G.R. No. 208912 - Separate Opinion

G.R. No. 208912/G.R. No. 209018, December 7, 2021,
♦ Decision, Leonen, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion, Gesmundo, [CJ]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Perlas-Bernabe, [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Caguioa, [J]

AMADEA ANGELA K. AQUINO, PETITIONER, VS. RODOLFO C. AQUINO AND ABBULAH C. AQUINO, RESPONDENTS.

Before the Court are the petitions for certiorari filed by Amadea Angela K. Aquino (Amadea), in G.R. No. 208912, seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated January 21, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA), and filed by Rodolfo Aquino (Rodolfo), in G.R. No. 209018, against the August 23, 2012 Decision2 and August 1, 2013 Resolution3 of the CA. Amadea essentially claims that she is the illegitimate daughter of deceased Arturo Aquino (Arturo), and, in turn, a legal heir of her grandfather, decedent Miguel Aquino (Miguel).

On October 21, 2013, the Third Division issued a Resolution4 consolidating G.R. Nos. 208912 and 209018. Both petitions were denied by the Court in its November 11, 2013 Resolution.5 Hence, Amadea filed a Motion for Reconsideration,6 and the Court also granted her motion to refer the case to the Court En Banc.7

The ponencia granted the motion for reconsideration of Amadea on the basis that Article 992 of the Civil Code should be accorded an interpretation that qualifies children, regardless of the circumstances of their birth, to inherit from their direct ascendants by right of representation; and that Abdulah Aquino (Abdulah) and Rodolfo are estopped from claiming that Amadea is not Arturo's child.

I share the view of Justice Caguioa insofar as the petitions should be remanded to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for reception of evidence and for resolution of the factual issues.

The subject matter raised before the Court is the interpretation of Art. 992 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.8

Amadea essentially argues that this provision is unfair as it wrongly distinguishes between a legitimate and an illegitimate child regarding their right to inherit, where the illegitimate child shall not have any right to inherit from the legitimate relatives of his or her father or mother. On the other hand, Abdulah and Rodolfo counter that Amadea did not even prove that she was an illegitimate child of Arturo in the first place, hence, she is not an heir of her alleged grandfather, Miguel.

The ponencia finds in favor of Amadea, stating that Art. 992, or the iron curtain principle, should be interpreted in such a way that children, regardless of the circumstances of their birth, can inherit from their direct ascendants by right of representation, applying the constitutional precepts of equal protection under the laws, due process, and the international obligations.

However, I find that before the Court should interpret whether Art. 992 of the Civil Code conforms to the Constitution or international laws, it must first be indispensably determined whether this Court can exercise its power of judicial review.

It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented. The essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law are: (a) the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, (b) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper party, (c) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity, and (d) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case.9

An actual case or controversy is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution, as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. To be justiciable, the case or controversy must present a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. Regardless of whether the Court's power of review is invoked under the traditional or expanded concept, the presence of an actual case or controversy remains a requisite before judicial power is exercised. However, when the Court's expanded jurisdiction is invoked, the requirement of an actual case or controversy is satisfied upon a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion in the assailed governmental act.10

In the landmark decision of Angara v. Electoral Commission,11 the Court ruled that the power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies to be exercised only after full opportunity of argument by the parties. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.12 In Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC,13 it was further emphasized that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable – definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other hand; that is, it must concern a real and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.14

Interrelated with the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. Consistently, a question is considered ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual or entity challenging it. The question of ripeness asks whether a case involves contingent events that may not occur as anticipated and whether there is actual injury to the party being suit.15 Thus, it is required that an act had been accomplished or performed by either branch of the government and that there is an immediate or threatened injury to the petitioner as a result of the challenged action before courts may interfere.16

By ripening seeds, it is meant, not that sufficient accrued facts may be dispensed with, but that a dispute may be tried at its inception before it has accumulated the asperity, distemper, animosity, passion, and violence of a full blown battle that looms ahead. The concept describes a state of facts indicating imminent and inevitable litigation provided that the issue is not settled and stabilized by tranquilizing declaration.17 Indeed, if the seeds of adjudication are not yet ripe, as there is no actual case or controversy yet, then the Court must not act on the judicial review of an assailed law.

The requirement of actual case or controversy before there can be a review of any law is constitutionally mandated under Section 1, Art. VIII:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (emphasis supplied)

If the Court acts on a case regarding the constitutionality of a particular statute without an actual case or controversy, it will not only violate Sec. 1, Art. VIII, but will also violate the doctrine that laws are constitutionally presumed valid. A challenged law always enjoys the presumption of constitutionality which the Court, at the first instance, cannot disturb in the absence of the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, or at the very least, prima facie grave abuse of discretion. If the Court were to invalidate the questioned law on the basis of conjectures and suppositions, then it would be unduly treading questions of policy and wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it, but also of the executive which approved it.18 Without an actual case or controversy, the Court will only provide an advisory opinion, which is constitutionally proscribed.19

On a deeper philosophical basis of judicial review, the existence of an actual case of controversy as a mandatory requisite of constitutional adjudication espouses a delicate balance between three separate but co-equal branches of government. It is equally of paramount public concern, certainly paramount to the survival of our democracy, that acts of the other branches of government are accorded due respect by this Court. Such acts, done within their sphere of competence, have been – and should always be – accorded with a presumption of regularity.20 The members of the legislature, as well as the top two officers of the executive branch, are direct representatives of the people, in whom sovereignty resides. The laws that are passed by Congress are a reflection of the will of the people.

When such acts are assailed as illegal or unconstitutional, the burden falls upon those who assail these acts to prove that they satisfy the essential norms of constitutional adjudication, because when the Court finally proceeds to declare an act of the executive or legislative branch of our government unconstitutional or illegal, what the Court actually accomplishes is the thwarting of the will of the elected representatives of the people in the executive or legislative branches of government.21 Notwithstanding Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the Constitution, since the exercise of the power of judicial review by this Court is inherently non-democratic, as the members of the bench are not elected by the people at-large, this Court should exercise caution in heedlessly setting aside or modifying an act of the executive or legislative branch.

While the Court is mandated to have an important and indispensable role in ensuring check and balance in the State, it is bound by the constitutional limitation under Sec. 1, Art. VIII that there must first be an actual case or controversy before judicial review maybe exercised – this is the strict condition by which the people, in whom sovereignty resides, conferred judicial power on the Court upon their act of ratifying the Constitution.

Thus, the existence of an actual case or controversy when invoking judicial review should not be taken lightly. It must be confirmed that the issues raised by the parties are indeed ripe for adjudication before the court as the assailed law has allegedly breached a particular constitutional right or rights.

With respect to the requirement of locus standi or legal standing, it requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.22 A party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal interest. It must show not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.23

Locus standi is a party's personal and substantial interest in a case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act being challenged. It calls for more than just a generalized grievance. The term "interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Unless a person's constitutional rights are adversely affected by the statute or ordinance, he has no legal standing.24 To be sure, the rule on standing admits of recognized exceptions: the [overbreadth] doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and the doctrine of transcendental importance.25

In the recent case of Falcis III v. Civil Registrar General,26 the petition, which was assailing the constitutionality of Arts. 1, 2, 46(4), and 55(6) of the Family Code, was dismissed due to lack of locus standi because the petitioner's supposed "personal stake in the outcome of this case" is not the direct injury contemplated by jurisprudence as that which would endow him with standing. It was emphasized therein that petitioner presented no proof at all of the immediate, inextricable danger that the assailed law poses to him; and that assertions of injury cannot, without sufficient proof, be directly linked to the imputed cause, which is the existence of the Family Code.27 Similarly, anticipation of harm is not equivalent to direct injury. Mere allegation that this injury comes from "the law's normative impact" is insufficient to establish the connection between the Family Code and his alleged injury. It was also discussed therein that the mere passage of a law does not create an actual case or controversy, and neither can it be a source of direct injury to establish legal standing.28

In this case, Amadea implores the Court to exercise its judicial review to provide a proper constitutional interpretation of Art. 992 of the Civil Code – whether it infringes her constitutional rights. A perusal of the assailed provision would show that before the Court can exercise its power of judicial review, the petition should have been brought by a party directly affected by the law, particularly, an illegitimate child; that the illegitimate child was unable to exercise his or her right to inherit because of the said law; and that the law produces an injury or damage against an illegitimate child, whether actual or imminent, which violates his or her constitutional rights.

I find that the Court, at this moment, cannot yet exercise its power of judicial review to interpret Art. 992 of the Civil Code because of the numerous unresolved factual issues.

As stated above, the suit assailing Art. 992 of the Civil Code must be brought before the Court by an illegitimate child, who was unduly prejudiced by the application of the law. However, in this case, it was not yet established whether Amadea, the party who assails the constitutionality of Art. 992, is an illegitimate child in the first place.

Amadea alleges that she is an illegitimate child of Arturo as shown by: (1) a Baptismal Certificate,29 which purportedly proves that Amadea was baptized as the daughter of Susan Kuan and Arturo Aquino;30 and (2) a Certification from the Davao Doctors Hospital dated July 5, 2003, which allegedly proves that "as per hospital record, her mother's name is Susan Kuan and her father's name is Arturo Aquino." Further, Amadea alleges that her grandfather, Miguel: (1) provided for the medical expenses of her mother while the latter was pregnant; (2) allowed the Aquino family doctor, Dr. Risalina Pangan, to attend to her mother; (3) allowed her to live in the Ancestral home of the Aquino family; (4) allowed her to be baptized as Amadea Angela Aquino; (5) visited her, provided for her needs, and spent for her education; and (6) instructed his son and grandson, shortly before his death, to give her a commercial lot.31

However, these are mere allegations and there was no evidence presented to establish the veracity and credibility of these allegations. It is an age-old rule in civil cases, such as a settlement of estate from which this current action arose, that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it, and mere allegation is not evidence.32 The rule that "mere allegation is not proof" is especially applicable when the allegations are controverted by the opposing party. In such instance, there is a factual issue or question of fact that must be resolved by a competent trial court.

Verily, when there is a controverted fact, there must necessarily be a trial to receive evidence in order to determine the credible factual assertion. Without conducting a hearing to resolve the questions of fact, the factual issues cannot be settled and the allegations will remain the same - absent any evidentiary proof. Even in a motion, as in this case, since Amadea filed a motion for inclusion before the RTC,33 a trial court is authorized to conduct a hearing and receive evidence to resolve the factual issues.34 In this manner, the factual allegations of the asserting party may be proven and the opposing party shall be given an opportunity to refute the allegations.

Notably, during the oral arguments, it was uncovered that there was no hearing conducted for the reception of testimonial or documentary evidence regarding the factual allegations of Amadea with respect to her status as an illegitimate child before the trial court, which was also evident in the opinion of Justice Caguioa:

Evidently, the Certification36 from the RTC stated that "no testimonial and documentary evidence [were] presented and offered both by the petitioner and the movant pertaining to the April 22, 2005 Order of the Court referring to the declaration of the Court" that the petitioner should be entitled to the portion of the estate. Despite such lack of presentation of evidence, Amadea's allegation that she is an illegitimate child of Arturo was admitted as gospel truth by the trial court. Again, mere allegation is not tantamount to proof. In a civil case, a person who asserts a fact has the burden of proving it as the necessity of proving lies with the person who sues.37

Amadea claims that there was no need to present evidence before the trial court regarding her status as an illegitimate child because there was already judicial admission on the part of Abdulah in his Comment to the Petition38 (Comment) dated November 14, 2003.

A judicial admission is a formal statement, either by a party or his or her attorney, in the course of judicial proceedings, which removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy. It is a voluntary concession of fact by a party or a party's attorney during judicial proceedings. Judicial admissions are used as a substitute for legal evidence at trial. Admissions made in the course of judicial proceedings or judicial admissions waive or dispense with the production of evidence, and the actual proof of facts by conceding for the purpose of litigation that the proposition of the fact alleged by the opponent is true.39

Nevertheless, a judicial admission is a deliberate, clear, unequivocal statement of a party about a concrete fact within that party's peculiar knowledge, not a matter of law. In order to constitute a judicial admission, the statement must be one of fact, not opinion. To be a judicial admission, a statement must be contrary to an essential fact or defense asserted by the person giving the testimony; it must be deliberate, clear and unequivocal.40

Indeed, before a judicial admission can be held binding against a party, which would forgo the presentation of evidence, such admission must be deliberate, clear, and unequivocal. Otherwise, it cannot be treated as a judicial admission to the prejudice of the party. Notably, the Rules on Evidence provide that an imputed admission is not a judicial admission if it is in fact not made:

Section 4. Judicial admissions. – An admission, oral or written, made by [the] party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that the imputed admission was not, in fact, made.41 (emphasis supplied)

I share the observation of Justice Caguioa that there was no deliberate, clear, and unequivocal statement made by Abdulah in his Comment regarding the admission to the status of Amadea being an illegitimate child of Arturo. The Comment stated that "[Abdulah] admits the allegations in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the Petition, on the personal circumstances of petitioner, the names of the deceased parents, the date of death and residence of decedent [Miguel] and the date of death and settlement of the estate of the late [Amadea C. Aquino, Miguel's first wife]."42 However, the "petitioner" referred to in the Comment of Abdulah is not Amadea; rather, it was Rodolfo being the petitioner in the RTC.

The Comment of Abdulah also stated that Amadea was identified as one of the persons that Miguel wanted to bequeath property to before he died.43 Evidently, this does not conclusively show that Abdulah admitted Amadea being an illegitimate child of Arturo. Absent any presentation of evidence, Amadea could either be an heir, legatee, or devisee of Miguel. If Amadea is a devisee of Miguel, it does not necessarily render her as an heir or granddaughter of Miguel.

Accordingly, I am not convinced that Abdulah deliberately, clearly, and unequivocally admitted Amadea being an illegitimate child of Arturo in his Comment. It cannot be considered a judicial admission of Abdulah. The only way for this factual question to be resolved – whether Amadea truly is an illegitimate child of Arturo – is to conduct a hearing for the reception of testimonial and documentary evidence.

Absent judicial admission on the part of Abdulah regarding the status of Amadea being an illegitimate child and the opposition raised against her allegation, Amadea must establish her claim through the presentation of evidence. I agree with Justice Caguioa that the applicable legal provision on this matter is Art. 283 of the Civil Code, as Amadea was born before the enactment of the Family Code, which provides:

To my mind, a party asserting the benefit conferred by Art. 283 of the Civil Code must present evidence to prove the same, especially when controverted by an opposing party. There is nothing in the law which ipso jure grants the status of being an illegitimate child when a party merely alleges it. As stated earlier, Amadea alleges that she is an illegitimate child of Arturo through the various acts showing her purported continued possession of such status. These allegations are not judicially admitted by Abdulah; rather, they are controverted by Abdulah and Rodolfo in their pleadings. Accordingly, it is imperative for both parties to present evidence during trial to resolve such conflicting factual assertions.

Further, a trial on the merits must be conducted to determine whether the certificate of live birth attached to Abdulah's Comment, which purportedly belongs to Amadea, is credible. The said certification states, among others, that: Amadea's name is "Maria Angela Kuan Ho"; and that she was born on "October 9, 1978" to "Enrique A. Ho, 22 years old, and Susan Saludes Kuan, 18 years old."45 During the oral arguments, Amadea admitted that she was indeed using the certificate of live birth in her official transactions, which was also stated in the opinion of Justice Caguioa:

A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries regarding the facts of birth in public records, particularly, the Civil Registry, made in the performance of a duty by a public officer or the Civil Registrar. As such, it is prima facie evidence of the fact of birth of a child, and it does not need authentication. It can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.47

The National Statistics Office Administrative Order No. 1-93 or the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Act No. 3753 and Other Laws on Civil Registration (IRR of Act No. 3753)48 states the rule on birth registration of illegitimate children:

Accordingly, the IRR of Act No. 3753 mandates that the names of the acknowledging parents of the illegitimate child be indicated in the certificate of live birth. In this case, the certificate of live birth, which Amadea recognizes and uses in her official transactions, indicates that her father at the time she was born was Enrique A. Ho, and not Arturo.

The registration of a birth goes through a rigorous process. The books making up the civil register are considered public documents and are prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated there. As a public document, a registered certificate of live birth enjoys the presumption of validity.49

Nevertheless, a certificate of live birth, in exceptional situations, can be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.50 Amadea claims that the alleged certificate of live birth that she was using in her official transactions was falsified; that Enrique A. Ho is not her biological father; and that her mother merely registered Enrique A. Ho as her father in her certificate of live birth to protect her from the teasing of others so she could attend school.51

It is my opinion that the best way to settle whether Amadea is the illegitimate child of Arturo, and also to give her an opportunity to refute the alleged certificate of live birth, is to have a trial on the merits. This is the only way of settling conflicting factual assertions in a civil case.

Amadea has the burden of proof to establish that she is an acknowledged natural child of Arturo and to overcome the presumption of antagonism provided under Art. 992 of the Civil Code.

Art. 992 of the Civil Code, a basic postulate, enunciates what is commonly referred to in the rules on succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no application, however, on testamentary dispositions.52

The rules laid down in Art. 98253 that "grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation" and in Art. 90254 that the rights of illegitimate children are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, are subject to the limitation prescribed by Art. 992 to the end that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother."55

In Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court,56 the Court cited Manresa in determining the rationale behind the iron curtain rule:

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.57 (emphases supplied)

Accordingly, the basis of the applicability of Art. 992 of the Civil Code is the presumption of antagonism or incompatibility between the legitimate and illegitimate children.

A presumption is defined as an inference as to the existence of a fact not actually known, arising from its usual connection with another which is known, or a conjecture based on past experience as to what course human affairs ordinarily take. It is either a presumption juris, or of law, or a presumption hominis, or of fact.58 A presumption of law exists when there is a law or rule directing the deduction made by the courts from the particular facts presented to them by the patties. Such deduction may be among the conclusive presumptions under Sec. 2 or the disputable presumptions under Sec. 3, Rule 131 of the Rules on Evidence, as amended.59 On the other hand, a presumption of fact is the reasonable deduction from the facts proved without an express direction of law to that effect.60 The function of a presumption is to dispense with the need for proof.61

Under the ambit of Art. 992 of the Civil Code, a presumption of law exists, particularly, that there is a presumption of antagonism or incompatibility between the legitimate and illegitimate children. It creates a disputable presumption that such antagonism exists, hence, illegitimate children cannot inherit from their decedents, who are legitimate children.

As the presumption presented under Art. 992 of the Civil Code is only a disputable presumption, then it can be overturned by the party upon whom it is directed. It is settled that a disputable presumption is a species of evidence that may be accepted and acted on where there is no other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or one which may be overcome by other evidence.62 Sec. 5, Rule 131 of the Rules on Evidence, as amended, provides the procedure on how a party, against whom the presumption is charged, can rebut such disputable presumption of evidence:

Section 5. Presumptions in civil actions and proceedings. – In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by the law or these Rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption. If presumptions are inconsistent, the presumption that is founded upon weightier considerations of policy shall apply. If considerations of policy are of equal weight, neither presumption applies.63 (emphasis supplied)

Indeed, the party to whom the disputable presumption is charged has the burden of going forward with the evidence to overcome the presumption.

The case of In Re: Intestate Estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay64 is squarely applicable in this case. There, the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) was survived by her husband and several grandchildren. One of her grandchildren was Emilio III, and during the trial of the estate court, it was proven that Emilio III was an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I, who was the only child of Cristina, and that Emilio III was reared ever since he was a mere baby by Cristina and her spouse. Notably, evidence was received by the trial court to determine who is legally entitled to administer Cristina's estate. One of the issues raised before the Court was whether Art. 992 of the Civil Code shall apply to bar Emilio III, an illegitimate and acknowledged natural child, from inheriting from his grandmother, Cristina. The Court held that:

Evidently, in that case, there was presentation of evidence during the trial, which established factual antecedents; and it was proved that Emilio III was an acknowledged natural child, that he was treated as their own son by Cristina and her spouse, and that after Cristina died, her spouse Federico eventually adopted Emilio III. Due to these factual findings, the presumption of antagonism under Art. 992 of the Civil Code was overcome by Emilio III, upon whom the disputable presumption was charged, hence, the iron curtain rule was not applied to him.66 Nonetheless, the Court exercised judicial restraint in making a final declaration of heirship and distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the estate considering that the question on who will administer the properties of the deceased [was] yet to be settled.67

In this case, Amadea has the burden of proof to overcome the disputable presumption of antagonism between illegitimate and legitimate children for the iron curtain principle to not apply. Through the presentation of evidence, Amadea must establish that she is an acknowledged natural child of Arturo, that in the eyes of the decedent Miguel, there is no antagonism between illegitimate and legitimate descendants, and that Miguel treated Amadea as his own granddaughter. Again, this presumption can only be overcome through the reception of evidence in a competent trial court.

At this point, it is clear that Amadea has not yet established being an illegitimate child of Arturo. Accordingly, it cannot be gainsaid that Amadea's rights were violated by the application of Art. 992 of the Civil Code because she has not yet established her status as an illegitimate child. As a rule, when there is no actual or imminent violation of the rights by the challenged law, there is an absence of an actual case or controversy ripe of judicial determination, and the Court cannot exercise its power of judicial review to interpret the law.68

Given the numerous factual issues that arise from the allegations of Amadea, the best way to settle these issues is to have a trial on the merits. Certainly, such trial on the merits cannot be conducted before the Court. For the Court to rule on the instant petitions would amount to usurpation of the functions of trial courts, as the Court's action would reach into settling factual disputes, a competence which it lacks. In Gios-Samar, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and Communications,69 the Court recounted the jurisprudential history of such dictum, thus –

Correlatively, petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed before this Court also recognize the limitations on the kind of questions it can entertain. Sec. 1 provides:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth.71

The above provision clearly limits the petitions filed before this Court to those raising questions of law only. The distinction between a "question of law" and a "question of fact" is settled. There is a "question of law" when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a "question of fact" when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct, is a question of law.72

This incapacity to settle factual questions is consciously conceded by the Court in its Internal Rules:

Section 2. The Court not a trier of facts. — The Court is not a trier of facts; its role is to decide cases based on the findings of fact before it. Where the Constitution, the law or the Court itself, in the exercise of its discretion, decides to receive evidence, the reception of evidence may be delegated to a Member of the Court, to either the Clerk of Court or one of the Division Clerks of Court, or to one of the appellate courts or its justices who shall submit to the Court a report and recommendation on the basis of the evidence presented.73

The sound rationale behind this dictum is simple. The trial court is concededly in the best position to gauge and evaluate the totality of the evidence presented since it receives demeanor evidence that the appellate courts are deprived of. This is the same reason why, as a rule, the Court treats factual findings of the lower court with finality. In Heirs of Villanueva v. Heirs of Mendoza,74 it was explained that:

Findings of fact made by a trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect by an appellate tribunal and, absent a clear disregard of the evidence before it that can otherwise affect the results of the case, those findings should not simply be ignored. Absent any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness, or capriciousness committed on the part of the lower court, its findings of facts are binding and conclusive upon the Court. The reason for this is because the trial court was in a much better position to determine which party was able to present evidence with greater weight.

The Court gives the highest respect to the RTC's evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses, considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand. From its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of witnesses. It is established that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These are important in determining the truthfulness of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. Indeed, the emphasis, gesture, and inflection of the voice are potent aids in ascertaining the witness's credibility, and the trial court has the best opportunity to take advantage of the same. Said aids, unfortunately, cannot be incorporated in the records. Therefore, all that is left for the appellate courts to utilize are the cold words of the witnesses contained in a transcript, with the risk that some of what the witnesses actually said may have been lost in the process of transcribing. As stated by an American court, there is an inherent impossibility of determining with any degree of accuracy what credit is justly due to a witness from merely reading the words spoken by him, even if there were no doubt as to the identity of the words. However artful a corrupt witness may be, there is generally, under the pressure of a skillful cross-examination, something in his manner or bearing on the stand that betrays him, and thereby destroys the force of his testimony. Many of the real tests of truth by which the artful witness is exposed, in the very nature of things, cannot be transcribed upon the record, and hence, they can never be appreciated and considered by the appellate courts.75

Nevertheless, I acknowledge that this case has been dragging before the courts for almost two (2) decades. This dispute arose from the July 2, 2003 Motion for Inclusion filed by Amadea before the RTC on July 17, 2003.76 Thus, I find that while the Court must remand the instant petitions before the RTC for the reception of evidence and trial on the merits, where both parties shall present evidence, the RTC shall be ordered to resolve the factual issues expeditiously.

It may be possible that the review of the doctrine regarding the treatment of illegitimate children under current legislation is justified. However, until such possibility becomes a certainty, I stand firm that there must be an actual case or controversy before the Court may exercise its judicial power regarding the interpretation of Art. 992 of the Civil Code. To haphazardly exercise judicial power without the requisite constitutional authority would be tantamount to judicial legislation, which is beyond the ambit of authority provided to the Court. If Amadea can prove her allegations before the RTC, which is empowered to resolve factual issues – that she is indeed the illegitimate child of Arturo – then she can return to this Court to continue her advocacy against the law purportedly against the interests of illegitimate children. Until a justiciable case is brought before the Court regarding the proper interpretation of Art. 992 of the Civil Code, I reserve my views regarding the constitutionality of the iron curtain rule.

WHEREFORE, I vote to REMAND the petitions to the Regional Trial Court, and that the latter be ORDERED to conduct a trial on the merits and RESOLVE the questions of facts presented in the petition within ninety (90) days upon receipt of the Decision.