A.M. No. RTJ-96-1336 - Concurring Opinion




A.M. No. RTJ-96-1336, June 2, 2020, ♦ Decision, Perlas-Bernabe, [J] ♦ Concurring Opinion, Leonen, [J] ♦ Separate Opinion, Hernando, [J] [ A.M. No. RTJ-96-1336, June 02, 2020 ] JOCELYN C. TALENS-DABON, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE HERMIN E. ARCEO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, RESPONDENT. RE: PETITION FOR PAYMENT OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS. CONCURRING OPINION LEONEN, J.: Sexual harassment is not a simple, ordinary offense. It is not victimless. Its perpetrators manifest a clear disregard for the human dignity of their victims while conveniently taking succor in the long miscredited cultural concept of patriarchy. Their actions reveal an utter, gross ignorance of an important part of our Constitution and laws. I agree with the ponencia's denial of Hermin E. Arceo's (Arceo) Petition for Payment of Retirement Benefits. This Court had already extended him leniency eight (8) years ago when it granted judicial clemency and allowed him to seek reemployment in government.1 Despite this benevolence, he now comes before this Court for a second act of mercy, citing an inapplicable provision of law no less.2 In doing so, Arceo fails to understand the severity of the crime he committed, and the value of seeking atonement from those he wronged. I This Court's grant of clemency to a judge dismissed from service is discretionary.3 An errant judge requesting clemency must show that he or she deserves it.4 With clemency being an act of mercy, its exercise "should be balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts.5 In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37,6 guidelines in resolving petitions for judicial clemency were set: Clemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts.1âшphi1 The Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a showing of potential and promise are indispensable. In the exercise of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts and all personnel thereof, the Court lays down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency: 1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation. 2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reformation. 3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself. 4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service. 5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.7 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) While this Court recognized Arceo's remorse in its 2012 ruling, Arceo has never really shown that he had sought forgiveness from the ones he wronged most—his victims, Atty. Jocelyn C. Talens-Dabon, and the rest of his staff whom he subjected to great distress. To grant Arceo further leniency now would only tip the scales in favor of an unremorseful abuser, neglect the interests of the victims of the offense, and be inconsistent with the principle of restorative justice. I advocated in Anonymous Complaint v. Dagala8 that the punishment on a judge's immoral acts should be calibrated with the interests of the victims, such that their genuine forgiveness should be considered: The vulnerability of having committed mistakes in the past even assists the human incumbents of our judicial offices. Past mistakes properly acknowledged, addressed, and atoned broaden the understanding of a judge of human frailty and the possibility of forgiveness from those he or she has wronged. Properly addressed, human sins inscribe compassion for our judges. Within the limits of the law, he or she will be able to calculate the proper reliefs of penalties appropriate to the action. Implicit in this understanding is the view that our judiciary is not simply a mechanical cog that dispenses specific penalties without full regard for the context of the facts proven. If this were so, current technology could simply be harnessed to substitute judges and justices, even for this Court, with robots. The legal system composed of the branches that promulgate, execute, and interpellate the law should not be seen as less than human institutions. Justices should be able to see the general norms that would apply given the set of facts that can be reasonably inferred from the evidence. However, in interpreting the facts, we should always examine the premises we have that are articulated by our conception of our realities that provide us with the basis for our inferences. . . . . It is time that we show more sensitivity to the reality of many families. Immorality is not to be wielded high-handedly and in the process cause shame on many of its victims. It should be invoked in a calibrated manner, always keeping in mind the interests of those who have to suffer its consequences on a daily basis. There is a time when the law should exact accountability; there is also a time when the law should understand the humane act of genuine forgiveness.9 (Emphasis supplied) In Macarubbo v. Atty. Macarubbo,10 this Court lifted the disbarment of an errant lawyer who had been disciplined for gross immoral conduct in light of his bigamous marriage and a third marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. This Court appreciated the lawyer's acknowledgment of his faults and the steps he had taken to make amends to his children. For these acts, this Court was satisfied that he had sufficiently shown remorse. On the other hand, in Que v. Atty. Revilla,11 this Court denied a disbarred lawyer's plea for clemency for not demonstrating moral reformation and rehabilitation, after he had failed to submit sufficient proof of contrition. This Court held: Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the respondent's sincerity in acknowledging his guilt. While he expressly stated in his appeal that he had taken full responsibility of his misdemeanor, his previous inclination to pass the blame to other individuals, to invoke self-denial, and to make alibis for his wrongdoings, contradicted his assertion. The respondent also failed to submit proof satisfactorily showing his contrition. He failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he is again worthy of membership in the legal profession. We thus entertain serious doubts that the respondent had completely reformed. As a final word, while the Court sympathizes with the respondent's unfortunate physical condition, we stress that in considering his application for reinstatement to the practice of law, the duty of the Court is to determine whether he has established moral reformation and rehabilitation, disregarding its feeling of sympathy or pity. Surely at this point, this requirement was not met. Until such time when the respondent can demonstrate to the Court that he has completely rehabilitated himself and deserves to resume his membership in the Bar, Our decision to disbar him from the practice of law stands.12 (Emphasis supplied) In Narag v. Atty. Narag,13 I opined in my dissent that this Court should have exercised mercy in lifting the lawyer's disbarment, as he has sufficiently shown that he has suffered enough after having been disbarred for 15 years. He has shown true reformation after having been forgiven by his family, and thus, deserved clemency from this Court: In this case, 80-year-old Dominador M. Narag filed his petition for readmission to the practice of law 15 years after his disbarment. In his petition for readmission, he expressed remorse and asked for complainant Julieta's and their children's forgiveness. He annexed to his petition a copy of an affidavit executed by his son, Dominador, Jr., attesting that complainant Julieta and their children had forgiven him. He also executed a holographic will in favor of complainant Julieta and their children. . . . . I disagree with the majority that these manifestations are hollow. I also disagree that the affidavit of Dominador M. Narag's son and the holographic will he presents are not sufficient to prove the forgiveness that has been bestowed upon him by his family. They are the parties that have been wronged and in so far as the State is concerned, he has already suffered enough. This case does not deal with the question of whether we can impose disciplinary action on acts of immorality by members of the profession. Had it been at issue, I would think that the forgiveness given by the parties that have been wronged should have great bearing on our determination. After all, there are limits to the government's interference into arrangements of intimacies among couples. I fail to grasp the alleged continuing gross immorality and [reprehensible behavior] committed by a remorseful 80-year-old man who has been forgiven by those he has emotionally wronged. I do not believe that the law should be read as being too callous and inflexible so as to be unable to accommodate the unique realities in this case. What is at issue in this case is whether Dominador M. Narag has suffered enough from his acts. This court showed them compassion and reinstated them as members of the legal profession in many instances where those disbarred are of old age who suffered "the ignominy of disbarment" long enough, showed remorse, and conducted themselves beyond reproach after their disbarment. The legal order has had its pound of flesh from Dominador M. Narag. He has committed a transgression, but we have exacted enough retribution. The purpose of the penalty has already been achieved. He is in the twilight of his years when he is at his best to reflect on what his life has been. He is armed by the forgiveness of his family, and he is visited by remorse. In my view, not granting him the mitigation he asks for is a failure of human compassion.14 (Citations omitted) In this case, Arceo failed to prove that he is entitled to this Court's additional clemency. He did not show evidence of his remorse. Not submitting manifestations of forgiveness from those he wronged shows how he misunderstands the nature of all legal prohibitions against sexual harassment. He shows no grasp of the consequences of sexual harassment not only to his direct victim, but also to his indirect victims: the rest of his staff who had to survive the hostile environment he had created in his sala, where he abused the power he wielded. II In Re: Deceitful Conduct of Ignacio S. Del Rosario,15 this Court held that the integrity of the Judiciary prevails over pleas for compassion. Judicial clemency should not be granted if it will not preserve public confidence in the Judiciary: While petitioner claims that he has been remorseful for his actions, there is no strong indication that he has creditably reformed himself. It is incumbent upon petitioner to prove in sufficient terms how he has effectively reformed himself, given his past transgressions which tarnished the Court's image and reputation. Moreover, petitioner likewise failed to present any evidence to demonstrate his promise and potential for public service. To emphasize, proof of reformation and a showing of potential and promise are considered as indispensable requirements to the grant of judicial clemency. Time and time again, the Court has repeatedly held that the image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of its personnel. All court personnel are mandated to adhere to the strictest standards of honesty, integrity, morality, and decency in both their professional and personal conduct. In order to preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice, they must exemplify the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of their official duties but also in their private dealings with other people. It cannot be gainsaid that, as an OCA employee, it was expected from petitioner to set a good example for other court employees in the standards of propriety, honesty, and fairness. It was incumbent upon petitioner to practice a high degree of work ethic and to abide by the exacting principles of ethical conduct and decorum in both his professional and private dealings. Clearly, petitioner failed to meet the aforesaid standards, having placed his personal interest over the interest of Primo, who trusted him wholeheartedly as a friend and confidant. Blatantly overlooking the Court's interest in the preservation and promotion of the integrity of the Judiciary, petitioner misappropriated the money that was entrusted to him by Primo and made misrepresentations to cover up his misappropriation of the entrusted sum. Petitioner did not even immediately return the money he misappropriated, despite Primo's demands. Petitioner's proffered reason for the misappropriation of the money that was entrusted to him by Primo hardly warrants any showing of mercy and compassion from the Court. In addition, while petitioner eventually paid Primo's financial liability with the Court, it was pointed out by the OAS that such restitution was only borne from petitioner's fear of possible administrative sanction. Considering the abovementioned circumstances, the Court believes that its compassion has to yield to the higher demand of upholding the integrity of the Judiciary. In the case at bar, what is being considered is the preservation and promotion of the public's confidence in the integrity of the Judiciary. It cannot be denied that petitioner took advantage of the trust and confidence ascribed to him as a court employee. Petitioner's infractions tainted the public perception of the image of the Court, casting serious doubt as to the ability of the Court to effectively exercise its power of administrative supervision over its employees. In an array of cases, the Court has come down hard and wielded the rod of discipline against members of the Judiciary who have failed to meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct. Judicial clemency is not a privilege or a right that can be availed of at anytime. It will only be granted by the Court if there is a showing that it is merited. A plea for judicial clemency will not be heeded when to grant such a request would put the good name and integrity of the courts of justice in peril.16 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) Since the Petition is essentially a second request for judicial clemency in the form of the release of retirement benefits, a stringent determination is required as to whether Arceo is entitled further compassion and liberality from this Court. The severity of his infraction is not only administrative in nature; it is criminal. In November 2004, the Sandiganbayan convicted Arceo for violating Republic Act No. 7877, or the Anti-Sexual Harassment Law.17 In defining sexual harassment, Section 3 of the law states in pan: SECTION 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. — Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said act. (a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when: (1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee; (2) The above acts would impair the employee's rights or privileges under existing labor laws; or (3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee. One (1) of the policies in criminalizing sexual harassment is upholding the dignity of workers in their place of work: SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State shall value the dignity of every individual, enhance the development of its human resources, guarantee full respect for human rights, and uphold the dignity of workers, employees, applicants for employment, students or those undergoing training, instruction or education. Towards this end, all forms of sexual harassment in the employment, education or training environment are hereby declared unlawful. (Emphasis supplied) Sexual harassment is not a trivial offense. Its essence lies not in the- simple violation of a victim's sexuality, but in a superior's undue exertion of power over the victim.18 Inherent in this predatory act is the assailant's perverted use of power to dominate his or her subordinate for sexual favors: Sexual harassment in the workplace is not about a [person] taking advantage of [another person] by reason of sexual desire; it is about power being exercised by a superior officer over [his or her] subordinates. The power emanates from the fact that the superior can remove the subordinate from his [or her] workplace if the latter would refuse his [or her] amorous advances.19 This vile act violates the inherent dignity of a person recognized under the Constitution.20 If we are to give effect to the State's declaration of how it values every person's dignity, no instance of sexual harassment can be condoned, especially those perpetrated in the Judiciary. Apropos is this Court's condemnation of sexual harassment: In the community of nations, there was a time when discrimination was institutionalized through the legalization of now prohibited practices. Indeed, even within this century, persons were discriminated against merely because of gender, creed or the color of their skin, to the extent that the validity of human beings being treated as mere chattel was judicially upheld in other jurisdictions. But in humanity's march towards a more refined sense of civilization, the law has stepped in and seen it fit to condemn this type of conduct for, at bottom, history reveals that the moving force of civilization has been to realize and secure a more humane existence. Ultimately, this is what humanity as a whole seeks to attain as we strive for a better quality of life or higher standard of living. Thus, in our nation's very recent history, the people have spoken, through Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of sexual harassment or hazing, acts previously considered harmless by custom, as criminal. In disciplining erring judges and personnel of the Judiciary then, this Court can do no less.21 (Citation omitted) As a former judge, Arceo showed greater perversity in the sexual harassment of his staff. In Sabitsana, Jr. v. Judge Villamor,22 it was held that one (1) of the duties of a judge is to be "an effective manager of the court and its personnel."23 Sexual harassment anywhere, let alone within the judge's chambers, is a gross violation of this duty. It shows not only a total disregard of the dignity of the employee directly violated, but also the indirect victims, staff members who are forced to work in an intimidating and hostile environment. As a former judge, Arceo must pay a higher price for having sullied the Judiciary's image, for cultivating a harrowing place of work, and for violating the dignity of his employees: We have repeatedly held that, while every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts greater moral righteousness than a seat in the judiciary. Performing as he does an exalted role in the administration of justice, a judge must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him. Thus, a judge must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can weather the most exacting scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice.24 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) It is significant to remember the words of this Court when it imposed the highest and most severe penalty of dismissal to Arceo for gross misconduct and immorality prejudicial to the best interests of the service: The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to administer justice but also upon the perception and confidence of the community that the people who run the system have done justice. At times, the strict manner by which we apply the law may, in fact, do justice but may not necessarily create confidence among the people that justice, indeed, is served. Hence, in order to create such confidence, the people who run the judiciary, particularly judges and justices, must not only be proficient in both the substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly, they must possess the highest integrity, probity, and unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public and private lives. Only then can the people be reassured that the wheels of justice in this country run with fairness and equity, thus creating confidence in the judicial system.25 Thus, I concur with the ponencia that the Petition for Payment of Retirement Benefits cannot be granted to Arceo, in order to preserve public confidence in this Court. Wielding the rod of discipline against errant members of the Bench increases the confidence of all court personnel in our ability to protect the dignity of the Judiciary's employees. It is time that this Court strongly show disapproval of all gendered inequities and take on the policy of no quarters for judges who sexually harass or abuse another court employee. Our compassion should not be mistaken for connivance. It is up to this Court to finally stand against sexual harassment, a menace that should be eradicated from all courts.1âшphi1 It is time that this Court set a zero-tolerance policy against judges who abuse power and thereafter seek recourse to this Court, invoking a humanitarian reason when they themselves failed to exercise basic human decency. ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the Petition for Payment of Retirement Benefits of Hermin E. Arceo. Footnotes 1 Ponencia, p. 3. See also Talens-Dabon v. Arceo, 699 Phil. 1 (2012) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc], 2 Id. at 2-3. 3 Re: Deceitful Conduct of Ignacio S. Del Rosario, Cash Clerk III, Records and Miscellaneous Matter Section, Checks Disbursement Division, FMO-OCA Ignacio S. Del Rosario, A.M. No. 201 1-05-SC, June 19, 2018, 866 SCRA 425 [J. Carpio, En Banc]. 4 Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan v. Villalon-Pornillos, 805 Phil. 688 (2017) [Per Curiam, En Banc]. 5 In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan T'rial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency, 560 Phil. 1, 5 (2007) [Per J. Corona, En Banc], 6 560 Phil. 1 (2007) [Per J. Corona, En Banc], 7 Id. at 5-6. 8 814 Phil. 103 (2017) [Per Curiam, En Banc], 9 J. Leonen, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Anonymous Complaint v. Presiding Judge Exequil L. Dagala, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Dapa-Socorro, Dapa, Surigao Del Norte, 814 Phil. 103, 149—156 (2017) [Per Curiam, En Banc], 10 702 Phil. 1 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc]. 11 746 Phil. 406 (2014) [Per Curiam, En Banc], 12 Id. at 416-417. 13 730 Phil. 1 (2014) [Per Curiam, En Banc]. 14 J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Narag v. Atty. Narag, 730 Phil. 1, 10-12 (2014) [Per Curiam, En Banc], 15 A.M. No. 2011-05-SC, June 19, 2018, 866 SCRA 425 [J. Carpio, En Banc], 16 Id. at 435-437. 17 Talens-Dabon v. Arceo, 699 Phil. I (2012) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc]. 18 J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Re: Anonymous Complaint Against Atty. Cresencio P. Co Unlian, Jr., A.C. No. 5900, April 10, 2019, [Per J. J. Reyes, Jr. En Banc] citing Philippine Aeolus Auto-Motive Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 387 Phil. 250, 264 (2000) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division], 19 Floralde v. Court of Appeals, 392 Phil. 146, 150 (2000) [Per J. Pardo, En Banc]. 20 CONST., art. II, sec. 11 states: SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. 21 Vedaña v. Valencia, 356 Phil. 317, 332 (1998) [Per J. Davide, First Division], 22 279 Phil. 483 (1991) [Per Curiam, En Banc], 23 Id. at 487-488. 24 Veloso v. Caminade, 478 Phil. 1, 7 (2004) [Per J. Corona, Third Division], 25 Talens-Dabon v. Judge Hermin E. Arceo, 328 Phil. 692, 705-706 (1996) [Per Curiam, En Banc], The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation