FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 200991, March 18, 2021 ]
SPOUSES WILFREDO AND DOMINICA ROSARIO, PETITIONERS, VS. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
ZALAMEDA, J.:
A home is not just property; it is a sanctuary, a realized dream. If for justifiable causes it must be seized, courts must ensure that the same is in accordance with law and upon observance of the requisites of due process.
The Case
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated 28 July 2011 and Resolution3 dated 20 February 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 110231. The CA reversed the Resolution4 dated 07 April 2008 of Branch 85, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in LRC Case No. Q-22034.
Antecedents
New San Jose Builders Inc. (NSJBI) and the Government Service Insurance System (respondent) entered into a Loan Agreement5 on 10 December 1997. NSJBI borrowed an amount of Php 600 million to finance the completion of two (2) housing projects, and to purchase a lot for construction of more housing projects. As security for the loan, NSJBI mortgaged three (3) parcels of land with existing improvements: 365 lots with existing low-cost houses at Mary Homes, Bacoor, Cavite, 102 condominium units at St. John Condominium at Scout Rallos, Quezon City (mortgaged properties), and rights over 240 condominium units in GSIS Metro Homes.
Under the loan agreement, NSJBI shall not alienate sell, dispose of, mortgage, or in any manner encumber the mortgaged properties or any portion thereof without the prior consent of the respondent. However, the parties also agreed that NSJBI may continue to sell the mortgaged properties subject to the condition that the net proceeds from the sales should be exclusively used in the recoupment of the loan. The parties further stipulated that in case of non-compliance with the conditions and stipulations agreed upon, respondent may immediately foreclose the mortgage, either judicially or extrajudicially, in accordance with the applicable provisions of law.
The mortgage was annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) and Condominium Certificates of Title (CCTs) of the mortgaged properties on 10 December 1997. Among those mortgaged pursuant to the Loan Agreement was Unit 205 in St. John Condominium at Scout Rallos, Quezon City (Unit 205), allegedly sold by NSJBI to the Spouses Wilfredo and Dominica Rosario (petitioners).
NSJBI defaulted in the payment of the loan. On 31 March 2003, respondent applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged properties. Subsequently, an auction sale was conducted on 17 June 2003, where respondent was the highest bidder.
Upon failure of NSJBI to exercise its right of redemption, the titles/ownership of the property were consolidated and the Register of Deeds cancelled the corresponding TCTs and CTCs in favor of respondent. Claiming that NSJBI continued in possession of the said foreclosed properties, respondent demanded NSJBI to vacate the foreclosed properties but to no avail. Hence, on 23 August 2006, respondent filed a petition for issuance of a writ of possession against NSJBI and all occupants of the foreclosed properties before the RTC.
NSBJI and its buyers, petitioners, Atty. Donardo S. Donato, Marcelino Delos Reyes and Carlitos Escueta, filed their pleadings-in-intervention. Respondent filed separate motions to expunge the pleadings-in-intervention.
On 07 April 2008, the RTC issued a Resolution, resolving to: 1) grant the motions for intervention, including that of petitioners; 2) treat the motion for leave to take judicial notice of Marcelino Delos Reyes as a motion to intervene and grant the same; and 3) grant respondent's application for a writ of possession as against NSJBI but only as to unsold condominium units and lots that are not in possession of third-party buyers. It also denied respondent's motion for partial reconsideration in a Resolution dated 11 June 2009.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
On 28 July 2011, the CA granted respondent's petition and reversed the RTC resolutions dated 07 April 2008 and 11 June 2009 of the RTC. It found that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting petitioner's motion for intervention in ex-parte proceeding for the issuance of a writ of possession.
The CA also ruled that the RTC erred in restraining the implementation of the writ of possession against petitioners since they are not third parties who are in adverse possession of the foreclosed property. It explained that the proper remedy for petitioners is to seek annulment of the mortgage or foreclosure before the House and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) for non-compliance with Section 186 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 957. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners argue that they should be allowed to intervene since they are third-party possessors of the foreclosed property who were not impleaded in respondent's ex-parte application.7 They contend that they should be considered a co-owners of the property instead of NSJBI's transferee or successor-in-interest.8 They also allege that their possession should be deemed adverse to respondent given that the mortgage agreement between it and NSJBI was entered into without authority from the HLURB in violation of Section 18 of PD 957.9
Issue
This Court is tasked to determine whether the CA erred in ruling that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion for allowing petitioners to intervene in respondent's ex-parte application for a writ of possession, and exempting from its implementation Unit 205 possessed by petitioners.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
The right to possess a foreclosed property after the redemption period is subject to the rights of third-party possessors
As a general rule, the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the foreclosed property after the lapse of the redemption period and no redemption is made.10 As owner, he is entitled to all the rights of ownership over a property recognized in Article 428 of the New Civil Code, including the right to possess the same, or jus possidendi.11 After consolidation of the ownership and transfer of TCT in the purchaser's name, a writ of possession will issue as a matter of course even without the necessity of a bond.12
As an exception, the ministerial duty of the court to issue an ex-parte writ of possession ceases when there are third-parties who are actually holding the mortgaged property adversely to the judgment debtor. Sec. 33 of Rule 39, made applicable to extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages by Sec. 6 Act No. 3135, provides:
SEC. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; by whom executed or given.ℒαwρhi৷ - If no redemption be made within one (1) year from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale, the purchaser is entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property; ....
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property as of the time of the levy. The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor. (Emphasis supplied).
Jurisprudence teaches that when there are third-party possessors of the property, the RTC should instead conduct a hearing to determine the nature of the adverse possession. However, for this exception to apply, it is not enough that the property is in the possession of a third party, it must also be held by the third party adversely to the judgment debtor or mortgagor.
In the early case of de Ortega v. Natividad,13 this Court explained the concept of a third-party adverse possessor and why a writ of possession cannot issue against such party. In that case, this Court affirmed the RTC's denial of the application for issuance of a writ of possession against supposed co-heirs of the mortgagor who were in actual possession of the mortgaged property even prior to the foreclosure suit. This Court explained that a writ of possession can only cause the eviction of parties to the suit, persons who came in under them pendente lite, and trespassers or intruders. It cannot be issued against a party in possession who was not a party to the foreclosure, and did not acquire his possession from a person who was bound by the decree, but who is a mere stranger and who entered into possession before the suit was commenced. This is because "the writ does not issue in case of doubt, nor will a question of legal title be tried or decided in proceedings looking to the exercise of the power of the court to put a purchaser in possession." This Court acknowledged that an application for writ of possession is a summary proceeding over which the court cannot decide on questions of the property's title and ownership. The same ratiocination was applied in Angeles v. Intermediate Appellate Court14 and Heirs of Nicolas v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.15
Meanwhile, in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Icot,16 this Court ruled that the writ of possession cannot be invoked against the heirs of the original owner of the property whose share therein have been erroneously sold to the judgment debtor.
Supposed owners whose titles were divested through forgeries or simulated conveyances may also be considered as third parties to ex-parte proceedings for applications of possessory writs involving their properties. In the recent case of Sy v. China Banking Corp.,17 this Court recalled the writ of possession issued by the RTC evicting the owners-occupants of the foreclosed property based on the finding that they were fraudulently deprived of their share thereon through simulated and forged conveyances. This Court, likewise, reminded the mortgagee bank of its obligation to be more vigilant in its transactions involving registered lands. In Development Bank of the Phils. v. Prime Neighborhood Association,18 this Court also affirmed the recall of a writ of possession based on the plea of third parties who were allegedly transferees of the true owner of the foreclosed property. In that case, it was claimed that the judgment mortgagor's supposed right to the property was hinged on a spurious title.
In Dayot v. Shell Chemical Co. (Phils.), Inc.,19 this Court upheld the right of the occupant of the foreclosed property who claimed they acquired the property from a party other than the judgment mortgagor. In that case, the Court ruled that the conflicting claims of ownership over the same property cannot be settled in an ex-parte proceeding for the issuance of a writ of possession.20
In the aforesaid cases, the Court deemed that the third-party's possession should be respected as it raises a disputable presumption of ownership, and under Article 433 of the Civil Code, a person who contests such disputable presumption must resort to judicial processes for the recovery of the property.21 However, for purposes of resolving the propriety of issuing a writ of possession, the trial court must conduct a summary hearing to determine the nature of the possession of third-party claimants.22 For it may be that the actual possessor is privy to any of the parties to the action, or his bona-fide possession may be disputed, or where such possession has been taken in connivance with the defeated litigant with a view to frustrating the judgment. The trial court shall then deny or accede to the enforcement of a writ of possession as the finding shall warrant.23
Incidentally, jurisprudence has often cited examples of parties against whom a writ of possession cannot issue. A co-owner, tenant, or usufructuary who is in actual possession cannot be evicted through an ex-parte application for a possessory writ. These parties are considered to possess the property based on their own right, and not merely as a transferee or successor of the mortgagor.
Co-owners cannot be evicted through a summary possessory writ from a co-owned property because in a co-ownership "each co-owner owns the whole, and over it he exercises rights of dominion, but at the same time he is the owner of a share which is really abstract because until the division is effected, such share is not concretely determined". During the period of coownership, a co-owner's possession of his share is linked to the possession of the other co-owners.24 Each of the co-owners merely own an abstract or ideal portion of the entire property.25
Meanwhile, usufructuaries are also protected from a writ of possession because during the subsistence of the usufruct, the owner parts with his right to possess and enjoy the property in favor of the usufructuary, while only retaining the jus disponendi or the power to alienate the same.26 Under Article 60327 of the Civil Code, sale of the property is not one of the causes of termination of the usufruct.
Finally, agricultural tenants of non-rice and corn crops are also considered as third-parties who possess the land adversely to the judgment debtor, and thus cannot be summarily ousted from the property through a writ of possession.28 This is because of the express provision of P.D. No. 1038, viz.:
SECTION 1. The tenure of the tenant-tillers in private agricultural lands devoted to crops other than rice and/or com, including but not limited to those primarily planted to abaca, banana, coconut, coffee, mango, durian and other permanent trees, shall be secured and no tenant-tiller shall be removed, ejected, ousted or excluded from his farmholding unless for causes provided by law and directed by a final decision or order of the court. (Emphasis ours)
PD No. 1038 was enacted to fortify the security of tenure of tenant-tillers who were being unlawfully ousted in their lands,29 and reinforce earlier laws providing for security of tenure for agricultural tenants. Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees, which they value as life itself, as deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of livelihood. The exercise of the right of ownership, then, yields to the exercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant.30
As will be discussed, this Court finds that individuals who buy condominium units or subdivision lots from developers are also entitled to the same treatment. Thus, writs of possession issued upon the application of mortgagee banks or financial institutions should exclude units or lots actually occupied by individual buyers.
Condominium and subdivision buyers are parties protected by law against compromising mortgages that would deprive them of their hard-earned property
We underscore that condominium and subdivision lot buyers are protected by PD No. 957 or the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree. Such legislative intention is clearly expressed in its preamble, viz.:
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to afford its inhabitants the requirements of decent human settlement and to provide them with ample opportunities for improving their quality of life;
WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting systems, and other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of home and lot buyers;
WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to different innocent purchasers for value; xxx
In the context of financing subdivision and condominium development projects, PD No. 957 recognizes the disparity between the resources of banks and financial institutions as against individual property buyers. In past cases, this Court has characterized PD No. 957 as an instrument of social justice meant to protect small lot and condominium unit buyers as against gigantic financial institutions who developers normally deal with.31 As eloquently stated by this Court in Philippine National Bank v. Office of the President:32
Protection must be afforded small homeowners who toil and save if only to purchase on installment a tiny home lot they can call their own. The consuming dream of every Filipino is to be able to buy a lot, no matter how small, so that he may somehow build a house. It has, however, been seen of late that these honest, hard-living individuals are taken advantage of, with the delivery of titles delayed, the subdivision facilities, including the most essential such as water installations not completed, or worse yet, as in the instant case, after almost completing the payments for the property and after constructing a house, the buyer is suddenly confronted by the stark reality, contrived or otherwise, in which another person would now appear to be owner.
x x x x x x x x x
"We cannot over emphasize the fact that the BANK cannot barefacedly argue that simply because the title or titles offered as security were clean of any encumbrance or lien, that it was thereby relieved of taking any other step to verify the over-reaching implications should the subdivision be auctioned on foreclosure. The BANK could not have closed its eyes that it was dealing over a subdivision where there were already houses constructed. Did it not enter the mind of the responsible officers of the BANK that there may even be subdivision residents who have almost completed their installment payments?"
Verily, while these large financial institutions have access to information and resources allowing them to protect themselves from loans with developers, individual property buyers are normally powerless to discover and prevent encumbrances involving the property being sold to them. Thus, this Court has held that the lofty aspirations of P.D. No. 957 should be read in every provision of the statute, in every contract that undermines its objects, in every transaction which threatens its fruition.33
Applying the policy behind PD No. 957, this Court, in Philippine National Bank v. Dee,34 ruled that mortgagee banks are bound to respect the contract to sell between the developer and the condominium unit buyer, despite the provisions of Act No. 3135, viz:
Nevertheless, despite the apparent validity of the mortgage between the petitioner and PEPI, the former is still bound to respect the transactions between respondents PEPI and Dee. The petitioner was well aware that the properties mortgaged by PEPI were also the subject of existing contracts to sell with other buyers. While it may be that the petitioner is protected by Act No. 3135, as amended, it cannot claim any superior right as against the installment buyers. This is because the contract between the respondents is protected by P.D. No. 957, a social justice measure enacted primarily to protect innocent lot buyers. Thus, in Luzon Development Bank v. Enriquez, the Court reiterated the rule that a bank dealing with a property that is already subject of a contract to sell and is protected by the provisions of P.D. No. 957, is bound by the contract to sell. (Emphasis ours)
In the past, the Court has likewise upheld the rights of individual buyers to possess their properties if it is established that the mortgagee-bank had knowledge of their conveyance to third-party buyers.
In Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court,35 this Court denied DBP's application for writ of possession, and upheld the right of Spouses Barican, the possessors of the property. This Court reasoned that DBP had knowledge of the sale with assumption of mortgage between the judgment debtor and Spouses Barican, and even received payments from them updating the loan. In addition, the Court found that the judgment debtor was never in possession of the property, and that there was a pending civil case between the DBP and Spouses Barican concerning ownership to the foreclosed property. The Court ruled that under the circumstances, the issuance of a writ of possession is no longer ministerial on the part of the trial court.
This Court employed the same ratiocination in Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals.36 In that case, the Court refused to enforce the writ of possession against a subdivision lot buyer whose property had been mortgaged by the developers. It explained that since the mortgagee-bank knew that the mortgaged property was occupied by persons other than the mortgagor, it could not eject them therefrom through a summary proceeding such as an application for a writ of possession. Further, it ruled that a third person in possession of an extrajudicially foreclosed realty, who claims a right superior to that of the original mortgagor must be given an opportunity to be heard on his claim in a proceeding of this nature. The possessor cannot be summarily dispossessed on the strength of a mere ex-parte possessory writ, since to do so would be tantamount to his summary ejectment, in violation of the basic tenets of due process. This Court also noted that unlike a judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage under Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, any property brought within the ambit of Act No. 3135 is foreclosed by the filing of a petition, not with any court of justice, but with the office of the sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made.37
In a similar way, herein respondent should not be allowed to summarily divest petitioners of their possession of Unit 205.ℒαwρhi৷ The protection afforded to a subdivision lot buyer under PD No. 957 should not be defeated, particularly by someone who is not a mortgagee in good faith.38 In this case, respondent knew that the mortgaged properties form part of a condominium project, which are within the purview of PD No. 957. It was aware that the loaned amounts were to be used for the development of NSJBI's various projects.39 This is clear from Sec. 6.2 of the Loan Agreement where respondent consented to the sale of the condominiums subject to the condition that the net proceeds from the sale be exclusively used in the recoupment of the loan, viz:
Section 6.2 That during the lifetime of this mortgage, the BORROWERMORTGAGOR shall not alienate, sell, dispose of, mortgage, or in any manner, encumber the mortgaged properties, or any portion thereof without the prior written consent of the LENDER-MORTGAGEE. However, the BORROWER-MORTGAGOR may continue to sell the 366 housing units, the 102 condominium units and its right on the 240 condominium units subject to the condition that the net proceeds from the sales should be exclusively used in recoupment of the loan. Should the BORROWER-MORTGAGOR violate this provision, it agrees and obligates itself to pay the LENDER-MORTGAGEE liquidated damages in an amount equivalent to 10% of the total loss, which amount shall automatically be added to the principal of the loan covered by the Mortgage, without the need of executing another contract and the LENDER-MORTGAGEE may declare the entire amount due and demandable.40 (Emphasis ours)
Under the circumstances, respondent knew the possibility and assumed the risk that some of the condominium units would eventually be sold to individual buyers. Hence, it cannot now claim that it was unaware of the individual buyers' rights, nor should it be allowed to bypass the same, through a summary application for a writ of possession without according them the opportunity to be heard. The RTC thus correctly allowed petitioners and the other condominium unit buyers to intervene, and be excluded from the issuance of the writ of possession. Respondent's supposed superior right over occupied condominium units should instead be determined in a full-blown proceeding where all the parties' claims are ventilated and scrutinized by the courts.
The ruling in Chinabank v. Lozada should be modified
Verily, transferees or successors of the judgment debtor or mortgagors have generally not been considered as third-party possessors. Their interest in the mortgaged property have not been treated as independent or adverse to the judgment mortgagor since their claim on the property merely stems from the latter.
In China Banking Corp. (CBC) v. Spouses Lozada,41 this Court ruled that condominium buyers who derive their right from the developers are not third parties who possess the foreclosed property adversely from the mortgagor. This Court explained that the rights of a condominium buyer are not the same as a co-owner, agricultural tenant, and usufructuary who possess the property in their own right. They are merely transferees or successors-in-interest of the developer-mortgagor. Thus, this Court ruled that it was mandatory and ministerial for the trial court to grant the ex-parte petition and order the issuance of a writ of possession in the latter's favor over the foreclosed property.
Applying the principle enunciated by this Court in China Banking Corp. (CBC) v. Spouses Lozada, this Court has later on explained, in various cases, who may be considered as transferees or successors-in-interest of the judgment debtor. These parties cannot claim that they possess an adverse interest from the mortgagor as to be excluded from a subsequent application for a writ of possession.
In Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara (Iloilo), Inc. v. Centeno,42 this Court declared that a person who buys the property after it was mortgaged does not qualify as a third-party whose possession is exempt from the reach of a consequent foreclosure and issuance of a writ of possession. On the other hand, the Court, in Spouses Marquez v. Spouses Alindog,43 disqualified a prior buyer of the judgment debtor from the legal protection given to third-party possessors of a foreclosed property since his interest is not adverse and is hinged on the right of the judgment debtor.
The Court has likewise ruled that the heirs of the judgment debtor are bound to respect the mortgage, foreclosure and eventual issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the mortgagee. As heirs, they merely stepped into the shoes of the mortgagor and are, thus, compelled not only to acknowledge but, more importantly, to respect the mortgage he had earlier executed in favor of the mortgagee. They cannot effectively assert that their right of possession is adverse nor independent from what they have inherited.44
Similarly, a corporation, who is a beneficiary and is represented by the individual mortgagors, is not considered a third-party adverse possessor of the property.45
Meanwhile, in Cabling v. Lumapas,46 this Court explained that when the judgment debtor executes a deed of conditional sale involving the subject property prior to the mortgage or foreclosure, the buyer is not a third party whose possession is entitled to protection against summary writs consequent to foreclosure. Similarly, the interest of third-party possessor who claims a right in the foreclosed property based on a contract to sell was deemed inchoate and therefore cannot be a basis to defeat the right of a winning purchaser to secure a writ of possession.47
Likewise, this Court has decided that a writ of possession secured by the mortgagee is binding on the supposed donee mortis causa of the judgment debtor.7!ᕼdMᗄ7 In Bascara v. Javier,48 this Court considered the donee a mere transferee or successor-in-interest who merely stepped into the shoes of the judgment debtor.
Obviously, a condominium unit or subdivision lot buyer can be classified as a transferee or successor-in-interest since they derive their title to the unit or lot from the developer. Upon the execution of contract to sell or a deed of sale, the unit or lot buyers merely step into the shoes of the developer. Thus, their possession is subject to conveyances made by the developer involving the property.
However, guided by the provisions and policy behind PD 957, this Court deems it proper to modify the rule disqualifying all transferees of successors of the judgment debtor from being considered as third-party adverse possessors. Individual buyers of condominium units or subdivision lots, while having privity with developer-mortgagors, should be excluded from the issuance or implementation of a writ of possession if they are actually occupying the unit or lot.
As clearly demonstrated by this case, these small property buyers would suffer deleterious consequences if they continue to be treated as ordinary transferees or successors-in-interest of property developers. Arguably, while subdivision lot buyers may seek protection under Section 18 of PD No. 957 and pursue the annulment of the mortgage between the developer and the financial institution entered without the prior written approval of the HLURB, they may in the meantime be deprived of the possession of their property or residence should a financial institution foreclose a mortgage thereon. Certainly, such a scenario is anathema to the policy behind PD No. 957. Individual subdivision and condominium buyers are legally entitled to protection from being summarily ejected from their homes through processes that they may completely be unaware of and have no control over.
Thus, in keeping with the avowed purpose of PD No. 957, the rule should now be that the issuance of a writ of possession ceases to be ministerial if a condominium unit or subdivision lot buyer intervenes to protect their rights against a mortgagee bank or financial institution. The court must order a hearing to determine the nature and source of the buyer's supposed right to the foreclosed property. Should the judge be satisfied that the oppositors to the issuance of the writ are bona fide condominium or subdivision buyers who are in actual possession of the property, the writ should thus be issued excluding the aforesaid buyers from its implementation. It should, however, be clarified that exclusion of such buyers is without prejudice to the outcome of cases concerning the validity of the mortgage between the developer and the mortgagee financial institution or bank under Section 18 of PD No. 957.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 28 July 2011 and Resolution dated 20 February 2012 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 110231 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution dated 07 April 2008 of Branch 85, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in LRC Case No. Q-22034 is REINSTATED. The writ of possession should exclude units possessed by petitioners and third-party buyers.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, C. J., Carandang, and Gaerlan, JJ., concur.
Caguioa, J., Please See Concurring Opinion.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 10-21.
2 Id., at 25-37; penned by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz, with Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Edwin D. Sorongon, concurring.
3 Id., at 40-42.
4 Id., at 90-92.
5 Id., at 74-84.
6 Section 18. Mortgages. No mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made by the owner or developer without prior written approval of the Authority. Such approval shall not be granted unless it is shown that the proceeds of the mortgage loan shall be used for the development of the condominium or subdivision project and effective measures have been provided to ensure such utilization. The loan value of each lot or unit covered by the mortgage shall be determined and the buyer thereof, if any, shall be notified before the release of the loan. The buyer may, at his option, pay his installment for the lot or unit directly to the mortgagee who shall apply the payments to the corresponding mortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit being paid for, with a view to enabling said buyer to obtain title over the lot or unit promptly after full payment thereto;
7 Id. at 15.
8 Id. at 15-19.
9 Id. at 19-20.
10 Spouses Fortaleza v. Spouses Lapitan, G.R. No. 178288, 15 August 2012, 692 Phil. 596 (2012) [Per J. Del Castillo].
11 Spouses Gallent v. Velasquez, G.R. No. 203949 & 205071, 06 April 2016, 784 Phil. 44 (2016) [Per J. Reyes].
12 Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Spouses Co, G.R. Nos. 171172 & 200061, 09 November 2015, 772 Phil. 291 (2015) [Per J. Jardeleza].
13 G.R. No. 47714, 14 March 1941, 71 Phil. 340 [Per J. Laurel].
14 G.R. No. 75009, 29 September 1989, 258 Phil. 746 [Per J. Medialdea].
15 G.R. No. 137548, 03 September 2007, 558 Phil. 649 [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez].
16 G.R. No. 168061, 12 October2009, 618 Phil. 320 [Per J. Carpio].
17 G.R. No. 213736, 17 June 2020, [Per J. Carandang]; See also Villanueva v. Cherdan Lending Investors Corp., G.R. No. 177881, 13 October 2010, 647 Phil. 494 [Per J. Nachura]; Capital Credit Dimension, Inc. v. Chua, G.R. No. 157213, 28 April 2004, 472 Phil. 250 [Per J. Reyes].
18 G.R. Nos. 175728 & 178914, 08 May 2009, 605 Phil. 660 [Per J. Tinga].
19 G.R. No. 156542, 26 June 2007, 552 Phil. 602, [Per J. Austria-Martinez]; See also Royal Savings Bank v. Asia, G.R. No. 183658, 10 April 2013, 708 Phil. 485 [Per J. Sereno].
20 See also Sio Tiat King v. Lim, G.R. No. 185407, 22 June 2015, 761 Phil. 173 [Per J. Reyes].
21 Sio Tiat King v. Lim, G.R. No. 185407, 22 June 2015, 761 Phil. 173 [Per J. Reyes].
22 Unchuan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78775, 31 May 1988, 244 Phil. 733 [Per J. Cortes].
23 Omaña v. Gatulayao, G.R. No. 47969, 22 July 1941, 73 Phil. 66 [Per J. Moran].
24 Gatchalian v. Arlegui, G.R. No. L-35615, L-41360, 17 February 1977, 166 Phil. 236 [Per J. Aquino].
25 See Carvajal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-44426, 25 February 1982 [Per J. Teehankee].
26 Moralidad v. Spouses Pernes, G.R. No. 152809, 03 August 2006, 529 Phil. 523 [Per J. Garcia].
27 Art. 603. Usufruct is extinguished:
(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly appears;
(2) By the expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or by the fulfillment of any resolutory condition provided in the title creating the usufruct;
(3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person;
(4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;
(5) By the total loss of the thing in usufruct;
(6) By the termination of the right of the person constituting the usufruct;
(7) By prescription.
28 See Clapano v. Gapultos, G.R. No. L-51574-77, 30 September 1984, 217 Phil. 409 [Per J. MelencioHerrera].
29 The whereas clause of PD No. 1038 provides:
WHEREAS, I have received disturbing reports that owners of private agricultural lands, landholders, agricultural lessors, legal possessors, civil law lessees, usufructuaries, or those acting for and in their behalf planted to crops other than rice and/or com, including but not limited to those primarily planted to abaca, banana, coconut, coffee, citrus, durian and other similar permanent trees, are harassing or ejecting or removing or ousting or excluding the tenant-tillers from their farmholdings in spite of the fact that existing laws, particularly Republic Acts Nos. 1199, as amended, and 3844, as amended, protect the security of tenure of these tenant-tillers;
30 Heirs of Soriano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128177, 15 August 2001, 415 Phil. 299 [Per J. YnaresSantiago].
31 Philippine National Bank v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 104528, 18 January 1996, 322 Phil. 6 [Per J. Panganiban]; Far East Bank & Trust Co. v. Marquez, G.R. No. 147964, 20 January 2004, 465 Phil. 276 [Per J. Panganiban].
32 Citing Breta and Hamor vs. Lao, et al., CA G.R. No. 58728-R, 11 November 1981 [Per J. Melo]; G.R. No. 104528, 18 January 1996, 322 Phil. 6 [Per J. Panganiban].
33 Luzon Development Bank v. Enriquez, G.R. Nos. 168646 & 168666, 12 January 2011, 654 Phil. 315-339 [Per J. Del Castillo].
34 G.R. No. 182128, 19 February 2014, 727 Phil. 473 [Per J. Reyes].
35 G.R. No. 79906, 20 June 1988, 245 Phil. 316 [Per J. Gutierrez].
36 G.R. No. 135219, 17 January 2002, 424 Phil. 757 [Per J. Ynares-Santiago].
37 See Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135219, 17 January 2002, 424 Phil. 757 [Per J. Ynares-Santiago].
38 Luzon Development Bank v. Enriquez, G.R. Nos. 168646 & 168666, 12 January 2011, 654 Phil. 315 [Per J. Del Castillo].
39 See Luzon Development Bank v. Enriquez, G.R. Nos. 168646 & 168666, 12 January 2011, 654 Phil. 315 [Per J. Del Castillo].
40 Rollo, p. 77.
41 G.R. No. 164919, 04 July 4, 2008, 579 Phil. 454 [Per J. Chico-Nazario].
42 G.R. No. 200667, 11 March 2013, 706 Phil. 106 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe]; See also BPI Family Savings Bank v. Golden Power Diesel Sales Center, Inc., G.R. No. 176019, 12 January 2011, 654 Phil. 382 [Per J. Carpio].
43 G.R. No. 184045, 22 January 2014, 725 Phil. 237 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe]; See also Cahilig v. Terencio, G.R. No. 164470, 28 November 2011, 677 Phil. 277 [Per J. Leonardo de Castro]; Madriaga, Jr. v. China Banking Corp., G.R. No. 192377, 25 July 2012, 691 Phil. 770 [Per J. Reyes].
44 See Spouses Gatuslao v. Yanson, G.R. No. 191540, 21 January 2015, 751 Phil. 188 (2015) [Per J. Del Castillo]; Heirs of Peñaflor v. Heirs of Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 197797, 09 August 2017, 816 Phil. 324 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe].
45 See St. Raphael Montessori School, Inc. v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 184076, 21 October 2015, 772 Phil. 79 [Per J. Peralta].
46 G.R. No. 196950, 18 June 2014, 736 Phil. 582 [Per J. Brion].
47 See AQA Global Construction, Inc. v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. Nos. 211649 & 211742, 12 August 2015, 766 Phil. 519 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe].
48 G.R. No. 188069, 17 June 2015, 760 Phil. 766 [Per J. Peralta].
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