G.R. No. 196359 - Separate Concurring Opinion

G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021,
♦ Decision, Leonen, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Perlas-Bernabe, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Hernando, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Inting, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Lopez, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Gaerlan, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion, Edgardo Delos Santos, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Lopez, [J]

The 1987 Constitution recognizes the family as the cornerstone of the state,1 and in turn acknowledges marriage as the foundation of the family.2 Consistent with these principles, the Family Code of the Philippines defines marriage as a "special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life."3 Accordingly, this Court consistently adopted a conservative interpretation of Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.4

This Court's conservative treatment and interpretation of the foregoing provision was laid down almost 25 years ago in Santos v. Court of Appeals5 and Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina.6 The foregoing rulings would inadvertently produce stringent guidelines by which parties would be required to prove that their spouse is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage.

Nullification of a marriage based on the psychological incapacity of either spouse is allowed only if proof of one's psychological incapacity prior to the marriage is satisfactorily established during trial. As astutely observed by the ponente, marriages have been rarely declared void ab initio on this ground in the last three decades..Even among those cases which happen to reach this Court, only a handful would even meet the strict requirements of Santos and Molina.

Mario Victor M. Andal (respondent) in the present case suffers from a debilitating drug addiction. Records reveal that respondent failed to sustain a livelihood or regular source of income and repeatedly exposed his child to danger as a result of his drug addiction.7 Clearly, this addiction has prevented respondent not only from performing his responsibility as a husband and father, but also from being a productive member of society.

The Court of Appeals overturned the decision of trial court due to the psychiatrist's failure to personally examine respondent. For this reason, the appellate court opined the evaluation report was "unscientific and unreliable." I agree with the ponente that the marriage in question ought to be declared void ab initio in the presence of satisfactory evidence establishing respondent's psychological incapacity.8 In connection with this, I find it proper to raise two additional points for the consideration of this Court in assessing appeals of this nature as well as the matters for the Legislature to ponder upon.

First is that family is a fluid and dynamic concept and that amendments to the Family Code attest to this fact. Moreover, Congress has enacted laws which recognize families which do not necessarily conform to traditional structure but nevertheless deserves the State's protection. For example, while illegitimate children were previously required to use the surname of their mothers,9 an amendment in 2014 now allows illegitimate children to use their father's surname provided that the father has recognized such.10 By enacting this amendment, the Congress impliedly recognized that a father and his recognized, illegitimate child are family notwithstanding the child's birth outside of marriage. Similarly, the Solo Parent's Act11 explicitly recognized that not all families are composed of a father, a mother, and their children, and sought to protect these so-called non-traditional families. Accordingly, our interpretation of the provisions of the Family Code should likewise adapt to the ever-changing tides of societal norms.1âшphi1

The contemporary concept of family is no longer as restrictive as it was more than 30 years go. It may do our society good to expand our construction of the constitutional mandate of protecting the family, and exercise greater discernment in ensuring the protection of the family. While I submit that marriage is the foundation of the family, we must also recognize that all of these unions are worthy to be protected as inviolable social institutions especially if continued cohabitation endangers a spouse and the children.

Second is the overlooked imprecision of Article 36 of the Family Code. The ponente noted that psychological incapacity is not a mental disorder recognized by the scientific community.12 In the absence of a medical definition, this Court, in its previous rulings, defined psychological incapacity in jurisprudence as a condition preventing a spouse from performing his or her essential obligation. It is a medically or clinically identified condition characterized by gravity, incurability, and juridical antecedence. Moreover, for psychological incapacity to be ground for nullification, the underlying condition causing such incapacity must have existed prior to solemnization of marriage. Significantly, this Court upheld the validity of a marriage notwithstanding a spouse's continued night outs and partying,13 refusal to provide for the family after discovering that the other has a child out of wedlock,14 or alleged drug addiction15 as in the present case due to absence of proof that a spouse's underlying condition was extant prior to the marriage.

It appears Article 36 was drafted without much thought or deliberation of its consequences in view of the constitutional mandate to safeguard the family as the foundation of society. To my mind, requiring juridical antecedence or that the spouse's condition which brings about psychological incapacity is onerous, and blatantly inconsistent with the protection of the family. Continued exposure to an environment characterized by hostility, violence, and economic difficulties cannot do any good for either spouse and their children. Not only may such conditions physically endanger the family, but also may affect their mental and psychological health adversely. While I do not want to speculate as to how Article 36 came about, I am of the opinion that Legislature ought to reexamine this provision and reconsider the wisdom of requiring proof that a spouse's psychological incapacity has been m existence prior to the marriage as a condition to declare a marriage void.

Although the Constitution characterizes family as an inviolable social institution, the State should not be overzealous in protecting it if it would deprive its members of their individual and fundamentally guaranteed rights and freedom. All the more reason if a spouse or spouses suffers from a condition which prevents him/her to understand and fulfill the essential obligations of marriage, the State should likewise extend the same protection to ensure the purity and sanctity of marriage.