G.R. No. 212726, June 10, 2020,
♦ Decision, Reyes Jr., [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Peralta, [CJ]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]

[ G.R. No. 212726, June 10, 2020 ]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. LEILANIE DELA CRUZ FENOL, RESPONDENT.

DISSENTING OPINION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

The majority opinion grants the petition of the Republic of the Philippines to reverse and set aside the affirmance of the declaration of presumptive death of respondent's husband Reneto Alilongan Suminguit.

I respectfully dissent.

Article 41 of the Family Code enumerates the following requisites for declaration of presumptive death: 1) the absent spouse has been missing for four (4) consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code;1 2) the present spouse wishes to remarry; 3) the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and 4) the present spouse files for a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.2

Here, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that Leilanie's trips to Manila and Davao del Norte in search of her husband were not sufficient3 to prove the facts surrounding his disappearance. Too, it faults Leilanie for not reporting Reneto's disappearance to the authorities and for not presenting other witnesses in support of her allegations.4 Due to these shortcomings, the OSG concludes that Leilanie fell short of the diligence required by law and jurisprudence to establish a well­-founded belief that her husband is presumably dead.

The majority opinion agrees with the Republic that Leilanie's trips to Manila and Davao del Norte and her heavy reliance on the statements made by her husband's family and relatives without presenting them as witnesses, and without seeking assistance to proper authorities cannot be concluded as earnest and diligent efforts to comply with the stringent requirement of "well-­founded belief." In Republic v. Cantor,5 however, the Court ruled that whether one has a "well-founded belief" that his or her spouse is dead depends on the unique circumstances of each case and there is no exact definition nor set standard or procedure in its determination, thus:

The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the circumstances of each particular case.1âшphi1 Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. xxx6 (emphasis added)

Here, sometime in January 2001, Leilanie's husband Reneto left their conjugal home in Malayan, M'lang Cotabato7 and went to Manila to apply for work overseas. Reneto, however, never returned and his whereabouts since then had remained unknown.8 Leilanie went to Manila and stayed there for seven (7) months to locate her husband but was not able to find him.9 In 2004, Leilanie went abroad to work, and at the same time, continued her search for Reneto.10 Her search abroad, however, was as futile as before.11 Reneto's whereabouts had remained unknown and no one among his friends, acquaintances and relatives abroad knew of it. Thus, after three (3) years,12 Leilanie returned to the Philippines, resumed her search for her husband but she never succeeded.13 She went to Cayawan, Davao del Norte, her husband's birthplace, where she was able to talk with Reneto's family and relatives, but they said they had no knowledge of Reneto's whereabouts14 nor heard a single news whether Reneto was still alive or already dead.

Leilanie's lack of resources appears on record. When Reneto left the conjugal dwelling in January 2001, Leilanie single-handedly raised their two­-month old baby,15 without a stable source of income. Though she had no means to support their daily needs and depended on the meager allowance from her mother,16 Leilanie was determined to find her missing husband. She travelled to Manila, Davao del Norte, and even abroad to search for Reneto. The financial difficulties and emotional struggles she and her daughter had to endure did not deter her from traversing different places to search and find him. She must have just started a new life, begun a career, and moved on from the despair of spousal abandonment yet, she had a resolute heart in her search for Reneto. In fine, Leilanie exerted her best efforts to locate her missing husband. She has shown "honest to goodness" efforts required in our jurisprudence to ascertain whether Reneto is still alive. To require Leilanie more than what she already did, and to demand that she should have tried much more or "hard enough," without saying how it should be done, is utterly unfair.

Whether Leilanie has exerted her best efforts to look for her husband is a question of fact that has been resolved by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Since the evidence on record support such factual finding, the same is deemed conclusive and will ought not be disturbed at this late stage.

To emphasize, a "well-founded belief" should be based on the circumstances of each case; and here, Leilanie has established a well-founded belief that her husband Reneto is presumably dead. Her search for Reneto, though unsuccessful, was not a mere passive search. It was sincere, honest, diligent, religious, and laborious. It took her nine (9) years to finally concede and accept that Reneto could no longer be found. Reneto left Leilanie and their newborn child in 2001, or for almost nineteen (19) years now. No one has heard of him. Nothing has been heard from him. No one has seen him.

Article 41 allows a spouse to seek judicial relief on the basis of "reasonable belief." Corollary to this, in declaring a person presumptively dead, it behooves the court to sustain a mere presumption. Absolute certainty is not a requisite. The ponencia even acknowledges this when it stated that: "the law does not demand positive certainty of the absent spouse's death for to do so would run counter to the very essence of a petition for declaration of presumptive death." Thus, to impose exacting standards and establish the same as solid proof of one's death defies what the law requires, which is a mere presumption.17

In Republic v. CA,18 the Court held that Article 41 of the Family Code had been resorted to by parties wishing to remarry knowing fully that their alleged missing spouses are alive and well. Thus, the law ordains that declarations of presumptive death are "without prejudice to the reappearance of the absent spouse." More, Article 42 of the Family Code19 decrees the automatic termination of the subsequent marriage entered into by the present spouse upon recording of the affidavit of reappearance by the absent spouse. Thus, in the distant possibility that Reneto reappears, the law provides remedies for him.

All told, the Court of Appeals did not commit reversible error in affirming the trial court's declaration that Reneto Alilongan Suminguit is presumptively dead pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code.

I, therefore, vote to DENY the petition and AFFIRM the dispositions of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.



Footnotes

1 Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs: (1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane; (2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years; (3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for four years.

2 See Republic v. Tampus, 783 Phil. 485, 491 (2016, citing Republic v. Cantor, 723 Phil. 114, 127-129 (2013); Republic v. Granada, 687 Phil. 403, 413 (2012); Republic v. Nolasco, 292-A Phil. 102, 109 (1993).

3 Rollo, p. 20.

4 Id.

5 723 Phil 114, 129 (2013).

6 Id.

7 Rollo, p. 36.

8 Id.

9 Id. at 37.

10 Id.

11 Id. at 12.

12 Id. at 37.

13 Id. at 38.

14 Id. at 37.

15 Id. at 32.

16 Id.

17 J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Republic v. Sareñogon, Jr., 780 Phil. 738 (2016).

18 See 513 Phil. 391 (2005), as cited in Republic v. Cantor.

19 Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.

A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed.


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