G.R. No. 212293 - Dissenting Opinion




G.R. No. 212293, June 15, 2020, ♦ Decision, Reyes Jr., [J] ♦ Dissenting Opinion, Caguioa, [J] [ G.R. No. 212293, June 15, 2020 ] OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, PETITIONER, VS. P/C SUPT. LUIS L. SALIGUMBA, RESPONDENT. DISSENTING OPINION CAGUIOA, J.: The ponencia reverses the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 127885 and reinstates the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) Joint Resolution in OMB-C-A-11-0758-L finding respondent Luis L. Saligumba (Saligumba) guilty of Serious Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. To recall, the case arose from the so-called "chopper scam" that involved the procurement of second-hand light police operational helicopters (LPOHs) for use of the Philippine National Police (PNP).1 During the time material to the case, Saligumba was a member of the Inspection and Acceptance Committee (IAC) and was a signatory to the IAC Resolution No. IAC-09-045.2 Said IAC Resolution stated that the helicopters conformed with the approved NAPOLCOM specifications and passed the acceptance criteria as indicated in the Weapons and Tactics and Communications Division (WTCD) Report. The IAC Resolution also recommended the PNP's acceptance of the LPOH units.3 In finding Saligumba administratively liable, the ponencia states: As previously identified, Resolution No. IAC-09-045 was issued to signify IAC's recommendation that the helicopters not only conformed with the requirements set forth, but also that the purchase of the same is consistent with the interest of the government, x x x: x x x x To reiterate, the mentioned WTCD Report No. T2009-04A has irregular entries on its face such that two items therein, i.e., endurance and ventilating system, were equivocal as to their conformity with the approved technical specifications. Moreover, the requirement of the helicopters being brand new was nowhere indicated. Yet, respondent, together with others, signed the same and confirmed the adherence of said helicopters with the criteria of the PNP.4 In support of its ruling, the ponencia cites the Court's pronouncement in FIO v. Piano,5 a case involving the same factual backdrop, to wit: It must be stressed that the IAC plays a vital role in the procurement process of the agency, since it has the responsibility of inspecting the deliveries to make sure they conform to the quantity and the approved technical specifications in the supply contract and the purchase order and to accept or reject the same. Simply put, the IAC is instrumental in the procurement process, without its approval, no consummated purchase of the helicopters could be made.6 Indeed, the Court in Piano ruled that it is the IAC that has the responsibility of inspecting the LPOHs to make sure that they conform to the NAPOLCOM specifications. This has been affirmed in Lukban v. Ombudsman,7 which likewise involves the same factual antecedents. However, the Court's pronouncements in these cases regarding the role of the IAC should not be sweepingly applied to ascribe liability on any and all officials simply because they were part of the IAC. Mere membership in the IAC should not be automatically equated to administrative liability as regards the procurement of the LPOHs that turned out to be second-hand units. This is especially true in this case where certain undisputed facts contravene Saligumba's liability for serious dishonesty. The ponencia maintains that Saligumba cannot feign ignorance on the incongruities surrounding the procurement of the helicopters as the same were apparent, and a mere cursory reading of the WTCD Report shows that the specifications of the LPOHs are non-compliant.8 Moreover, the ponencia found that Saligumba failed to make further inquiry on the condition of the helicopters.9 These findings, however, are belied by the records of the case. In particular, the following pronouncements in the CA Decision are worth considering: In his Reply, petitioner cited the 1998 PNP Procurement Manual x x x explaining that whenever a member of the IAC is not familiar with the item delivered, the inspection will be referred to a technical committee for inspection and recommendation. He also stated, thus: 9. The Report had some matters to be clarified on the portion 'endurance' which has a remark of 'no available data' and on the entry on Ventilating System that requires the LPOHs be air-conditioned when the MAPTRA-supplied LPOHs are not air-conditioned, and with the remarks stating that they are 'standard helicopters'; 10. Upon perusal of the report, Saligumba [noticed] the columns 'endurance' and 'aircondition'. Saligumba sought clarification of the report and he was invited to the clarification made by PSupt. Balmaceda on a memo dated 02 October 2009 stating that 'the subject helicopters were configured for police operations' and that the helicopters ordered were 'standard helicopters.' Standard helicopters ordered by the PNP do not have airconditioning unit. Airconditioning unit is provided in a different model not ordered by the PNP. x x x x Indeed, petitioner's reliance on the recommendation made by the composite technical inspection team, as well as the Memorandum of Supt. Larry Balmaceda [,who is a pilot], is justified. He acted in good faith when he opted to follow the lead of those who are in a better position to assess the condition of the helicopters, there being no personal or ill motive on his part. We must point out that good faith is presumed. It is incumbent upon the Ombudsman to prove that the reliance made by petitioner on the recommendation of experts is tainted with bad faith.10 (Emphasis supplied) From the foregoing, there is merit to Saligumba's claim of good faith. Contrary to the ponencia's ruling,11 Saligumba's acts of adhering to the 1998 PNP Manual and thereby seeking clarification of the WTCD Report from the composite technical inspection team, and relying on its recommendation, negate any ill intent on his part. It should be emphasized that dishonesty — like bad faith — is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but a question of intention.12 It is characterized as the concealment or distortion of truth, which shows lack of integrity or a disposition to defraud, cheat, deceive, or betray and an intent to violate the truth.13 Taking these into consideration, it is clear that Saligumba's liability for serious dishonesty has not been proven. In addition, contrary to the Ombudsman's ruling, the existence of conspiracy was not sufficiently shown.1âшphi1 While in its entirety, the Ombudsman's factual findings tend to show a sequence of irregularities in the procurement of the helicopters, this does not in itself amount to a conspiracy between each and every person involved in the procurement process. For conspiracy to be appreciated, it must be clearly shown that there was a conscious design to commit an offense.14 IN VIEW THEREOF, I vote to DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 127885. Footnotes 1 Ponencia, pp. 1-2. 2 Id. at 7. 3 Id. at 9. 4 Id. at 9-10. 5 820 Phil. 1031 (2017). 6 Ponencia, pp. 8-9. 7 G.R. No. 238563, February 12, 2020. 8 Ponencia, p. 9. 9 Id. at 10. 10 Rollo, pp. 57-61. 11 Ponencia, p. 10. 12 Sabio v. Field Investigation Office, 825 Phil. 848, 859 (2018). 13 Alfornon v. Delos Santos, 789 Phil. 462, 473 (2016). 14 PNP-CIDG v. Villafuerte, G.R. Nos. 219771 & 219773, September 18, 2018, accessed at . The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation