for the OMB to definitively establish the elements of the crime during the preliminary investigation as probable cause merely implies a probability of guilt.115 Based on the evidence submitted, the OMB determined that there is a prima facie existence of the elements of the crimes charged against petitioners.116 Petitioners, as members of the BAC, were not able to justify the adoption of direct contracting.117 Reliance on the TWG and subordinates is not a proper defense as the BAC is required to scrutinize every transaction that its agency will enter into. Thus, the BAC should have checked if the requirements and procedures under the law were properly observed.118 In this regard, petitioners failed to establish grave abuse of discretion on the part of the OMB.119 Its factual findings, therefore, should be accorded respect, if not finality.120 Lastly, respondents counter that there was no violation of petitioners' right to speedy disposition of cases.121
Petitioners filed their reply122 and reiterated the arguments in their Petition.
Issue
Considering the foregoing, the sole Issue for the resolution of the Court is whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioners' petition for certiorari for lack of jurisdiction.
Our Ruling
The petition has no merit. The CA did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari outright.1a⍵⍴h!1 The proper mode to assail the OMB's finding of probable cause in criminal cases is by filing a petition for certiorari before this Court— which petitioners failed to do.
The question to be resolved in this case is not novel Indeed, in Carpio-Morales, the Court struck down as unconstitutional the second paragraph of Section 14 of RA 6770. However, it is settled that the doctrine laid down in Carpio-Morales has no application in criminal cases before the OMB.
In Gatchalian v. Office of the Ombudsman123 (Gatchalian), the Court examined previous case law and clarified that Carpio-Morales has limited application to administrative cases before the OMB.124 The antecedents of Gatchalian are similar with the instant case. The OMB found probable cause to indict petitioner Gatchalian and other individuals for violation of RA 3019, Malversation, and violation of the Manual of Regulations for Banks in relation to the New Central Bank Act.125 Petitioner therein also filed a petition for certiorari before the CA to assail the OMB ruling and reasoned that he elevated the case to the CA by virtue of the ruling in Carpio-Morales.126 The appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction and opined that Carpio- Morales "should be understood in its proper context, i.e., that what was assailed therein was the preventive suspension order arising from an administrative case filed against a public official."127 On further appeal, this Court agreed with the CA's disposition—the relevant portions of the Decision state:
A thorough reading of the [Carpio-]Morales decision, therefore, would reveal that it was limited in its application—that it was meant to cover only decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. The Court never intimated, much less categorically stated, that it was abandoning its rulings in Ruizon and Estrada and the distinction made therein between the appellate recourse for decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative and non-administrative cases. Bearing in mind that Morales dealt with an interlocutory order in an administrative case, it cannot thus be read to apply to decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in non-administrative or criminal cases.
x x x x
It is thus clear that the [Carpio-]Morales decision never intended to disturb the well-established distinction between the appellate remedies for orders, directives, and decisions arising from administrative cases and those arising from non-administrative or criminal cases.
Gatchalian's contention that the unconstitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 6770 declared in [Carpio-]Morales equally applies to both administrative and criminal cases—and thus the CA from then on had jurisdiction to entertain petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 to question orders and decisions arising from criminal cases—is simply misplaced. Section 14 of R.A. 6770 was declared unconstitutional because it trampled on the rule-making powers of the Court by: 1) prescribing the mode of appeal, which was by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, for all cases whether final or not; and 2) rendering nugatory the certiorari jurisdiction of the CA over incidents arising from administrative cases.
The unconstitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 6770, therefore, did not necessarily have an effect over the appellate procedure for orders and decisions arising from criminal cases precisely because the said procedure was not prescribed by the aforementioned section. To recall, the rule that decisions or orders of the Ombudsman finding the existence of probable cause (or the lack thereof) should be questioned through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed with the Supreme Court was laid down by the Court itself in the cases of Kuizon, Tirol Jr., Mendcza-Arce v. Ombudsman, Estrada, and subsequent cases affirming the said rule. The rule was, therefore, not anchored on Section 14 of R.A. 6770, but was instead a rule prescribed by the Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers. The declaration of unconstitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 6770 was therefore immaterial insofar as the appellate procedure for orders and decisions by the Ombudsman in criminal cases is concerned.
The argument therefore that the promulgation of the [Carpio-]Morales decision—a case which involved an interlocutory order arising from an administrative case, and which did not categorically abandon the cases of Kuizon, Tirol, Jr., Mendoza-Arce, and Estrada—gave the CA certiorari jurisdiction over final orders and decisions arising from non-administrative or criminal cases is clearly untenable.
To stress, it is the better practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same. Following the principle of stare decisis ei nan quieta movere—or follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled—the Court therefore upholds the abo vementioned established roles on appellate procedure, and so holds that the CA did not err in dismissing the case filed by petitioner Gatchalian for lack of jurisdiction.128
Therefore, the remedy to assail the OMB's findings of probable cause in criminal or non-administrative cases Is still by filing a petition for certiorari with this Court, and not with the CA. This doctrine has never been struck down or abandoned by Carpio-Morales.
This is supported by a more recent case, Yatco v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon (Yatco).Yatco also assailed the OMB's ruling in a criminal case for lack of probable cause before the CA, which the latter likewise dismissed. As thai case was also further appealed, the Court, in its disposition, reiterated Gatchalian, and stated:
Meanwhile, with respect to criminal charges, the Court has settled that the remedy of an aggrieved party from a resolution of the Ombudsman finding the presence or absence of probable cause is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 cf the Rules of Court and the petition should be filed not before the CA, but before the Supreme Court. In the fairly recent case of Gatchalian v. Office of the Ombudsman, (decided on August 1, 2018), the Court traced the genesis of the foregoing procedure and cited a wealth of jurisprudence recognizing the same:
x x x x
Thus, it is evident from the foregoing that the remedy to assail the ruling of the Ombudsman in non-administrative/criminal cases file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Supreme Court) is well-entrenched In our jurisprudence.130 (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, it remains that OMB resolutions on probable cause In criminal cases are assailable by filing a petition for certiorari with this Court. This has always been and is still the prevailing rale. To repeat, Carpio-Morales did not invalidate this remedy as it covers administrative cases only. The CA has no jurisdiction over findings of probable cause in criminal cases,
In the instant case, the CA, therefore, did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners have erroneously filed their petition for certiorari with the appellate court, when it should have been filed before this Court.
It follows then that petitioners have lost their right to assail the OMB's finding of probable cause against them when they elevated the case before the wrong forum, Similar with how the Court proeesded in Gatchalian and Yatco, it is not proper for this Court to just assume jurisdiction and rule on the merits of the instant case given petitioners' availment of the wrong remedy.131
Now that Informations were already filed in the Sandiggnbayan, petitioners have all the opportunity there during the trial proper to dispute the findings of probable cause, and, possibly, to eventually clear their names from the alleged crimes.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Resolutions dated August 4,2016 and February 21,2017 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 146382 are hereby AFFIRMED,
SO ORDERED.
Perlas-Bernabe, SAJ, (Chairperson), J., Please see concurring opinion. Inting, Gaerlan and Dimaampao, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 On a preliminary note, the rollo of this case is improperly paginated. Pagination jumped from page 396 to page 697. Note, however, that this is merely a typographical error in the pagination; the documents are not incomplete.
2 Rollo, pp. 26-84. Filed on April 17, 2017.
3 Id. at 85-86. Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan-Castillo, and concurred in by Justices Florito S. Macalino and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles.
4 Id. at 87-95. Id.
5 Id. at 85-86. Penned by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer I Clarence N. Joson, and by Preliminary Investigation and Administrative Adjudication Bureau B. Director Moreno F. (recommending approval) and Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales.
61 Id. at 335-367.
7 Entitled "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."
8 THE REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 217 in relation to Arts, 171 and 48.
9 The other respondent government officials and private individual in the OMB proceedings (who also eventually became accused in the trial proper before the Sandiganbayan) did not appeal the OMB findings.
10 Rollo, p. 39.
11 Id. at 286.
12 Id. at 40.
13 Id. at 286.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 287.
16 Id. at 287.
17 entitled "As Act Providing for the Modernization, Standardization, and Regulation of the Procurement Activities of Government, and for Other Purposes," approved on January 10, 2003.
18 Rollo, p. 287.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. Total amount of quotation is P6,248,900.00 for 1582 units at P3,950.00 each.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 104.287-288.
24 Id. at 287-288.
25 Id.Id. at 288.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 283-289.
35 Id. at 289.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 289-290.
41 Id. at 290.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 290-291.
46 Id. at 291.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 291-292.
49 Id. at 292.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Section 50. Direct Contracting, —
Direct Contracting or single source procurement is a method of procurement of goods that does not require elaborate bidding documents. The supplier is simply asked to submit a price quotation or a pro-forma invoice together with the conditions of sale. The offer may be accepted immediately or after some negotiations. Direct contracting may be resorted to by concerned procuring entities under any of the following conditions: xxxx
c) Those sold by an exclusive dealer or manufacturer which does not have sub-dealers selling at lower prices and for which no suitable substitute can be obtained at more advantageous terms to the Government.
54 Rollo, p. 293.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 285-311.
64 Id. at 295.
65 Id. at 296.
66 Id.Id.
67 Id.Id. at 297.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 293-299.
71 Id. at 299.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 301.
75 Id. at 301-302.
76 Id. at 303.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 305.
81 Id. at 306-309.
82 Id. at 310.
83 Id. at 357.
84 Id. at 312-328; supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed by Patdu at rollo, pp.329-354.
85 Id. at 355-367.
86 Id. at 365-366.
87 Underscored portion is the amendment,
88 Rollo, p. 44.
89 Id. at 368-371, 372-376.
90 Id. at 86.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 95.
93 Entitled "Act No. 6770, an act providing for the functional and structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman, and for other purposes" approved on November 17, 1989.
94 772 Phil. 672 (2015).
95 Id. Rollo, p. 89.
96 Rollo, p. 91.
97 356 Phil. 787 (1998).
98 Rollo, pp. 92-93.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 47-51.
101 Id. at 51.
102 Id. at 51-53.
103 Id. at 53-57.
104 Id. at 57-58.
105 Id. at 64-65, 67-70.
106 Id. at 65.
107 Id. at 66, 72.
108 Id. at 74-78.
109 Id. at 78-79.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 699-725.
112 Id. at 711-713.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 713-714.
115 Id. at 714-716.
116 Id. at 717.
117 Id. at 718-719.
118 Id. at 719-721
119 Id. at 722.
120 Id. at 714.
121 Id. at 723.
122 Id. at 729-746.
123 G.R. No. 229288, August 1, 2018.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 G.R. No. 244775, July 6, 2020.
130 Emphasis supplied.
131 See notes 123 and 129.
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