G.R. Nos. 244413 & 244415-16 - Separate Concurring Opinion

G.R. No. 244413, February 18, 2020,
♦ Decision, Carandang, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Leonen, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Zalameda, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Lopez, [J]

NURULLAJE SAYRE Y MALAMPAD @ "INOL", PETITIONER, VS. HON. DAX GONZAGA XENOS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PANABO CITY, DAVAO DEL NORTE, BRANCH 34; HON. MENARDO I. GUEVARRA, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

The 1987 Constitution vests upon the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. This rule-making power is exclusive; it is not shared by this Court with the Congress, more so with the Executive.1

Pursuant to its rule-making power, the Court adopted in Administrative Matter (AM) 18-03-16-SC the Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases providing the acceptable plea bargains which may be approved by courts.2 After the adoption of the Plea Bargaining Framework, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued Department Circular No. 27 (DOJ Circular) providing amended guidelines on plea bargaining for Republic Act No. (RA) 9165. The DOJ Circular provides. the acceptable plea bargains directed to all prosecutors, the prescribed procedure before the prosecution grants consent to a plea bargain, and the procedure observed if a plea bargain is approved without the prosecution's consent.3 Notably, a portion of the acceptable plea bargains under the DOJ Circular differed from the acceptable plea bargains found in the Court's Plea Bargaining Framework.

The constitutionality of the DOJ Circular is directly challenged before the Court in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. According to petitioner, the different plea bargains provided in the DOJ Circular effectively repealed, altered, or modified the Plea Bargaining Framework. Thus, petitioner submits that the DOJ encroached upon the Courts exclusive rule-making power.

Considering the very important and pivotal issues raised in the petition, the policy on judicial hierarchy should not deter the Court from rendering a final and definitive pronouncement

While the Court enjoins observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, the Court may still act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition when absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy.4

I agree with the ponencia that serious and compelling reasons justify the direct resort of petitioner to the Court. The perceived inconsistency between the Court's Plea Bargaining Framework and the DOJ Circular has far-reaching implications which affect on-going plea bargaining before trial courts. At the same time, the confusion raised by the seemingly conflicting provisions severely hinders the efficiency of courts in tackling cases involving illegal drugs.

In Estipona v. Lobrigo,5 the Court acknowledged that the Philippine problem on illegal drugs has reached "epidemic," "monstrous," and "harrowing" proportions, and that its disastrously harmful social, economic, and spiritual effects have broken the lives, shattered the hopes, and destroyed the future of thousands especially our young citizens. Fully aware of the gravity of the drug menace and its direct link to certain crimes, the Court, within its sphere, must do its part to assist in the all-out effort to lessen, if not totally eradicate, the continued presence of drug lords, pushers and users.6

An underlying purpose for the Plea Bargaining Framework under A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC is to make it "simpler and easier to understand."7 Indubitably, a properly administered plea bargaining system results in speed, economy, and finality of judicial processes which will ultimately benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the courts.8 The Court adopted the Plea Bargaining Framework precisely to accomplish the speedy disposition of drugs cases. However, if there is confusion in its implementation, courts will find it difficult to accomplish this goal.

Bearing these in mind, the Court must proceed with its duty to make a final and definitive pronouncement that will shed light over questions clouding the implementation of the Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases.

The accused has no constitutional right to plea bargain. The approval of a plea bargain requires the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor

At the outset, petitioner is not automatically entitled to the grant of his proposed plea bargain. The Court's ruling in Estipona, Jr. v. Lobrigo9 and the Plea Bargaining Framework did not do away with the requirement of consent from the prosecutor.

It is well-settled that acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right Under Section 2, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the grant of a plea bargain depends on the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged.10 An accused has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to proceed with the trial.11

In People v. Villarama,12 the Court stressed that consent. from the prosecutor is a condition precedent before an accused may vahdly plead guilty to a lesser offense. The reason for this is obvious. The prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions. Consequently, it is his duty to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, when the evidence in his hands can only sustain the former. And the consent of the offended party, i.e. the state, will have to be secured from the prosecutor who acts in behalf of the government.13

Here, the DOJ Circular undersco.res the necessity of the prosecution's consent before an accused may plead guilty to a lesser offense. The DOJ Circular further recognizes the procedure before the prosecution may give its consent to a plea bargain.

Under the DOJ Circular, the discretion of prosecutors to give consent to plea bargaining offers is subject to the strict control and monitoring by the DOJ. The circular also provides all plea offers must be initiated in writing by way of a formal motion filed by the accused in court. Thereafter, the prosecution shall r quest for a drug dependency assessment pursuant to AM 18-03-16-SC. Thisdrug dependency report shall be a condition sine qua non for the prosecution to give its consent to the plea bargain. If the court approves a plea bargain without the prosecution's consent, the prosecutor shall interpose a vigorous objection in open court and manifest that the State does not give its consent.14

The DOJ Circular shows that not all of its contents contravened the Court's Plea Bargaining Framework. In this case, the only plea bargain deemed unacceptable to the prosecution was the proposal involving illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The other plea bargain proposals pertaining to illegal possession of dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia were both accepted by the prosecution. While it is unfortunate that the DOJ did not fully adopt all acceptable plea bargains found in the Court's Plea Bargaining Framework, the plea bargains which are consistent in both may still be used and applied by both prosecutors and litigants.

DOJ Department Circular No. 27 does not repeal, alter, or modify the Plea Bargaining Framework in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC

Now, the primordial issue to be resolved is how to reconcile the seemingly conflicting plea bargains.

The different acceptable plea bargains found in the DOJ Circular and the Court's Plea Bargaining Framework are harmonized by recognizing the following distinctions:

The Plea Bargaining Framework was adopted pursuant to the rulemaking power of the Court. The acceptable plea bargains found therein are acceptable for the purpose of approval before the courts. It is a rule of practice and procedure to be observed in judicial proceedings.

On the other hand, the DOJ Circular is a guideline arising from the prosecutor's full control of the prosecution of criminal actions. The acceptable plea bargains found therein are acceptable for the purpose of giving consent by the prosecution. It is merely an internal guideline for prosecutors to follow before they may give their consent to proposed plea bargains.

The internal nature of the DOJ Circular is abundantly clear. To start, the DOJ Circular expressly addressed and directed its guidelines "[t]o: ALL PROSECUTORS."15 Further, the body text explained the DOJ's rationale for issuing internal guidelines to its own prosecutors:

While plea bargaining is now allowed pursuant to the case of "Salvador Estipona, Jr. y Asuela v. Hon. Frank E. Lobrigo," the discretion of prosecution offices to give their consent to offers of plea bargaining in dangerous drugs cases is subject to strict control and monitoring by this Department in view of the intensified campaign of the government against illegal drugs.16

The explicit purpose of the guidelines was to control and monitor the exercise of discretion by prosecution offices before consenting to plea bargains. Obviously, the guidelines are binding only upon these prosecution offices, and shall not affect the discretion of the courts. With due respect, the view that the DOJ Circular will "ultimately amount to deadlocks"17 is inaccurate. If the prosecution does not give consent, then the next course of action for the court is simple: just continue with the ordinary course of proceedings.·When the prosecution withholds its consent, it basically means no plea bargaining agreement was reached and trial merely proceeds. Ultimately, there is no such danger for any "deadlock" to occur.

To illustrate, when an accused makes a proposal to plea bargain, the prosecutor is faced with two options: to give or withhold its consent. In determining the. appropriate response, the prosecutor turns to the DOJ Circular which provides the acceptable plea bargains and the procedure before giving consent. If there is no consent, the prosecutor simply rejects the proposal and the case merely proceeds. If the court resolves on approving the plea, the prosecutor is directed by the circular to interpose a vigorous objection and manifest that the State does not consent to the plea bargain, thus -

In the event that the court insists on approving a plea bargain that is not allowed or goes beyond what is allowed under these guidelines, the trial prosecutor shall interpose his/her vigorous objection in open court and manifest that the State does not give its consent to the plea bargain.18

Further, the foregoing interpretation of the DOJ Circular is admitted by respondents. Respondents averred that the circular only applies to the negotiation stage of plea bargaining, i.e., before the prosecution consents. Thereafter, should there be a plea bargaining agreement by the parties, the approval of the same becomes subject to the sound discretion of the court.19

In choosing to respect the prosecution's discretion to give or withhold consent, the Court is not surrendering any of its powers.20 Instead, it is an exercise of sound judicial restraint. Courts cannot forcefully insist upon any of the parties to plead in accordance with the Plea Bargaining Framework. To emphasize, when there is no unanimity between the prosecution and the defense, there is also no plea bargaining agreement to speak of. If a party refuses to enter a plea in conformity with the Plea Bargaining Framework, a court commits grave abuse of discretion should it unduly impose its will on the parties by approving a plea bargain and issuing a conviction based on the framework.

At any rate, plea to a lesser offense is still possible even up to the point when the prosecution rests its case.21 After presentation of prosecution evidence, the parties may still weigh and consider their options to plea bargain based on such evidence. If entering a plea bargaining agreement remains beneficial to the mutual interests of the prosecution and the defense, they are not precluded from doing.so during that stage in the proceedings. Even at such a late stage, the parties are still given sufficient opportunity to submit a proposed plea bargain, subject to approval from the court after considering the evidence on record -

If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecutiqn does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. The only basis on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could be nbthing more and nothing less than the evidence on record. As soon as the prosecutor has submitted a comment whether for or against said motlon, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused made his change of plea to the end that the interests ofjustice arid of the public will be served.22

When the Court's rule-making power and the prosecution services' full discretion and control over criminal prosecutions are properly delineated and distinguished it becomes apparent that the DOJ Circular does not contravene the Plea Bargaining Framework found in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC. Simply stated, the DOJ Circular did not encroach upon the Supreme Court's power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts.

Plea bargaining has been defined as a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining.23

In reaching this mutual agreement, the prosecution has sufficient authority to give or withhold its consent. Courts will not interfere with this authority considering that the prosecution service has full control over criminal prosecutions. However, once the prosecution and the accused reach a mutual agreement, the discretion to approve or deny the plea bargain now falls under the exclusive domain of the courts, dependent on the circumstances of each case. As then Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, now Chief Justice, puts it -

Significantly, plea bargaining is always addressed to the sound discretion of the judge, guided by Court issuances, like A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC dated April 10, 2018. If the objection to the plea bargaining is solely to the effect that it will weaken the drug campaign of the government, then the judges may overrule such objection because they are constitutionally bound to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. Judges must decide cases based on evidence, law and jurisprudence, and they cannot just defer to the policy of another Branch of the government. However, if objections to the plea bargaining are valid and supported by evidence to the effect that the offender is a recidivist, a habitual offender, or known in the community as a drug addict and a troublemaker, or one who has undergone rehabilitation but ha a relapse, or has been charged many times, or when the evidence of guilt of the charge is strong, courts should not allow plea bargaining, because that will not help keep law and order in the community and the society. And just because the prosecution and the defense agree to enter into a plea bargain, it does not mean that the courts will approve the same. The judge must still exercise sound discretion in granting or denying plea bargaining, taking into account relevant circumstances, such as the character of the accused.24

It should be emphasized that the Regional Trial.Court (RTC) correctly ordered the continuation of proceedings because there was no mutual agreement to plea bargain. Since the prosecution did not give its consent pursuant to Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure the RTC properly exercised discretion in choosing to proceed with trial.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the petition for certiorari and prohibition there being no grave abuse of discretion committed by the Regional Trial Court of Panabo City, Davao Del Norte.