G.R. No. 252578 - Concurring and Dissenting Opinion

G.R. No. 252578, December 7, 2021,
♦ Decision, Carandang, [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Gesmundo, [CJ]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Perlas-Bernabe, [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Leonen, [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion, Inting, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion, Zalameda, [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, M. Lopez, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Gaerlan, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, J. Lopez, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Dimaampao, [J]

ATTY. HOWARD M. CALLEJA, ATTY. JOSEPH PETER J. CALLEJA, ATTY. CHRISTOPHER JOHN P. LAO, DE LA SALLE BROTHERS INC., AS REPRESENTED BY BR. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, FSC, DR. REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, NAPOLEON L. SIONGCO, AND RAEYAN M. REPOSAR, PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, SECRETARY OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC), RESPONDENTS.

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, PETITIONER, VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA; ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL (ATC); ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC); SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SENATE, PRESIDENT VICENTE C. SOTTO III; AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, RESPONDENTS.

MELENCIO S. STA. MARIA, EIRENE JHONE E. AGUILA, GIDEON V. PEÑA, MICHAEL T. TIU, JR., FRANCIS EUSTON R. ACERO, PAUL CORNELIUS T. CASTILLO, EUGENE T. KAW, PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MENARDO I. GUEVARRA, THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF FILEMON SANTOS, JR., PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF ARCHIE FRANCISCO F. GAMBOA, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR., SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT EDUARDO M. AÑO, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DELFIN N. LORENZANA, SECRETARY OF FINANCE CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ III, SECRETARY OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY GREGORIO HONASAN II, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MEL GEORGIE B. RACELA, RESPONDENTS.

BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES CARLOS ISAGANI T. ZARATE, FERDINAND GAITE, AND EUFEMIA CULLAMAT; GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE ARLENE D. BROSAS; ACT-TEACHERS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE FRANCE L. CASTRO, KABATAAN PARTYLIST REPRESENTATIVE SARAH JANE I. ELAGO; BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST PRESIDENT, SATURNINO OCAMPO; MAKABAYAN CO-CHAIRPERSON LIZA LARGOZA MAZA; BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST CHAIRPERSON NERI J. COLMENARES; ACT-TEACHERS PARTY-LIST PRESIDENT ANTONIO TINIO, AND ANAKPAWIS PARTY-LIST VICE PRESIDENT ARIEL CASILAO, AND MAKABAYAN SECRETARY GENERAL, NATHANAEL SANTIAGO, PETITIONERS, VS. PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, AND THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, RESPONDENTS.

RUDOLF PHILIP B. JURADO, PETITIONER, VS. THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

CENTER FOR TRADE UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS (CTUHR), REPRESENTED BY DAISY ARAGO, PRO-LABOR LEGAL ASSISTANCE CENTER (PLACE), REPRESENTED BY ATTY. NOEL V. NERI, ARMANDO TEODORO, JR., VIOLETA ESPIRITU, AND VIRGINIA FLORES, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL (ATC); ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP), REPRESENTED BY LT. GEN. FELIMON SANTOS JR. AND THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), REPRESENTED BY LT. GEN. ARCHIE GAMBOA, RESPONDENTS.

CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, FELICITAS A. ARROYO, RAY PAOLO J. SANTIAGO, AMPARITA STA. MARIA, MARIA ILSEA W. SALVADOR, MARIANNE CARMEL B. AGUNOY, XAMANTHA XOFIA A. SANTOS, MARIA PAULA S. VILLARIN, PAULA SOPHIA ESTRELLA, IGNATIUS MICHAEL D. INGLES, ERNESTO B. NERI, FR. ALBERT E. ALEJO, S.J., PAULA ZAYCO ABERASTURI, WYANET AISHA ELIORA M. ALCIBAR, SENTRO NG MGA NAGKAKAISA AT PROGRESIBONG MANGGAGAWA (SENTRO), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY-GENERAL JOSUA T. MATA, PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR., DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN N. LORENZANA, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECRETARY EDUARDO M. AÑO, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ III, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY MENARDO I. GUEVARRA, DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY GREGORIO B. HONASAN II, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MEL GEORGIE B. RACELA, ALL MEMBERS OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL FILEMON SANTOS, JR., PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF GENERAL ARCHIE FRANCISCO F. GAMBOA, RESPONDENTS.

SANLAKAS, REPRESENTED BY MARIE MARGUERITE M. LOPEZ, PETITIONER, VS. RODRIGO R, DUTERTE, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF ALL THE ARMED FORCES, SENATE, AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, RESPONDENTS.

FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS (FFW-NAGKAISA) HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT ATTY. JOSE SONNY MATULA; TRADE UNION LEADERS OF THE NAGKAISA LABOR COALITION (NAGKAISA), NAMELY, ANNIE ENRIQUEZ GERON (PRESIDENT OF THE PUBLIC SERVICES LABOR INDEPENDENT CONFEDERATION), DANIEL EDRALIN (SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTEL AND RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRY), RENATO MAGTUBO (CHAIRMAN OF THE PARTIDO MANGGAGAWA), DEOBEL DEOCARES (PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR), DANILO LASERNA (FFW-VP FOR EDUCATION/HEAD OPERATIONS); CO-CHAIR OF THE CHURCH LABOR CONFERENCE (CLC) JULIUS H. CAINGLET (FFW-VP FOR ADVOCACY & NETWORKING), RUEL POLON (PRESIDENT OF TF LOGISTIC PHILS WORKERS UNION); KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU) CHAIRMAN ELMER LABOG, ELEANOR DE GUZMAN (WORKERS' RESISTANCE AGAINST TYRANNY & FOR HUMAN RIGHTS) AND PASCUAL PAUSAL (KILOS NA MANGGAGAWA); TRADE UNION LEADERS OF THE UNI GLOBAL UNION-PHILIPPINE LIAISON COUNCIL NAMELY, JESUS EXEQUIEL NIDEA (PRESIDENT), ROLAND DELA CRUZ (EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT); AND KILUSANG ARTIKULO TRESE (A.13) CONVENOR ROLANDO LIBROJO, PETITIONERS, VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, SECRETARY OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL SECRETARIAT, RESPONDENTS.

JOSE J. FERRER, JR., PETITIONER, VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, SENATE, AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, RESPONDENTS.

BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN) SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO REYES, JR., BAYAN CHAIRPERSON MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, MOVEMENT AGAINST TYRANNY CONVENOR GUILLERMINA "MOTHER MARY JOHN" D. MANANZAN, O.S.B, FORMER UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES (UP) PRESIDENT FRANCISCO NEMENZO, PH.D., FORMER UP DILIMAN CHANCELLOR MICHAEL TAN, KARAPATAN ALLIANCE PHILIPPINES (KARAPATAN) SECRETARY GENERAL CRISTINA E. PALABAY, KARAPATAN CHAIRPERSON ELISA TITA P. LUBI, FORMER NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CULTURE AND THE ARTS CHAIRPERSON FELIPE M. DE LEON, JR., PH.D., FORMER DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT (DSWD) SECRETARY PROF. JUDY M. TAGUIWALO, FREE JONAS BURGOS MOVEMENT CHAIRPERSON EDITA T. BURGOS, RENATO R. CONSTANTINO, JR., FORMER NATIONAL ANTI-POVERTY COMMISSION UNDERSECRETARY MA. CORAZON J. TAN, FORMER DSWD UNDERSECRETARY MARIA LOURDES TURALDE JARABE, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS CHAIRPERSON DANILO HERNANDEZ RAMOS, CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE RETURN OF THE MARCOSES AND MARTIAL LAW (CARMMA) CONVENOR BONIFACIO P. ILAGAN, MOST REV. DEOGRACIAS IÑIGUEZ, D.D., FORMER BAYAN MUNA PARTYLIST REPRESENTATIVE TEODORO A. CASIÑO, MAE P. PANER, VERGEL O. SANTOS, FR. WILFREDO DULAY, M.D.J., PROF. MICHAEL PANTE (ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY), PROF. TEMARIO C. RIVERA (UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES), PROF. JOSEPH ANTHONY Y. LIM (ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY), FRANCISCO A. ALCUAZ, FORMER UP CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES DIRECTOR CYNTHIA N. ZAYAS, PH.D., KILUSANG MAYO UNO SECRETARY GENERAL RONALDO M. ADONIS, PINAG-ISANG SAMAHAN NG MGA TSUPER AT OPEREYTOR (PISTON) NATIONWIDE CHAIRPERSON JUANITO AQUINO RANJO, JR., HEALTH ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY CHAIRPERSON EDELINA PADILLA-DELA PAZ, M.D., GABRIELA-YOUTH SECRETARY-GENERAL CLARICE JOY PALCE, VOICES OF WOMEN FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE CONVENOR TINA-AGEL S. ROMERO, AMIHAN NATIONAL FEDERATION OF PEASANT WOMEN SECRETARY GENERAL CATARINA T. ESTAVILLO, PAMALAKAYA CHAIRPERSON FERNANDO L. HICAP, SALINLAHI ALLIANCE FOR CHILDREN'S CONCERNS SECRETARY GENERAL EULE C. RICO BONGANAY, ANAKBAYAN SECRETARY GENERAL VINZHILL PERFAS SIMON, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL JOANNA MARIE GASPAR ROBLES, BAHAGHARI SPOKESPERSON REY KRISTOFFER VALMORES SALINAS, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE) PRESIDENT SANTIAGO Y. DASMARIÑAS, JR., COURAGE SECRETARY GENERAL MANUEL R. BACLAGON, NOEMI LARDIZABAL DADO, PAMILYA NG DESAPARECIDOS PARA SA KATARUNGAN CHAIRPERSON ERLINDA T. CADAPAN, ASHER P. CADAPAN, HUSTISYA! PAGKAKAISA NG MGA BIKTIMA PARA SA HUST1SYA CHAIRPERSON EVANGELINE P. HERNANDEZ, KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY) CHAIRPERSON-EMERITUS CARMEN "NANAY MAMENG" DEUNIDA, SAMAHAN NG EX-DETAINEES LABAN SA DETENSYON AT ARESTO (SELDA) CHAIRPERSON TRINIDAD G. REPUNO, PETITIONERS, VS. H.E. RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, VICENTE SOTTO III, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SENATE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND ALAN PETER CAYETANO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO, CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, JAY L. BATONGBACAL, DANTE B. GATMAYTAN, THEODORE O. TE, VICTORIA V. LOANZON ANTHONY CHARLEMAGNE C. YU, FRANCISCO ASHLEY L. ACEDILLO, AND TIERONE JAMES M. SANTOS, PETITIONERS, VS. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PHILIPPINES, SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR. TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR., DELFIN N. LORENZANA, EDUARDO M. AÑO, CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ III, MENARDO I. GUEVARRA, GREGORIO B. HONASAN II, AND MEL GEORGIE B. RACELA, AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING UNDER THEIR CONTROL, DIRECTION AND INSTRUCTIONS, RESPONDENTS.

MA. CERES P. DOYO, JOSEFA ANDRES MAGLIPON MARCELO, MARIA A. RESSA, RACHEL E. KHAN, MARIA ROSARIO F. HOFILEÑA, LILIBETH SOCORRO FRONDOSO, MARIA TERESA D. VITUG, MARIO S. NERY, JR., BEATRICE P. PUENTE, FLORANGEL ROSARIO-BRAID, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, LEILA M. DE LIMA, JOSE CHRISTOPHER Y. BELMONTE, SERGIO OSMEÑA III, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, SR., LORENZO R. TAÑADA III, JOSE MANUEL I. DIOKNO, EDMUNDO G. GARCIA, LUTGARDO B. BARBO, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, PETITIONERS, VS. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HERMOGENES ESPERON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER; TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS; DELFIN LORENZANA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; EDUARDO AÑO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT; CARLOS DOMINGUEZ III, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF FINANCE; MENARDO I. GUEVARRA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; GREGORIO BALLESTEROS HONASAN II, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY; MEL GEORGIE B. RACELA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL; WENDEL E. AVISADO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT; THE ANTI- TERRORISM COUNCIL (ATC) CREATED UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 11479; THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA); AND ANY PERSONS ACTING UNDER THEIR CONTROL, SUPERVISION, OR DIRECTION IN RELATION TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 11479, RESPONDENTS.

NATIONAL UNION OF JOURNALISTS OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSELITO O. ALTAREJOS, IVY MARIE B. APA, ANNA MAY V. BAQUIRIN, ARNEL BARBARONA, JUNELIE O. BARRIOS, MARIA VICTORIA JOY B. BELTRAN, LIAN NAMI ALOEN P. BUAN, MARA ALYSSABEL D. CEPEDA, RICHARD C. CORNELIO, FRANCES BEA C. CUPIN, ARDEE E. DELOLA, ERNEST JEWELL B. DIÑO, LEONILO O. DOLORICON, CECILIA VICTORIA O. DRILON, GLENDA M. GLORIA, BARTHOLOME TANKEH GUINGONA, ABDULMARI L. IMAO JR., JAZMIN B. LLANA, GRACE MARIE LOPEZ, BIENVENIDO L. LUMBERA, DIANDRA DITMA A. MACARAMBON, GUTIERREZ M. MANGANSAKAN II, AMADO ANTHONY G. MENDOZA III, VINCENT MARCO C. MORALES, KRISTINE ONG MUSLIM, ELIZABETH JUDITH C. PANELO, NORBERTO S. ROLDAN, JOSELITO B. SARACHO, RAISA MARIELLE B. SERAFICA, ELIZABETH ROSE O. SIGUION REYNA, LISA I. TAPANG, LUIS V. TEODORO JR., ROLAND B. TOLENTINO, MICHAEL JUDE C. TUMAMAC, EDGIE FRANCIS B. UYANGUREN, MA. SALVAC1ON E. VARONA, AND DENZEL Q. YORONG, PETITIONERS, VS. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, AND NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, RESPONDENTS.

KABATAANG TAGAPAGTANGGOL NG KARAPATAN REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL CONVENER BRYAN EZRA C. GONZALES, YOUTH FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT CHRISTIAN B. GULTIA, YOUTH ACT NOW AGAINST TYRANNY REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL CONVENER RAOUL DANIEL A. MANUEL, MILLENNIALS PH REPRESENTED BY ITS COMMITTEE HEAD JOSE RIO I. IWASAKI, SAMAHAN NG PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT IAN RED D. LIGOT, GOOD GOV PH REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT DEXTER ARVIN E. YANG, YOUTH STRIKE 4 CLIMATE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT JEFFERSON A. ESTELA, LIBERAL YOUTH OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS COMMITTEE CHAIR DAVIN RENN S. SANTOS, AKSYON KABATAAN REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY-GENERAL PRINCESS CYNTHIA NATHALIE DRILON, LA SALLE DEBATE SOCIETY REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT AND TEAM CAPTAIN HANS XAVIER W. WONG, DLSU UNIVERSITY STUDENT GOVERNMENT REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT LANCE ISIAH C. DELA CRUZ, SANGGUNIAN NG MGA MAG-AARAL NG PAARALANG LOYOLA NG ATENEO DE MANILA REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT JAMESUN W. BEJARIN, UP DILIMAN UNIVERSITY STUDENT COUNCIL, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON SEAN ANGELO A. THAKUR, UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CENTRAL STUDENT COUNCIL, REPRESENTED BY ITS DIRECTOR FOR ARTLETS THERESE MARIE B. IFURUNG, STUDENT COUNCIL ALLIANCE OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL CHAIRPERSON, JEZA ANTONETTE A. RODRIGUEZ, NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY ITS DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL JANDEIL B. ROPEROS, PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, THE MEMBERS OF THE ANTI TERRORISM COUNCIL: HERMOGENES ESPERON IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, TEODORO LOCSIN JR. IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DELFIN LORENZANA IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, EDUARDO AÑO IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, CARLOS DOMINGUEZ III IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, MENARDO GUEVARRA IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, GREGORIO HONASAN IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, BENJAMIN DIOKNO IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE ANTI MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL, THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY VICENTE SOTTO III IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND ALAN PETER CAYETANO IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, RESPONDENTS.

ALGAMAR A. LATIPH, BANTUAS M. LUCMAN, MUSA I. MALAYANG, DALOMILANG N. PARAHIMAN, PETITIONERS, VS. SENATE, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, VICENTE C. SOTTO III, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, AND ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL (ATC) BOTH REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, RESPECTIVELY, AS ALTER EGO OF THE PRESIDENT AND CHAIRPERSON OF THE ATC, RESPONDENTS.

THE ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG), PETITIONER, VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, RESPONDENT.

BISHOP BRODERICK S. PABILLO, BISHOP REUEL NORMAN O. MARIGZA, RT. REV. REX B. REYES JR., BISHOP EMERGENCIO PADILLO, BISHOP GERARDO A. ALMINAZA, DR. ALDRIN M. PEÑAMORA, DR. ANNELLE G. SABANAL, DR. CHRISTOPHER D. SABANAL, FR. ROLANDO F. DE LEON, SR. MA. LIZA H. RUEDAS, SR. ANABELL "THEODORA" G. BILOCURA, REV. MARIE SOL S. VILLALON, DR. MA. JULIETA F. WASAN, FR. GILBERT S. BILLENA, JENNIFER F. MENESES, DEACONESS RUBYLIN G. LITAO, JUDGE CLETO VILLACORTA, REY CLARO CASAMBRE, RURAL MISSIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SISTERS' ASSOCIATION IN MINDANAO, PETITIONERS, VS. PRESIDENT RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY SEN. VICENTE SOTTO III, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER ALAN PETER CAYETANO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, AS CHAIRMAN OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, RESPONDENTS.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF WOMEN FOR REFORMS, INTEGRITY, EQUALITY, LEADERSHIP AND ACTION (GABRIELA) INC., GERTRUDES R. LIBANG, JOAN MAY E. SALVADOR, EMERENCIANA A. DE JESUS, MARY JOAN A. GUAN, MARIVIC V. GERODIAS, LOVELY V. RAMOS, LEONORA O. CALUBAQUIB, MONICA ANNE E. WILSON, SILAHIS M. TEBIA, PETITIONERS, VS. PRESIDENT RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE; ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA; SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT VICENTE C. SOTTO III; AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, RESPONDENTS.

LAWRENCE A. YERBO, PETITIONER, VS. OFFICES OF THE HONORABLE SENATE PRESIDENT AND HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

HENDY ABENDAN OF CENTER FOR YOUTH PARTICIPATION AND DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES, CALVIN DHAME LAGAHIT OF CEBU NORMAL UNIVERSITY - STUDENT DEMOCRATIC PARTY, CHRISTIAN LOUIE ILUSTRISIMO OF CEBU NORMAL UNIVERSITY - STUDENTS REPUBLIC PARTY, BENNA LYN RIZON OF CEBU NORMAL UNIVERSITY - REFORMATIVE LEADERS (RELEAD) PARTY, LYRNIE REGIDOR OF UP CEBU - UNION OF PROGRESSIVE STUDENTS, HANNSON KENT J. NAMOC OF UP CEBU - NAGKAHIUSANG KUSOG SA ESTUDYANTE, GILBERT G. APURA, JR. OF UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS - STUDENT POWER PARTY, DAVID C. SUICO OF UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS - STUDENT ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY, AND MARY THERESE T. MAURIN OF UNIVERSITY OF CEBU LAW STUDENT SOCIETY, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND CHAIRPERSON OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL; ALL MEMBERS OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL NAMELY: HON. HERMOGENES ESPERON, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER; HON. TEODORO LOCSIN, JR., SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS; HON. DELFIN N. LORENZANA, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; HON. EDUARDO AÑO, SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT; HON. CARLOS DOMINGUEZ, SECRETARY OF FINANCE; HON. MENARDO GUEVARRA, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; HON. GREGORIO B. HONASAN II, SECRETARY OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY; AND HON. MEL GEORGIE B. RACELA, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC) SECRETARIAT, RESPONDENTS.

CONCERNED ONLINE CITIZENS REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY MARK L. AVERILLA, NOELLE THERESA E. CAPILI, ROBBY DERRICK S. CHAM, VICTOR LOUIS E. CRISOSTOMO, ANTHONY IAN M. CRUZ, MARITA Q. DINGLASAN, THYSSEN C. ESTRADA, MARK ANGELO C. GERONIMO, BALBINO PADA GUERRERO JR., JOVER N. LAURIO, JOHN CARLO T. MERCADO, RAYMOND DE VERA PALATINO, LEAN REDINO P. PORQUIA, MARCEL DAR STEFAN T. PUNONGBAYAN, ALBERT LOUIS R. RAQUEÑO, OLIVER RICHARD V. ROBILLO, JULIUS D. ROCAS, JUAN MIGUEL R. SEVERO, MA. GIA GRACE B. SISON, PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MENARDO I. GUEVARRA, THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF FILEMON SANTOS, JR., PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF ARCHIE FRANCISCO F. GAMBOA, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR., SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT EDUARDO M. AÑO, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DELFIN N. LORENZANA, SECRETARY OF FINANCE CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ III, SECRETARY OF INFORMATION & COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY GREGORIO HONASAN II, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MEL GEORGIE B. RACELA, RESPONDENTS.

CONCERNED LAWYERS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES (CLCL) MEMBERS RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, PACIFICO A. AGABIN, JEJOMAR C. BINAY, EDRE U. OLALIA, ANNA MARIA D. ABAD, ANACLETO REI A. LACANILAO III, J. V. BAUTISTA, ROSE-LIZA EISMA-OSORIO, EMMANUEL R. JABLA, PETITIONERS, VS. PRESIDENT RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT VICENTE SOTTO III, AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY HOUSE SPEAKER ALAN PETER CAYETANO, RESPONDENTS.

BEVERLY LONGID, SAMIRA GUTOC, JOANNA K. CARIÑO, AMIRAH ALI LIDASAN, NORA P. SUKAL, ABDUL HAMIDULLAH ATAR, JUMORING BANDILAN GUAYNON, FRANCISCA TOLENTINO, WINDEL B. BOLINGET, DRIEZA A. LININDING, TERESA DE LA CRUZ, LORENA BAY-AO, CHAD ERROL BOOC, JEANY ROSE L. HAYAHAY, AND JUDITH PAMELA A. PASIMIO, PETITIONERS, VS. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PHILIPPINES, SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., DELFIN N. LORENZANA, MENARDO I. GUEVARRA, EDUARDO M. AÑO, TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR., CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ III, GREGORIO B. HONASAN II, MEL GEORGIE B. RACELA, RESPONDENTS.

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW (CENTERLAW), INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, JOEL R. BUTUYAN, WHO IS ALSO SUING IN HIS OWN BEHALF; AND MEMBERS ROGER R. RAYEL, GILBERT T. ANDRES, CRISPIN FRANCIS M. JANDUSAY, KIMBERLY ANNE M. LORENZO, GELIE ERIKA P. ESTEBAN, ELREEN JOY O. DE GUZMAN, NICOLENE S. ARCAINA, AND SHAWN DUSTIN B. COSCOLUELLA;

FOUNDATION FOR MEDIA ALTERNATIVES, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, LIZA GARCIA; DEMOCRACY.NET.PH, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS TRUSTEE, CARLOS ADRIAN A. NAZARENO; VERA FILES, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, ELLEN T. TORDESILLAS, WHO IS ALSO SUING IN HER OWN BEHALF, AND ITS JOURNALISTS MEEKO ANGELA R. CAMBA, ANTHONY L. CUAYCONG, REIVEN C. PASCASIO, MERINETTE A. RETONA, ROSALIA C. REVALDO, ELIJAH J. RODEROS, CELINE ISABELLE B. SAMSON, IVEL JOHN M. SANTOS, AND ESTRELITA C. VALDERAMA; AND

PROFESSORS OF THE LYCEUM OF THE PHILIPPINES UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW, NAMELY, DEAN MA. SOLEDAD DERIQUITO-MAWIS, PROFESSOR CARLO L. CRUZ, PROFESSOR MARILYN P. CACHO-DOMINGO, PROFESSOR SENEN AGUSTIN S. DE SANTOS, PROFESSOR MARLA A. BARCENILLA, PROFESSOR ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES, PROFESSOR JUAN CARLOS T. CUNA, AND PROFESSOR JOHN PAUL ALZATE DELA PASION PETITIONERS, VS. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PHILIPPINES; ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL; EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AS REPRESENTED BY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA; ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL AS REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR ATTY. MEL GEORGIE B. RACELA; DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AS REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY MENARDO I. GUEVARRA; DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT AS REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY WENDEL E. AVISADO; PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE AS REPRESENTED BY GENERAL ARCHIE FRANCISCO F. GAMBOA; ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AS REPRESENTED BY LIEUTENANT GILBERT CAPAY, AND NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AS REPRESENTED BY DIRECTOR ERIC BITO-ON DISTOR, RESPONDENTS.

MAIN T. MOHAMMAD, JIMMY P. BLA, NAZR S. DILANGALEN, PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCATES (PAHRA) (REPRESENTED BY ROSEMARIE R. TRAJANO), RUPERT AXEL M. CRUZ, MARIA PATRICIA CERVANTES-POCO, LEO ANGELO R. AÑONUEVO, TAKAHIRO KENJIE C. AMAN AND MUHAMMAD MUKTADIR A. ESTRELLA, PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR., DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN N. LORENZANA, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECRETARY EDUARDO M. AÑO, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ III, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY MENARDO I. GUEVARRA, DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY GREGORIO B. HONASAN II, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MEL GEORGIE B. RACELA, AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL FILEMON SANTOS, JR., PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF ARCHIE FRANCISCO F. GAMBOA, AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES AS COMPONENT HOUSES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

BRGY. MAGLAKING, SAN CARLOS CITY, PANGASINAN SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN (SK) CHAIRPERSON LEMUEL GIO FERNANDEZ CAYABYAB; BRGY. TALAMBAN, CEBU CITY SK COUNCILOR JOAHANNA MONTA VELOSO; BRGY. TALAYAN, QUEZON CITY SK COUNCILOR NESTIE BRYAL COSIPAG VILLAVIRAY; BRGY. DOLORES, TAYTAY, RIZAL SK COUNCILOR FRANCHESCA IL CAMONIAS PERSIA; BRGY. MALHACAN, MEYCAUAYAN CITY, BULACAN SK COUNCILOR JELLY BEAN AIRAN SANGUIR SANTIAGO; BRGY. MAYBUNGA, PASIG CITY SK CHAIRPERSON PATRICIA MAE ANGELES TORRES; BRGY. SAN JOAQUIN, PASIG CITY SK CHAIRPERSON JAMES PAUL T. JOYNER; BRGY. ORANBO, PASIG CITY SK CHAIRPERSON PAULO D. TUMLOS; BRGY. KAPITOLYO, PASIG CITY SK CHAIRPERSON ALEXIS RAFAEL M. TORRES; BRGY. POBLACION ILAWOD, LAMBUNAO, ILOILO SK CHAIRPERSON LOVELYN Q. LOSARIA; SK FEDERATION OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF LEGANES, ILOILO PRESIDENT ILOILO NIEL JOSHUA J. RAYMUNDO; PASIG CITY LOCAL YOUTH DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL GOVERNANCE COMMITTEE CHAIRPERSON IRISH E. TAGLE; ALYANSA NG KABATAANG PASIGUEÑO REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN LOUISE S. TUNGOL; KILOS PASIG AND JOVITO R. SALONGA (JRS) POLICY STUDIES MEMBERS RAM ALAN CRUZ; ELEAZAR SALONGA; MARGARITA SALONGA SALANDANAN, ROBERT JOHN OCAMPO ROBAS; EDISON LATI; MARIA ANTHEA BALUTA, AND ADRIAN SOMIDO, PETITIONERS, VS. RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND CHAIRPERSON OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL; EDUARDO M. AÑO, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT; DELFIN N. LORENZANA, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, AND MENARDO I. GUEVARRA, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, RESPONDENTS.

ASSOCIATION OF MAJOR RELIGIOUS SUPERIORS IN THE PHILIPPINES (REPRESENTED BY ITS CO-CHAIRPERSONS, FR. CIELITO R. ALMAZAN OFM AND SR. MARILYN A. JAVA RC AND ITS CO-EXECUTIVE SECRETARIES, FR. ANGELITO A. CORTEZ, OFM AND SR. CRISVIE T. MONTECILLO, DSA), RAFAEL VICENTE R. CALINISAN, NOEL R. DEL PRADO AND ADRIAN N. VIVAS, PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR., DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN N. LORENZANA, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECRETARY EDUARDO M. AÑO, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ III, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY MENARDO I. GUEVARRA, DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY GREGORIO B. HONASAN II, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MEL GEORGE B. RACELA, ALL MEMBERS OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL FILEMON SANTOS, JR. AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF GENERAL ARCHIE FRANCISCO F. GAMBOA, RESPONDENTS, X X

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES (UP) SYSTEM FACULTY REGENT DR. RAMON GUILLERMO, EXECUTIVE BOARD MEMBER, EDUCATION INTERNATIONAL AND ALLIANCE OF CONCERNED TEACHERS (ACT)-PHILIPPINES SECRETARY-GENERAL RAYMOND BASILIO, DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY (DLSU)-MANILA PROFESSOR AND ACT PRIVATE SCHOOLS PRESIDENT DR. ROW ELL MADULA, UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS (UST) FACULTY ASSOCIATION OF SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL PRESIDENT AND ACT-PRIVATE SCHOOLS SECRETARY-GENERAL JONATHAN V. GERONIMO, UP-DILIMAN DIRECTOR OF OFFICE OF COMMUNITY RELATIONS AND CONGRESS OF TEACHERS AND EDUCATORS FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY-UP (CONTEND-UP) CHAIRPERSON DR. GERRY LANUZA, ACT-NCR UNION TREASURER ANNARIZA C. ALZATE, ACT-NCR UNION SECRETARY AND QUEZON CITY PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION (QCPSTA) VICE-PRESIDENT RUBY ANA BERNARDO, QCPSTA PRESIDENT AND ACT-NCR UNION REGIONAL COUNCIL MEMBER KRISTHEAN A. NAVALES, ACT-NCR UNION CALOOCAN CHAPTER PRESIDENT AND ACT-NCR UNION REGIONAL COUNCIL MEMBER GRACE EDORA, FORMER DIRECTOR AT KOMISYON SA WIKANG FILIPINO (KWF) DR. AURORA BATNAG, UP-DILIMAN VICE CHANCELLOR FOR COMMUNITY AFFAIRS DR. ALELI BAWAGAN, ALL UP ACADEMIC EMPLOYEES UNION NATIONAL PRESIDENT AND UP ASST. PROF. CARL MARC RAMOTA, UP-DILIMAN COLLEGE OF SCIENCE DEAN DR. GIOVANNI A. TAPANG, POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES (PUP)-MANILA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY DEAN PROF. RAMIR M. CRUZ, ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY (ADMU) FULL PROFESSOR AND TANGGOL KASAYSAYAN LEAD CONVENER DR. FRANCIS GEALOGO, DLSU-MANILA PROFESSOR AND TANGGOL WIKA LEAD CONVENER DR. DAVID MICHAEL SAN JUAN, UP-DILIMAN ACTING DIRECTOR OF CAMPUS MAINTENANCE OFFICE MS. PERLITA C. RANA, ALL UP ACADEMIC EMPLOYEES UNION BOARD MEMBER DR. MELANIA FLORES, PUP-MANILA CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS STUDIES CHIEF PROF. PAULO BENEDICTO C. VILLAR, UST SIMBAHAYAN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT OFFICE DIRECTOR DR. ARVIN EBALLO, UST SIMBAHAYAN ASSISTANT DIRECTOR PROF. FROILAN ALIPAO, PUP-MANILA DEPARTMENT OF COOPERATIVES AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT CHAIRPERSON DR. HILDA F. SAN GABRIEL, PUP-MANILA DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATION RESEARCH CHAIRPERSON KRUPSKAYA T. VALILA, PUP-MANILA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY CHAIRPERSON LOUIE C. MONTEMAR, UP-DILIMAN DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO AT PANITIKAN NG PILIPINAS CHAIRPERSON DR. VLADIMEIR GONZALES, DLSU-MANILA DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO CHAIRPERSON DR. RHODERICK NUNCIO, DLSU-MANILA PROFESSORS DR. RAQUEL SISON-BUBAN, DR. ERNESTO V. CARANDANG II, DR. DOLORES TAYLAN, PROF. RAMILITO CORREA, DR. MARIA LUCILLE ROXAS, MON KARLO MANGARAN, DEBORRAH ANASTACIO, JECONIAH DREISBACH, BILLY DE GUZMAN, AND ROMAN GALLEGO, DON BOSCO TECHNICAL INSTITUTE OF MAKATI TEACHER ERSELA CARILLO, PHILIPPINE NORMAL UNIVERSITY (PNU)-MANILA PROFESSOR DR. JOEL COSTA MALABANAN, UNIVERSITY OF MAKATI PROFESSOR KEVIN PAUL D. MARTIJA, PUP-MANILA PROFESSORS PATRICIA CAMILLE VILLA, EMY RUTH GIANAN, MARVIN LOBOS AND SONNY M. VERSOZA, COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN PROFESSOR LYRRA I. MAGTALAS, ADMU PROFESSORS DR. GARY DEVILLES, DR. VINCENZ SERRANO AND MARK BENEDICT LIM, ADMU TEACHER ELLA MARA MELANIE DONAIRE, UP-DILIMAN PROFESSORS SHARON ANNE PANGILINAN, DR. ROMMEL RODRIGUEZ, AND DR. GRACE CONCEPCION, ASST. PROF. CLOD MARLAN KRISTER V. YAMBAO, ASST. PROF. LOUISE JHASHIL SONIDO, AND PROF. SOFIA G. GUILLERMO, UP-MANILA PROFESSOR REGINALD VALLEJOS, BULACAN STATE UNIVERSITY (BULSU) PROFESSORS MARY DEANE DC CAMUA, MARICRISTH T. MAGALING, JAIME V. VILLAFUERTE, ISRAEL DC SAGUINSIN, JENNIFER DELFIN, JENINA S. REYES, KEANU HAROLD G. REYES, BOIE L. LOPEZ, JEVINSON B. FERNANDEZ, JUSTINE G. MENESES, ANGELO O. SANTOS, REGGIE REY C. FAJARDO, EDUCATORS MARIEL S. QUIOGUE AND DANIM R. MAJERANO, UST-MANILA INSTRUCTORS/ PROFESSORS/TEACHERS ADRIAN ROMERO, LEONARDO GUEVARRA, JR., JOHN CHRISTIAN VALEROSO, AND DR. CHUCKBERRY PASCUAL, PETITIONERS, VS. H.E. RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, SALVADOR MEDIALDEA IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, VICENTE SOTTO III, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SENATE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALAN PETER CAYETANO IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER, VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, SECRETARY OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AS MEMBERS OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, ARMED FORCES OP THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GENERAL GILBERT GAPAY AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF GENERAL CAM1LO PANCRATIUS PASCUA CASCOLAN, RESPONDENTS.

BALAY REHABILITATION CENTER, INC. (BALAY), CHILDREN'S LEGAL RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC. (CLRDC), COALITION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN-ASIA PACIFIC (CATW-AP), DR. BENITO MOLINO, MEDICAL ACTION GROUP (MAG), TASK FORCE DETAINEES OF THE PHILIPPINES (TFDP), GREGORIO V. BITUIN, JR., FAMILIES OF VICTIMS OF INVOLUNTARY DISAPPEARANCE (FIND), PETITIONERS, VS. RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY & CHAIRPERSON OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL (ATC), RESPONDENTS.

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, IBP NATIONAL PRESIDENT DOMINGO EGON Q. CAYOSA AND IBP GOVERNORS BURT M. ESTRADA, DOROTEO LORENZO B. AGUILA, BABY RUTH F. TORRE, ELEAZAR S. CALASAN, ERIC C. ALAJAR, GIL G. TAWAY IV, GINA H. MIRANO-JESENA, JAMES JAYSON J. JORVINA, AND CHRISTY JOY S. SOLLESTA, PETITIONERS, VS. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL COMPOSED OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY AND THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING SECRETARIAT AS MEMBERS, THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. GILBERT GAPAY, AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, REPRESENTED BY LT. GEN. CAMILO CASCOLAN, RESPONDENTS.

COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR PEOPLE'S DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNANCE, INC, (CPDG) REPRESENTED BY VICE PRESIDENT ROCHELLE M. PORRAS; KALIKASAN PEOPLE'S NETWORK FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (KPNE) REPRESENTED BY NATIONAL COORDINATOR JOSE LEON A. DULCE; CENTER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS-PHILIPPINES (CEC) REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR LIA MAI T. ALONZO; CLIMATE CHANGE NETWORK FOR COMMUNITY-BASED INITIATIVES, INC. (CCNCI) REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR KARLENMA M. MENDOZA; UNYON NG MANGGAGAWA SA AGRIKULTURA (UMA) REPRESENTED BY CHAIRPERSON ANTONIO L. FLORES; MACSASAKA AT SIYENTIPIKO PARA SA PAGUNLAD NG AGRIKULTURA (MASIPAG) REPRESENTED BY NATIONAL COORDINATOR CRISTINO C. PANERIO; PHILIPPINE NETWORK OF FOOD SECURITY PROGRAMMES, INC. (PNFSP) REPRESENTED BY OFFICER-IN-CHARGE BEVERLY P. MANGO; CHILDREN'S REHABILITATION CENTER (CRC) REPRESENTED BY DEPUTY DIRECTOR NIKKI P. ASERIOS; IBON FOUNDATION, INC., REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR JOSE ENRIQUE A. AFRICA; SAMAHAN AT UGNAYAN NG MGA KONSYUMERS PARA SA IKAUUNLAD NG BAYAN (SUKI) REPRESENTED BY CONVENOR ROLANDO D. CALIMLIM; AND EUFEMIA P. DORINGO, PETITIONERS, VS. RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE AND THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND CHAIRPERSON OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL (ATC), VICENTE SOTTO III, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALAN PETER CAYETANO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

PHILIPPINE MISEREOR PARTNERSHIP, INC., REPRESENTED BY YOLANDA R. ESGUERRA; CAUCUS OF DEVELOPMENT NGO NETWORKS, INC., REPRESENTED BY SANDINO SOLIMAN; CATHOLIC BISHOPS CONFERENCE OF THE PHILIPPINES-CARITAS FILIPINAS FOUNDATION INC., REPRESENTED BY ANTONIO JR. E. LABIAO; AND DISASTER RISK REDUCTION NETWORK PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SUSANA M. BALINGIT, PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, THE MEMBERS OF THE ANTI- TERRORISM COUNCIL: HERMOGENES C. ESPERON JR. IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR. IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DELFIN N. LORENZANA IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, EDUARDO M. AÑO IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ III IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, MENARDO I. GUEVARRA IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, GREGORIO B. HONASAN II IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, AND MEL GEORGIE B. RACELA IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE ANTI MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL, RESPONDENTS.

PAGKAKAISA NG KABABAIHAN PARA SA KALAYAAN (KAISA KA), ACTION AND SOLIDARITY FOR THE EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN (ASSERT-WOMEN), DAP-AYAN TI BABBAI, KAISA KA YOUTH, PAGKAKAISA NG MGA SAMAHAN NG MANGINGISDA (PANGISDA-WOMEN), ORIANG, PAMBANSANG KONGRESO NG KABABAIHAN SA KANAYUNAN (PKKK), SARILAYA, WORKERS FOR PEOPLE'S LIBERATION - WOMEN, WOMEN'S LEGAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS BUREAU (WLB), THE YOUNG WOMEN INITIATIVES (YOUWIN), LUALHATI BAUTISTA, CAITLIN LOUISE M. CASEÑAS, NIZA CONCEPCION, PRECY D. DAGOOC, CORAZON V. FABROS, MYLEN F. GOYAL, PROF. MARIA LAYA T. LARA, CLAIRE DE LUNE LOPEZ, MARIA JOCELYN KARA MAGSANOC, AIDA SANTOS MARANAN, DR. JUNICE LIRZA D. MERGAL, ANA MARIA NEMENZO, ATTY. CLARA RITA PADILLA, TERESITA ANG SEE, ROSEMARIE D. TRAJANO AND RHODA URIZAR VIAJAR, PETITIONERS, VS. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PHILIPPINES, SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR. TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR., EDUARDO M. AÑO, CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ III, MENARDO I. GUEVARRA, GREGORIO B. HONASAN II, AND MEL GEORGIE B. RACELA, AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING UNDER THEIR CONTROL, DIRECTION, AND INSTRUCTIONS, RESPONDENTS.

ANAK MINDANAO (AMIN) PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE AMIHILDA SANGCOPAN; DEPUTY SPEAKER MUJIV S. HATAMAN; ATTY'S. SATRINA MOHAMMAD, JAMAR M. KULAYAN ALMAN-NAJAR L. NAMLA AND BENSAUD O. DEGUSMAN; RAMEER TAWASIL; AND SHEIKH JAMSIRI T. JAINAL, PETITIONERS, VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA; NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, RET. GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON JR.; SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON. TEODORO L. LOCSIN JR.; SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GEN. DELFIN N. LORENZANA; SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, RET. GEN. EDUARDO AÑO; SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, HON. CARLOS DOMINGUEZ III; SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, HON. MENARDO I. GUEVARRA; SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY, HON. GREGORIO HONASAN; THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC); THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA); SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT VICENTE C. SOTTO III; THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, THEIR AGENTS AND ALL PERSONS ACTING IN THEIR BEHALF, RESPONDENTS.

HAROUN ALRASHID ALONTO LUCMAN, JR., JAYVEE S. APIAG, TYRONE A. VELEZ, LEONARDO VICENTE B. CORRALES, MARIO MAXIMO J. SOLIS AND SALUGPONGAN TA' TANU IGKANOGON COMMUNITY LEARNING CENTER, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MA. EUGENIA VICTORIA M. NOLASCO, PETITIONERS, VS. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN, SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH VICENTE SOTTO III, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH ALAN PETER CAYETANO IN HIS CAPACITY AS HOUSE SPEAKER, RESPONDENTS.

The present consolidated petitions — thirty-seven (37) in total — assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. (RA) 11479,1 otherwise known as the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 (ATA), for its alleged violation of numerous constitutional rights and liberties, as well as the doctrine of separation of powers. The petitioners argue that the law is void on its face under the vagueness/overbreadth standards, among others, and as such, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, rendering it null in its entirety.

The ponencia accepted the facial challenge, but only with respect to certain facts and circumstances relative to Sections 4 to 6 (with respect to training), 8 to 10 (with respect to membership under the third paragraph), 12 (with respect to training and expert advice or assistance as forms of material support), 25 to 28 (with respect to designation and proscription), and 29 (on detention) of the ATA. The delimitation proceeded from the view that pursuant to prevailing Philippine jurisprudence, facial challenges on legislative acts are permissible only: if they curtail the right to freedom of expression and its cognate rights. Utilizing this framework, the majority then found the following portions of the law unconstitutional: (1) the clause "which are not intended to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person's life, or to create a serious risk to public safety" found in the proviso of Section 4; and (2) the second paragraph of Section 25.

First off, I fully concur with the ponencia's delimited facial challenge framework. Considering the present status of our jurisprudence on facial challenges (which until overturned in the proper case therefor remains good law), as well as the already complex nature of the issues accepted by the Court in these permissible facial challenges, the majority's approach is — to my mind — a prudent and practical exercise of discretion that justifies a refusal to adjudicate all other issues raised by the petitioners that do not relate to said rights, or those that are too speculative and raise genuine questions of fact. I caution, however, that this delimitation does not - as it should not - preclude subsequent constitutional challenges that may present appropriate factual situations that can more sharply address the unresolved issues raised against the other provisions of the law. Further, it does not - as it should not - preclude a doctrinal shift by this Court of its present framework on facial challenges which may be undertaken in a future case, but not in this already complex case riddled with already complicated issues.

Anent the procedural matters, I likewise fully agree that petitioners, except for petitioners in G.R. No. 253118 (Balay Rehabilitation Center, Inc. v. Duterte) and UDK 16663 (Yerbo v. Offices of the Honorable Senate President and the Honorable Speaker of the House of Representatives), have sufficiently complied with the requisites for the Court's exercise of its judicial power. Based on the assertions traversed by the ponencia, I am convinced that petitioners have shown credible and imminent threat of injury to their rights that may result from the law's implementation. Similarly, I find that the accepted issues in this case raise serious and genuine concerns affecting freedom of expression and its cognate rights that justify this Court's immediate action.

My concurrence with the said framework as well as the ponente's views on most of the prominent substantive issues consequently traversed in the ponencia pursuant thereto, on the one hand, and my dissent against the majority's ruling upholding the validity of the phrase "organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism" found in the third paragraph of Section 10, as well as the third mode of designation found under the third paragraph of Section 25 of the ATA, on the other, are forthwith explicated in this Opinion.

I. Facial and as-applied challenges, and the propriety of the ponencia's delimited framework.

In concept, a facial challenge contends that a government law, rule, regulation, or policy is unconstitutional as written, or on its face, or on the very text of the policy itself.2 It is typically described as "a head-on attack on the legislative judgment, an assertion that the challenged statute violates the Constitution in all, or virtually all, of its applications x x x."3 Thus, it may result in invalidating the law in its entirety based on its wording (on its face) often after a consideration of all or almost all of its possible unconstitutional applications beyond the particular circumstances of a petitioner.4

Facial challenges are often raised using the void-for-vagueness and overbreadth standards. Under the vagueness standard, a statute is rendered void if it "'fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute,' [and because] it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and Convictions x x x."5 Meanwhile, the overbreadth standard leads to a finding of unconstitutionality if a statute indiscriminately and unnecessarily broadly sweeps, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms.6

These common tests notwithstanding, there have been cases where the Court employed the strict scrutiny test in ostensible facial challenge cases, such as in Ople v. Torres,7 White Light Corporation v. City of Manila,8 Serrano v. Galant Maritime Services, Inc.,9 and Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City.10 Under the strict scrutiny test, a statute would pass constitutional muster only if it is: (1) necessary to achieve a compelling State interest; and (2) the least restrictive means to protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.11

In contrast to a facial challenge, an as-applied challenge contends that a government law, rule, regulation, or policy is unconstitutional as applied to a particular activity/ies.12 It "concedes that the statute may be constitutional in many of its applications, but contends that it is not so under the particular circumstances of the case."13 Because of its nature as specifically tailored only to a particular and specific set of facts and rights, an as-applied challenge may result in invalidating the statute only as-applied to the petitioner. This is accomplished by carving out an exception for the petitioner's case from the application of the statute, or severing or removing the unconstitutional application (i.e., unconstitutional application in the petitioner's case) from the constitutional application.14

In the Philippine context, the first explicit use of the term "facial challenge" in our jurisprudence can be traced to the Opinion of Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) in the case of Cruz v. Secretary of Environment15 - a case involving a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed by Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa directly before the Court assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of RA No. 8371, otherwise known as the "Indigenous Peoples Rights Act" (IPRA). Noting that petitioners therein lacked standing and filed the suit "only to settle what they believe to be the doubtful character of the law in question," Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition because "were [the Court] to assume jurisdiction and decide wholesale the constitutional validity of the IPRA," and declare it void on its face, would not only run counter to "the established rule that a party can question the validity of a statute only if, as applied to him, it is unconstitutional."16 It would also "[upset] the balance of power among the three branches of the government and erecting, as it were, x x x the Supreme Court, as a third branch of Congress, with power not only to invalidate statutes but even to rewrite them."17 Evidently seeking to limit, if not curtail, further attempts by litigants in directly assailing before the Court — and the Court in deciding wholesale - the constitutional validity of any law based only on an alleged "doubtful character of the law in question," he posited that facial challenges to statutes are allowed only when they operate in the area of freedom of expression because of the "'chilling' effect on freedom of expression," viz.:

The only instance where a facial challenge to a statute is allowed is when it operates in the area of freedom of expression. In such instance, the overbreadth doctrine permits a party to challenge the validity of a statute even though as applied to him it is not unconstitutional, but it might be if applied to others not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. Invalidation of the statute "on its face" rather than "as applied" is permitted in the interest of preventing a "chilling" effect on freedom of expression.18

Justice Mendoza reiterated this position in his Opinion19 in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,20 which the ponencia therein adopted. Quoting the observations of Justice Mendoza, the Court explained that a facial challenge "is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible 'chilling effect' upon protected speech."21 The rationale for this principle was provided in the following manner:

The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.22 (underscoring and emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

In said case, the Court, however, instructed that the foregoing concepts do not apply to penal statutes considering that these laws have "general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if a facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct."23 Further, considering that, among others, an "'on its face' invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected[,]"24 the Court cautioned that a facial challenge is a "'manifestly strong medicine,' to be employed 'sparingly and only as a last resort,' and is generally disfavored."25

The Court, in the succeeding cases of Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan26 Spouses Romualdez v. Commission on Elections,27 and Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council (Southern Hemisphere),28 reiterated that penal statutes cannot be the subject of facial invalidation. In Southern Hemisphere, the Court reminded that a facial challenge is allowed in free speech cases "to avert the 'chilling effect' on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be abridged."29

However, the Court eventually clarified this prohibition against the application of facial challenges to penal statutes in Disini v. Secretary of Justice (Disini),30 declaring that the same is true only when the penal statutes do not encroach upon free speech rights, thus:

When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable. The inapplicability of the doctrine must be carefully delineated. As Justice Antonio T. Carpio explained in his dissent in Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, "we must view these statements of the Court on the inapplicability of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines to penal statutes as appropriate only insofar as these doctrines are used to mount 'facial' challenges to penal statutes not involving free speech."31

Only a few months after the promulgation of Disini, the Court once more employed the facial challenge in the case of Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa (Spouses Imbong),32 under a seemingly expanded version of the facial analysis.

At this juncture, it deserves clarification that while Spouses Imbong states that this Court "has expanded [the] scope [of facial challenges] to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights," the ponencia cannot be faulted in concluding that the phrase "other fundamental rights" pertains only to rights that are cognate to free speech, similar to religious freedom. To recount, Imbong only states that:

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statutes, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. x x x33 (underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Notably, such pronouncements should be read in relation to the context in which they were made. In the immediately preceding paragraph, the Court provided a brief discussion of US jurisprudence, which enumerated what these "fundamental rights" include. Thus:

In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.34 (emphases and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Based on the foregoing, it may be reasonably argued that the Philippine law "modification" to the concept of facial challenges under US Constitutional Law is only with reference to the withholding of the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statutes. Nonetheless, with respect to the expansion in scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights, the term "fundamental rights" was not explicitly interpreted in Spouses Imbong to include all other constitutional rights. Thus, the phrase "fundamental rights" ought to pertain to the same character as the immediately preceding term "religious freedom" found in the same "but also" clause. This, in turn, is consistent with the fundamental rights covered under the US Constitutional Law, such as "freedom of the press and peaceful assembly." If Spouses Imbong intended to truly expand the scope of facial challenges to all other fundamental rights, then the Court should have clearly specified or provided examples of what these other rights are, for ample guidance.

One may argue that the Court, in Spouses Imbong, actually took cognizance of other constitutional rights in a facial challenge, such as the right to life and to equal protection, as when it tackled the other issues raised by some of therein petitioners. However, in my view, this supposed expansion, if anything, remains to be ambiguous.

To highlight this ambiguity, there has been no categorical qualification or abandonment by the Court in Spouses Imbong of the well-entrenched Southern Hemisphere dictum that facial challenges in free speech cases are presently justified "by the aim to avert the 'chilling effect' on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be abridged." If indeed a doctrinal shift was meaningfully intended, then the Court ought to have lucidly explained its reasons relative to the established Southern Hemisphere rule.

Thus, with these uncertainties, the ponencia is justified in restrictively interpreting the phrase "other fundamental rights" in Spouses Imbong as to cover only free speech and its cognate rights.

In any event, subsequent cases after Spouses Imbong have continued to echo the Southern Hemisphere framework on facial challenges.

For one, in SPARK v. Quezon City,35 the Court rejected the invocation of the overbreadth doctrine, considering that petitioners therein have not claimed any transgression of their rights to free speech or any inhibition of speech-related conduct. The Court stated the ruling in Southern Hemisphere that "the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases."36 Even later, in Falcis III v. Civil Registrar General,37 the Court similarly pronounced that "a facial challenge requires a showing of curtailment of the right to freedom of expression, because its basis is that an overly broad statute may chill otherwise constitutional speech."38

Based on the foregoing discussions, it is thus apparent that prevailing jurisprudence, at the time the present consolidated petitions were filed, still restrict the operation of facial challenges to cases infringing on the freedom of expression and its cognate rights. This rule remains "good law" up until the Court clearly and unmistakably modifies or overturns the same once the appropriate opportunity arrives to re-examine its bearings. As this case is already riddled with numerous complicated issues upon the submission of a staggering 37 petitions, prudence and practicality dictate that the Court should refrain from adding another layer of complexity in the disposition of the instant petitions.

Hence, for these reasons, I fully concur with the ponencia's circumscribed but balanced approach in resolving this case. Besides, as the ponencia also explains, the other issues raised in these petitions against the other provisions of the law outside of the accepted issues "are too speculative and raise genuine questions of fact that require submission of concrete evidence x x x"39 and therefore, cannot be resolved even outside the delimited facial challenge framework. Evidently, the actual case and controversy/ripeness requisite for the exercise of judicial power still precludes the Court from resolving these other arguments of petitioners that patently raise conjectural or theoretical questions.40

On the substantive merits, I likewise concur with the ponencia in upholding the validity of Section 441 of the ATA, but invalidating the clause "which are not intended to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person's life, or to create a serious risk to public safety" found in the proviso.

Again, under our prevailing jurisprudence, facial challenges are proper only when raised against statutes that infringe on freedom of expression and its cognate rights. Because of this jurisprudential limitation, the present facial challenge against Section 4 of the ATA can only be entertained with respect to the proviso that evidently affects and relates to the freedom of expression. As can be gleaned from its text, Section 4 of the ATA consists of two (2) parts, the first of which relates to pure conduct that has nothing to do with expression. It enumerates the varied acts that could manifestly result to the destruction of life, limb, or property (i.e., acts intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to any person, or endangers a person's life, or extensive damage or destruction to a government or public facility, public place or private property, etc.), as well as the purposes (i.e., to intimidate the general public or a segment thereof, create an atmosphere or spread a message of fear, etc.) which must indispensably accompany the acts in order for the same to be penalized as terrorism. The second part, on the other hand, is the proviso which explicitly relates to and affects expression and related expressive conduct. Within the context of the free speech submissions, these two (2) parts must be conjointly passed upon as they are substantially related to — and hence, cannot be simply extricated from - one another.

At this juncture, it must be borne in mind that the Court is authorized to employ the various aids to statutory construction in order to draw out the proper interpretation of Section 4 so that the legislative will may be reflected in its implementation and operation. Under our constitutional scheme, the Supreme Court is the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, and as such, has the distinguished but delicate power and duty of testing the validity of legislative acts for their conformity with the Constitution.42 Notably, aside from the interrelation of Section 4's two parts, based on the entire law's structure, it is further apparent that the numerous provisions of the ATA depend for their operation on the definition provided in Section 4. Clearly, therefore, Section 4 plays a central and crucial role in the operation and implementation of the ATA for which a clarifying interpretation is essential.

Section 4's main part complies with substantive due process; presumption of constitutionality prevails.

As a general rule in constitutional law, a statute enjoys the presumption of constitutionality. In its most basic sense, the presumption means that courts, in passing upon the validity of a law, will afford some deference to the act of co-equal branches of the government pursuant to the separation of powers principle.43 Thus, before a law may be struck down as unconstitutional, courts must be certain that there exists a clear and unequivocal breach of the constitution, and not one that is speculative or argumentative.44 But, if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, the same should be upheld.45 It therefore places a heavy burden on the assailant to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the act is incompatible with the constitution. Verily, to doubt is to sustain.46

Petitioners essentially argue that Section 4 of the ATA violates the constitutional right to substantive due process and freedom of expression. Thus, it was incumbent upon petitioners in this case to clearly prove the alleged unequivocal breach or conflict with the Constitution.

Substantive due process requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just. "It demands the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to life, liberty or property."47 In penology, case law states that due process requires the terms of a penal statute to "be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties."48 As once remarked by eminent constitutionalist Fr. Joaquin Bernas, "due process requires not only that the accused be informed of the offense he is charged with [as contained in the Information] but also that he must be able to understand what the law commands and prohibits."49 The requirement stems from the principle that penal laws are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.50 Accordingly, it is incumbent upon Congress to "provide a precise definition of forbidden acts."51

Despite these key premises, the due process clause does not impose any "constitutional or statutory duty to the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment, as long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act x x x."52 "A criminal statute is not rendered uncertain and void because general terms are used therein."53 "As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained[;]"54 otherwise, the Court will not hesitate to strike down the provision.

Applying these precepts, I also find that the main part of Section 4 sufficiently contains comprehensible standards that would enable its subjects to know what conduct would render them liable to its penalties. Thus, it complies with constitutional substantive due process requirements. Allow me, however, to expound upon the following points:

First, the acts sought to be penalized under the main part of Section 4 of the ATA must be indispensably accompanied by any of the six (6) listed purposes. More importantly, the acts and purposes must be characterized by the severity and gravity of the damage or destruction caused or projected to be caused by the act committed.55

A perusal of the deliberations reveals, that the legislature not only intended for the purposes to accompany and qualify the acts enumerated under subsections (a) to (e) of Section 4. More significantly, they intended to punish the various acts enumerated under the main part of Section 4 only in their most serious forms, characterized by the gravity or magnitude of their resulting or intended effects. In fact, interspersed across the main part are terms that evidently qualify the nature of the punishable acts as envisioned by Congress. For example, subsections (b) and (c) employ the term "extensive" to qualify the gravity of the intended damage or interference. On the other hand, the adjective "seriously", was used to qualify the character of the purposes "to destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, economic, or social structures of the country" and "undermine public safety" such that the resolve to destabilize or destroy fundamental structures or undermine public safety are shown to be genuine and grave.

Meanwhile, the addition of the phrase "nature and context" to further qualify the purposes leads to a reasonable conclusion that the legislature intended the same severity of damage across all six (6) listed purposes,56 and thus, must be understood in this context.57 Accordingly, since the law intended the purposes to accompany and qualify the acts enumerated under subsections (a) to (e), it can be concluded that any criminal act short of the gravity and severity that the legislature intended cannot he categorized as terrorism under Section 4. In fact, as clarified during the Senate deliberations, the distinction between the crime of terrorism under the ATA and ordinary crimes will depend on the intent and purpose of the act,58 as determined from the acts done and their effect, context, and implication.59

To further clarify each of the penalized acts, it can be gleaned that the phrase "engages in acts intended to" in subsections (a), (b), and (c), refers to acts that cause or result in the damage or destruction of a person's life or limb, or of property. On the other hand, the phrase "endangers a person's life" in subsection (a) can be construed as nothing more than a restatement of the contemplated scenarios of "death or serious bodily injury" found in the same provision, as evident from the co-sponsor's speech during the deliberations,60 and thus precludes the inclusion of innocent conduct or mere thought within the acts punishable as terrorism. Meanwhile, the extensive destruction caused to "government or public facility, public place, or private property" under subsection (b) can be read similarly with the extensive interference with or destruction to "critical infrastructure" under subsection (c) to refer to damage or destruction that is so severe as to debilitate key governmental functions, as may be seen from the sponsor's explanation61 and following the definition of critical infrastructure under Section 3 (a) of the ATA, which would thus separate it from the ordinary crime of arson.62

Second, while not all of the terms used in the main part of Section 4 of the ATA have been defined in the law, their meaning can be discerned from common usage, as well as case law.

Moreover, it can be observed that even prior to the enactment of the Human Security Act (HSA) and the ATA, the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) already employed the term "terrorism" in several of its provisions.63 While the OEC does not itself define "terrorism,"64 case law65 shows that the character of the acts considered as terrorism under our election laws is not significantly different from the character of the terrorist acts envisioned under the ATA. In either situation, the acts considered as terrorism are characterized by serious or grave violence, threat, and/or intimidation (in addition to fraud that evidently bears particular relevance only to election terrorism).

Third and last, the ATA's definition of terrorism is consistent with international instruments. In fact, the law's sponsor pointed out during the deliberations that the proposed definition of terrorism is consistent with the United Nations (UN)'s proposed Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (Proposed Convention)66 and is comparable with the anti-terrorism laws of other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. It can also be noted that the terms used in Section 4 of the ATA also bear similarities with those used in defining terrorist offenses under the Directive (EU) 2017/541 of The European Parliament and of The Council (15 March 2017) on combating terrorism.67 In fact, the definition of terrorism under Section 4 appears to be in parallel with the definition of terrorist acts in various international instruments in that: (1) the latter require the performance or commission of acts (overt acts) which are: (a) generally considered as offenses under the domestic or national laws,68 or (b) specified crimes or acts that could rightfully be considered as crimes under domestic law or under International Humanitarian Law,69 or (c) acts without lawful authority;70 and (2) majority of the definitions also require that the acts or offenses are coupled with or qualified by any or a combination of the following aim, intent, or purpose: (a) intimidating a population;71 (b) compelling a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act;72 (c) causing substantial damage to property or to the environment;73 (d) causing death or serious bodily injury;74 (e) causing extensive destruction of such a place where such destruction results in or is likely to result in major economic loss;75 and (f) seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization.76

In fine, in order for an act to be punishable under Section 4 of the ATA, it must: (i) indispensably be accompanied by any of the enumerated purposes, and (ii) be characterized by gravity and severity of the resulting or intended effects, which is determined by the case's nature and context. Accordingly, subject to the ponencia's clarifying and narrowing construction, I agree that there is no constitutional infirmity presented in these cases enough to warrant the striking down of Section 4's main part. I, however, find it apt to mention that the definitive application of the various instances mentioned in Section 4 must undergo judicial scrutiny upon the proper ripe case filed therefor so as to allow jurisprudence on this relatively new - if not, barely illuminated - legal subject to evolve.

The "not intended" clause in Section 4's proviso is invalid; presumption of unconstitutionality was not overcome.

With respect to laws regulating speech based on its content, the presumption of constitutionality is reversed. Case law settles that content-based restrictions on speech bear a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality77 and are subject to strict scrutiny.78 Accordingly, it was incumbent upon the government, in this case, to prove that the proviso complies with the constitutional standards.

Freedom of expression is considered as the foundation of a free, open, and democratic society.79 It is an indispensable condition to the exercise of almost all other civil and political rights.80 Thus, it is given a preferred status that stands on a higher level than substantive economic freedom or other liberties.81 In its essence, the right to free expression involves the freedom to disseminate ideas and beliefs, regardless of its subject and tenor,82 and includes the entire range of communication, from vocal or verbal expressions to expressive conduct or symbolic speech that incorporates both speech and non-speech elements, including inaction.83

Because of the fundamental role that freedom of expression plays in our democratic society, particularly the vital necessity of a free exchange of ideas for society to thrive, the Constitution mandates that "[n]o law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances."84 In this regard, the "government lacks the power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content"85 and "may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers"86 or "simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable,"87 or constitutes as "sharp attacks on government and public officials."88 For these reasons, a governmental action that restricts speech comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.89

Over time, however, the Court has carved out narrow and well-defined exceptions to the rule on restrictions upon the content of speech.90 These exceptions are borne out of the recognition that some types of speech may be injurious to the equal right of others or those of the community or society, and thus, may be subjected to regulation by the State under its pervasive police power.91 The few well-defined and narrow areas where the exceptions are said to apply include pornography, advocacy of imminent lawless action, danger to national security, false or misleading advertisement, and libel.92 Outside of these limited categories, the expression is protected and are not subject to prior restraint.93

Furthermore, it is settled that statutes regulating speech based on its content are subject to the strictest scrutiny.94 The approach requires the existence of a considered legislative judgment that a particular mode of expression has to give way to other compelling needs of society, and a direct causal link between the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented.95 In addition, the restriction must be reasonably and narrowly drawn to fit the regulatory purpose, with the "least restrictive means among available, effective alternatives"96 undertaken.97 Accordingly, the government action will only be sustained if the government shows a compelling interest and the restraint is necessary to protect such interest. But even in such a case, the restraint shall be narrowly drawn - if "readily susceptible" to such a construction98 - to the extent necessary to protect or attain the compelling State interest;99 otherwise, the statute must be struck down as unconstitutional.

Reinforcing the right to freedom of expression is the constitutional guarantee against deprivation of liberty without due process of law. The conception of liberty embraces the right to freedom of expression. Thus, pursuant to due process, the extent and limits of the permissible restriction on expression must be sufficiently and clearly expressed so as to give persons of ordinary intelligence fair notice that their contemplated speech is forbidden by the statute and to preclude arbitrary law enforcement. Because of the due process requisite and the constitutional guarantee against government intrusion on speech, the "standards of permissible statutory vagueness are strict[er] in the area of free expression."100 Thus, a statute may be properly invalidated when it infringes on free speech and expression despite an attempt to narrowly construe it. Indeed, the uncertainty as to the scope of a law's proscriptions will have a chilling effect on expression that must be guarded against by the reasonable specificity of the subject regulation. If the law is unreasonably ambiguous, speech will be unduly chilled.

Parenthetically, even in those well-defined areas where content-based restrictions on speech are permissible, the regulation can be constitutionally challenged on the grounds that a "substantial amount of protected speech is prohibited or chilled in the process."101 A statute that fails to draw distinction between constitutionally protected and unprotected expressions may be struck down for impermissibly overreaching and intruding upon the freedoms guaranteed by the free speech rights as secured by the due process clause.102 For these reasons, it has been held that "the usual doctrines as to the separability of constitutional and unconstitutional applications of statutes may not apply where their effect is to leave standing a statute patently capable of many unconstitutional applications, threatening those who validly exercise their rights of free expression with the expense and inconvenience of criminal prosecution."103

Finally, it should be emphasized that, as held in Chavez v. Gonzales,104 a content-based restriction on expression shall be permitted only when it is shown that "words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent x x x."105 Known as the clear and present danger (CPD) rule, which case law recognizes as the applicable test for determining the validity of limitations on freedom of expression,106 it has since undergone several modifications.107 Its latest iteration, enunciated in Brandenburg v. Ohio (Bradenburg)108 which has been equally recognized in our jurisdiction,109 refined the rule by limiting its application to expression where there is imminent lawless action,110 viz.: "where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Thus, under the Brandenburg doctrine, advocating for the use of force or violating the law is protected, unless it is (i) directed to inciting or producing, (ii) imminent lawless action, and (iii) is likely to incite or produce such action.111 In this situation, the burden to show the existence of a grave and imminent danger that would justify adverse action lies on the government.112 Moreover, the proof of such imminence must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural.113

Applying the foregoing principles to this case, I affirmingly conclude that the "not intended" clause constitutes as an impermissible content-based restraint on expression that cannot be saved by a narrowing construction. For reference, it reads:

Provided, That, terrorism as defined in this section shall not include advocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage of work, industrial or mass action, and other similar exercises of civil and political rights, which are not intended to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person's life, or to create a serious risk to public safety. (emphasis supplied)

Irrefragably, "advocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage of work, industrial or mass action, and other similar exercises of civil and political rights" are not included in the definition of terrorism (as found in Section 4's main part), and hence, shall not be considered as terrorist acts. These are constitutionally protected exercises of the right to freedom of expression which occupy a preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties."114 However, it is apparent that the "not intended" clause qualifies and essentially contradicts said recognition. When read together, the protected expressions of advocacy, protest, and other similar exercises of civil and political rights are not included from the definition of terrorism only when they are "not intended to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person's life, or to create a serious risk to public safety." Thus, when perceived to have any of these intended effects, the protected expressions shall be punished as terrorist acts. Considering that it seeks to penalize expression based on its content, the "not intended" clause is subject to a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality and strict scrutiny. As elaborated below, I find that while the State has a compelling interest to prevent and penalize terrorism, the restriction on the exercise of the right to freedom of expression under this provision is not necessary nor reasonably and narrowly drawn to protect said interest.

For one, the "not intended" clause fails to provide sufficient standards to distinguish between the expressions expressly excluded by the proviso from the definition of terrorism, and those which it considers as terrorist acts punishable under Section 4 of the ATA. Notably, intent is a state of mind, and therefore subjective. Thus, in order to be intelligibly deciphered, the law must provide the parameters by which to draw out this intent. The "not intended" clause, however, falls short of the due process requisite of reasonable specificity since it simply provides that said exercises of civil and political rights are punishable as terrorism when accompanied by any of the enumerated intent (i.e., to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person's life, or to create a serious risk to public safety). This deficiency in the stated parameters, therefore, effectively creates a situation where these protected exercises of the freedom of expression can be penalized as terrorism. But, as the law's sponsor clarified and explained during the deliberations, they can never be considered as terrorism in the course of their exercise.115

Moreover, the "not intended" clause evidently excluded the required standards of direct causal link, imminence and likelihood under the Brandenburg doctrine, and thus, reduced the level of protection given to expressions which the legislative intended. Thus, rather than clarifying the scope of Section 4, the "not intended" clause instead blurs the line between protected expressions and punishable actions. Given its vague contours, the "not intended" clause's regulation on speech not only impermissibly spills and overreaches into constitutionally protected expressions; it also runs the risk of chilling the exercise of this right for vagueness reasons.116 An ordinary citizen has no fair guidance as to whether or not his expression, such as a tweet of frustration or criticism against the government, may be conceived by law enforcement agents as intended to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person's life, or to create a serious risk to public safety. In the end, the speech is chilled by the fear of apprehension or prosecution.

For another, the "not intended" clause fails to provide sufficient standards to distinguish the expressions it seeks to penalize under Section 4 from the expressions penalized under other provisions of the law overtly penalizing expressions, i.e., Section 5 (threat to commit terrorism), Section 8 (proposal to commit terrorism), and Section 9 (inciting to commit terrorism), as well as under Sections 6 and 12 (with respect to training). If the expression referred to in the "not intended" clause falls within those categories where prior restraint on speech is permitted, then they rightfully fall under any of these other provisions which overtly penalize expressions.

In sum, the absence of ascertainable standards for inclusion and exclusion under the proviso's "not intended" clause is precisely what offends due process.117 When the statute provides no guidance for limiting its coverage, such as when "Congress has sent inconsistent signals as to where the new line or lines should be drawn,"118 the Court must decline such narrowing construction. In such a situation, the Court must not hesitate to strike down the offending provision, as the ponencia rightfully did in this case.

Sections 5, 8, and 9119 of the ATA are likewise susceptible to a facial challenge, considering that they overtly target expression. Nonetheless, I also discern that these provisions are valid content-based restraints on expression and are, therefore, constitutional, as ruled by the ponencia.

To reiterate, statutes which penalize expression based on their content, such as Sections 5, 8, and 9 of the ATA, are subject to the strictest scrutiny120 and a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality.121 Moreover, it must be established that the expression sought to be restrained is: (i) directed to inciting or producing, (ii) imminent lawless action, and (iii) likely to incite or produce such action122 pursuant to the Brandenburg standards.123 Accordingly, in order that expression can be constitutionally proscribed, it must have been intended to produce a certain effect,124 and must have a direct and unmistakable causal link to the criminal conduct;125 the mere fact that "an audience may take 'serious offense' to particular expression"126 is not sufficient to conclude that the expression is "likely" to produce the lawless action. Applying these parameters, Sections 5, 8, and 9 of the ATA are sufficiently clear and narrowly-tailored to meet a compelling state interest.

In particular, there is a compelling state interest in prohibiting and penalizing threat, proposal, and inciting to commit terrorism. Communication that can directly and unmistakably lead to or aid terrorist activities raises grave and serious international concern because it creates an atmosphere or a particular state of mind in the audience conducive to the commission of criminal acts.127 For these reasons, and more, the criminalization of one or several forms of such expressions are made in various international instruments.128 In fact, the prevention and deterrence of incitement to terrorism in the interest of protecting national security and public order are legitimate grounds for limiting the freedom of expression under Article 19, Paragraph 3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. They are also consistent with Article 20, paragraph 2 of the same Covenant, which requires States to prohibit any "advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence."129 On the other hand, proposal and threat to commit terrorism are considered as unprotected expression130 since they involve the communication of some illegal or violent activity which the state has a compelling interest to prevent. Finally, it can be observed that the ATA is not the first law that seeks to penalize these kinds of expressions where content-based restraint is permissible as the Revised Penal Code131 is replete with provisions that penalize proposal, inciting, and threat. As with these provisions, the ATA simply recognizes the fact that certain expressions must give way to the equal rights and liberties of others - that evidently include the rights to life and property, as well as security which the law's sponsor noted.132

In the same vein, these provisions are narrowly tailored and are the least restrictive means to achieve the compelling State interest above-mentioned. For one, the ATA itself provides the elements for the crime of proposal to commit terrorism, viz.: the person (i) has decided to commit terrorism and (ii) proposes its execution to another or other person/s. As correctly observed by the ponencia, the phrase "decided to commit" is an important element of proposal under Section 8 that the State must indispensably prove — apart from the proposal aspect — in order to convict a person under its provisions. Considering that penal laws are construed in favor of the accused and strictly against the State, the latter must therefore prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused "decided to commit" terrorism separately from the second element of proposal. Without this decision element, proof of the proposal alone, even if indisputably shown, cannot support a conviction.

Meanwhile, U.S. case law has defined threats as "statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals," even if the speaker does not "actually intend to carry out the threat."133 In U.S. v. Paguirigan,134 the Court has emphasized that threat under our penal laws is characterized by a "deliberate purpose of creating in the mind of the person threatened the belief that the threat will be carried into effect" as determined from the surrounding circumstances; otherwise, the crime committed is not threat but simply misdemeanor. Based on these characterizations, it is clear that the threat, which criminal law penalizes contemplates of serious, genuine, and intentional expressions calculated to put the hearer or listener into fear, irrespective of whether the intended unlawful violent act is actually carried out. Thus, as the ponencia correctly held, the threat contemplated under Section 5 of the ATA includes only those that appears "credible" - as in fact expressly reflected under Rule 4.5 of the IRR - which must be determined based on the surrounding circumstances.

On the other hand, with respect to incitement to commit terrorism, a joint declaration of experts on freedom of expression, as well as the UN Secretary General, explains that "incitement should be understood as 'a direct call to engage in terrorism, with the intention that this will promote terrorism, and in a context in which the call is directly causally responsible for increasing the actual likelihood of a terrorist act occurring.'"135 The UN Secretary General also recommended that states prosecute incitement to terrorism only if it "directly encourages the commission of a crime, is intended to result in criminal action, and is likely to result in criminal action" in order for States to comply with international protection of freedoms of expression.136 Moreover, it can be noted that under international law, incitement per se is generally punishable only where it leads to the commission of the substantive or target crime,137 as it is considered merely as a mode of responsibility.138 In this accord, for incitement to be thus penalized, the following factors must be considered: (a) causal connection of the incitement to the substantive crime in that it must have contributed significantly to the commission of the latter; (b) intentional act or awareness by the person of the substantial likelihood that the substantive crime will be committed; and (c) intent to bring about the crime incited or instigated.139 Noticeably, as the ponencia perceived, Rule 4.9 of the ATA's Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) articulates these parameters in characterizing inciting to terrorism, and thus, further supports the conclusion that the law is narrowly tailored.

Finally, it can be observed that the legislature140 intended these provisions to operate only within the confines of the intent-purposes parameters of Section 4 of the ATA, as well as for the clear and present danger rule - as already modified by the Brandenburg standards — and the relevant jurisprudence to guide the courts in their interpretation.141 It should also be borne in mind that the necessity and proportionality requirements attached to content-based restrictions are deemed incorporated in the application of these Sections, such that mere propaganda or advocacy must be distinguished from those expressions that are clearly intended to incite, propose, or threaten acts of terrorism.

For all these reasons, the ineluctable conclusion is that in order for an expression to be penalized under Sections 5, 8, and 9 of the ATA, it is necessary that the expression is shown to have a direct, unmistakable, and immediate causal link to the intended terrorist act, as enumerated under Section 4 of the ATA, and that it is intended to promote, induce, or commence terrorism, and is likely to produce such action.142 To note, the circumstances surrounding each case must be considered,143 such as the words used and the context in which they were used144 from which the intent can be inferred; and that the accused is shown to have transmitted the communication for the purposes of issuing a threat, proposal, or incitement, or with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as such.145 Together, these factors should provide sufficient guidance to the courts, as well as the relevant law enforcement agencies and personnel in the implementation and application of these provisions of the ATA.

I also recognize that Sections 6 and 12 of the ATA are susceptible to a facial challenge but only insofar as they penalize "training" and "expert advice or assistance." Indeed, as defined in the ATA and in the U.S. case of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project146 (Holder), as well as ordinary usage, these terms include communication or expressions which are protected under the right to freedom of expression, and the more specific intellectual liberty guarantee under the right to academic freedom, found under Section V, Article XIV of the Constitution.147 As content-based restrictions on speech, these provisions are therefore, subject to strict judicial scrutiny148 and die heavy presumption of unconstitutionality.149 Based on these parameters, I find that with respect to training and expert advice or assistance, the ponencia correctly upheld the validity of Sections 6 and 12 of the ATA. I explain further.

Under the first prong of strict scrutiny, compelling state interest evidently exists in prohibiting and penalizing the provision of training and expert advice and assistance for the commission of terrorism. These are preventive measures that have been introduced in the law precisely for the purpose of preventing terrorism at its early stages, as emphasized by the law's sponsor throughout the legislative deliberations.150 But more than preventing terrorist acts, penalizing support to terrorist activities, such as training and expert advice or assistance, can help prevent legitimizing terrorist groups, including their respective causes and agenda. As held in Holder,151 "material support" is a valuable resource by definition that helps lend legitimacy to foreign terrorist groups which makes it easier for them to persist, recruit members, and raise funds — all of which facilitate more terrorist attacks.152 Lastly, it should be recognized that the adoption of these preventive measures is consistent with the states' obligations "to prevent the commission of terrorist acts" provided in [UNSCR] No. 1373 (2001)153 of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Verily, the devastating human cost of terrorism, in addition to its debilitating impact on our social, economic, and political structures, calls for proactive measures that ensure that terrorist acts are thwarted at the onset.

Furthermore, under the second prong of strict scrutiny, these provisions are narrowly drawn and are the least restrictive means to achieve the compelling State interest.

Section 3 (k) of the ATA defines training as the "giving of instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill in relation to terrorism as defined hereunder, as opposed to general knowledge." Based on this definition, it is clear that, in order to be punishable under Section 6 of the ATA, the training must involve the transfer of specific information or competence calculated to enable the trainee to perform a particular task or function that can facilitate the commission of terrorism. To my mind, the statement that the instruction or teaching must be "designed to impart a specific skill in relation to terrorism" "as opposed to general knowledge" sufficiently clarifies and narrows its coverage to the type of expression that the State has the right to restrain. Accordingly, training under Sections 6 and 12 shall be punishable only when the following elements concur: (i) the training is with the purpose of committing terrorism; (ii) the training is intentionally designed to impart a skill in relation to terrorism; and (iii) the skill imparted has specific relation to a projected act of terrorism, not mere general knowledge. Absent any one of these, any information or skill taught or imparted shall be considered as mere general knowledge that is expressly excluded from the law's operation.

The above interpretation on training is equally applicable to expert advice or assistance since both involve the giving of information or instruction; thus, the foregoing elements must concur for expert advice or assistance to be punishable. Additionally, it should be recognized that Section 12 of the ATA provides the element of knowledge that the individuals or groups of persons receiving the material support are "committing or planning to commit terrorism" as defined under Section 4. Thus, in order to penalize a person under Section 12 for providing material support in the form of training and/or expert advice or assistance, the State must sufficiently prove that the person knew that the recipient individuals or groups of persons are "committing or planning to commit terrorism."

For another, it must be recognized that the term support under Section 12 of the ATA is explicitly qualified by the word material. To my mind, this qualification is relevant for it betrays an intention to limit Section 12's coverage to only those acts that play an essential, relevant, and significant role in the planning or commission of terrorism. In fact, as explained in Holder,154 "material support" refers only to a valuable resource that helps lend legitimacy to foreign terrorist groups and which makes it easier for them to persist, recruit members, and raise funds — all of which facilitate more terrorist attacks.155 In this context, therefore, it should be clear that advice or assistance given in a professional capacity - including those given by lawyers and medical practitioners - which is not directly related to the planning or commission of terrorism is not covered by Section 12. Significantly, the exclusion of legal and medical advice or assistance from Section 12's coverage was explicitly guaranteed by the law's sponsor during the deliberations.156

Finally, the training and/or expert advice or assistance covered by these provisions should be read together with the Brandenburg standards.157 Thus, it must be adequately demonstrated that the training or expert advice or assistance is (i) directed to inciting or producing, (ii) imminent lawless action, and (iii) is likely to incite or produce such action158 before it can be penalized under Sections 6 and 12 of the ATA.

For similar reasons, I assent that Section 10159 of the ATA is susceptible to a facial challenge insofar as it penalizes membership or association in a terrorist organization, found under the third paragraph thereof. As case law holds, the right to freedom of association is deemed cognate of the right to freedom of expression because it represents an effective mechanism whereby other rights, such as freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, and expression, are exercised.160 As such, it is likewise considered as a preferred freedom161 expressly guaranteed under Section 8, Article III of the Constitution, as well as under the right to liberty of Section 1, Article III, and under Section 4, Article III, all of the Constitution.162 Accordingly, any state action which may have the effect of curtailing its exercise is subject to the closest scrutiny.163

Applying these parameters, I find that the validity of the third paragraph of Section 10 of the ATA must be upheld, except for the phrase "organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism," which clause was unfortunately upheld by the majority in this case.

First, there are sufficient and compelling reasons to restrain the exercise of the freedom to associate with respect to terrorist organizations. Membership lends moral aid and psychological encouragement to the organization.164 In the context of terrorism, it is a form of support that helps lend legitimacy to the terrorist group thereby allowing it to persist and facilitate more terrorist attacks. As such, it has been held that "when membership is accepted or retained with knowledge that the organization is engaged in an unlawful purpose, the one accepting or retaining membership with such knowledge makes himself a party to the unlawful enterprise in which it is engaged."165 For these reasons, penalizing and prohibiting membership in terrorist groups is considered as a necessary and reasonable measure to prevent and curtail terrorism. As explained by the law's sponsor, this is one of the several counter-terrorism measures introduced in the ATA for the purpose of preventing terrorism at its early stages.166

Second, with the exception of the phrase "organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism" the third paragraph of Section 10 of the ATA contains sufficiently clear and well-defined parameters to distinguish punishable from protected associations; hence, they are neither vague nor overbroad.

As can be deciphered from the third paragraph of Section 10 of the ATA, there are three (3) separate but interrelated elements that must concur in order for membership to be punishable thereunder, namely: (1) "voluntarily and knowingly join [ing] [the] organization, association, or group of persons"; (2) "knowing that [the] organization, association, or group of persons"; (3) is proscribed under Section 26, designated by the UNSC as a terrorist organization, or organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism. As earlier stated, penal laws are construed in favor of the accused and strictly against the State; hence, the latter must prove each of these elements beyond reasonable doubt.

Based on the foregoing, I conclude that the first two (2) instances of punishable membership under Section 10 are sufficiently clear and narrowly tailored as to preclude any arbitrary finding of membership, and are thus valid. Indeed, as the ponencia properly explained, the membership penalized under these two instances are limited to knowing membership, as distinguished from nominal membership, because of the scienter or knowledge167 element (in addition to the voluntariness element) which attaches both to the joining of the organization, association or groups of persons, and to the nature or status of said organization either as proscribed under Section 26 or designated by the UNSC.168 As the Court similarly found in People v. Ferrer,169 these elements of voluntarily and knowingly joining and knowledge of the organization's status as a terrorist sufficiently circumscribe the law's operation as they betray the legislative intent170 to criminalize only those voluntary and knowing membership.

Moreover, with respect to the second element, the person's knowledge of the nature or status of the organization, association, or groups of persons under the first two instances can be readily determined, considering that the procedure for proscription and UNSC designation can be found in the ATA and relevant international instruments, respectively. Hence, the person's knowledge of said nature or status can be ascertained from the circumstances surrounding the proscription or UNSC designation, as well as from the actual declaration of the status of the organization as a terrorist.

In contrast to the foregoing, the person's knowledge of the nature or status of the organization under the third instance of punishable membership, covered by the phrase organized for the purposes of engaging in terrorism, cannot be rationally determined, considering that the law is completely silent with respect to the parameters for the determination of the organization's status as a terrorist.

To note, the majority view, as articulated in Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo's (Chief Justice Gesmundo) opinion, propounds that the phrase is in fact clear, considering that Section 10 should be read in relation to Section 4, such that the phrase should cover only those organizations whose purpose is to engage in any of the five types of overt acts under the latter Section.171 For this reason, the phrase "organized for the purposes of engaging in terrorism" was upheld.

I disagree. Plainly, the contentious phrase "organized for the purposes of engaging in terrorism" is unreasonably vague since it fails to provide sufficient guidance, on its face, whether or not the group covered by the third instance of membership needs to first commit or first attempt to commit any terrorist act to be deemed as "organized" for such purpose. As such, an ordinary person, much more law enforcement officers, may unwittingly construe the same to mean that a mere purported intent to commit terrorism in the future is already sufficient to consider a group as having been "organized" for purpose of engaging in terrorism. More importantly, even the legislative deliberations fail to provide any clarification since the law's sponsor simply leaves the matter up to the evidence.172 Thus, the vagueness of this phrase leaves much to the discretion of the law enforcement officers which could very well lead to an arbitrary finding of terrorist membership under Section 10 of the ATA.

In fine, the phrase "organized for the purposes of engaging in terrorism" is impermissibly vague and as such, constitutes an unconstitutional regulation on the freedom of association, which is a cognate right of speech. Thus, I dissent against the majority's ruling upholding its validity.

As it has been with the provisions tackled in this discourse, the sections of the ATA dealing with designation and proscription can also be subject to a facial analysis in view of their significant and consequential impact on the exercise of the right to freedom of expression and its cognate rights. The broad and amplified scope of these counterterrorism measures may undeniably lead to the stilling of legitimate dissent and concerted civil actions. For these reasons, the relevant case law on content-based regulations on expression justifies a largely similar treatment for assessing the constitutional validity of the provisions on designation and proscription. While they are not regulations on expression per se, their highly deterrent effect almost equally restrains the exercise of the right as much as a content-based regulation on expression and association and should thus, be subject to the strictest scrutiny.

Applying these parameters, it is apparent that a compelling State interest underlies both designation and proscription. It is undeniable that these counterterrorism measures are not only intended to forestall possible terrorist activities of foreigners within Philippine jurisdiction or against Philippine nationals abroad, as well as to cooperate with global efforts against international terrorist groups who are known to operate across territorial borders pursuant to our international obligations under UNSCR No. 1373.173 They are also impelled by the general considerations of law enforcement, public order, and public safety — all of which are State interests of a compelling nature and are therefore lawful subjects of state action. Moreover, these are accepted counterterrorism measures recognized by other jurisdictions which therefore, reinforce the reasonableness of these measures.174

I further find that designation, through automatic adoption of the UNSC listing, and the proscription measures are reasonable and narrowly tailored to meet the foregoing State interests. Particularly, with respect to designation through automatic adoption by the Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC) of the designation or listing made by the UNSC, I agree that there are adequate standards and rigorous procedures for listing (as well as delisting) under pertinent issuances of the UNSC and the UN Sanctions Committee. These issuances include UNSC Resolution (UNSCR) No. 1373175 and UNSCR No. 1555 (2004),176 which enumerate the reprehensible acts connected to terrorism; the Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of its Work177 of the UN Sanctions Committee, which is tasked with the maintenance and updating of the list, and which Guidelines contain the procedure for delisting; and UNSCR No. 2368 (2017),178 which established a procedure for the review of delisting requests. Other similar resolutions have been passed by the UNSC further refining the corpus of authorities governing the maintenance, updating, and implementation of the consolidated list.

Moreover, the adoption of the Consolidated List is enjoined by our binding obligations under UNSCR No. 1373 which the UNSC issued pursuant to its powers under the UN Charter.179 While this resolution does not explicitly mandate States to automatically adopt the said List of terrorists and terrorist groups, the consolidated list may be taken as a form of an implementing measure adopted and enforced by the UNSC to maintain and restore international peace and security against terrorist threats which states are obligated to undertake under UNSCR No. 1373 and subsequent UNSC resolutions.180 Considering that the measures for the implementation of these obligations are left for each state to determine and depend on their respective legal regimes, the determination of the appropriate mechanisms to comply with our international obligations under said Resolutions remains in the discretion of the political branches of our government. Evidently, Congress, as the seat of police power in our system of government, considered the automatic adoption of the UNSC Consolidated List as an effective means of protecting the state from foreign terrorists. Indeed, as made clear in this case, terrorism has become a global threat and, as such, involves international terrorist groups who are known to operate across territorial borders. Thus, regardless of the wisdom of this decision, it cannot be denied that the adoption of the UNSC Consolidated List is bolstered by practical considerations especially given the country's limited resources and logistical intelligence.

Meanwhile, with respect to proscription, it is observed that the ATA, in fact, provides extensive and rigorous requirements and procedures that afford the respondent due process prior to proscription. As outlined in the ponencia, proscription passes a thorough screening process that requires the coordinated action and consensus of the Department of Justice, the ATC, and the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency even prior to its initiation which thus, maximizes the verification of relevant information and draws from the particular and peculiar expertise of these executive agencies. More significantly, the proceedings are also commenced before the higher-level collegiate court (i.e., the Court of Appeals), and are circumscribed by the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence, as well as the relevant procedural rules to be promulgated that will specifically govern proscription proceedings.

Further, in allowing the issuance of a preliminary order of proscription, the ATA requires that the order be supported by an application which is duly verified and sufficient in form and substance, and be based on a judicial finding of probable cause that the issuance of said order is necessary to prevent the commission of terrorism. Finally, Section 26 of the ATA explicitly requires that the respondent be given due notice and the opportunity to be heard which thus, ensures that the potential proscriptee is given the chance to air its side and present countervailing evidence. In fine, all these requisites and rigorous procedures, including the heightened level of scrutiny on the part of the court which squares with the explanations made by the law's sponsor,181 should preclude possible abuse by State authorities and exclude flimsy evidence in the proscription of organizations, associations, or groups of persons as terrorists.

In contrast, designation under the second and third modes are constitutionally problematic, considering that it: (1) is broadly tailored; (2) lacks reasonable safeguards against misuse and abuse; and (3) is not the least restrictive means to accomplish the compelling State purposes behind them.

To elucidate, the designation under the second and third modes grants the ATC wide and unbridled discretion in determining whether a suspected person or group may be designated as terrorists or organized for the purpose of terrorism within the law's contemplation. It also fails to provide reasonable safeguards, including speedy remedies, against erroneous designations. Moreover, it does not indicate the quantum of evidence upon which a valid designation under these modes may rest. The probable cause standard also appears to be foreign to the concept of designation because executive determination of probable cause is generally associated with the filing of an Information in court. Thus, it cannot be simply construed to apply to the designation process.

Further, these modes do not afford the potential designee the opportunity to be heard and present countervailing evidence in their favor. Together, these generalized parameters under the law may lead to weak and baseless findings based on mere suspicion and questionable evidence, thereby virtually granting the ATC unbridled discretion in designating any suspected person or organization as terrorists. They not only make the foregoing police power measures offensive to the constitutional requirement of substantive due process under a strict scrutiny analysis, but they also unduly invade the sensitive spheres of protected liberties including the freedom of expression.

Finally, there are other suitable alternatives which may equally aid law enforcement agencies in the apprehension of suspected terrorists and terrorist groups that are far less intrusive and potentially injurious to protected rights. These include the adoption of an internal watchlist by law enforcement agencies or the maintenance of an agency database to monitor potential terrorist threats, as well as proscription. All told, the designation measures under the second and third modes are arbitrarily and broadly tailored, and fail the strict scrutiny test. As such, I vote to strike them down as unconstitutional.

Notably, while the ponencia appropriately struck down the second mode of designation (to which I concur), the majority of the Court, through Chief Justice Gesmundo's opinion, regrettably arrived at a different conclusion with respect to the third mode of designation under Section 25 of the ATA. As postulated by the majority, the third mode of designation under Section 25, when read with the law's IRR, allegedly provides sufficient substantive, procedural, and evidentiary criteria to inform any person or entity of the basis of designation. Thus, the majority held that the third mode of designation is a valid means of preventing or cutting off financial and logistical support to a terrorist act and enable the detection and prevention of any impending terrorist attack and hence, constitutional.

Nonetheless, as I already extensively discussed above, and even by the ponente, the third mode of designation is not narrowly tailored to achieve its compelling State interest. It is also plagued with the absence of reasonable safeguards against misuse and abuse due to its failure to specify the proper evidentiary standard upon which a valid designation under this mode may rest. There are likewise no proper remedies available to curb the ATC's unbridled discretion in its application. Truth be told, there are really no appreciable substantial disparities between the second and third modes of designation insofar as their constitutional infirmities are concerned; hence, it is quite perplexing how a different ruling was reached with respect to the third mode of designation despite the striking down of the second mode. Therefore, I dissent against the majority's disposition relative to the third mode of designation.

In similar fashion, Section 29 of the ATA is susceptible to a facial challenge. Indeed, the threat of arrest without a judicial warrant and prolonged detention may undoubtedly chill and stifle the free exercise of expression and its cognate rights which the Court must promptly address. Under this lens, I further find that Section 29 of the ATA must be sustained, but subject, however, to the Court's clarifying and narrowing construction, as expressed in the pertinent discussions of the ponencia.

Controversially, Section 29 of the ATA is one of the counterterrorism measures which the State introduced in the exercise of its police power to respond to the ever-evolving problem of terrorism and to prevent and disrupt future terrorist acts.182 As will be highlighted in the subsequent discussions, one of the major premises of petitioners' arguments rests on their interpretation that Section 29 unlawfully carves out additional exceptions to Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,183 and thus, unduly expands the permissible exceptions to the guarantee against unreasonable seizures.184 As such, they argue that it unavoidably stifles the exercise of free speech rights. Given these allegations, I find it appropriate that the validity of Section 29 is tested under the most exacting standards of strict scrutiny and overbreadth, similar to the ATA's provisions on designation and proscription.185

Once more, pursuant to the strict scrutiny standard, Section 29 of the ATA would pass constitutional muster only if it is: (1) necessary to achieve a compelling State interest; and (2) the least restrictive means to protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.186 On the other hand, the provision would be struck down as unconstitutional for overbreadth if it achieves a governmental purpose by means that are unnecessarily broad and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.187 In determining overreach, the Court must necessarily assess the limits of the provision's constitutional application. The alleged unconstitutional expansion of the permissible exceptions to the guarantee against unreasonable seizures which will thereby chill expression evidently raises overbreadth concerns that must be addressed by the Court.188

Ultimately, however, the Court is not precluded from employing the various aids to statutory construction to properly interpret the provisions of Section 29 so that the legislative will may accurately be reflected in its enforcement and implementation. And, if found susceptible to a construction that would separate its constitutional from unconstitutional applications, then the same cannot be rendered invalid.

At the onset, it is imperative to point out that Section 29 of the ATA contemplates a valid warrantless situation. As can be gleaned from its provisions, Section 29 requires two (2) actions before a person can be detained for a period of fourteen (14) calendar days from the arrest: first, the ATC issues an authority in writing; and second, the law enforcement agent or military personnel has lawfully taken into custody a person suspected of committing any of the acts defined and penalized under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 of the ATA. Applying the basic statutory construction rule that statutes should be construed in a way that "gives it the greater chance of surviving the test of constitutionality,"189 there is no justifiable reason to suppose that Section 29 provides for an "executive warrant of arrest" or a warrantless arrests based on mere suspicion of the ATC. Rather, the proper reading is that a person may be arrested without a warrant pursuant to Section 29 but only under any of the instances contemplated in Rule 9.2. of the IRR, which mirrors Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

Additionally, it must be emphasized that Section 29 begins with the phrase "The provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to the contrary notwithstanding x x x" This is significant as it immediately establishes that Section 29 — at its core — is not an arrest provision that prescribes a new standard for warrantless arrests but rather, only seeks to carve out an exception to the periods provided in Article 125 of the RPC, which punishes the delay in the delivery to the proper judicial authorities of persons who have been detained for some legal ground beyond the period specifically provided therein. Thus, in the words of the ponencia, "the subject matter of Section 29 is really the extended detention period, and not the grounds for warrantless arrest, which remains as those instances provided by Section 5, Rule 113."190

Perceptibly, the law's IRR reflects the foregoing interpretation as it fills in the details for its proper implementation in harmony with prevailing standards.1a⍵⍴h!1 Particularly, Rule 9.1. requires the submission by the arresting officer of a sworn statement "stating the details of the person suspected of committing acts of terrorism, and the relevant circumstances as basis for taking custody of said person"191 before the ATC can issue a written authorization. It also requires the ATC to state in the written authorization said relevant circumstances that justified the arrest. In both, the circumstances relate to the instances of valid warrantless arrests enumerated under Section 5 of Rule 113, as reflected in Rule 9.2. of the law's IRR.

For the same reasons, I am also not convinced that Section 29 of the ATA authorizes warrantless arrests based on mere suspicion. Under prevailing rules and jurisprudence, probable cause remains the applicable standard in valid warrantless arrests situations.192 As case law holds, it is the existence of probable cause that "objectifies the reasonableness of the warrantless arrest, in compliance with the constitutional mandate against unreasonable arrests."193 Parenthetically, this Court has, in some cases, also referred to the person arrested as a "suspect" even when the warrantless arrest was validly made pursuant to probable cause.194 Thus, the use of the term "suspect" in Section 29 does not in any way downgrade said standard to mere suspicion, but rather, merely describes the person arrested as one who has not yet been charged in court.195

Probable cause is defined as "an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion."196 The grounds of suspicion are said to be reasonable when "the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested."197 The instances of valid warrantless arrests include those found under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court; as earlier intimated, these have been substantially mirrored under Rule 9.2. of the IRR of the ATA.198

Pertinently, Section 5 (a) of Rule 113, otherwise known as an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto, requires the concurrence of two (2) elements, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.199 The requirement that the officer is "present" signifies that the overt acts of the crime must take place within the sensory perception, especially sight or hearing, of the arresting officer.200 Thus, under the situations covered by Section 5 (a), immediate action is required "to suppress the breach of public order and to prevent further breaches then and there."201

On the other hand, Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, also known as hot pursuit arrests, requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts or circumstances indicating that the accused had committed it.202 The phrase "has just been committed" connotes that the time interval between the actual commission of the crime and the arrival of the arresting officer must be brief,203 such that the effects or corpus of the crime which has just been committed are still visible. Meanwhile, the phrase "personal knowledge of facts and circumstances" on the part of the arresting officer refers to "events or actions within the actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime."204

Under both situations covered by Section 5 (a) and 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, the officer's personal knowledge of (i) the fact of the commission of an offense, and (ii) facts or circumstances indicating that the person to be arrested has committed the offense is essential. Under Section 5 (a), the officer himself/herself witnesses the crime and the commission thereof by the person to be arrested; while in Section 5 (b), the officer knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed205 and perceives actions or events at the scene that connects the person to be arrested to the visible effects or corpus of the crime.206 In both situations, it is the officer's personal knowledge, drawn from overt acts constitutive of a crime, that becomes the basis of the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrests. This personal knowledge carries with it a sense of immediacy that "acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame" and not from a subsequent exhaustive investigation.207

Given the arresting officer's limited timeframe in the determination of probable cause when operating on the ground, inherent limitations certainly inure in said determination in warrantless arrests situations.208 This is especially so when it comes to the ascertainment of the complex crime of terrorism, which is a situation of utmost exigency given its potential grave consequences and wide-scale disastrous nature. Officers on the ground do not always possess classified information or intelligence and yet are called to immediately act upon a suspect's unlawful activities. Thus, based on the standards for warrantless arrests, the officer may apprehend the suspect and later on, detain him or her for a longer period upon the determination of the ATC that the act committed is actually an act of terrorism under the ATA. This determination and the consequent license to prolong detention is embodied in the written authorization of the ATC. As intended, the authority of the ATC under Section 29 of the ATA is confined to the determination of whether or not the period of detention should be extended to fourteen (14) days — and not to the determination of whether an arrest should be made. At the risk of belaboring the point, if the written authority is issued, the ATC confirms that the person was arrested for the commission of a terrorist act which thus calls for the longer 14-day detention period. If it does not, then the arresting officer shall deliver the suspected person to the proper judicial authority within the periods specified under Article 125 of the RPC — the prevailing general rule.209 Since terrorists have "become more clandestine and sophisticated in executing their attacks," the ATC certainly would be in a better position to make such determination as it is mandated to "[establish and maintain comprehensive database information systems on terrorism, [terroristic] activities, and counterterrorism operations." In every instance, however, law enforcement agents must ensure the proper observance of the rights of detainees and endeavor to secure them against possible abuses.

Furthermore, I reckon that Section 29 of the ATA does not run afoul of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution,210 which provides that a person apprehended shall be judicially charged within three (3) days during the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Aside from the fact that the said constitutional provision specifically applies in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it, the same also does not contain any express prohibition on Congress with respect to the possibility of imposing longer periods of detention in a situation where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not suspended, which is a matter of legislative wisdom and policy. It is therefore error to use Article VII, Section 18 as legal basis to clip the power of Congress to formulate novel policies that would respond to other threats on national security, as it has done in the enactment of the ATA.

Significantly, Section 29 also does not render inutile the inherent Commander-in-Chief powers of the President, considering that it does not affect, much less limit, the President's exercise of discretion in determining whether the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must be suspended. Section 29 neither negates any of the President's residual powers to address terroristic threats or attacks as Commander-in-Chief. Even with the passage of the ATA, the standards for the suspension of the said privilege remains to be the presence of circumstances provided under paragraph 1, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. Again, Section 29 of the ATA only pertains to the extended detention period relative to Article 125 of the RPC.

Notably, the constitutional deliberations show that the situation covered by Article 125 of the RPC and Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution are different, to wit:

Since Section 29 serves only as an exception to the periods provided under Article 125 of the RPC, it should be understood to operate in the ordinary context where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not suspended. When the privilege of the writ is suspended under the parameters of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the three-day period operates.

As well, I recognize that the extended detention period provided under Section 29 of the ATA constitutes reasonable and narrowly-tailored counterterrorism measures designed to protect public safety and national security from the ever-evolving problem of terrorism. Indeed, as the provision itself explicitly provides, Section 29 only operates when a person has been lawfully arrested without a judicial warrant for violating Sections 4 to 12 of the ATA; and, considering the Court's ruling that Section 4 excludes protests, advocacies, dissents, and other exercises of political and civil rights, this provision should no longer result in an impermissible chilling effect on expression.212 Besides, the enactment of the fourteen-day period of detention was borne from the experience of our law enforcement agencies and was agreed to be the reasonable time needed for the gathering of evidence for the purpose of the inquest proceedings for terror crimes.213 Absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, the Court should respect the wisdom of Congress in this crucial matter.

Moreover, it is apparent that the law itself, as well as its IRR, provides numerous safeguards to protect the detainee's right during the period of detention.214 These include the requirement that other relevant agencies be informed of the arrestee's detention, including the Commission on Human Rights as well as the judge of the trial court nearest the place of apprehension or arrest within forty-eight (48) hours therefrom. They also provide punishment for any failure to comply with these requirements. In addition, Section 29 does not preclude the detainee from availing of the remedies against warrantless arrests under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as well as the other remedies available under our law and rules, including the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus - which must still be adjudged based on the facts surrounding the warrantless arrest itself, and not on the basis merely of the ATC's written authority.

Meanwhile, with respect to the miscellaneous issues discussed in the ponencia that were not featured in this Opinion,215 allow me to express my full concurrence in support of its reasons, to which I find no impelling need to add more. Overall, I take this opportunity to laud the ponente for eruditely, prudently, and competently handling this sensationally complex case constituting 37 petitions, which - despite some divergence in views - nonetheless reflects the Court's holistic effort to strike a deft balance between all the institutional and societal values involved.

The issue of terrorism is both critical and complicated. It requires a multi-sectoral and balanced approach to address and combat its ever-growing threat to lives, property, freedoms, and our way of life. Law enforcement measures are just one of the means to address this problem. While several of its provisions are upheld, subject to the Court's judicious construction, it is hoped that in the implementation of the ATA, the rule of law prevails. Indeed, at all times, respect for human rights must be upheld;216 otherwise, the courts, in the exercise of the judicial branch's constitutional mandate, will not hesitate to wield the heavy hand of justice against any abusive enforcement. Further, upon the proper cases that are ripe for adjudication, courts are also not precluded from assessing the application of the ATA to arrive at the statute's proper interpretation against concrete facts and circumstances that were not included herein. In this regard, the jury is still out there against the possible applications of the ATA as jurisprudence evolves in the course of its existence.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to PARTIALLY GRANT the petitions. For the reasons herein discussed, the following provisions of the ATA are unconstitutional:

(1) the clause "which are not intended to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person's life, or to create a serious risk to public safety" found in the proviso of Section 4;

(2) the phrase "organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism" found in the third paragraph of Section 10; and