[ G.R. No. 206761, June 23, 2021 ]
PAUL AMBROSE, PETITIONER, VS. LOUELLA SUQUE-AMBROSE, RESPONDENT.
CONCURRING OPINION
CAGUIOA, J.:
I concur. I agree with the ponencia’s holding that Paul Ambrose (petitioner) here has the legal standing to file a petition for declaration of nullity before a Philippine Court. Petitioner, as a foreigner husband of a Filipino wife in a marriage celebrated in the Philippines, has locus standi precisely because he is a spouse, and as mentioned by the ponencia, Section 2(a) of the "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages" (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not distinguish between foreign and Filipino spouses on the matter of who may file a petition for declaration of nullity of void marriages, to wit:
Section 2. Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages. —
(a) Who may file. — A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
I further second the ponencia's citation of the irrelevance of Article 15 of the Civil Code since said provision clearly relates to family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity of Filipino citizens. It simply has no application to foreign nationals such as petitioner in the instant case.
To be sure, the legal standing of a foreigner spouse to sue has been touched on by the Court in the case of Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera1 (Pilapil), where the German spouse therein was found to lack the standing to file the complaints as "offended spouse," for having obtained the divorce decree in Germany prior to the filing of said complaints. Resembling the facts in Republic v. Manalo2 (Manalo), the Court there ruled that since the divorce decree is binding on the German spouse pursuant to the nationality principle, he may no longer be seen as an offended spouse in the contemplation of the crime of adultery in the Revised Penal Code.
In Pilapil, the Court laid down as part of its decisional rule that the litmus test in the determination of the legal standing of a foreigner spouse to sue as a spouse in Philippine courts is whether a marriage still subsisted. Speaking through Justice Regalado, the Court clarified, thus:
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., after a divorce was granted by a United States court between Alice Van Dorn, a Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union x x x.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.ℒαwρhi৷ However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law x x x.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets.
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.3
Unlike the facts in Manalo and Pilapil, the instant case involves a foreigner spouse seeking before a Philippine court the remedy of a declaration of nullity of his marriage with a Filipino spouse celebrated in the Philippines. Thus, at the time of the filing of the instant petition, the marriage between petitioner and respondent is presumed to be valid until it is nullified. This configuration of facts does not lend itself to the application of Article 15 of the Civil Code, and is instead within the province of locus standi.
Finally, on point as well is the ponencia's correction of the lower courts' framing of the instant controversy as one that pertains to the nationality of petitioner. As correctly reframed by the ponencia, it is the doctrine of lex loci celebrationis or the law of the place of the ceremony that squarely applies, so that since the marriage between petitioner and respondent was celebrated in the Philippines, the Philippine law on dissolution and declaration of nullity of marriages must apply, and since petitioner here cites Article 36 of the Family Code on psychological incapacity as the ground for the prayer of the declaration of nullity of his marriage with respondent, then it is incorrect to deny said petition on account of petitioner's supposed lack of standing or personality to file the same.
In the light of the foregoing, I CONCUR in the Court's disposition to remand the case to the RTC for further proceedings on the merits.
Footnotes
1 G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 643.
2 831 Phil. 33 (2018).
3 Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, supra note 1, at 663-664.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
