[ G.R. No. 218461, September 14, 2021 ]
ILDEFONSO T. PATDU, JR., PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, RESPONDENT.
CONCURRING OPINION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
I concur.
Petitioner Ildefonso T. Patdu, Jr. (Patdu, Jr.) filed the instant petition assailing the Decision1 dated December 13, 2010 in Decision No. 2010-133 and the Resolution dated April 6, 20152 in Decision No. 2015-135 of respondent Commission on Audit (COA), which among others: (a) reinstated the Notice of Disallowance (ND) No. 97-011-102 (DOTC) (95) dated June 18, 1997 (ND 95) disallowing the excessive costs of construction of the Davao Fishing Port Complex (the Project) in the total amount of P53,951,955.033 for violating the rule on unreasonable excessiveness of government infrastructure contracts pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1594 and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR); and (b) held Patdu, Jr., among other persons, civilly liable for the portion of P5,210,744.29 corresponding to the Variation Orders (VO) he reviewed that were found to be infirm.4
Pertinent portions of the disputed ND and assailed COA rulings read:
ND No. 97-011-102 (DOTC) (95) dated June 18, 19975
| PAYEE |
AMOUNT DISALLOWED |
PERSONS LIABLE |
FACT AND/OR REASONS FOR DISALLOWANCE |
| EEI/JE Manalo Construction Joint Venture |
P53,951,955.03 |
PBAC for the award of the contract.
- Jose R. Valdecanas
- Chairman
- Cesar T. Valbuena
- Member
- Wilfredo M. Trinidad
- Member
- Florencio T. Aricheta
- Member
- The Consultant:
PCI/Basic which prepared the agency estimate.
- Dir. Samuel C. Custodio
- Project Director
- Ildefonso Patdu
-Project Manager.
Responsible for the review of variation orders.
- EEI/JE Manalo
construction Joint Venture
| Excess amount after re-evaluation of PMO justification on the result of COA technical review of the contract for the construction of Davao Fishing Port. |
COA Decision No. 2010-133 dated December 13, 2010
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the herein appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, LAO-N Decision No. 2005-039 and LAO-N Resolution No. 2005-039A denying the request to lift ND No. 98-004-102 (DOTC) (96) are hereby AFFIRMED. Likewise, the 5th Indorsement dated July 19, 2001 of the Director of then NGAO II lifting ND No. 97-011-102 (DOTC) (95) is hereby SET ASIDE. The decision of the DOTC Department Auditor disallowing the project cost difference/excess is hereby REINSTATED.
The incumbent Auditor is directed to inform the Management and the persons liable of the reinstated disallowance.6 (Underscoring supplied)
COA Decision No. 2015-135 dated April 6, 2015
Consequently, the liability of Mr. Ildefonso T. Patdu, Jr. under ND No. 97-011-102 (DOTC) (95) is hereby AFFIRMED. However, Mr. Patdu should only be held liable for the excessive costs in the variation orders he reviewed, specifically, Variation Order Nos. 5, 7 and 8, in the total amount of [P]5,210,744.29.
The rest of the persons liable under ND Nos. 97-011-102 (DOTC) (95) dated June 18, 1997 and 98-004-102 (DOTC) (96) dated May 28, 1998, and COA Decision No. 2010-133 dated December 13, 2010, shall remain to be liable therefor.7 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Notably, records show that the subject matter of the assailed rulings actually pertains to the appeal of the Notice of Disallowance (ND) No. 98-004-103 (DOTC) (96) (ND 96) which similarly relates to irregularities concerning the Davao Fishing Port Complex project but involves a different transaction and a different set of parties.8 In this regard, it should be highlighted that petitioner was not a party to ND 96 and thus, was not originally privy to the appeal before the COA Proper, which was brought by parties held civilly liable under the said disallowance. As may be gathered from the assailed COA rulings, the reinstatement of ND 95 - and along with it, Patdu, Jr.'s liability thereunder - was made only as a side incident in the appeal of ND 96.9
In his petition before the Court, Patdu, Jr. essentially argues that the lifting of ND 95 by the Director of the National Government Audit Office II (NGAO Director) through the 5th Indorsement dated July 19, 2001 had already attained finality. Thus, he posits that the COA gravely abused its discretion in reinstating the said disallowance following the doctrine of finality or immutability of judgments.10 However, notwithstanding the fact that Patdu Jr.'s interest is limited to ND 95, he nevertheless prayed for the lifting and setting aside of both ND 95 and ND 96 in the prayer of his petition. The COA, on the other hand, primarily asserts that it is given wide latitude by the Constitution in terms of its audit functions.11
At the onset, it is well to note that, since he was not an aggrieved party insofar as ND 96 is concerned, Patdu Jr. lacks the requisite standing to question the same before the Court.12 "Necessarily, the person availing of a judicial remedy must show that he possesses a legal interest or right to it, otherwise, the issue presented would be purely hypothetical and academic."13 Hence, the ponencia is correct in limiting its ruling only to issues concerning ND 95.
The doctrine of immutability of judgments
applies in the instant case.
Well-settled is the rule that once a judgment has become final and executory, it may no longer be modified in any respect. In Heirs of Gabule v. Jumuad,14 the Court held that:
It is a hornbook rule that once a judgment has become final and executory, it may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land, as what remains to be done is the purely ministerial enforcement or execution of the judgment. This is known as the doctrine of immutability of judgments. x x x.15
Notably, the doctrine of immutability or finality of judgments is not a mere technical rule of procedure sourced solely from the Rules of Court, but is primarily a general principle borne from substantive considerations. Corollary to the well-enshrined policy that litigation must end at some point,16 it ensures a winning party's right to reap the benefits of the finality of a favorable judgment. As held in numerous cases on the subject:17
In staying its own hand in disturbing final judgments, this Court emphasized that the immutability of final judgments is not a matter of mere technicality, "but of substance and merit." In Peńa v. Government Service Insurance System:
[I]t is axiomatic that final and executory judgments can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land. Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so also the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.
x x x x
The rule on finality of decisions, orders or resolutions of a judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative body is "not a question of technicality but of substance and merit," [as its] underlying consideration [is] ... protecti[ngl ... the winning party['s substantive rights] ... Nothing is more settled in law than that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.18 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In the instant case, the ponencia correctly holds that the doctrine of immutability of judgments is applicable to the decision of the NGAO Director.19 As the Court has categorically declared in past cases, the said doctrine equally applies to judgments rendered by quasi-judicial bodies.20 Verily, the interest of the winning party to reap the benefits of a judgment remains the same whether in the context of a judicial or an administrative proceeding.
The COA gravely abused its discretion in
reinstating ND 95, which lifting should already
be deemed final and immutable.
The foregoing general premises notwithstanding, it is important to highlight that the manner by which a ruling attains finality remains to be governed by the applicable laws or rules of procedure of the pertinent adjudicating body.
For judicial cases in which the Rules of Court apply, Rule 36 (Judgments, Final Orders and Entry Thereof) in relation to Rule 39 (Execution, Satisfaction, and Effect of Judgments) are the primary governing rules with respect to the attainment of finality. On the other hand, for COA cases, a ruling attains finality based on the COA's own rules of procedure. Specifically, Section 6, Rule V of the 1997 COA Revised Rules of Procedure21 (COA Rules), which was in effect during the pendency of the case, provides:
Section 6. Power of Director on Appeal. - The Director may reverse, modify, alter, or affirm the decision or ruling of the Auditor. However, should the Director render a decision reversing, modifying or altering the decision or ruling of the Auditor, the Director shall, within ten (10) days, certify the case and elevate the entire record to the Commission Proper for review and approval.
As may be gleaned from the above-cited provision, it is only in cases where the NGAO Director reverses, modifies, or alters the decision or ruling of the Auditor that the decision should be elevated to the COA Proper for automatic review. Conversely, when the NGAO Director affirms or sustains the ruling of the Auditor, further elevation and review are unnecessary. As such, the affirmance, when not anymore appealed by an aggrieved party in accordance with the COA rules, will simply lapse into finality. The reason for the automatic review provision is palpable: the COA Proper is tasked to resolve the seeming conflict between the Auditor and Director's rulings to arrive at a proper conclusion on an audit case. However, if no conflict exists, then there is no need for the COA Proper to automatically review the matter since both the Auditor and Director are already in agreement.
In this case, the NGAO Director sustained the COA Auditor's 4th Indorsement dated January 31, 2000 recommending the lifting of the disallowance. Considering that the NGAO Director's decision was not appealed, the same had already lapsed into finality. Notably, this is, in fact, the thrust of Patdu, Jr.'s petition before this Court:
6.4. It must be recalled that the Auditor favorably considered Mr. Custodio's Motion for Reconsideration of ND No. 97-011-102 (DOTC) (95). Guided by Sec. 7, Rule IV, 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA, the Auditor elevated his decision lifting the audit disallowance to the Director, NGAO II, for automatic review. Through his 4th Indorsement, the Auditor recommended to the Director the lifting of the audit disallowance.
6.5. On review, NGAO II Director Tobias P. Lozada sustained the decision of the Auditor to lift ND No. 97-011 102 (DOTC) (95). The pertinent portion of his decision contained in a 5th Indorsement dated July 19, 2001 reads:
Premises considered, pursuant to the Revised CSE Manual, this Office sustains the DOTC Auditor's decision lifting the disallowance under ND No. 97-011-102 (DOTC) dated June 18, 1997 in the amount of [P]53,951,955.03.
6.6. It can be readily seen from the Decision of the Director, NGAO II, that the latter did not reverse, modify or alter the decision or ruling of the Auditor. Of pertinence to the said decision of the Director is Section 6, Rule V, 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA, relating to Appeal front Auditor to Director. Sec. 6 of the Rules reads:
RULE V
APPEAL FROM AUDITOR TO DIRECTOR
x x x x
Section 6. Power of Director on Appeal. - The Director may reverse, modify, alter, or affirm the decision or ruling of the Auditor. However, should the Director render a decision reversing, modifying or altering the decision or ruling of the Auditor, the Director shall, within ten (10) days, certify the case and elevate the entire record to the Commission Proper for review and approval.
6.7. From the foregoing provision, it is crystal clear that it is only when the Director reverses, modifies or alters the decision or ruling of the Auditor that the rule on automatic review by the Commission Proper sets in. If the Director affirms the decision or recommendation of the Auditor as in the present case, the rule on automatic review does not apply.
6.8. Considering that the Director affirmed the decision or ruling of the Auditor to lift ND No. 97-011-102 (DOTC) (95), the rule on automatic review provided under Section 6, Rule V of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA did not set in. Accordingly, Director Lozada was correct in not elevating the matter to the Commission Proper for Automatic Review.
6.9. It must be accentuated that decision of the NGAO II Director sustaining and affirming the decision of the Auditor to lift ND No. 97-011-102 (DOTC) (95) remained uncontested for almost 10 years. This being so, it has attained finality. Consequently, it became immutable and unalterable.22 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Patdu, Jr.'s foregoing contention is consistent with what appears on record. As the records show, the contractor, i.e., EEI/JE Manalo Construction Joint Venture, wrote a Letter dated December 12, 1997 to the COA Auditor assailing the issuance of ND 95. As stated, the COA Auditor treated the letter as a request for reconsideration and eventually recommended the total lifting of the disallowance through a 4th Indorsement dated January 31, 2000. The NGAO Director, in turn, sustained in full this recommendation in a 5th Indorsement23 dated July 19, 2001, which reads in relevant part:
In a 4th Indorsement dated January 31, 2000, the DOTC Auditor recommended the total lifting of the disallowance amount to P53,951,955.03
x x x x
In accordance with the Revised Manual on CSB, the lifting of the ND's should be concurred in by the Director of the issuing Auditor.
x x x x
Premises considered, pursuant to the Revised CSB Manual, this Office sustains DOTC Auditor's decision lifting the disallowance under ND No. 97-011-102 (DOTC) dated June 18, 1997 in the amount of P53,951,955.03.24 (Emphases supplied)
Based on the foregoing disposition, Patdu, Jr. correctly averred that the elevation of the NGAO ruling to the COA Proper was not required under Section 6, Rule V of the COA Rules. Hence, as the same was not anymore appealed, the NGAO Director's decision had lapsed into finality.
At this juncture, it is noteworthy to also highlight that the COA Proper's reinstatement came after the lapse of an inordinate period of almost ten (10) years. To recall, while the decision of the NGAO Director was issued way back on July 19, 2001, the reinstatement by the COA Proper was made only on December 13, 2010. Undoubtedly, aside from its impropriety, the COA Proper's course of action is riddled with inordinate delay.
For its part, the COA, in its Comment,25 merely traverses this issue by asserting that it is given wide latitude by the Constitution in terms of its audit functions. However, the COA should be reminded that while it does enjoy wide latitude in conducting its audit, it should also not arbitrarily apply its own rules to the undue prejudice of the public. It should be stressed that, in past cases,26 the Court had already exhorted quasi-judicial tribunals to "be the first to respect and obey its own rules, if only to provide the proper example to those appearing before it and to avoid all suspicion of bias or arbitrariness in its proceedings."27
Given the circumstances of this case where automatic review is not warranted under the COA Rules and further considering the lapse of almost ten (10) long years from the time Patdu, Jr. was led on to believe that the disallowance had already been lifted, it would be the height of injustice to sustain the COA's blanket assertion of its authority to audit without any reasonable or fair regard to the application of its own rules to the parties before it. As the records itself bear out, the lifting of ND 95 had already lapsed into finality and, hence, should not have been revived by the COA Proper based on its own caprice and whim. Accordingly, the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the same.
At any rate, Patdu, Jr.'s civil liability for the
disallowance remains suspect based on
prevailing jurisprudence.
At any rate, even if one were to discount the issue of finality, Patdu, Jr. should not be held civilly liable under prevailing jurisprudence.
Under Section 38,28 Chapter 9, Book I and Section 43,29 Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code,30 as interpreted in prevailing case law,31 the civil liability of approving/authorizing public officers for disallowances issued by the COA will only arise upon a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. Otherwise, such officers are presumed to have acted within the regular performance of their official functions and in good faith, and hence, are not accountable for the return of disallowed amounts.
In disallowance cases involving government contracts, the foregoing precepts are reflected under Rules 2 (a) and (b) of the guidelines recently established in Torreta v. COA,32 to wit:
Accordingly, we hereby adopt the proposed guidelines on return of disallowed amounts in cases involving unlawful/irregular government contracts submitted by herein Justice Perlas-Bernabe, to wit:
1. If a Notice of Disallowance is set aside by the Court, no return shall be required from any of the persons held liable therein.
If a Notice of Disallowance is upheld, the rules on return are as follows:
a. Approving and certifying officers who acted in good faith, in the regular performance of official functions, and with the diligence of a good father of the family are not civilly liable to return consistent with Section 38 of the Administrative Code of 1987.
b. Pursuant to Section 43 of the Administrative Code of 1987, approving and certifying officers who are clearly shown to have acted with bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, are solidarily liable together with the recipients for the return of the disallowed amount.
c. The civil liability for the disallowed amount may be reduced by the amounts due to the recipient based on the application of the principle of quantum meruit on a case to case basis.
d. These rules are without prejudice to the application of the more specific provisions of law, COA rules and regulations, and accounting principles depending on the nature of the government contract involved. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In holding Patdu, Jr. civilly liable for the disallowance, the COA Proper in this case advanced the following ratiocination:
Mr. Patdu was included among the persons liable under ND No. 97-011-102 (DOTC) (95) for reviewing the variation orders. Based on Decision No. 2010-133 dated December 13, 2010, the project cost was found to be excessive by [P]53,951,954.13, computed as follows:
x x x x
It can be gleaned from the above computation that the amounts of the variation orders reviewed by Mr. Patdu as Project Engineer were part of the total project cost, a portion of which was found excessive and disallowed in audit. Mr. Patdu failed to diligently review the variation orders which resulted in the overpricing of the project as computed by the COA-STTFP. However, his liability shall only be on the excess costs for the variation orders he reviewed, in the total amount of [P]5,210,744.29.33 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
However, apart from the statement that "[petitioner] failed to diligently review [VO Nos. 5, 7, and 8 which resulted in the overpricing of the project as computed by the COA-[Special Task Force on Flagship Project (STFFP)]," the COA Proper's ruling was silent with respect to Patdu, Jr.'s bad faith, malice, or gross negligence relative to his participation in the project.
More significantly, contrary to the COA Proper's action, Patdu, Jr. amply justified his participation with respect to the questioned VOs relative to the Davao Fishing Port Complex project:
6.45. The construction of the project was already underway when petitioner reviewed the "variations orders". Significantly, these orders were recommended by the consultants during the construction stage as they were necessary in the implementation of the project.
6.46. It must be recalled that in his letter dated December 12, 1997, Mr. Custodio presented the justifications on these Variation Orders, to wit:
6.46.1. Variation Order No. 5 - Mobilization / Demobilization cost (or dredging equipment was included in the aforementioned variation order because there is a new item o( work, i.e., dredging, which is not included in the original contract and there is a need to bring in said equipment to the project site, hence the cost of mobilization/demobilization.
6.46.2. Variation Order No. 7 - The original contract calls (or the use of Concrete Asphalt (or Roadway and Parking Area. Due to the absence of supply of concrete asphalt in the area, the Contractor in his desire not to delay the project, offered to use PCCP instead at the same cost as Concrete Asphalt. The said substitution resulted to an increase in the thickness of the pavement and a decrease in the thickness of the sub-base. This offsetting resulted to a cost difference of P10,902,431.33 in favour of the government.
6.46.3. Variation Order No. 7E - Construction of Deepwell, the cost of deepwell for Variation Order No. 3 can not be adopted because they vary in depth. Deepwell for V.O. #3 is 42 meters deep, while for V.O. #7E, it is 75 meters deep.
6.46.4. Variation Order No. 8 - The discrepancy between the quantity take-of( and the BOO resulted to an overestimate of quantities in V.O. No. 8, however, this quantities were rectified in the Final Quantification.
6.47. Apparently, these justifications were favourably considered by the Auditor when he recommended the lifting of (ND) No. 97-011-102 (DOTC) (95) which included the audit disallowances on these variations orders.
6.48. Significantly, the justifications were not refuted by the STFFP. There was nothing from the records to dispute the justification that Variation Order No. 5 included an item of work that was included in the original contract. Since this was a new item of work that requires the use of equipment, it is imperative to mobilize these equipment to the project site. Obviously, they will be demobilized after the completion of the variation order. There was also nothing to show that the equipment mobilized for the original contract included the same equipment used for the new item of work covered by Variation Order No. 5.
6.49. As has been explained in the December 12, 1997 letter of Mr. Custodio, the contractor used Portland Cement Concrete Pavement instead of concrete asphalt because of the absence of supply of the latter in the area. It was not disputed either that indeed Portland Cement Concrete Pavement was used Roadway and Parking Area. Difference in thickness alone will not sustain the audit disallowance covered by Variation Order No. 7 simply because the use of Portland Cement Concrete Pavement on one hand, and the use of concrete asphalt on the other hand, involved different scope of work and different cost.34 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Evidently, his justifications pertain to technical adjustments/rectifications made during the course of the Project, which resulted in additional costs to the government. To note, the foregoing contentions were not rebutted by the COA in its Comment.
Case law explains that for negligence to be characterized as gross, the breach of duty must be flagrant or palpable, otherwise a mere error of judgment only amounts to simple negligence, which is compatible with the defense of good faith:
Negligence is the omission of the diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time, and of the place. In the case of public officials, there is negligence when there is a breach of duty or failure to perform the obligation, and there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable. An act done in good faith, which constitutes only an error of judgment and for no ulterior motives and/or purposes, as in the present case, is merely Simple Negligence.35
Hence, considering the prevailing jurisprudential parameters on civil liability and taking into account Patdu, Jr.'s unrebutted defenses in his petition, the imposition of civil liability on the latter's part cannot be maintained.
In any event, as afore-discussed, since the 5th Indorsement dated July 19, 2001 issued by the NGAO Director had sustained the COA Auditor's decision recommending the lifting of ND 95, the same was not required to be elevated to the COA Proper. Such decision, therefore, had already lapsed into finality. Consequently, Patdu, Jr.'s petition should be granted in part.
Accordingly, I vote to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. The Decision dated December 13, 2010 in Decision No. 2010-133 and the Resolution dated April 6, 2015 in Decision No. 2015-135 of the Commission on Audit are REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as Notice of Disallowance (ND) No. 97-011-102 (DOTC) (95) dated June 18, 1997 is concerned. The Notice of Disallowance (ND) No. 97-011-102 (DOTC) (95) is hereby LIFTED.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 28-35. Signed by Chairman Reynaldo A. Villar and Commissioners Juanito G. Espino, Jr. and Evelyn R. San Buenaventura.
2 Id. at 36-43. Signed by Commissioners Heidi L. Mendoza and Jose A. Fabia.
3 "P53,951,954.02" in the dispositive portion of April 6, 2015 Resolution; id. at 42.
4 See id. at 40-42.
5 Id. at 70; emphasis supplied.
6 Id. at 34.
7 Id. at 42.
8 See id. at 31-34.
9 See id.
10 See id. at 10-15.
11 See Comment dated December 17, 2015; id. at 122-123.
12 See Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., 802 Phil. 116 (2016).
13 Id. at 151-152.
14 See G.R. No. 211755, October 7, 2020.
15 Id., citing One Shipping Corporation v. Peńafiel, 751 Phil. 204, 210 (2015).
16 See Zarate v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 747, 749 (1919).
17 See Civil Service Commission v. Moralde, 838 Phil. 840 (2018); Torres v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp., 677 Phil. 672 (2011); Fua, Jr. v. COA, 622 Phil. 368 (2009); and Peńa v. Government Service Insurance System, 533 Phil. 670 (2006).
18 Civil Service Commission v. Moralde, id. at 855, citing Peńa v. Government Service Insurance System, id. at 683-690.
19 Ponencia, p. 8.
20 See Civil Service Commission v. Moralde, supra at 856.
21 Approved January 1997.
22 Rollo, pp. 11-12.
23 Id. at 92-94.
24 Id. at 93-94.
25 Dated December 17, 2015. Id. at 114-126.
26 See Basarte v. Commission on Elections, 551 Phil. 76, 84-85 (2007), citing Agbayani v. Commission on Elections, 264 Phil. 861, 868 (1990). See also Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 328 Phil. 210 (1996).
27 Agbayani v. Commission on Elections, id.
28 Which reads:
Section 38. Liability of Superior Officers. - (1) A public officer shall not be civilly liable for acts done in the performance of his official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence.
x x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
29 Which reads:
Section 43. Liability for Illegal Expenditures. - Every expenditure or obligation authorized or incurred in violation of the provisions of this Code or of the general and special provisions contained in the annual General or other Appropriations Act shall be void. Every payment made in violation of said provisions shall be illegal and every official or employee authorizing or making such payment, or taking part therein, and every person receiving such payment shall be jointly and severally liable to the Government for the full amount so paid or received.
x x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
30 Executive Order No. 292, entitled "Instituting the 'Administrative Code of 1987'" (August 3, 1988).
31 See Madera v. COA, G.R. No. 244128, September 8, 2020.
32 See G.R. No. 242925, November 10, 2020.
33 Rollo, p. 41.
34 Id. at 22-23.
35 Daplas v. Department of Finance, 808 Phil. 763, 774 (2017).
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