G.R. No. 208912

G.R. No. 208912/G.R. No. 209018, December 7, 2021,
♦ Decision, Leonen, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion, Gesmundo, [CJ]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Perlas-Bernabe, [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Caguioa, [J]

AMADEA ANGELA K. AQUINO, PETITIONER, VS. RODOLFO C. AQUINO AND ABBULAH C. AQUINO, RESPONDENTS.

A child whose parents did not marry each other can inherit from their grandparent by their right of representation, regardless of the grandparent's marital status at the birth of the child's parent.

For this Court's resolution are two consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari1 concerning a nonmarital child's2 right to inherit from her grandfather's estate.

The Petition in G.R No. 2089123 questions the Court of Appeals Decision4 disqualifying Amadea Angela K. Aquino (Angela) from inheriting from her alleged grandfather's estate.5

Meanwhile, the Petition in G.R. No. 2090186 assails the Court of Appeals Decision7 and Resolution8 denying Rodolfo C. Aquino's (Rodolfo) Petition for Certiorari for being the wrong remedy and for violating the rules against forum shopping and the principle of res judicata.9

On May 7, 2003, Rodolfo filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for the letters of administration of his father's estate.10

Rodolfo alleged that his father, Miguel T. Aquino (Miguel), died intestate on July 5, 1999, leaving personal and real properties. The estate of his first wife, Amadea C. Aquino (Amadea), who had died earlier on September 27, 1977, was already settled in 1978. Miguel was survived by: (1) Enerie B. Aquino, his second wife; (2) Abdulah C. Aquino (Abdulah) and Rodolfo C. (Rodolfo) Aquino, his sons with Amadea; and (3) the heirs of Wilfredo C. Aquino, his son with Amadea who also died earlier. Miguel was also predeceased by another son with Amadea, Arturo C. Aquino (Arturo).11

On July 2, 2003, Angela moved that she be included in the distribution and partition of Miguel's estate.12 She alleged that she was Arturo's only child.13 She presented a July 5, 2003 Certification14 from the hospital, stating that she was Arturo and Susan Kuan's daughter.15

According to Angela, Arturo died on January 10, 1978,16 before she was born on October 9, 1978. While her parents were not married, they did not suffer from any impediment to marry. Her parents were planning to marry before Arturo died.17

Angela claimed that her grandfather, Miguel, took care of her mother's expenses during her pregnancy with her.18 Her mother was also attended by the Aquinos' family doctor.19 Moreover, Angela lived with her mother and the Aquino family at their ancestral home.20

Since her birth, her father's relatives had continuously recognized her as Arturo's natural child.21 Her father's brother, Abdulah, was even her godfather.22 In support of this, Angela presented her baptismal certificate23 stating that she was Arturo's daughter.24

Angela narrated that Miguel, who fondly called her "Maggie," provided for her needs and supported her education.25 Before Miguel died, he provided instructions on how his properties were to be distributed.26 Based on a certain July 2, 1999 "INSTRUCTION OF MIGUEL T. AQUINO,"27 Angela was among the heirs who would receive portions of Miguel's estate.28 Miguel gave her a commercial lot, which rentals were now paid to her.29

On November 12, 2003, Rodolfo opposed30 Angela's Motion, claiming that Arturo never legally recognized Angela as his natural child in his lifetime.31 Angela also never presented sufficient evidence to prove her filiation.32 Moreover, Rodolfo alleged that Angela was born more than nine months from Arturo's death.33 Therefore, there was no way of knowing if Angela was Arturo's child.34

On November 17, 2003, Abdulah filed his Comment on Rodolfo's Petition35 and moved for the issuance of letters of administration of Miguel's estate in his favor.36

On December 18, 2003, Angela filed a Manifestation and Reply37 to Rodolfo's opposition. She alleged that she was born less than nine months, or particularly 272 days, from Arturo's death.38

Recognizing that Rodolfo had expressed his intention to yield the administration in favor of Abdulah, the trial court issued the letters of administration on September 3, 2004, and appointed Abdulah as administrator of Miguel's estate.39

On March 7, 2005, Angela filed a Motion for Distribution of Residue of Estate or for Allowance to the Heirs.40 She alleged that as Arturo's natural child, she has a legal right to a monthly allowance like those given to Miguel's other heirs.41 Rodolfo opposed,42 while Abdulah commented43 on this motion.44

On April 22, 2005, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order45 that granted Angela's July 2, 2003 and March 7, 2005 Motions.46 It ruled that the Aquino clan was already estopped from denying Angela's filiation.47 As heir, Angela was deemed entitled to a share in Miguel's estate.48 The dispositive portion of the Order reads:

Rodolfo and Abdulah separately moved for reconsideration,50 though Rodolfo's was later deemed withdrawn.51 Later, the trial court denied Abdulah's Motion in its March 6, 2008 Order.52

Rodolfo filed a Petition53 for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, assailing the trial court's April 22, 2005 and March 6, 2008 Orders.54

On August 23, 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision,55 denying Rodolfo's Petition on the grounds of wrong remedy and violation of the principles of forum shopping and res judicata.56 Rodolfo moved for reconsideration, but his motion was also denied in an August 1, 2013 Resolution.57

On September 30, 2013, Rodolfo filed a Petition for Review58 before this Court, assailing the Court of Appeals' August 23, 2012 Decision and August 1, 2013 Resolution.59 This Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 209018.60

Rodolfo argued that Angela was already barred from claiming her nonmarital filiation to Arturo, since she was born after his death.61 Even if she were Arturo's nonmarital child, Rodolfo noted that she cannot represent him in Miguel's estate under Article 992 of the Civil Code.62 Moreover, assuming that she was Miguel's granddaughter, she was still not entitled to the grant of P64,000.00 monthly allowance since, says Rodolfo, the Civil Code limits the provision of an allowance to the decedent's widow and children.63

Rodolfo also contended that he availed of the right remedy in elevating his case via a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, since the trial court's Orders, one of which was an interlocutory order, were issued with grave abuse of discretion.64 If he did avail of the wrong remedy, he says that the Court of Appeals should have consolidated his Petition with Abdulah's appeal, since it already treated his Petition as an appeal.65

Finally, Rodolfo claimed that he did not commit forum shopping because he filed his Petition for Certiorari before Abdulah filed his appeal. Furthermore, he was not a party in Abdulah's appeal.66

Rodolfo prayed for the reversal of the Court of Appeals' August 23, 2012 Decision and August 1, 2013 Resolution.67

Meanwhile, Abdulah appealed the trial court's April 22, 2005 and March 6, 2008 Orders before the Court of Appeals68 claiming that Angela failed to prove her filiation and, in any case, Angela could not inherit from Miguel ab intestato.69

On January 21, 2013, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision70 in favor of Abdulah.71 It held that Angela failed to prove her filiation in accordance with Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code. Moreover, she failed to present birth records showing Arturo's paternity or any document signed by Arturo admitting her filiation. Since Arturo died before she was born, Angela cannot also establish open and continuous possession of her status as Arturo's child, under Article 172(3) of the Family Code. Thus, Miguel's or the Aquino clan's overt acts cannot translate to legal recognition of her status as Arturo's child.72

In any case, even if Angela were able to establish her filiation, the Court of Appeals ruled that she could not inherit ab intestato from Miguel. It cited Article 922 of the New Civil Code, which provides that nonmarital children cannot inherit ab intestato from their parents' marital relatives.73

Angela moved for reconsideration,75 which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its July 24, 2013 Resolution.76

On October 2, 2013, Angela filed a Petition for Review77 before this Court, assailing the Court of Appeals January 21, 2013 Decision.78 This Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208912.79

Angela argued that since she enjoyed the same love and support from her grandfather and his family, as they would to marital children, the principle of estoppel should apply. She claimed that the Aquino clan's acknowledgment of her status as her father's natural child should stop them from questioning her filiation.80

Moreover, Angela contended that Article 992 of the Civil Code's presumed antagonism between the marital and nonmarital family should only apply to immediate families.81 Her grandfather "cannot be presumed to hate his own grandchild."82 Article 992 cannot be interpreted to apply to the relatives in the ascending line. It should only apply to collateral relatives.83

Angela prayed that the Court of Appeals January 21, 2013 Decision be reversed, and that the trial court's April 22, 2005 and March 6, 2008 Orders be reinstated. Angela also prayed for a declaration that she was her grandfather Miguel's legal heir.84

On October 21, 2013, this Court's Third Division issued a Resolution85 consolidating G.R. Nos. 208912 and 209018.86 This Court denied both Petitions in its November 11, 2013 Resolution,87 which reads:

Angela moved for reconsideration89 on January 10, 2014, citing the following grounds:

On April 25, 2014, Angela moved to have the case referred to this Court En Banc,91 She asserted that this Court should revisit its ruling in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court.92 In Diaz, this Court held that the word "relatives" in Article 992 was a broad term that, when used in a statute, "embrace[d] not only collateral relatives" but also all of the person's kin, unless the context indicated otherwise.93 Thus, Angela argued that it included the grandparents of nonmarital children.94 According to Angela, referral of the case to the En Banc was proper, as only it could reverse a doctrine or principle laid down by this Court.95

On April 29, 2014, this Court's Third Division issued a Resolution96 granting Angela's Motion.

On May 30, 2014, Angela filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration97 arguing that the interpretation that grandparents are included in the prohibition under Article 992 of the Civil Code is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause.98 The law allows nomnarital descendants to inherit from a nonmarital child, putting nonmarital descendants of marital children, like Angela, at a more disadvantageous position.99

On September 2, 2014, this Court issued a Resolution100 granting Angela's Motion for Reconsideration, reinstating the Petitions, and requiring Abdulah and Rodolfo to submit their comment.

Abdulah filed his Comment101 on October 17, 2014, while Rodolfo filed his Comment102 on October 30, 2014. Angela filed her Consolidated Reply103 on January 14, 2015.

On January 27, 2015, this Court issued a Resolution104 giving due course to the Petitions and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

On April 17, 2015, Rodolfo filed his Memorandum.105 He reiterates that Angela can no longer prove that she was Arturo's nonmarital child since Arturo died before she was born.106 Assuming that she was Arturo's nonmarital child, Rodolfo says that she still could not inherit from Miguel's estate since a nonmarital child was "barred to inherit from the legitimate family of her [or his] putative father under the iron bar rule in Article 992 of the New Civil Code."107

On April 28, 2015, Abdulah filed his Memorandum.108 He averred that the Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that Angela "failed to present competent proof of her filiation with Arturo[.]"109 Angela's birth record states that her mother was Maria Angela Kuan Ho and her father was Enrique Ho.110 Angela also allegedly failed to present any public document or any private handwritten document made and signed by Arturo, admitting that he was Angela's father.111 There was likewise no evidence showing that Angela openly and continuously possessed the status of a nonmarital child.112 He adds that she never even instituted any action "for recognition or acknowledgement by her putative father within the periods allowed by law."113

Abdulah contended that the Court of Appeals did not err when it held that the principle of estoppel in Tongoy v. Court of Appeals,114 could not be applied. In Tongoy, there was overwhelming evidence that the nonmarital child was in continuous possession of the status of natural children. Meanwhile, Angela failed to present evidence to prove her allegations.115

Abdulah further maintained that the Court of Appeals correctly held that, under Article 992 of the Civil Code, Angela was barred from participating in the settlement of Miguel's estate.116 Article 992 "categorically bars an illegitimate child from inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of [their] father or mother."117 Lastly, Abdulah argued that Angela cannot question the constitutionality of Article 992 in a settlement proceeding. It should be done in a case for declaratory relief before the trial court, with notice to the Solicitor General.118

On May 13, 2015, Angela filed her Memorandum119 insisting that Arturo recognized and acknowledged her filiation. She asserted that even Rodolfo and Abdulah admitted this in their judicial admissions, thus estopping them from claiming otherwise.120

Angela added that the Court of Appeals erred when it applied the iron curtain rule to her.121 According to Angela, interpreting Article 992 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Articles 902, 982, 989, 990, 995, and 998 will show that "Article 992 only prohibits reciprocal succession between collaterals, not between descendants and ascendants."122

Finally, Angela asserted that when the Court of Appeals considered grandparents and other direct ascendants as "relatives" under Article 992, it violated the Constitution's equal protection clause. She argued that a less restrictive measure should be considered:123

On July 3, 2018, this Court issued a Resolution directing the Office of the Solicitor General to submit its Comment on the Petitions.

In its Comment125 filed on July 16, 2018, the Office of the Solicitor General concurred with the Court of Appeals ruling that Rodolfo's Petition should be denied "for being an erroneous remedy and for violating the rules on forum shopping."126 It likewise agreed with the Court of Appeals that Angela's failure to prove her filiation with Arturo prevented her from inheriting from Miguel's estate.127

Further to a July 9, 2019 Resolution,128 this Court conducted oral arguments on the consolidated petitions on September 3 and September 17, 2019. Dean Cynthia Del Castillo (Dean Del Castillo) and Professor Elizabeth Aguiling-Pangalangan (Professor Aguiling-Pangalangan) were appointed as amici curiae.129 After the oral arguments concluded, the parties were given 20 days to file their respective memoranda.

On October 7, 2019, Angela,130 the Office of the Solicitor General,131Abdulah,132 and Professor Aguiling-Pangalangan133 filed their respective Memoranda. On the same day, Dean Del Castillo submitted a Supplemental Opinion134 to her earlier-submitted Opinion of Amicus Curiae.135 Rodolfo filed his Memorandum on October 17, 2019.136 The Memoranda filed by Angela, Rodolfo, and Abdulah substantially reiterate their previous arguments before this Court.

In addition to arguments already made in its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General posits that Angela's alleged birth certificate attached to Abdulah's Comment in G.R. No. 208912, which shows the father named as one Enrique A. Ho, means that Angela's father is not Arturo, as she claims.137 The Office of the Solicitor General, Abdulah, and Rodolfo all argue that Article 992 of the Civil Code does not violate the equal protection clause, maintaining that marital and nonmarital families should be kept separate to reduce resentment between them.138

First, whether or not Amadea Angela K. Aquino (the alleged nonmarital child of Arturo C. Aquino, who was a marital child of Miguel T. Aquino) can inherit from her grandfather's estate; and

There is a distinction between a challenge to the constitutionality of a legal provision and revising the interpretation of a legal provision to make it more harmonious with the Constitution and, whenever applicable, provisions of treaties that have the effect of law in our jurisdiction.

As the Constitution is the fundamental law of our land, its provisions are deemed written in every statute and contract. All other laws must conform to it:

A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.139 (Citations omitted)

Because of this, it is within this Court's power and duty to declare void all laws repulsive to the Constitution. When there is conflict between the Constitution and a law, the Constitution must prevail.140

Any attack on the constitutionality of any statute should be raised at the earliest time and in a proper case. These are among the requirements for a valid exercise of judicial review when the constitutionality of a provision is challenged:

Fundamentally, for this Court to exercise the immense power that enables it to undo the actions of the other government branches, the following requisites must be satisfied: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy involving legal rights that are capable of judicial determination; (2) the parties raising the issue must have standing or locus standi to raise the constitutional issue; (3) the constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity, thus ripe for adjudication; and (4) the matter of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case, or that constitutionality must be essential to the disposition of the case.141 (Citation omitted)

In her May 27, 2015 Memorandum,142 Angela alleged that the continuing inclusion of grandparents and other direct ascendants in the word "relatives" in Article 992 of the Civil Code violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. She argued:

Nonetheless, when a provision is challenged, courts must first adopt an interpretation of the provision based on the ambient facts that will be: (1) constitutional; and (2) consistent with statutes and treaties which have the effect of law. Laws are joint acts of the Legislature and the Executive, co-equal branches of government to which this Court extends a becoming courtesy.144 Whenever possible, courts avoid declaring laws as unconstitutional,145 especially if the conflict between the Constitution and the statute may be resolved by interpreting and construing the latter's words and phrases.

Hence, even if the attempt to declare a statutory provision as unconstitutional is not properly raised or in its proper form, courts must still interpret the law consistent with the Constitution, other statutes, and treaties that have the effect of law.

In this regard, as this Court seeks to ensure certainty and stability of judicial decisions, whenever we set precedents, we ensure that it is applied to succeeding cases with similar facts.146 Yet, this Court should not hesitate to abandon established doctrines if there are strong and compelling reasons to do so, such as changes in law or public policy, evolving conditions, or the most pressing considerations of justice.147 "But idolatrous reverence for precedent, simply as precedent, no longer rules. More important than anything else is that the court should be right."148

Associate Justice Alfred Benjamin S. Caguioa posited that examining Article 992 of the Civil Code is premature when there are evidentiary matters that first need to be addressed.149 However, this does not account for how the current state of Article 992 bars Angela from making any claims to Miguel's estate even if she proves that she is Arturo's nonmarital child.

Refusing to timely address Article 992 is to subject the parties to even more protracted litigation. Even if the trial court finds for Angela on the facts, she will still not obtain the ultimate relief she seeks, because the absolute bar in Article 992 that persists in our legal system places her firmly outside Miguel's successional line.

The Sisyphean futility of attempting to prove nonmarital filiation in cases like Angela's is illustrated in Leonardo v. Court of Appeals,150 where this Court held that even if the petitioner could prove that he was the nonmarital child of the deceased's son, he could not represent the son in the deceased's estate.

The Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion in its January 21, 2013 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 01633:

At the very least, to rule upon Article 992 at this juncture, rather than at some indefinite future, will obviate repetitively and successively litigating a question that this Court is perfectly competent to answer now. It is in the greater interest of judicial economy and effective administration of justice to do so.

The statutory prohibition against reciprocal intestate succession between nonmarital children and the marital children and relatives of their parents is rooted in Article 943 of the Spanish Civil Code, made effective in the Philippines on December 7, 1889:

ARTICLE 943. A natural or a legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives so inherit from the natural or legitimated child.

This is in line with what this Court had considered as the regime under the Spanish Civil Code: The "legitimate" relationship is the general rule, and exceptions made for nonmarital ascendants or descendants, which would allow properties of the marital family to pass to nonmarital relatives, must be expressly stated.152

Under the Spanish Civil Code, "natural children”153 and "legitimated children"—natural children made legitimate children through subsequent marriage of the parents, provided the child is acknowledged by the parents,154 and by royal concession155—were covered by the prohibition. However, they could still inherit in intestate succession, but only in their own right.156 Nonmarital children who were neither "natural" nor "legitimated" had no right at all to inherit in intestate succession.157

When Republic Act No. 386, ordaining and instituting the Civil Code of the Philippines, took effect in 1950, nonmarital children, or "illegitimate children,"158 was classified as the following: "natural children," or those whose parents were unmarried at the time of conception, and not disqualified to marry each other;159 "natural children by legal fiction," or those conceived or born of marriages void from the beginning;160 and "illegitimate children other than natural in accordance with Article 269 and other than natural children by legal fiction[.]"161 Later, the Family Code would eliminate the distinctions among the various categories of nonmarital children:

Because the Civil Code changed the classification of nonmarital children, so did the wording of the prohibition, reflected now in Article 992:

ARTICLE 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.

The Civil Code now allows all nonmarital children as defined in the Civil Code to inherit in intestate succession. But because of Article 992, all nonmarital children are barred from reciprocal intestate succession:

The prohibition extends to the descendants of the nonmarital child. In Rodriguez v. Reyes:164

The prohibition affects the nonmarital child's right of representation under Articles 970 to 977 of the Civil Code.166

In Landayan v. Bacani,167s this Court denied the right of representation to a nonmarital child, as the child was disqualified to inherit intestate from the marital children and relatives of the child's father:

Similarly, in Leonardo v. Court of Appeals,169 a grandchild was found not to have the right to represent his predeceased mother in his grandmother's estate, because the grandchild was a nonmarital child of the mother:

Referring to the third assignment of error, even if it is true that petitioner [grandchild] is the child of Sotero Leonardo [mother], still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes [grandmother] considering that, as found again by the Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the Philippines.)170

The prohibition in Article 992 is so restrictive that this Court has characterized it as an "iron curtain"171 separating marital and nonmarital relatives. In Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court,172 this Court after conducting oral arguments on the matter even rejected an interpretation of the word "relatives" that would bar reciprocal intestate succession only between collateral relatives:

Yet, while Article 992 prevents nonmarital children from inheriting from their marital parents' relatives, there is no such prohibition for the nonmarital child whose parent is a nonmarital child as well. Articles 989 and 990 of the Civil Code provide:

ARTICLE 989. If, together with illegitimate children, there should survive descendants of another illegitimate child who is dead, the former shall succeed in their own right and the latter by right of representation.

ARTICLE 990. The hereditary rights granted by the two preceding articles to illegitimate children shall be transmitted upon their death to their descendants, who shall inherit by right of representation from their deceased grandparent.

Because of this, the reciprocity in intestate succession of nonmarital children now depends on their parents' marital status. The parity granted to nonmarital children is more illusory than real. This disparity of treatment was not left unnoticed. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, in his Reflections on the Reform of Hereditary Succession, stated:

In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only within the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children.174 (Emphasis supplied)

Article 992 carves out an exception to the general rule that persons, by operation of law, inherit intestate from their blood relatives up to a certain degree. It does so through a classification of persons based on their birth status. The classification created in Article 992 is made upon persons at their conception and birth—when they are children.175 Children bear the burden of this classification, despite having no hand in it and its creation dependent on matters beyond their control, and without any power to change it176 or even mitigate some of its most pernicious effects.177 As this Court conceded in Concepcion v. Court of Appeals:178

The law, reason and common sense dictate that a legitimate status is more favorable to the child. In the eyes of the law, the legitimate child enjoys a preferred and superior status. He is entitled to bear the surnames of both his father and mother, full support and full inheritance. On the other hand, an illegitimate child is bound to use the surname and be under the parental authority only of his mother. He can claim support only from a more limited group and his legitime is only half of that of his legitimate counterpart. Moreover (without unwittingly exacerbating the discrimination against him), in the eyes of society, a 'bastard' is usually regarded as bearing a stigma or mark of dishonor.179

In 1974, Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, was passed. Among its salient features is the recognition, promotion, and protection of the child's rights, without distinction, among others, to their parents' marital status. It states in part:

ARTICLE 3. Rights of the Child. — All children shall be entitled to the rights herein set forth without distinction as to legitimacy or illegitimacy, sex, social status, religion, political antecedents, and other factors. (Emphasis supplied)

The Constitution affirms the dignity of children as human beings,180 and mandates the promotion and protection of their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being:

It is our State policy to protect the best interests of children,181 referring to the "totality of the circumstances and conditions which are most congenial to the survival, protection and feelings of security of the child and most encouraging to the child's physical, psychological and emotional development."182 Article XV, Section 3(2) of the Constitution states:

(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development[.]

In line with these, the Philippines has bound itself183 to abide by universal standards on children's rights embodied in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Convention, a human rights treaty signed by the Philippines on January 26, 1990 and ratified on August 21, 1990,184 contains several State obligations, including a commitment to nondiscrimination of children and the enforcement of their best interests as a primary consideration in actions concerning children:

The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child is operative in Philippine law. Its principles and policies have been embraced in many laws on children and social welfare.186 Notably, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7610,187 or the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act, provides:

This Court has repeatedly invoked the Convention to protect the rights and promote the welfare of children in matters of custody;188 filiation and paternity;189 adoption;190 crimes committed against them;191 and their status and nationality.192 As amicus curiae Professor Aguiling-Pangalangan pointed out:

Clearly, our Constitution, our laws, and our voluntary commitment to our treaty obligations, when taken together, extend special protection to children, in equal measure and without any qualifications. When we affirm our international commitments that are in harmony with our constitutional provisions and have already been codified in our domestic legislation, we do nothing more than to recognize and effect what has already formed part of our legal system.

In this instance, should children's successional rights be at stake, then the best interest of the child should be of paramount consideration.

The Civil Code dates back to 1950, when it took effect. The most recent interpretation of Article 992 by this Court, was promulgated in 1990, when the present Constitution was still relatively new194. Since then, developments in children's rights should be deemed as a new lens through which our laws may be scrutinized. In David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal:195

This Court does not exist in a vacuum. It is a constitutional organ, mandated to effect the Constitution's dictum of defending and promoting the well-being and development of children. It is not our business to reify discriminatory classes based on circumstances of birth.196

This case may be resolved without passing upon the constitutionality of Article 992. However, that provision should now be reexamined in order to be consistent with the Constitution.

In In re Grey,197 decided under the Spanish Civil Code, this Court cited the commentaries of the Spanish civilist Manresa in explaining the philosophy behind the prohibition in Article 992:

This philosophy has been repeated in cases decided under Article 992, such as Corpus,199 Diaz200 Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista201 and Manuel v. Ferrer.202

Intestate succession is based on the decedent's presumed will.203 Article 992 then assumes that the decedent's disposition of their property would not have included any nonmarital children, due to a supposed hostility between the marital family and the nonmarital child because the latter was the outcome of an extramarital affair.204

However, a nonmarital child is not defined that way. Nonmarital children, or "illegitimate children" as used under Article 165 of the Family Code, are "[c]hildren conceived and born outside a valid marriage[.]"205 The phrase "outside a valid marriage" does not necessarily mean an extramarital affair. Parents may choose not to get married despite having no legal impediment to marry. The 2016 report of the Philippine Statistics Authority on Marriage in the Philippines206 showed a declining trend in the number of marriages—from 490,054 registered marriages in 2007 to 419,628 in 2016.207 In 10 years, the number decreased by 14.4% 208

If there is a legal impediment, it does not necessarily follow that the impediment is that either or both parents are married to another person. It is entirely possible that one or both of them are below marriageable age.209 The Philippine Statistics Authority also reported that in 2017, 196,478 children were born to adolescent—19 years old and under—mothers and 52,342 children were sired by adolescent fathers.210

Another reason why a child could have been born "outside a valid marriage" is because their mother was a victim of sexual assault211 who did not marry the perpetrator. This is an unfortunate and wretched reality.

Too, our courts, in passing judgment upon the validity of marriages, bestow the status of a nonmarital child.212

There are also times when the father of an unborn child may have died before being able to marry the child's mother, as what has been alleged in Angela's case.

Children born from these circumstances are also considered "illegitimate." Yet, there may be no "antagonism or incompatibility," "hate," or "disgraceful looks" to speak of. If Article 992 merely recognizes existing conditions, then it should be construed to account for other circumstances of birth and family dynamics. Peace within families cannot be encouraged by callously depriving some of its members of their inheritance. Such deprivation may even be the cause of antagonism and alienation that could have been otherwise avoided.

This Court has recognized that the alleged resentment and hostility presumed by Article 992 can be proven by evidence to be non-existent. Particular facts of a case may show that the decedent's will does not distinguish between marital and nonmarital relatives, precluding a rigid application of Article 992.

This Court abandons the presumption in In re Grey, Corpus, Diaz, and In re Suntay, among others, that nonmarital children are products of illicit relationships or that they are automatically placed in a hostile environment perpetrated by the marital family. We are not duty bound to uncritically parrot archaic prejudices and cruelties, to mirror and amplify oppressive and regressive ideas about the status of children and family life. The best interest of the child should prevail.

We adopt a construction of Article 992 that makes children, regardless of the circumstances of their births, qualified to inherit from their direct ascendants—such as their grandparent—by their right of representation. Both marital and nonmarital children, whether born from a marital or nonmarital child, are blood relatives of their parents and other ascendants. Nonmarital children are removed from their parents and ascendants in the same degree as marital children. Nomnarital children of marital children are also removed from their parents and ascendants in the same degree as nomnarital children of nonmarital children.

This interpretation likewise makes Article 992 more consistent with the changes introduced by the Family Code on obligations of support among and between the direct line of blood relatives. As explained by amicus curiae Dean Del Castillo:

Accordingly, when a nonmarital child seeks to represent their deceased parent to succeed in their grandparent's estate, Article 982 of the Civil Code shall apply. Article 982 provides:

ARTICLE 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal portions. (Emphasis supplied)

The language of Article 982 does not make any distinctions or qualifications as to the birth status of the "grandchildren and other descendants" granted the right of representation. Moreover, as pointed out by Senior Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe, to allow grandchildren and other descendants, regardless of their birth status, to inherit by right of representation will protect the legitime of the compulsory heir they represent; otherwise, the legitime will be impaired, contrary to protections granted to this legitime in other areas of our law on succession.216

Applying Article 982 in situations where the grandchild's right to inherit from their grandparent is in issue is more in accord with our State policy of protecting children's best interests and our responsibility of complying with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.

To emphasize, this ruling will only apply when the nonmarital child has a right of representation to their parent's share in her grandparent's legitime. It is silent on collateral relatives where the nonmarital child may inherit by themself. We are not now ruling on the extent of the right of a nonmarital child to inherit in their own right. Those will be the subject of a proper case and, if so minded, may also be the subject of more enlightened and informed future legislation.

However, the application of Article 982 here does not automatically give Angela the right to inherit from Miguel's estate. Angela must still prove her filiation.

We must first resolve the rules concerning proof of filiation that govern this case.

The Office of the Solicitor General, Abdulah, and Rodolfo insist that Angela failed to prove her filiation to Arturo under Article 175,217 in relation to Article 172,218 of the Family Code. Even if the provisions under the Civil Code219 were applied, they say that Angela's claim will not prosper since she did not file any action for recognition within four years from the time she attained the age of majority, when she turned 18 years old in 1996.

Angela was born on October 9, 1978, before the Family Code was created and when the Civil Code provisions on proving filiation applies. Meanwhile, she moved that she be included in the distribution and partition of Miguel's estate on July 2, 2003, when the Family Code was already in effect.

The question as to what provisions should be applied was already settled. As thoroughly explained in Bernabe v. Alejo:220

Per the ruling in Bernabe, Angela, who was not yet born when the Family Code took effect, has the right to prove that she was her father's daughter under Article 285 of the Civil Code within four years from attaining the age of majority. Under Article 402 of the Civil Code, the age of majority is 21 years old. Angela attained majority on October 9, 1999. She had until October 9, 2003 to assert her right to prove her filiation with Arturo. Thus, when she moved to be included in the distribution and partition of Miguel's estate on July 17, 2003, she was not yet barred from claiming her filiation.

However, there is no provision in the Civil Code that guides a child, who was born after their father's death, in proving filiation with him.

Article 283 of the Civil Code222 provides for the compulsory recognition of natural children, one ground for which is "continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father by direct acts of the latter or of his family[.]" Angela certainly qualifies as a natural child as defined in the Civil Code, there being no contest that her putative parents were unmarried, yet had no impediment to marry each other at the time of her birth. But as been held by this Court, the enjoyment or possession of the status of a natural child is only a ground for obligatory recognition by the alleged father, and not by itself a sufficiently operative acknowledgment.223 Compulsory recognition involves the father's express recognition of his paternity,224 which is impossible in this case. A person may possess, uninterrupted, the status of a "natural child," but this Court has held that only those "natural children" legally acknowledged according to the requirements of the Civil Code are entitled to inherit:

Petitioners' contention is tenable. We are bound by the finding of the Court of Appeals in its decision that said respondents are the natural children of Justo Magallanes, that the petitioners do not deny their status as such, and that it can be inferred from the records that they enjoyed such status during the lifetime of their deceased father. Nonetheless, we are also bound by its finding that the record fails to adequately show that said respondents were ever acknowledged as such natural children. Under article 840 of the old Civil Code, above quoted, the natural children entitled to inherit are those legally acknowledged. In the case of Briz vs. Briz, 43 Phil. 763, the following pronouncement was made: ". . . the actual attainment of the status of a legally recognized natural child is a condition precedent to the realization of any rights which may pertain to such child in the character of heir. In the case before us, assuming that the plaintiff has been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of natural child, she is undoubtedly entitled to enforce legal recognition; but this does not in itself make her a legally recognized natural child." It being a fact, conclusive in this instance, that there was no requisite acknowledgment, the respondents' right to inherit cannot be sustained.225

Yet, this Court in Tongoy v Court of Appeals226 recognized that there are circumstances where the natural child in question has already been enjoying the benefits and privileges of an acknowledged natural child, treated as such not just by the putative parent, but also by the extended family. In these instances, requiring the natural child to undergo the formalities of compulsory recognition, for fear that they be deprived of their hereditary rights, may be "rather awkward, if not unnecessary":

Similarly, in Pactor v. Pestaño,228 a nonmarital child was permitted to participate in the settlement of the intestate estate of his father despite the lack of formal recognition during his father's lifetime. This Court noted that the nonmarital child, due to the father's acts and the widow's as well, had been in continuous possession of the status of a child of his father. As such, extending the application of the rule in Tongoy is proper in this case.

Moreover, DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity and filiation.229 Under the Rule on DNA Evidence, among the purposes of DNA testing is to determine whether two or more distinct biological samples originate from related persons, known as kinship analysis.230 The Rule on DNA Evidence permits the use of any biological sample, including bones,231 in DNA testing. This Court has sanctioned the exhumation of bodies for DNA testing.232 In Estate of Ong v. Diaz,233 this Court affirmed the use of DNA testing in an instance when the putative father was dead:

Likewise, while the Rule on DNA Evidence refers specifically to DNA testing as probability of parentage involving a putative father,235 it does not prohibit the use of kinship analysis through DNA testing of other genetically related persons, when there is prima facie evidence or reasonable possibility236 of genetic kinship. Thus, in the absence of viable biological samples of the putative father, DNA testing may be used as corroborative evidence237 of two or more persons' exclusion or inclusion in the same genetic lineage, subject to scientific analysis of the likelihood of relatedness of those persons based on the results of the tests. This is in keeping with the liberalization of the rule on investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, in the paramount consideration of the child's welfare and best interest of the child.238

The matter of how filiation may be proved under the present circumstances having been settled, we proceed to the factual issues raised in this case.

This Court is not a trier of facts.239 "It is not [our] function to examine and determine the weight of the evidence supporting the assailed decision."240 This is consistent with the rule that only questions of law may be resolved in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

An exception to this general rule, however, is when there exist conflicting factual findings in the lower courts,241 such as what has occurred here. The Regional Trial Court found that Angela should be considered "an acknowledged natural child or legitimated child of her father, Arturo C. Aquino,"242 while the Court of Appeals held that Angela "failed to present any competent proof of her filiation with Arturo Aquino through any of the means provided by law."243

However, resolving several factual matters raised in the parties' pleadings and during the oral arguments requires receiving additional evidence, which this Court is not equipped to do. Documents may need to be presented and authenticated; witnesses' testimonies received and examined; and DNA testing ordered and conducted, to determine the truth or falsity of the allegations raised by the parties before this Court. This Court finds it prudent to remand these cases to their court of origin for reception of evidence, in conformity with the legal principles articulated here.

Succession is not only a mode of acquiring ownership: a way for properties to be transferred from one person to another. Our laws have made succession a fixed point in the life cycle of a family. To whom a decedent's property is given and how much is our civil laws approximation of familial love: first descending, then ascending, and finally spreading out.244 In its own way, an inheritance may be viewed as recompense, however pitiful and inadequate, for a permanent loss of which there can never be sufficient satisfaction. The laws on succession have social, cultural, and even moral dimensions, affecting and affected by ever-evolving norms of family, marriage, and children.

While not binding upon our jurisdiction, the changes in legitimacy statutes and successional rights in other countries may offer alternative perspectives that can help foster an overdue conversation about our civil laws.

As early as 1967, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and the United Nations Economic and Social Council appointed a special rapporteur to study discrimination against nonmarital children, then called as "persons born out of wedlock," across different member-nations, including the Philippines.245 One outcome of this study was a set of draft general principles submitted by the Sub-Committee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities246 "to enable all members of society, including persons born out of wedlock, to enjoy the equal and inalienable rights to which they are entitled,"247 including inheritance rights:

12. Every person born out of wedlock shall, once his filiation has been established, have the same inheritance rights as persons born in wedlock. Legal limitations or restrictions on the freedom of a testator to dispose of his property shall afford equal protection to persons entitled to inheritance, whether they are born in wedlock or out of wedlock.248

Spain, after whose legal regime the Philippines had patterned—with improvements—its civil law system,249 abolished the distinctions between marital and nonmarital children in 1981.250 This resulted in a divergence from our successional laws:

Since 1981 the compulsory or forced heirs of the testator as referred to in art. 807 [of the Spanish Civil Code] are (1) First, children and descendants. (2) In the absence of children or descendants, the parents or ascendants of the testator (3) In any case, the widower or widow, succeeds the testator in the manner and to the extent established by the Civil Code. Therefore, there is no longer any discrimination between children due to their origin, and the live-in partner is not a forced heir. Moreover, the widowed spouse is only appointed on a usufruct share, and not the ownership of a share.251 (Citation omitted)

More generally, the 1975 European Convention on the Legal Status of Children Born Out of Wedlock, ratified by 23 Council of Europe states,252 includes a provision on nondiscrimination of children in succession:

A child born out of wedlock shall have the same right of succession in the estate of its father and its mother and of a member of its father's or mother's family, as if it had been born in wedlock.

In 2013, the European Court of Human Rights observed that among its member-states, 21 countries gave children inheritance rights independent of their parents' marital status; 19 countries still retained a distinction according to the parents' marital status but the distinction did not extend to inheritance; 1 country—Malta—still made some distinctions in inheritance; and only Andorra treated nonmarital children less favorably than their marital counterparts in inheritance matters.253

Similarly, the United States Supreme Court struck down a state law which limited the intestate succession of nonmarital children to the matrilineal line, upon a finding that this limitation—not applicable to marital children—violated the equal protection clause.254 There, it was acknowledged that although there was a legitimate purpose in promoting the family unit, this could not be achieved by discriminating against a cohort of children who could "affect neither their parents' conduct nor their own status."255

Our own laws also reflect progress in treating persons, regardless of their birth status, more equally. The Family Code and its amendments256 sought to improve the living conditions of nonmarital children, by conferring upon them the rights and privileges previously unavailable under the Civil Code and its antecedents. Numerous social welfare laws grant benefits to marital and nonmarital children alike.257 Moreover, laws such as Republic Act No. 8972, or the Solo Parents' Welfare Act, and Republic Act No. 10165, or the Foster Care Act, demonstrate that the family as a basic autonomous social institution is not restrictively defined by traditional notions of marital relations, moving toward unshackling the status of a child from the acts of their parents.

All children are deserving of support, care, and attention. They are entitled to an unprejudiced and nurturing environment free from neglect, abuse, and cruelty. Regardless of the circumstances of their birth, they are all without distinction entitled to all rights and privileges due them. The principle of protecting and promoting the best interest of the child applies equally, and without distinction, to all children. As observed by Justice Gregory Perfecto in Malonda v. Malonda:258

All children are entitled to equal protection from their parents. Only a distorted concept of that parental duty, which springs from and is imposed by nature, may justify discriminatory measures to the prejudice of those born out of illicit sexual relations. The legal or moral violations upon which some of our present day legal provisions penalize illegitimate children with social, economic and financial sanctions, are perpetrated by the parents without the consent or knowledge of the children. If the erring parents deserve to have their foreheads branded with the stigma of illegitimacy, it is iniquitous to load the innocent children with the evil consequences of that stigma. There can be illegitimate parents but there should not be any illegitimate children.259

Nonetheless, the present state of our family laws constrains us to apply the Civil Code and the Family Code as they are, including the classifications and distinctions embedded in them. Reshaping policies with a profound effect on the basic framework of Philippine civil law may be better left to the Filipino people, through their duly elected representatives, empathetic to and steadfast in our constitutional commitment to our children.

WHEREFORE, Amadea Angela K. Aquino's Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 208912 is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The January 21, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01633 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The cases are REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of origin for resolution, within 90 days of receipt of this Decision, of the issues of Amadea Angela K. Aquino's filiation—including the reception of DNA evidence upon consultation and coordination with experts in the field of DNA analysis—and entitlement to a share in the estate of Miguel T. Aquino, in accordance with this Decision and the re-interpretation of Article 992 of the Civil Code.

Hernando, Carandang, Inting, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, and Marquez, JJ., concur.