G.R. No. 252119 - Concurring Opinion




G.R. No. 252119, August 25, 2020, ♦ Decision, Perlas-Bernabe, [J] ♦ Concurring Opinion, Leonen, [J] [ G.R. No. 252119, August 25, 2020 ] *ABS-CBN CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, RESPONDENT. SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION** LEONEN, J.: I concur in the result of the ponencia written by the esteemed Senior Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe. This Petition became moot the moment the House Committee on Legislative Franchises denied petitioner ABS-CBN Corporation's application for franchise renewal. The non-renewal was not made an issue in this case, and petitioner filed no supplemental pleading either. Thus, any resolution here would have been limited to issues originally raised, namely: (1) whether a status quo ante order should have been issued; and (2) under the special circumstances of this case, whether respondent National Telecommunications Commission gravely abused its discretion in issuing the Cease and Desist Order while the House was deliberating on the renewal. However, even with the issues that constrain us, I find that this case is capable of repetition yet evading review. For one, this could happen again to any other media network. Its consequences affect the shaping of public opinion, since we deal here with the media and journalists, those who assist the electorate and the people, as sovereign, in exercising their right to freely express well-considered opinions. Therefore, I deem it my duty to state my opinion on some of the fundamental issues raised in the Petition as guidance for the Bench and Bar. I would have voted to issue a status quo ante order and eventually declare that respondent gravely abused its discretion in its unprecedented issuance of the Cease and Desist Order-more so when viewed in the context of this case and the regulatory agency's policy. Freedom of expression is a primordial right. Amid the ever complex digital means of communication now within the public's grasp, the media plays a large role to provide not only information, but information that is factual and true-that which is governed by the code of journalistic ethics, and which belies the irresponsible posts and rumors on social media. Just the same, broadcast media remains one of the major channels of information today. Hence, to silence a network of such huge scale, one that has provided vital news to the country-now, more than ever, amid the pandemic-is not only prima facie censorship, but is an outright denial of information from the Filipino people who need it most. Given that other media giants with expired franchises had been allowed to operate pending the renewal of their applications, and considering the House's documented delay in acting on petitioner's franchise, respondent's extraordinary action not only took the House by surprise, but also affected the sovereign discussion on matters related to the governance of the arts. I A status quo has been defined as "the last actual peaceful uncontested situation that precedes a controversy."1 In its ordinary meaning, "status quo is the existing state of affairs[,] while status quo ante refers to the state of affairs that existed previously."2 Status quo ante is a Latin term for "the way things were before." When an order of this nature is imposed, it is to maintain the state of things existing before the controversy.3 Status quo ante is an interlocutory order4 created by this Court En Banc. This Court, in fact, stated that "courts are now powerless to fashion a remedy" when a changed situation of the parties would be utterly unfair, and "equitable considerations require that the status quo ante be restored."5 Our jurisprudence is replete with instances of how status quo ante orders have been issued. As the long succession of cases will show, this Court has repeatedly restored the status quo ante for several compelling reasons that cater to the demands of justice and equity. Status quo ante first appeared in our jurisprudence in 1913. In Molina v. Somes,6 the plaintiff submitted to this Court that "when an appeal is taken without supersedeas, and the judgment appealed from is executed, and subsequently reversed, the appellee is bound to restore the status quo ante or respond in damages for his failure or inability so to do."7 Though this Court mainly ruled on the plaintiff's change of theory, it stated that "many actions would be fruitless if the plaintiff could not obtain an injunction to maintain the status quo until the final determination of the rights of the parties."8 It was only in 1946, however, when this Court first used the term status quo ante. In Beltran v. Diaz,9 it was faced by a fait accompli after the People's Court had canceled the petitioner's bail and had him arrested despite lack of evidence to cancel the bail. This Court upheld its duty to "restore petitioner to his status quo ante as. far as is possible" by allowing his release upon the filing and approval of a new bail bond.10 Reverting to the issue of execution pending appeal raised in Molina, this Court in the 1948 case of Naredo v. Yatco11 held that, "where the executed judgment is reversed on appeal, the trial court shall issue such orders of restitution as equity and justice may warrant" and "the appellees [are] bound to restore the status quo ante or respond in damages for their failure to do so."12 In Villanueva v. Pelayo,13 where the plaintiff secured the execution of the judgment only three days after its rendition, this Court held that this was an execution pending appeal, and thus, provided measures to restore the status quo ante.14 On the other hand, there are early cases when this Court refused to restore the status quo ante. In the 1950 case of Juan P. Pellicer & Co., Inc. v. Philippine Realty Corporation,15 this Court found that doing so would undo the consolidation of the original titles to the parcels of land and be a waste of time, effort, and money, when there was still a pending action. Similarly, in the 1960 case of Inco v. Enriquez,16 this Court refused a return to the status quo ante when the agreement's annulment would amount to fraud, not further public policy, and defy all justice and equity. It explained that "[t]he interests of society demand that bad faith and fraud be severely repressed, and the Courts cannot consent to their furtherance, directly or indirectly."17 This Court has also held that the status quo ante cannot be restored when the acts complained of have been done or executed.18 Status quo ante has also been applied in discussing moral damages. In 1964, Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Pangasinan Transportation Company, Inc. v. Legaspi,19 coined the term "spiritual status quo ante" as the aim of an award of moral damages: Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a defendant; they are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action. . . . In other words, the award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante: and, therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. The intensity of the pain experienced by the relatives of the victim is proportionate to the intensity of the affection for him and bears no relation whatever with the wealth or means of the offender. The death caused by a beggar is felt by the parents of the victim as intensely as that caused by the scion of a wealthy family.20 (Citation omitted) This doctrine has been cited as early as 1979 in Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. v. Espino, Jr.21 It was subsequently affirmed in Filinvest Credit Corporation v. The Intermediate Appellate Court,22 Makabali v. Court of Appeals,23 Spouses de la Serna v. Court of Appeals,24 Samson v. Bank of the Philippine Islands,25 City Government of Tagaytay v. Judge Guerrero,26 Jarcia, Jr. v. People,27 and in the recent case of Guy v. Tulfo.28 In 1968, this Court first applied status quo ante in election cases. In Pacis v. Commission on Elections,29 it annulled the petitioner's proclamation and the respondent's subsequent proclamation as mayor-elect, holding that "the case stands as if no proclamation has ever been made at all" and that both parties must "return to status quo ante - neither is proclaimed."30 Also in 1968, this Court held that a decision may be set aside, and the status quo ante be restored, when the compromise agreement from which the decision was rendered is tainted with fraud, mistake or duress, or when one of the parties fails or refuses to comply with it.31 In 1972, this Court in Bahanuddin v. Hidalgo32 affirmed its duty to restore the status quo ante if the court below had no jurisdiction and the writ of replevin was void ab initio. That same year, this Court in Banzon v. Cruz33 restored the status quo ante after finding that the petitioners' lots were wrongfully taken. Status quo ante has likewise been applied in contracts as early as 1972. In Luzon Brokerage Company, Inc. v. Maritime Building Company, Inc.,34 this Court held, albeit indirectly, that the restoration of the parties to the status quo ante is contemplated by Article 1592 of the Civil Code.35 In Floro Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,36 this Court concluded that the cancellation of the agreement meant restoring the status quo ante, or before the agreement was executed. Conversely, status quo ante has been applied in rescissions of contracts. In Reyes v. Lim,37 this Court decided that rescission will not be ordered unless there can be restitution or the status quo ante is restored. In Pryce Corporation v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,38 it held that a rescinded contract is deemed inexistent and restored the status quo ante. Courts likewise applied status quo ante in labor cases. In 1982, this Court declared in Philippines Inter-Fashion, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission39 that, because of the illegal strike and the illegal lockout, both parties were in pari delicto, warranting the restoration of the status quo ante. Later, in 1984, this Court in Union of Supervisors (RB) Natu v. Secretary of Labor40 held that "[t]he Labor Code provision on reinstatement . . . is aimed to restore the situation as nearly as possible to status quo ante" or before "the unfair labor practice."41 It later clarified in Santos v. National Labor Relations Commission42 and in Torillo v. Leogardo43 that when an employee who was unjustly dismissed is reinstated, the employee is restored to the position they were removed from; that is, the status quo ante.44 Furthermore, in YSS Employees Union v. YSS Laboratories, Inc.,45 this Court held that the Secretary of Labor did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing orders preserving the status quo ante, considering that it was done for the common good, and that the lingering strike could be inimical to both the employer's and employee's interests. In recent years, election cases that saw status quo ante orders have been on a rise. Among others, in Asistio v. Judge Aguirre,46 this Court issued a status quo ante order pending a determination of whether the petitioner should be excluded from the permanent voters' list of Caloocan City for not complying with the residency rule. In Mitra v. Commission on Elections,47 this Court issued a status quo ante order allowing the petitioner to be voted in the May 2010 elections, pending a determination of whether his certificate of candidacy was properly canceled. In Amora v. Commission on Elections,48 this Court issued a similar order pending a determination of whether the petitioner's disqualification due to a defective notarization of his certificate of candidacy was proper. In Sabili v. Commission on Elections,49 the same order required the parties to observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of the assailed Commission on Elections resolutions. In Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections,50 this Court issued a status quo ante order enjoining the Commission on Elections from enforcing its decision, pending a determination of whether the petitioner may run as governor. In Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections,51 it issued status quo ante orders for all 54 consolidated petitions, pending a determination of whether the 52 party-list groups may participate in the May 2013 elections. Likewise, when constitutional issues are raised, this Court does not hesitate to order a status quo ante while the constitutionality of the laws and issuances in question were being determined. A prime example is Tatad v. Secretary of Energy,52 where Republic Act No. 8180, a law that would have deregulated the downstream oil industry, was declared unconstitutional. Acting53 on a motion for reconsideration, this Court emphasized that the remedy to prevent the revival of an unwanted status quo ante, as a result of the law being unconstitutional, lies with Congress, which may enact the necessary remedial legislation. Likewise, in Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability,54 where the primary issue was the petitioner's claim to executive privilege, a status quo ante order enjoined the contempt order from being implemented, and the parties were required to observe the status quo prior to the assailed order. This order was later nullified. In Strategic Alliance Development Corporation v. Radstock Securities, Ltd.,55 which involved the P6.185 billion pillage of public coffers, this Court issued a similar order preventing the compromise agreement from taking effect. This agreement was later declared unconstitutional. In Gutierrez v. House of Representatives,56 this Court issued a status quo ante order in the petitioner's favor, where the issue involved the validity of the impeachment complaints against her. In Bankers Association of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections,57 the status quo ante order hindered the implementation of the Commission on Elections' Money Ban Resolution for the May 2013 elections while its constitutionality was being determined. In Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa,58 the status quo ante order went against the implementation of the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act pending the issue of its constitutionality. Finally, in Ocampo v. Mendoza,59 the status quo ante order enjoined the parties to observe the status quo before the Radio Frequency Identification Project was implemented, so as to not render the petition moot and "to prevent serious damage" that its implementation would bring.60 Moreover, courts issue mandatory writs to restore matters to the status quo ante when the restraining order or preliminary injunction had been properly issued.61 The sole object of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard.62 In Overseas Workers Welfare Administration v. Chavez,63 this Court defined status quo, status quo ante litem, and preliminary injunction, as follows: More significantly, a preliminary injunction is merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to the main case subject to the latter's outcome, the sole objective of which is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. The status quo should be that existing at the time of the filing of the case. The status quo usually preserved by a preliminary injunction is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested status which preceded the actual controversy. The status quo ante litem is, ineluctably, the state of affairs which is existing at the time of the filing of the case. Indubitably, the trial court must not make use of its injunctive power to alter such status.64 (Emphasis supplied) However, in Garcia v. Mojica65 and Megaworld Properties and Holdings, Inc. v. Majestic Finance and Investment Company, Inc.,66 this Court categorically differentiated a status quo ante order from a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. Quoting Justice Florenz D. Regalado, this Court explained in both cases: There have been instances when the Supreme Court has issued a status quo order which, as the very term connotes, is merely intended to maintain the last, actual, peaceable and uncontested state of things which preceded the controversy. This was resorted to when the projected proceedings in the case made the conservation of the status quo desirable or essential, but the affected party neither sought such relief or the allegations in his pleading did not sufficiently make out a case for a temporary restraining order. The status quo order was thus issued motu proprio on equitable considerations. Also, unlike a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, a status quo order is more in the nature of a cease and desist order, since it neither directs the doing or undoing of acts as in the case of prohibitory or mandatory injunctive relief. The further distinction is provided by the present amendment in the sense that, unlike the amended rule on restraining orders, a status quo order does not require the posting of a bond.67 (Emphasis supplied) Thus, in Repol v. Commission on Elections,68 and likewise in Dojillo v. Commission on Elections,69 this Court annulled the status quo ante orders issued by the Commission on Elections for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. In both cases, this Court noted that the orders were actually temporary restraining orders that had automatically ceased effect. Unlike in a status quo ante order where no specific rule governs, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court specifically provides for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction when certain requirements are met. Section 3 enumerates the grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, as follows: SECTION 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established: a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. Before a writ of preliminary injunction, whether mandatory or prohibitory, may be issued, the following requisites must first be proven: (1) The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right in esse; (2) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right; (3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and (4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.70 In Los Baños Rural Bank, Inc. v. Africa,71 this Court expounded on these requisites: [I]njunction, like other equitable remedies, should be issued only at the instance of a suitor who has sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property sought to be protected. It is proper only when the plaintiff appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint. In particular, the existence of the right and the violation thereof must appear in the allegations of the complaint and must constitute at least a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief. Thus, there are two requisite conditions for the issuance of a preliminary injunction; namely, (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injustice. Further, while a clear showing of the right is necessary, its existence need not be conclusively established. In fact, the evidence required to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in the hearing thereon need not be conclusive or complete. The evidence need only be a "sampling" intended merely to give the court an idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction, pending the decision of the case on the merits. Thus, to be entitled to the writ, respondents are only required to show that they have the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in their Complaint.72 (Citations omitted) To entitle the applicant to an injunctive writ, a clear legal right-a right "clearly founded in or granted by law"-must exist.73 No injunction can be granted in the absence of a clear legal right,74 as in this case. The requirement of a clear legal right, however, is not necessary for the issuance of a status quo ante order. As seen in our jurisprudence, when issuing a status quo ante order, this Court is guided by a number of factors: justice and equity considerations, when conservation of the status quo is desirable or essential, the prevention of any serious damage, and where constitutional issues are raised. As all of these considerations are present in this case, I would have voted to issue a status quo ante order. II Petitioner successfully showed an ostensible right to the relief it prayed for. Respondent's May 5, 2020 Order directing petitioner to "immediately cease and desist from operating its radio and televisions stations" was issued with grave abuse of discretion-and for many reasons. II (A) First, the Cease and Desist Order was served on petitioner without prior notice or hearing. This is a violation of its right to due process. Due process is guaranteed by the Constitution75 and extends to administrative proceedings.76 At the heart of procedural due process is the need for notice and an opportunity to be heard.77 In Central Bank of the Philippines v. Cloribel:78 Previous notice and hearing, as elements of due process, are constitutionally required for the protection of life or vested property rights, as well as of liberty, when its limitation or loss takes place in consequence of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, generally depend[e]nt upon a past act or event which has to be established or ascertained ... ... [T]he necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding and the circumstances involved. In so far as generalization is possible in view of the great variety of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing.79 (Emphasis supplied) Moreover, in Montoya v. Varilla,80 this Court ruled: Well-settled is the rule that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Unarguably, this rule, as it is stated, strips down administrative due process to its most fundamental nature and sufficiently justifies freeing administrative proceedings from the rigidity of procedural requirements. In particular, however, due process in administrative proceedings has also been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. Hence, even if administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are not strictly bound by procedural requirements, they are still bound by law and equity to observe the fundamental requirements of due process. Notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative or judicial proceedings. In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard.81 (Citations omitted) In line with due process, Commonwealth Act No. 146 or the Public Service Act, as amended, requires proper notice and hearing before a certificate of public convenience/permit/license may be suspended or revoked.82 Under the National Telecommunications Commission's 2006 Rules of Practice and Procedure, before an entity could be subjected to a disciplinary measure for violating any law, rule, or regulation, the Commission must first serve a show cause order. This order contains "the particulars and matters which the Commission is inquiring"; likewise, it calls upon respondents to file a verified answer at the stated place and time and to "explain why no judgment or action" should be taken against them.83 The Commission may also conduct a summary proceeding within 72 hours of the parties' receipt of its order.84 Within 15 days, it shall require the submission of position papers and memoranda. When some issues need clarifying, the Commission shall set a conference for it.85 Likewise, the Commission may, in its discretion, issue a cease and desist order in the following cases: (1) "if the continued acts of the public's utility operator shall cause serious detriment to public interest and the security of the state"; and (2) "in cases of willful or unreasonable refusal" to comply with any order of the Commission, or with other relevant laws.86 In this case, petitioner was not given proper notice and hearing. Instead, on May 5, 2020, respondent hastily issued a Cease and Desist Order,87 which merely states as basis that upon expiration of Republic Act No. 7966, the law that had granted petitioner's franchise, petitioner "no longer has a valid and subsisting congressional franchise."88 It cites Section 1 of Act No. 3846,89 which provides: SECTION 1. No person, firm, company, association, or corporation shall construct, install, establish, or operate a radio transmitting station, or a radio receiving station used for commercial purposes, or a radio broadcasting station, without having first obtained a franchise therefor from the Congress of the Philippines.90 Respondent knew very well that petitioner's franchise was about to expire and bills for its renewal were pending in Congress. In fact, Commissioner Gamaliel Cordoba (Cordoba) himself, who co-penned the Cease and Desist Order, had participated in the February 24, 2020 hearing of the Senate Committee on Public Services, where issues on the franchise renewal were discussed.91 Respondent had every opportunity to abide by its own rules of procedure to ascertain what action is appropriate to take-including whether a cease and desist order should be issued. But, for whatever reason, it chose not to do so. Instead, it blatantly violated petitioner's right to due process and openly defied Congress' prerogative. As stated earlier, respondent anchored the Cease and Desist Order simply on the expiration of the franchise. This does not even fall within any of the two instances mentioned in respondent's own Rules of Practice and Procedure to justify the issuance of such order. Moreover, the Order commanded petitioner to immediately cease and desist from operating the radio and television stations listed therein. This took effect upon petitioner's receipt of the Order, without giving the latter an opportunity to explain. As such, the Cease and Desist Order is actually in the nature of a preliminary injunction as it enjoins petitioner from continuing the operation of its broadcast stations. In GMA Network, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission,92 this Court recognized the National Telecommunications Commission's power to issue a cease and desist order as a provisional relief during the pendency of an action. A cease and desist order was compared to a status quo order because it "does not direct the doing or undoing of acts[.]"93 However, in that same case, this Court clarified that if the cease and desist order is more of a preliminary injunction, compliance with the essential requisites of a writ of preliminary injunction is necessary before it may be issued. As has been enumerated earlier, these requisites are the following: (1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this right is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage.94 (Citation omitted) None of these essential requisites were met in this case. At any rate, it is hard to conceive how it would be for the public's best interests to enjoin petitioner from going on air, or how the public would be seriously and irreparably injured by allowing petitioner to continue its broadcast operations. Neither has any urgent and paramount need been shown for the Cease and Desist Order to be issued. On the other hand, this Court has held that a license "is an operating authority of importance involving primarily the interest of the public," and the "valuable rights and investments made in reliance on a license ... should not be destroyed ... except for the most compelling reasons."95 II (B) Second, even if petitioner's permits were to be rendered expired ipso facto upon the expiry of the legislative franchise, the issuance of the Cease and Desist Order would still be improper. Petitioner would still have the authority to continue, in light of the grace period that respondent itself gave in Memorandum Order No. 02-03-2020 dated March 16, 2020.96 In this Memorandum Order, which was signed by Cordoba, respondent expressly stated: C. ON THE MANAGEMENT OF PERMITS All subsisting permits, permits necessary to operate and maintain broadcast and pay TV facilities nationwide expiring within the quarantine period shall automatically be renewed and shall continue to be valid sixty (60) days after the end of the government-imposed quarantine period. Thereafter, these stations shall be given sixty (60) days to file for the renewal of their permits/licenses without penalties or surcharges. (Emphasis supplied) In the same Memorandum Order, respondent expressly acknowledged that "broadcast and pay TV networks and [their] supporting infrastructures will continue to play a critical role in [the] government's efforts to provide timely and accurate information to the public during this critical period." Furthermore, in the February 24, 2020 Senate hearing, Cordoba admitted that the respondent regulatory agency has not withdrawn any provisional authority in the past97 nor closed broadcast companies due to an expired franchise. Instead, it allowed them to operate while their franchises were pending renewal.98 Thus, not only was the Cease and Desist Order contrary to respondent's own Memorandum Order granting the grace period, but it is also contrary to respondent's own policy of allowing broadcast companies to continue their operations pending their franchise renewal. To be sure, such inconsistent decisions demand no less than a thorough explanation, lest they be deemed arbitrary. In this Court's words in Globe Telecom, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission:99 [W]e think it essential, for the sake of clarity and intellectual honesty, that if an administrative agency decides inconsistently with previous action, that it explain thoroughly why a different result is warranted, or if need be, why the previous standards should no longer apply or should be overturned. Such explanation is warranted in order to sufficiently establish a decision as having rational basis. Any inconsistent decision lacking thorough, ratiocination in support may be struck down as being arbitrary. And any decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity.100 Unfortunately, the Cease and Desist Order fails to explain why respondent accorded petitioner a different regulatory treatment from other broadcasting stations. The Cease and Desist Order's issuance is a serious error tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. In issuing it, respondent has singled out petitioner without any reasonable basis, in violation of the equal protection guarantee under the Constitution: "Equal protection of the laws" requires that "all persons ... be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced." The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted authorities.101 (Citations omitted) III Again, we look into Section 1 of Act No. 3846, as amended, cited by respondent in its Cease and Desist Order. It states: SECTION 1. No person, firm, company, association, or corporation shall construct, install, establish, or operate a radio transmitting station, or a radio receiving station used for commercial purposes, or a radio broadcasting station, without having first obtained a franchise therefor from the Congress of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied) A perusal of Section 1, as amended, would readily show that it does not include television broadcast stations in the enumeration. This Court had previously observed that despite the advent of commercial television in the 1950s, there was no corresponding amendment to Act No. 3846 to reflect the new technology.102 Subsequently, the Public Service Act was passed, creating the Public Service Commission. All public services (save for a few exceptions), including broadcasting stations, were placed within its jurisdiction.103 Under Section 13(a) of the Public Service Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 2677 in 1960, the Public Service Commission was vested with "jurisdiction, supervision and control over all public services"; and, as written under Section 13(b), public services included wire or wireless communications system and wire or wireless broadcasting stations. Hence, radio and television broadcasting stations fall within the jurisdiction and regulatory authority of the Public Service Commission. In 1972, the Commission was abolished, and its regulatory and adjudicatory functions were transferred to the Board of Communications.104 In 1979, by virtue of Executive Order No. 546, the National Telecommunications Commission was created. It received the functions of the Board of Communications and the Telecommunications Control Bureau, which were both abolished through the same issuance. Unlike Section 1 of Act No. 3846, as amended, nothing in the Public Service Act, as amended, and in Executive Order No. 546 explicitly required the acquisition of a legislative franchise before a radio and television broadcasting station may operate. Nonetheless, in Associated Communications & Wireless Services - United Broadcasting Networks v. National Telecommunications Commission,105 this Court ruled that a congressional franchise is necessary to operate a television broadcast. It pointed to Presidential Decree No. 576-A,106 whose Section 1 expressly referred to the franchise requirement in stating that "[n]o radio station or television channel may obtain a franchise unless it has sufficient capital on the basis of equity for its operation for at least one year," and whose Section 6 made a similar reference to the franchise requirement. This Court further observed that Executive Order No. 546 did not intend to dispense with the franchise requirement. Rather, in continuing to grant franchises after the executive order had been passed, Congress has actually maintained the franchise requirement.107 Later, in Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting System,108 this Court pronounced that "[b]roadcast and television stations are required to obtain a legislative franchise," and after doing so, they must also obtain certificates of public convenience from the National Telecommunications Commission before they can operate.109 IV This case, however, is not about a failure to apply for a franchise or to have it renewed, but about the government officials' delay in acting on the franchise renewal until it finally expired. There was, thus, no prima facie valid reason for the Cease and Desist Order. Petitioner's franchise was granted under Republic Act No. 7966.110 As early as 2014, numerous bills for the franchise's renewal had been filed in the House of Representatives, six years before it expired: a. House Bill No. 4997,111 filed by Representative Giorgidi B. Aggabao before the 16th Congress in 2014; b. House Bill No. 4349,112 filed by Representative Micaela S. Violago before the 17th Congress on November 10, 2018; c. House Bill No. 676,113 filed by Representative Micaela S. Violago before the 18th Congress on July 1, 2019; d. House Bill No. 3521,114 filed by Representative Rose Marie J. Arenas before the 18th Congress on August 6, 2019; e. House Bill No. 3713,115 filed by Representative Joy Myra S. Tambunting before the 18th Congress on August 8, 2019; f. House Bill No. 3947, filed by Representative Sol S. Aragones before the 18th Congress on August 14, 2019; g. House Bill No. 4305,116 filed by Representative Vilma Santos-Recto before the 18th Congress on September 2, 2019; h. House Bill No. 5608,117 filed by Representatives Aurelio D. Gonzales, Jr., Johnny T. Pimentel, and Paulino Salvador C. Leachon before the 18th Congress on November 25, 2019; i. House Bill No. 5705,118 filed by Representative Rufus B. Rodriguez before the 18th Congress on December 4, 2019; j. House Bill No. 5753,119 filed by Representative Josephine Y. Ramirez Sato before the 18th Congress on December 9, 2019; k. House Bill No. 6052,120 filed by Representatives Carlos Isagani T. Zarate, Ferdinand R. Gaite, Eufemia C. Cullamat, France L. Castro, Arlene D. Brosas, and Sarah Jane I. Elago before the 18th Congress on January 27, 2020; l. House Bill No. 6138,121 filed by Representative Mark O. Go before the 18th Congress on January 30, 2020; and m. House Bill No. 6293,122 filed by Representative Loren Legarda before the 18th Congress on February 13, 2020. On January 6, 2020, several representatives filed House Resolution No. 639,123 urging the House Committee on Legislative Franchises to report, without delay, on the bills regarding petitioner's franchise renewal. The Senate, for its part, likewise filed two (2) bills similarly seeking the franchise renewal: (1) Senate Bill No. 981,124 filed by Senator Ralph Recto on August 28, 2019; and (2) Senate Bill No. 1403,125 filed by Senator Ramon Bong Revilla, Jr. on March 5, 2020. As the franchise was nearing its expiry, Representative Raul del Mar filed House Joint Resolution No. 28126 on February 18, 2020, seeking an extension until June 20, 2022. On February 26, 2020, two more bills were filed in the House and the Senate, respectively-one until May 4, 2021,127 and the other until December 31, 2020.128 The extensions were sought to give both houses of Congress more time to assess the pending bills. On March 10, 2020, the House Committee on Legislative Franchises finally began proceedings for the hearings on these bills.129 However, when COVID-19 struck the country, deliberations were suspended in view of the enhanced community quarantine.130 Nonetheless, while Congress cannot be faulted for suspending the deliberations, the fact remains that as early as 2014, franchise renewal applications had been lodged in Congress. For six long years, these bills had hung like a sword of Damocles over petitioner, leaving it without any clear resolution on whether its franchise would be renewed at all. The inaction on these pending bills would not have been suspect, had it not been in sharp contrast to Congress' swift action on the franchise renewal of petitioner's leading rival, GMA Network, Inc. House Bill No. 4631 was filed in the 17th Congress on December 7, 2016.131 Barely a month later, on January 16, 2017, the House approved the bill, and transmitted it to the Senate two days later. The Senate passed the bill on March 13, 2017, and the House concurred with the amendments a day later. Finally, on April 21, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte (President Duterte) signed the bill into Republic Act No. 10925.132 The entire renewal process took merely four months and only required the filing of one House bill. As for petitioner's franchise, there is no clear technical reason why the numerous bills for its renewal stalled in Congress for over half a decade. The closest to it is found in House Resolution No. 639, which stated that the delay was "possibly due to President Duterte's objection to subject renewal[.]"133 Besides that, no other reason has been offered as to why the House could only act on the bills on March 10, 2020, six years after the first one had been filed. According to petitioner, its market share is estimated to be anywhere from 31% to 44%, making it one of the largest broadcast stations in the country.134 This means that petitioner provided access to news and entertainment to the majority population. Therefore, the delay in the franchise renewal deliberations for no technical reason at all effectively silenced petitioner, which amounts to a prima facie censorship. This, in the words of Justice J.B.L. Reyes: . . . [is] not a mere instance of official indolence, but a subtle attempt to impose absolute radio [and television] censorship, and to silence at will radio [and television] stations which allow airing of views critical of the powers that be. We should be ever alert to such indirect subversion of the constitutional liberties of speech and of the press.135 Indeed, such exercise of censorship is an assault on the right to free speech that is engraved in our fundamental law. In Newsounds Broadcasting Network v. Dy,136 this Court elaborated: [I]t cannot be denied that our Constitution has a systemic bias towards free speech. The absolutist tenor of Section 4, Article III testifies to that fact. The individual discomforts to particular people or enterprises engendered by the exercise of the right, for which at times remedies may be due, do not diminish the indispensable nature of free expression to the democratic way of life. The following undisputed facts bring the issue of free expression to fore. Petitioners are authorized by law to operate radio stations in Cauayan City, and had been doing so for some years undisturbed by local authorities. Beginning in 2002, respondents in their official capacities have taken actions, whatever may be the motive, that have impeded the ability of petitioners to freely broadcast, if not broadcast at all. These actions have ranged from withholding permits to operate to the physical closure of those stations under color of legal authority. While once petitioners were able to broadcast freely, the weight of government has since bore down upon them to silence their voices on the airwaves. An elementary school child with a basic understanding of civics lessons will recognize that free speech animates these cases.137 Furthermore, under Article XII, Section 11 of the Constitution, Congress has the sole prerogative of granting or denying franchises of broadcast networks: SECTION 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the Philippines. In issuing the questioned Cease and Desist Order, respondent undermined this congressional prerogative.Ꮮαwρhi৷ In Divinagracia,138 this Court explained the dichotomy between the grant of legislative franchises by Congress and the issuance of regulatory licenses by the National Telecommunications Commission: The complexities of our dual franchise/license regime for broadcast media should be understood within the context of separation of powers. The right of a particular entity to broadcast over the airwaves is established by law - i.e., the legislative franchise - and determined by Congress, the branch of government tasked with the creation of rights and obligations. As with all other laws passed by Congress, the function of the executive branch of government, to which the NTC belongs, is the implementation of the law. In broad theory, the legal obligation of the NTC once Congress has established a legislative franchise for a broadcast media station is to facilitate the operation by the franchisee of its broadcast stations. However, since the public administration of the airwaves is a requisite for the operation of a franchise and is moreover a highly technical function, Congress has delegated to the NTC the task of administration over the broadcast spectrum, including the determination of available bandwidths and the allocation of such available bandwidths among the various legislative franchisees. The licensing power of the NTC thus arises from the necessary delegation by Congress of legislative power geared towards the orderly exercise by franchisees of the rights granted them by Congress. Congress may very well in its wisdom impose additional obligations on the various franchisees and accordingly delegate to the NTC the power to ensure that the broadcast stations comply with their obligations under the law. Because broadcast media enjoys a lesser degree of free expression protection as compared to their counterparts in print, these legislative restrictions are generally permissible under the Constitution. Yet no enactment of Congress may contravene the Constitution and its Bill of Rights; hence, whatever restrictions are imposed by Congress on broadcast media franchisees remain susceptible to judicial review and analysis under the jurisprudential framework for scrutiny of free expression cases involving the broadcast media. The restrictions enacted by Congress on broadcast media franchisees have to pass the mettle of constitutionality. On the other hand, the restrictions imposed by an administrative agency such as the NTC on broadcast media franchisees will have to pass not only the test of constitutionality, but also the test of authority and legitimacy, i.e., whether such restrictions have been imposed in the exercise of duly delegated legislative powers from Congress. If the restriction or sanction imposed by the administrative agency cannot trace its origin from legislative delegation, whether it is by virtue of a specific grant or from valid delegation of rule-making power to the administrative agency, then the action of such administrative agency cannot be sustained. The life and authority of an administrative agency emanates solely from an Act of Congress, and its faculties confined within the parameters set by the legislative branch of government.139 Moreover, respondent utterly disregarded the official communication from the House of Representatives,140 which called for it to issue petitioner a provisional authority pending the franchise renewal deliberations; as well as Senate Resolution No. 344, adopted on March 4, 2020, which also called for the same provisional authority.141 This baseless act of defiance should have no place in our system of government. By issuing a Cease and Desist Order, respondent, a regulatory agency, effectively removed an entire broadcast network from the airwaves notwithstanding the bills for franchise renewal pending in Congress. Since its Order already operates as a franchise denial, respondent has already preempted any action by Congress--even without having the delegated authority to do so: The licensing authority of the NTC is not on equal footing with the franchising authority of the State through Congress. The issuance of licenses by the NTC implements the legislative franchises established by Congress, in the same manner that the executive branch implements the laws of Congress rather than creates its own laws. And similar to the inability of the executive branch to prevent the implementation of laws by Congress, the NTC cannot, without clear and proper delegation by Congress, prevent the exercise of a legislative franchise by withholding or canceling the licenses of the franchisee.142 As mentioned, petitioner is one of the largest broadcast networks in the country, delivering news and information to a majority of the population. Even if the Cease and Desist Order were to be withdrawn, it is unclear whether petitioner would be able to operate immediately. It would need days for the network to get back on the air. Every day that it is off the air, information is being denied to the people. All this happened while this country is in the midst of a public health crisis. Mass media remains one of the public's main access points of information, and its role cannot be overemphasized: An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic thought and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be mere empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution. Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have both the right to gather and the obligation to check the accuracy of information they disseminate. For them, the freedom of the press and of speech is not only critical, but vital to the exercise of their professions. The right of access to information ensures that these freedoms are not rendered nugatory by the government's monopolizing pe1iinent information. For an essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.143 A FINAL NOTE I am not under the illusion that petitioner only produces quality programs aimed to educate and inform the public. Nor were all its presentations near the kind of quality art deserving of attention from its audience. Some of the network's offerings (like some of its noon time shows) had no value other than mindless entertainment that wasted the opportunity to uplift our people in exchange for ratings and advertisement by addressing the basest instinct of human beings. Undoubtedly, independent of any judgment on the content of its programs, the quality of information-including the arts relating to mass entertainment-will be gravely affected by petitioner's fate. From the facts of this case, one cannot but help note the extraordinary challenges it faced. That special attention, which resulted in the protracted process to decide 'on the renewal of a franchise that petitioner had held for decades, should have certainly invited more exacting inquiry from this Court. In this age, there is a necessity for journalism-with all the ethics that goes with the profession-to prevail over the extraordinary access that is out there on social media, blogs, and other digital sources that can certainly be called misinformation and propaganda. Petitioner may have made the case for the classic chilling effect on expression: that an experienced network with great impact on many of our far-flung rural areas can be silenced. Unfortunately, since the intervening denial by the House Committee on Legislative Franchises was not made an issue in this case, I cannot help but join the majority in dismissing the only issues raised in this case for being moot and academic. The hindsight that history provides may be a balm for future generations, but it is no consolation for the present one. But it is for what history may teach a future generation that can inspire more and continue to speak, to inform, and to shape public opinion so that it is more in accordance with the truth. The sovereign Filipino people-not only the kapamilya-deserves no less. ACCORDINGLY, I join the ponencia only in its result. I vote to DISMISS the Petition. Footnotes 1 Los Baños Rural Bank, Inc., v. Africa, 433 Phil. 930, 945 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division] citing Verzosa v. Court of Appeals, 359 Phil. 425 (1998) [Per J. Panganiban, First Division]. See also Rodulfa v. Alfonso, 76 Phil. 225, 231-232 (1946) [Per J. De Joya, En Banc] citing Fredericks v. Huber, 180 Pa., 572; 37 Atl., 90. 2 Dynamic Builders & Construction Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Presbitero, Jr., 757 Phil. 454, 481 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc]. 3 Remo v. Bueno, 784 Phil. 344, 385 (2016) [Per J. Leonardo-de Castro, En Banc]. 4 Dimayuga v. Commission on Elections, 550 Phil. 387, 394 (2007) [Per J. Azcuna, En Banc]. 5 Ralla v. Ralla, 132 Phil. 517 (1968) [Per J. Sanchez, En Banc]. 6 24 Phil. 49 (1913) [Per J. Moreland, First Division]. 7 Id. at 55. 8 Id. at 63. 9 77 Phil. 484 (1946) [Per J. Sanchez, En Banc]. 10 Id. at 491. 11 80 Phil. 220 (1948) [Per J. Bengzon, En Banc] citing Molina vs. Somes, 24 Phil. 49, 55 [Per J. Moreland, First Division]; Moran op. cit. Vol. I, p. 648. 12 Id. at 224. 13 110 Phil. 602 (1960) [Per J. Bengzon, En Banc]. 14 Id. at 605. 15 87 Phil. 302 (1950) [Per J. Tuason, En Banc]. 16 107 Phil. 226 (1960) [Per J. Reyes, J.B.L., En Banc]. 17 Id. at 230. 18 Los Baños Rural Bank, Inc., v. Africa, 433 Phil. 930, 945-946 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]. See also Remonte v. Bonto, 123 Phil. 63 (1966) [Per J. Sanchez, En Banc]. 19 120 Phil. 1379 (1964) [Per J. Regala, First Division]. 20 Id. at 1385. 21 183 Phil. 507 (1979) [Per J. Guerrero, First Division]. 22 248 Phil. 394 (1988) [Per J. Sarmiento, Second Division]. 23 241 Phil. 260 (1988) [Per J. Fernan, Third Division]. 24 303 Phil. 333 (1994) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division]. 25 453 Phil. 577 (2003) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]. 26 616 Phil. 28 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division]. 27 682 Phil. 317 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division]. 28 G.R. No. 213023, April 10, 2019 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division]. 29 130 Phil. 545 (1968) [Per J. Sanchez, En Banc]. 30 Id. at 566. 31 Arrieta v. Malayan Sawmill Co., 133 Phil. 481, 485-486 (1968) [Per C.J. Concepcion, En Banc]. 32 150 Phil. 495 (1972) [Per J. Reyes, J.B.L., First Division]. 33 150-A Phil. 865 (1972) [Per J. Teehankee, En Banc]. 34 150 Phil. 114 (1972) [Per J. Reyes, J.B.L., First Division]. 35 Id. at 130. 36 319 Phil. 473 (1995) [Per J. Feliciano, Third Division]. 37 456 Phil. 1, 12 (2003) [Per J. Carpio, First Division]. 38 497 Phil. 490 (2005) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]. 39 203 Phil. 23 (1982) [Per J. Teehankee, First Division]. 40 213 Phil. 398 (1984) [Per J. Makasiar, Second Division]. 41 Id. at 407-408. 42 238 Phil. 161 (1987) [Per J. Feliciano, Third Division]. 43 274 Phil. 758 (1991) [Per C.J. Fernan, Third Division]. 44 Id. at 766. 45 622 Phil. 201 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division]. 46 633 Phil. 523 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, En Banc]. 47 636 Phil. 753 (2010) [Per J. Brion, En Banc]. 48 655 Phil. 467 (2011) [Per J. Nachura, En Banc]. 49 686 Phil. 649 (2012) [Per J. Sereno, En Banc]. 50 686 Phil. 563 (2012) [Per J. Abad, En Banc]. 51 707 Phil. 454 (2013) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc]. 52 346 Phil. 321 (1997) [Per J. Puno, En Banc]. 53 Tatad v. Secretary of Energy, 347 Phil. 1 (1997) [Per J. Puno, En Banc]. 54 572 Phil. 554 (2008) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc]. 55 622 Phil. 431 (2009) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc]. 56 658 Phil. 322 (2011) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc]. 57 Bankers Association of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, 722 Phil. 92 (2013) [Per J. Brion, En Banc]. 58 732 Phil. 1 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc]. 59 804 Phil. 638 (2017) [Per J. Sereno, En Banc]. 60 Id. at 650. 61 Banzon v. Cruz, 150-A Phil. 865, 898 (1972) [Per J. Teehankee, En Banc] citing Comm. of Public Highways v. San Diego, 142 Phil. 553 (1970) [Per J. Teehankee, First Division]. 62 See Philippine National Bank v. Castalloy, 684 Phil. 438 (2012) [Per J. Reyes, Second Division]; Los Baños Rural Bank, Inc., v. Africa, 433 Phil. 930 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]; Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 246 Phil. 591 (1988) [Per J. Sarmiento, Second Division]; Rodulfa v. Alfonso, 76 Phil. 225 (1946) [Per J. De Joya, En Banc]. 63 551 Phil. 890 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division]. 64 Id. at 911-912. 65 372 Phil. 892 (1999) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]. 66 775 Phil. 34 (2015) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division]. 67 Id. at 52 and Garcia v. Mojica, 372 Phil. 892, 900 (1999) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division] citing FLORENZ D. REGALADO, I REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM 651 (6th Revised Ed., 1997). 68 472 Phil. 335 (2004) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc]. 69 528 Phil. 890 (2006) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc]. 70 Bicol Medical Center v. Botor, 819 Phil. 447, 458 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division] citing St. James College of Parañaque v. Equitable PCI Bank, 641 Phil. 452, 466 (2010) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., First Division]. 71 433 Phil. 930 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]. 72 Id. at 941. 73 Bicol Medical Center v. Bator, 819 Phil. 447, 461 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division] citing Executive Secretary v. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc., 701 Phil. 64 (2013) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division]. 74 Dynamic Builders & Construction Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Presbitero, Jr., 757 Phil. 454, 470 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc]. 75 CONST., art. III, sec. 1 states: SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. 76 See Montoya v. Varilla, 595 Phil. 507 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, En Banc]; Globe Telecom, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission, 479 Phil. 1 (2004) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division]. 77 Montoya v. Varilla, 595 Phil. 507, 519 (2008) [Per J. Chico Nazario, En Banc]. 78 150-A Phil. 86 (1972) [Per J. Concepcion, Second Division]. 79 Id. at 101-102. 80 595 Phil. 507 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, En Banc]. 81 Id. at 519-520. 82 Commonwealth Act No. 146 (1936), as amended, sec. 16(m) and (n). 83 NTC RULES (2006), Rule 10, sec. 4. 84 NTC RULES (2006), Rule 10, sec. 5. 85 NTC RULES (2006), Rule 10, sec. 5. 86 NTC RULES (2006), Rule 10, sec. 5. 87 The Order was signed by Commissioners Gamaliel A. Cordoba and Deputy Commissioners Edgardo V. Cabarios and Delilah F. Deles. 88 Id. at 2. 89 An Act Providing for the Regulation of Radio Stations and Radio Communications in the Philippine Islands, and for Other Purposes (1931) was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 365 (1938), Commonwealth Act No. 571 (1940), and Republic Act No. 584 (1950). 90 Act No. 3846, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 571 (1940). 91 Transcript of the February 24, 2020 Senate Hearing, attached to the Petition as Annex "E." 92 780 Phil. 244 (2016) [Per J. Brion, Second Division]. 93 Id. at 253. 94 Id. at 254. 95 Lemi v. Valencia, 135 Phil. 185, 199 (1968) [Per J. Castro, En Banc]. 96 Implementation of Enhanced Community Quarantine over Entire Luzon Island Including Metro Manila. The Memorandum Order was signed by NTC Commissioner Gamaliel A. Cordoba and noted by Secretary Gregorio B. Honasan II of the Department of Information and Communications Technology. Available at (last accessed on August 24, 2020). 97 Transcript of the February 24, 2020 Senate Hearing, attached to the Petition as Annex "E", p. 47. 98 Id. at 48. 99 479 Phil. 1 (2004) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division]. 100 Id. at 33-34. 101 Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 202275, July 17, 2018, 872 SCRA 50, 134 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc]. 102 See Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc., 602 Phil. 625 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division]. 103 At this point, I take exception to this Court's ruling in Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. that radio broadcasting stations were expressly excluded from the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission under Section 14 of the Act. I submit that the term "radio companies," which were expressly excluded from the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission "except as to the fixing of rates" under Section 14 of the Public Service Act, is different from "radio broadcasting stations." These radio companies pertained to telegraphic companies as can be gleaned from the cases cited in Divinagracia, namely: RCPI v. Santiago, 157 Phil. 484 (1974) [Per J. Fernando, Second Division] and RCPI v. NTC, 289 Phil. 935 (1992) [Per J. Padilla, First Division]. The cited cases involved the same petitioner-Radio Communications Philippines, Inc.-a radio or telegraph company that transmits telegraphic messages of its customers, not a radio broadcasting station. 104 Presidential Decree No. 1 (1972), Integrated Reorganization Plan of the executive branch. 105 445 Phil. 621 (2003) [Per J. Puno, Third Division]. 106 Regulating the Ownership and Operation of Radio and Television Stations and for Other Purposes (1974). 107 Associated Communications & Wireless Services - United Broadcasting Networks v. National Telecommunications Commission, 445 Phil. 621, 645 (2003) [Per J. Puno, Third Division]. 108 602 Phil. 625 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division]. 109 Id. at 655-656. 110 An Act Granting the ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation a Franchise to Construct, Install, Operate and Maintain Television and Radio Broadcasting Stations in the Philippines, and for Other Purposes (1995). 111 An Act Renewing the Franchise Granted to ABS-CBN Corporation (formerly ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation) under Republic Act No. 7966 or "An Act Granting ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation a Franchise to Construct, Install, Establish, Operate, and Maintain Broadcasting Stations in the Philippines, and for Other Purposes" for Twenty-Five (25) Years from the Effectivity of this Act, available at (last accessed on August 24, 2020). 112 An Act Renewing the Franchise Granted to ABS-CBN Corporation (formerly ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation) under Republic Act No. 7966 or "An Act Granting ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation a Franchise to Construct, Install, Establish, Operate, and Maintain Broadcasting Stations in the Philippines, and for Other Purposes" for Twenty-Five (25) Years from the Effectivity of this Act, available at (last accessed on August 24, 2020). 113 An Act Renewing the Franchise Granted to ABS-CBN Corporation (formerly ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation) under Republic Act No. 7966 or "An Act Granting ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation a Franchise to Construct[,] Install, Establish, Operate, and Maintain Broadcasting Stations in the Philippines, and for Other Purposes" for Twenty-Five (25) Years from the Effectivity of this Act, available at (last accessed on August 24, 2020). 114 An Act Renewing the Franchise Granted to ABS-CBN Corporation under Republic Act No. 7966 Otherwise Known as "An Act Granting ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation a Franchise to Construct, Install, Operate, and Maintain Television and Radio Broadcasting Stations in the Philippines, and for Other Purposes for Twenty-Five (25) Years from the Effectivity of this Act," available at (last accessed on August 24, 2020). 115 An Act Renewing the Franchise Granted to ABS-CBN Corporation (formerly ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation) under Republic Act No. 7966 or "An Act Granting ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation a Franchise to Construct, Install, Establish, Operate, and Maintain Broadcasting Stations in the Philippines, and for Other Purposes" for Twenty-Five (25) Years from the Effectivity of this Act, available at (last accessed on August 24, 2020). 116 An Act Renewing for Another Twenty-Five (25) Years the Franchise Granted to ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, presently known as ABS-CBN Corporation, under Republic Act No. 7966, Entitled "An Act Granting the ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation a Franchise to Construct, Install, Operate and Maintain Television and Radio Broadcasting Stations in the Philippines, and for Other Purposes", available at (last accessed on August 24, 2020). 117 An Act Renewing the Franchise Granted to ABS-CBN Corporation (formerly ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation) under Republic Act No. 7966 or "An Act Granting ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation a Franchise to Construct[,] Install, Establish, Operate, and Maintain Broadcasting Stations in the Philippines, and for Other Purposes" for Twenty[-]Five (25) Years from the Effectivity of this Act, available at (last accessed on August 24, 2020). 118 An Act Renewing the Franchise Granted to ABS-CBN Corporation (formerly ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation) under Republic Act No. 7966 or "An Act Granting ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation a Franchise to Construct, Install, Establish, Operate, and Maintain Broadcasting Stations in the Philippines, and for Other Purposes" for Twenty-Five (25) Years from the Effectivity of this Act, available at (last accessed on August 24, 2020). 119 An Act Renewing for Another Twenty-Five (25) Years the Franchise Granted to ABS-CBN Corporation, Presently Known as ABS-CBN Corporation, under Republic Act No. 7966, entitled "An Act Granting ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation a Franchise to Construct, Install, Establish, Operate and Maintain Television and Radio Broadcasting Stations in the Philippines, and for Other Purposes", available at (last accessed on August 24, 2020). 120 An Act Renewing the Franchise Granted to ABS-CBN Corporation (formerly ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation) under Republic Act No. 7966 or "An Act Granting ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation a Franchise to Construct[,] Install, Establish, Operate, and Maintain Broadcasting Stations in the Philippines, and for Other Purposes" for Twenty-Five (25) Years from the Effectivity of this Act, available at (last accessed on August 24, 2020). 121 Renewing for Another Twenty-Five (25) Years the Franchise Granted to ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation (formerly ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation) under Republic Act No. 7966 or "An Act Granting the ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation a Franchise to Construct, Install, Operate and Maintain Television and Radio Broadcasting Stations in the Philippines, and for Other Purposes", available at (last accessed on August 24, 2020). 122 Renewing the Franchise Granted to ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation (formerly ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation) under Republic Act No. 7966 or "An Act Granting the ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation a Franchise to Construct, Install, Operate and Maintain Television and Radio Broadcasting Stations in the Philippines, and for Other Purposes" for Twenty-Five (25) Years from the Effectivity of this Act, available at (last accessed on August 24, 2020). 123 Resolution Urging the Committee on Legislative Franchises to Report Out Without Further Delay for Plenary Action a Consolidated Version of Eight (8) Pending Bills Proposing the Renewal for Another Twenty-Five (25) Years of the Legislative Franchise of ABS-CBN Corporation, available at (last accessed on August 24, 2020). Filed by Representatives Edcel Lagman, Micaela Violago, Joy Myra Tambunting, Johnny Pimentel, Doy Leachon, Jocelyn Limkaichong, Emmanuel Billones, Christopher Belmonte, France Castro, Carlos Zarate, Eufemia Cullamat, Ferdinand Gaite, and Arlene Brosas. 124 Renewing for Another Twenty-Five (25) Years the Franchise Granted to ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, Presently Known as ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, Under Republic Act No. 7966, Entitled "An Act Granting the ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation a Franchise to Construct, Install, Operate and Maintain Television and Radio Broadcasting Stations in the Philippines, and for Other Purposes", available at (last accessed on August 24, 2020). 125 Renewing for Another Twenty-Five (25) Years the Franchise Granted to ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, Presently Known as ABS-CBN Corporation, Under Republic Act No. 7966, Entitled "An Act Granting the ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation a Franchise to Construct, Install, Operate and Maintain Television and Radio Broadcasting Stations in the Philippines, and for Other Purposes", available at (last accessed on August 24, 2020). 126 Joint Resolution Extending the Franchise of ABS-CBN Corporation Until the End of this 18th Congress on June 30, 2020, available at (last accessed on August 24, 2020). 127 Joint Resolution Extending the Franchise of ABS-CBN Corporation Until May 4, 2021, available at (last accessed on August 24, 2020). 128 An Act Amending Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7966 to Extend the Term of the Franchise of ABSCBN Corporation Until 31 December 2020, available at (last accessed on August 24, 2020). 129 Petition, p. 8. 130 House suspends work from March 16 to April 12 due to COVID-19 concerns, ABS-CBN NEWS ONLINE, March 13, 2020, (last accessed on August 24, 2020). 131 H. No. 4631, 7th Cong. (2017), available at (last accessed on August 24, 2020). 132 An Act Renewing for Another Twenty-Five (25) Years the Franchise Granted to Republic Broadcasting System, Inc., Presently Known as GMA Network, Inc., Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 7252, Entitled "An Act Granting the Republic Broadcasting System, Inc. a Franchise to Construct, Install, Operate and Maintain Radio and Television Broadcasting Stations in the Philippines (2017). See also the law's legislative history, available at . 133 H. Res. 639, 18th Cong. (2020), available at (last accessed on August 24, 2020). 134 Petition, p. 37. 135 J. J.B.L. Reyes, Separate Concurring Opinion in Lemi v. Valencia, 135 Phil. 185, 200 (1968) [Per. J. Castro, En Banc]. 136 602 Phil. 255 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division] 137 Id. at 269. 138 602 Phil. 625 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division]. 139 Id. at 656-657. 140 The February 26, 2020 Letter was signed by Franz E. Alvarez, Chairperson of the Committee on Legislative Franchises, and concured in by House Speaker Alan Peter Cayetano. Attached as Annex "B" of the Petition. 141 S. Res. 344, 18th Cong., 1st Session (2020), available at (last accessed on August 24, 2020). 142 Divinagracia v. National Telecommunications Commission, 602 Phil. 625, 668 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division]. 143 Valmonte v. Belmonte, 252 Phil. 264, 270-271 (1989) [Per J. Cortes, En Banc]. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation