[ A.C. No. 11104, June 09, 2020 ]
ROGELIO PASAMONTE, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. LIBERATO TENEZA, RESPONDENT.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
I concur in the finding that respondent Atty. Liberato Teneza (Atty. Teneza) should be disbarred for violating the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The basis of this penalty is clear. Atty. Teneza had no qualms in encouraging and witnessing two men's multiple marriages to different women. His comments did not satisfactorily justify his misconduct.
However, I reiterate my apprehension in entertaining administrative complaints for gross immorality filed by third parties before this Court. This is because "[a]s a ground for disbarment, gross immorality requires a nuanced analysis of our collective notions of morality, the prevailing reality of relationships and families, and the particular circumstances of each case."1
I
The standard for determining morality of conduct in disciplinary proceedings must be measured by secular and not religious parameters.2 "At best, religious morality weighs only persuasively on us."3 This Court's determination of what constitutes gross immorality must hinge on the lawyer's conduct as an officer of the court, and "only insofar as it involves conduct that affects the public or its interest."4 As the ponencia explained:
[A] lawyer may be removed or suspended from the practice of law for grossly immoral conduct. In administrative cases against lawyers involved in illicit relationships, grossly immoral conduct was defined as an act that is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community's sense of decency.5
Hence, this Court must exercise caution when third parties raise gross immorality in disciplinary proceedings so as to not unduly intrude into the personal relationships of lawyers. "Marital indiscretion by itself is insufficient to strip one's license to practice law. To sensibly implement our notion of secular morality is to reckon with the prevailing realities of how marriage works, and not dwell on its idealized versions."6
As officers of the court, lawyers are held to exacting standards, and their indiscretions must be sanctioned. However, stripping them of their license to practice law on the ground of immorality requires a degree of moral depravity that severely erodes public trust in the rule of law.
In Anonymous Complaint v. Dagala,7 I proposed the following guidelines in resolving administrative complaints for gross immorality:
If at all, any complaint for immorality should not be entertained except when it is commenced by its victims. That is, the betrayed spouse, the paramour who has been misled, or the children who have to live with the parent's scandalous indiscretions.
I accept that in some cases, especially where there is some form of violence against women and children within the families affected, it would be difficult for the victims to come forward. It should only be then that a third party's complaint may be entertained. The third party must show that it acts for the benefit of the victims, not as a means to cause more harm on them. Furthermore, the inability of the victims must be pleaded and proven.
....
I appreciate the ponente's acknowledgment that "immorality only becomes a valid ground for sanctioning members of the Judiciary when the questioned act challenges his or her capacity to dispense justice." This affirms this Court's principle that our jurisdiction over acts of lawyers and judges is confined to those that may affect the people's confidence in the Rule of Law. There can be no immorality committed when there are no victims who complain. And even when they do, it must be shown that they were directly damaged by the immoral acts and their rights violated. A judge having children with women not his wife, in itself, does not affect his ability to dispense justice. What it does is offend this country's predominantly religious sensibilities.8 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, in a plethora of cases, I concurred with the finding of gross immorality based on the complaints of parties who were directly affected by and suffered from the respondents' indiscretions.
In Tuvillo v. Laron9 and Hierro v. Atty. Nava II,10 the complaints against a judge and a lawyer, respectively, were lodged by the paramour's husband. The mistresses also testified in both cases to support the charges.
In Tumbaga v. Atty. Teoxon,11 it was the paramour, and in Ceniza v. Atty. Ceniza, Jr.,12 the wife, who instituted the administrative proceedings against the lawyers. I submitted that in these cases, gross immorality was properly pleaded and established by the most interested persons—the parties who were rightfully distressed, directly affected, and outraged by the court officers' immoral conduct.
I concurred in dismissing the respondent judge in Dagala,13 but dissented from the majority in that immorality was among the proper grounds. The case involved an anonymous complaint against respondent Judge Exequil L. Dagala alleging that he had brandished a firearm in an altercation, taken part in illegal logging, and, in passing, claimed he had a mistresses, from which the issue of immorality arose.
There, respondent admitted to siring children with other women with his wife's knowledge. It was found that respondent and his wife amicably parted but that he continued to send her support. I opined that respondent's conduct was not grossly immoral, one that is of perverse nature that undermines the legal profession. While the other allegations of misconduct were clearly unethical and warranted his dismissal, the majority underscored his personal relationships. I remained consistent in my view that this Court must be cautious in acting upon charges of immorality where the most affected parties did not even participate:
Many of us hold the view that it is unethical to breach one's fervent commitments in an intimate relationship. At times however, the breach is not concealed and arises as a consequence of the couple's often painful realization that their marriage does not work. In reality, there are couples who already live separately and whose children have grown and matured understanding that their environment best nurtured them when their natural parents do not live with each other with daily pain.
In this case, the wife of the judge may have chosen to live separately. They have been childless clue to an unfortunate disease suffered by the wife. It appears from the report of the National Bureau of Investigation that the wife had been regularly receiving support from the judge. There are no complaints from any of the children fathered by the respondent. Finally, there is the unrebutted manifestation of the judge that his wife has forgiven and even forgotten him.
It appears that the judge's indiscretions, which were rumors from the point of view of the Anonymous Complaint and unmentioned in the report of the investigating judge but which became the main basis for the interim report of the male agent of the National Bureau of Investigation, are now the main basis for dismissing the respondent. All these without consulting the spouse or any of his children. All these without regard to whether their lives should again be disrupted.
It is time that we show more sensitivity to the reality of many families. Immorality is not to be wielded high-handedly and in the process cause shame on many of its victims. It should be invoked in a calibrated manner, always keeping in mind the interests of those who have to suffer its consequences on a daily basis. There is a time when the law should exact accountability; there is also a time when the law should understand the humane act of genuine forgiveness.14
Likewise, in my dissent in Sabillo v. Atty. Lorenzo,15 where the grounds for disbarment were anchored on allegations of physical and psychological abuse, I also disagreed with the majority's finding of immorality which was not even pleaded:
This case arose out of a Complaint alleging that complainant was misled by respondent, and that she has suffered from psychological and physical abuse in his hands. However, it was found that complainant, respondent, and respondent's wife had forged an arrangement that worked for all those involved.
As opined, what this arrangement seems to offend is the religious sensibilities of our nation, which, by itself, is not immoral. It is not the business of the state to interfere with the intimate relationships of couples and assess their morality, unless their conduct is so depraved that it affects the public's confidence in the rule of law.
....
I fail to see what scandalous circumstances were present here. The "arrangement" where respondent's two (2) children stayed with complainant and respondent in their condominium unit, as explicitly intended by the children's mother, is neither scandalous nor immoral. Save for respondent's supposedly abusive behavior toward complainant, they were living in harmony. There was no evidence of hostility between [the paramour] and the children's mother.
....
Thus, I cannot agree with the Investigating Commissioner's finding that "while respondent has an 'arrangement' with his legal spouse with whom he has two children, who stays with him and complainant, the same does not make the illicit relationship morally upright."
The Resolution, meanwhile, expressed that "this Court is appalled by respondent's brazen attitude in admitting his sexual relationship with a woman, other than his wife, in full knowledge and recognition of his minor daughters as if there was nothing unconventional about their situation."
Deeming an amicable arrangement outside of marriage as immoral is a view that no longer keeps in step with the times.16 (Citations omitted)
In Sabillo, the complainant, respondent's mistress, did not raise issues of immorality but alleged incidents of physical and psychological abuse. However, these were largely ignored by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in its investigation and instead chose to focus on how respondent, his wife, and his paramour forged an arrangement where the paramour cared for the respondent's children. Even though there was no hostility among them, the majority viewed this "illicit relationship" as grossly immoral. However, I opined that this may have offended the majority's religious sensibilities only because secular standards would not view an amicable arrangement outside of marriage, by itself, as grossly immoral. I proposed for the case to be remanded to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for further investigation on complainant's allegations of physical and psychological abuse.
II
Disinterested third parties who charge court officers of gross immorality are generally unbothered by the misconduct, until, for some reason, they deem it fit to wield it high-handedly against judges and lawyers. "This is not to say that complainants' motives are relevant to their causes of actions."17 Rather, it is why this Court must scrutinize allegations of gross immorality in a calibrated manner.
Here, complainant Rogelio Pasamonte lodged the Complaint against respondent, claiming that respondent is no longer fit to be a member of the bar "for violating the lawyer-client relationship and consenting to and engaging in a bigamous marriage."18 This is precisely the accusation of immorality described in Dagala and Sabillo which this Court must not entertain.
Respondent's acts of consenting to and engaging in multiple marriages were not inherently harmful to complainant. I do not see how complainant was injuriously affected by respondent's allegedly immoral conduct. The records are bereft of anything to indicate that he was outraged by respondent's indiscretions. Curiously, complainant 'discovered' respondent's two marriages after the latter assisted his second wife, Mary Grace dela Roca (dela Roca) in filing suits for bigamy and violation of Republic Act No. 9262 against him.19
Complainant also averred that he "reluctantly and with a heavy heart"20 went on with the subsequent marriage with dela Roca when "[respondent] assured him that their marriage will not be registered with the Local Civil Registry."21 More interesting is how he alleged that "[respondent] had a propensity [for] meddling with the processes of the Local Civil Registry."22 Complainant at first appeared indifferent to respondent's seeming disobedience to the law. That is, until they had a falling out.
In any case, it is not this Court's business to speculate on his reasons for filing this complaint. I have previously stated that "an objective criterion of immorality is that which is tantamount to an illegal act."23 However, even with this parameter, evidence is insufficient to support a claim of immorality on respondent's part.
In Perfecto v. Judge Esidera,24 the respondent judge knowingly contracted a subsequent sacramental marriage before an unlicensed solemnizing officer. In ruling that respondent was not grossly immoral, this Court ratiocinated:
We cannot conclude that, for purposes of determining administrative liability, respondent judge disobeyed the law against bigamy when she and her second husband conducted a marriage ceremony on March 18, 1990.
Respondent judge claimed that this marriage was merely a sacramental marriage entered into only to comply with the requirements of their religious beliefs. It was valid only under the Roman Catholic Church but has no legal effect. Their solemnizing officer was not licensed to solemnize marriage from the National Archives or from the civil government.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code prohibits a second or subsequent marriage before the legal dissolution of a first marriage:
Art. 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered ill the proper proceedings.
The second or subsequent marriage contemplated under this provision is the marriage entered into under the law. Article 1 of the Family Code defines marriage as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life[.]"
Thus, the validity of the second marriage, if not for the subsistence of the first marriage, is considered one of the elements of the crime of bigamy. The elements of bigamy are:
(a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, In case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Respondent judge's act of participating in the marriage ceremony as governed only by the rules of her religion is not inconsistent with our law against bigamy. What the law prohibits is not second marriage during a subsisting marriage per se. What the law prohibits is a second marriage that would have been valid had it not been for the subsisting marriage. Under our law, respondent judge's marriage in 1990 was invalid because of the solemnizing officer's lack of authority.25 (Citations omitted)
However, we cannot reasonably conclude that respondent's subsequent marriage was bigamous in this case. "What the law prohibits is not second marriage during a subsisting marriage per se. What the law prohibits is a second marriage that would have been valid had it not been for the subsisting marriage."26 Here, we do not know the circumstances surrounding the marriages, whether both are valid and subsisting. Further, the ponencia's justification in finding gross immorality based on the strength of the marriage certificates appears doubtful:
A marriage contract, being a public document, enjoys the presumption of regularity in its execution and is conclusive as to the fact of marriage.1âшphi1 Thus, the marriage contracts bearing Atty. Teneza's name are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he contracted two marriages. Moreover, in his counter-affidavit in the charge for bigamy, Atty. Teneza admitted entering into a second marriage. This admission more than proves his identity as husband in both marriages and the existence of the two marriages.27 (Citations omitted)
Marriage certificates alone are insufficient to support a bigamy charge, and cooperation of an offended party is crucial for it to prosper. It must also be noted that the criminal complaint for bigamy against respondent was provisionally dismissed, and there was no proof that any offended party participated in its proceedings. The ponencia narrated that respondent claimed good faith "because he had not heard from his first wife since 1983."28 There was also no evidence that the first wife, who is the most interested person, objected to the subsequent marriage, or that the supposedly second wife was misled. In my view, state coercion to litigate on marital indiscretion unduly tramples on the individual autonomy of those involved.
III
While I do not find respondent's acts as grossly immoral, he is still administratively liable for violation of his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
I agree with the majority that respondent's complicity to multiple marriages of two men to different women, and his blasé attitude in seeking to be complimented for his imagined bravery for witnessing them, mocks our laws. His words and actions showed utter disregard for rules and is unbecoming of a court officer.
Respondent's defense is reproduced from the ponencia's discussion:
In his Answer, Atty. Teneza admitted that he was Rogelio's lawyer for certain ejectment cases. He denied violating their lawyer-client relationship when he assisted Mary Grace in the bigamy case because bigamy is not related to the ejectment cases that he handled for Rogelio. He also denied registering Rogelio and Mary Grace's marriage with the Local Civil Registry.
Atty. Teneza admitted that he was a wedding sponsor in the marriage of Francisco with Cristina and with Michelle. He explained that "he acceded to the behest of Cristina, and Michelle, that he stood as one of their principal sponsors in their marriages with [Francisco] because, if something goes wrong in any of these marriage, [he] would stand witness and testify on the facts of said marriages against his own brother-in-law [Francisco]." Atty. Teneza posits that "instead of [Rogelio] attributing an alleged wrong-doing against [him], he should even commend, and laud him for braving to stand against his own brother-in-law, if a complaint will be filed against [Francisco]."
....
In his Position Paper, Atty. Teneza asserts that the allegations in the complaint are fabricated and are the products of Rogelio's vindictive mind. He insists that he did not violate the lawyer-client relationship when he assisted his sister-in-law, Mary Grace, in the bigamy and R.A. No. 9262 cases. The ejectment cases that he handled for Rogelio are only on a case-to-case basis; he is not Rogelio's exclusive lawyer. Further, he did not use the information he obtained from Rogelio in the ejectment cases in filing the bigamy and R.A. No. 9262 cases. Besides, Rogelio's civil status is of public knowledge.
Atty. Teneza denies meddling with the legal processes of the Local Civil Registry. He insists that he only stood as sponsor in the wedding of Francisco and Cristina and also with Michelle upon the request of the brides.29 (Citations omitted)
Canon 1, Rules 1.01, and 1.0230 mandate lawyers to "uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and for legal processes." Meanwhile, Canon 731 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires them to "uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession." However, respondent instead encouraged these men to defy the law, which act lessens the public confidence in our legal system. Certainly, his consent to multiple marriages of the same men defiles the integrity of his profession.
Lastly, Lawyers are called upon to avoid potential conflicts of interest.32 Here, respondent courted conflict when he assisted complainant's second wife in filing charges against complainant, his former client. It was his duty to be circumspect with his words and actions, and actively prevent scenarios where they may be deemed unethical and or cast in a bad light.
All told, I agree with the majority that respondent is unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote that respondent Atty. Liberato Teneza be DISBARRED, and his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
Footnotes
1 J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Hierro v. Atty. Nava II, A.C. No. 9459. January 7, 2020 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
2 Perfecto v. Judge Esidera, 764 Phil. 384, 399 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Divison].
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Ponencia, p. 6
6 J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Hierro v. Atty. Nava II, A.C. No. 9459, January 7, 2020 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
7 814 Phil. 103 (2017) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
8 Id. at 154-155.
9 See J. Leonen, Separate Opinion in Tuvillo v. Laron, 797 Phil. 449, 469-495 (2016) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
10 See J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Hierro v. Atty. Nava II, A.C. No. 9459, January 7, 2020 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
11 See J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Tumbaga v. Teoxon, 821 Phil. 1, 20-27 (2017) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc].
12 See J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Ceniza v. Atty. Ceniza, Jr., A.C. No. 8335, April 10, 2019, < http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65158 > [Per Curiam, En Banc].
13 814 Phil. 103 (2017) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
14 J. Leonen, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Anonymous Complaint v. Dagala, 814 Phil. 103, 156 (2017) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
15 A.C. No. 9392, December 4, 2018 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
16 J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Sabillo v. Atty. Lorenzo, A.C. No. 9392, December 4, 2018, 9-10 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
17 Perfecto v. Judge Esidera, 764 Phil. 384, 407 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Divison].
18 Ponencia. p. 1.
19 Id. at 2.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Sabillo v. Atty. Lorenzo, A.C. No. 9392, December 4, 2018 [Per Curiam, En Banc] citing J. Leonen, Separate Opinion in Anonymous Complaint v. Dagala, 814 Phil 103 (2017) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
24 764 Phil. 384 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
25 Id. at 401-402.
26 Id. at 402.
27 Ponencia. pp. 6-7.
28 Id. at 7.
29 Id. at 2-3.
30 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 provide:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
RULE 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
RULE 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
31 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 7 provides:
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the integrated bar.
32 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 15, Rule 15.01 provides:
CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.
RULE 15.01 A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client, shall ascertain as soon as practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client or his own interest, and if so, shall forthwith inform the prospective client.
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