[ G.R. No. 218269. June 06, 2018 ]
IN RE: APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION, SUPREMA T. DUMO, PETITIONER, V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
I concur with the ponencia insofar as it resolves to deny the Petition due to Suprema Dumo's (Dumo) failure to establish that she, by herself and through her predecessors-in-interest, has been in possession of the disputed property in the manner and for the period required under Section 14, paragraphs 1 and 2 of PD 1529.
However, I respectfully disagree as to its: (i) reliance on Republic v. TA.N. Properties1 (T.A.N.) with respect to the nature and burden of proof required to establish land classification status; and (ii) application of the second requirement for registration under Section 14(2) espoused in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic2 (Malabanan).
I discuss these matters in sequence.
Certifications of land classification status as proof of alienability and disposability
On the basis of the Court's 2010 decision in T.A.N., the ponencia holds that applicants must present the following in order to prove that the land subject of a registration proceeding has been classified as alienable and disposable: (i) a certificate of land classification status issued by the CENRO or PENRO of the DENR; and (ii) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.3
I submit that the second requirement established in TA.N. has been rendered superfluous and unnecessary by the issuance of DENR Administrative Order No. (DENR AO) 2012-09, which delegated unto the CENRO, PENRO and the NCR Regional Executive Director (RED-NCR) not only the authority to issue certifications on land classification status, but also certified true copies of approved land classification maps4 (LC maps) with respect to lands falling within their respective jurisdictions.
DENR AO 2012-09 states:
In view of the thrust of the government to [make] public service more accessible to the public, the authority to sign and/or issue the following documents is hereby delegated to the [CENROs], except in the National Capital Region (NCR) where the same shall be vested upon the [RED-NCR]:
1. Certification on land classification status regardless of area based on existing approved [LC maps]; and
2. Certified true copy of the approved [LC maps] used as basis in the issuance of the certification on the land classification status of a particular parcel of land. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
T.A.N. was decided under the regime of DENR AO 98-24.(awÞhi( At that time, the CENRO did not have the authority to issue certified true copies of approved LC Maps nor did the CENRO serve as repository of said copies.
Since the certification in question in T.A.N. was issued prior to DENR AO 2012-09, the Court's decision therein was correctly premised upon such lack of authority on the part of the CENRO. As well, the CENRO certificates in question in the cases of Republic v. Lualhati5 (Lualhati) and Republic v. Nicolas,6 (Nicolas) which apply the Court's ruling in T.A.N., were also issued prior to the effectivity of DENR AO 2012-09, and thus, correctly anchored on the same premise. Notably however, this lack of authority no longer obtains at present.
On this score, I respectfully submit that in view of DENR AO 2012-09, certifications of land classification status issued by the CENRO, PENRO and the RED-NCR should be deemed already sufficient for purposes of proving the alienable and disposable character of property subject of land registration proceedings, provided that these certifications expressly bear references to: (i) the LC map; and (ii) the document through which the original classification had been effected, such as a Bureau of Forest Development Administrative Order7 (BFDAO) issued and signed by the DENR Secretary. The BFDAO usually contains the following language:
x x x Pursuant to Section 13 of PD 705,8 otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, as amended, I hereby declare an aggregate area of [x x x] hectares, more or less, as alienable or disposable for cropland and other purposes and place the same under the control and management of the Bureau of Lands, for disposition pursuant to the provisions of the Public Land Act, located in [x x x], shown and described in BFD Map [x x x], which is attached hereto and forms an integral part of this Order x x x[.]9
Precisely, the BFDAO (or any other issuance of the same tenor) constitutes the original classification required in T.A.N. (i.e., a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records). As the language of the BFDAO quoted above indicates, it serves to: (i) confirm the State's intention to release the land identified therein from the public dominion and classify the same as alienable and disposable; and (ii) define the specific metes and bounds of the subject land by incorporating, through reference, the LC Map covering the same.
Hence, I submit that the presentation of the original classification and LC Map no longer serves any further purpose when references thereto already appear on the face of the CENRO, PENRO or RED-NCR certificate submitted by the applicant, since these references already provide the State with a way to verify the correctness of the certificate against said public documents which are, in turn, in the State's custody.
To note, CENRO, PENRO or RED-NCR certificates do not fall within the class of public documents which, under Section 23, Rule 132,10 constitute prima facie evidence of their contents. Like private documents, the authenticity of these certificates and the veracity of their contents remain subject to proof in the manner set forth under Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 20. Proof of private document. — Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
Pursuant to the foregoing, the submission of CENRO, PENRO or RED-NCR certificates as evidence of registrability entails the presentation of the testimony of the proper issuing officers before the trial court for the purpose of authenticating the certificates they have issued. Thus, any doubt as to the correctness of the references appearing on the face of these certificates can thus be dispelled through the exercise of the trial court's coercive subpoena powers. Once the certification in question is authenticated and verified by the proper officer, I submit that the burden of proof to establish that the land subject of the proceeding is unregistrable then shifts, as it should, to the State.
To my mind, the observance of the proper authentication and verification procedures and the State's participation (through the Office of the Solicitor General) in the trial process are sufficient safeguards against the grant of registration on the basis of falsified or inaccurate certifications. To allow the applicant to still carry the burden of proof to establish registrabiltiy despite presentation of duly authenticated documents showing the same unduly tips the scale in favor of the State, and compromises the efficiency and accessibility of public service.
Under Executive Order No. 19211 (EO 192), the DENR is mandated to exercise supervision and control over forest lands [and] alienable and disposable lands.12 To carry out this mandate, EO 192 vests the DENR Secretary with the power to "[e]stablish policies and standards for the efficient and effective operations of the [DENR] in accordance with the programs of the government"; [p]romulgate rules, regulations and other issuances necessary in carrying out the [DENR]'s mandate, objectives, policies, plans, programs and projects"; and "[d]elegate authority for the performance of any administrative or substantive function to subordinate officials of the [DENR]".13
The simplification of the requirements set forth in T.A.N. neither sanctions the amendment of judicial precedent, nor does it place primacy on administrative issuances. Such simplification merely aligns with the specific thrust of government underlying the issuance of DENR AO 98-24, that is, to make public service more accessible to the public; it is but a recognition of the DENR Secretary's powers under EO 192 to "[p]romulgate rules, regulations and other issuances necessary in carrying out the [DENR]'s mandate, objectives, policies, plans, programs and projects"; and "[d]elegate authority for the performance of any administrative or substantive function to subordinate officials of the [DENR]"14 which issuances, in turn, carry the same force and effect of law.15
Nevertheless, references to: (i) the LC map; and (ii) the BFDAO remain necessary, for while the CENRO, PENRO and RED-NCR are vested with authority to issue certifications on land classification status, the actual power to classify lands of the public domain lies in the President, and later delegated by law solely unto the DENR Secretary through Section 13 of PD 705:
SEC. 13. System of Land Classification. – The Department Head shall study, devise, determine and prescribe the criteria, guidelines and methods for the proper and accurate classification and survey of all lands of the public domain into agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing lands, and into such other classes as now or may hereafter be provided by law, rules and regulations.
In the meantime, the Department Head shall simplify through inter-bureau action the present system of determining which of the unclassified lands of the public domain are needed for forest purposes and declare them as permanent forest to form part of the forest reserves. He shall decree those classified and determined not to be needed for forest purposes as alienable and disposable lands, the administrative jurisdiction and management of which shall be transferred to the Bureau of Lands: Provided, That mangrove and other swamps not needed for shore protection and suitable for fishpond purposes shall be released to, and be placed under the administrative jurisdiction and management of, the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources. Those still to be classified under the Present system shall continue to remain as part of the public forest. (Emphasis supplied)
According to the ponencia, the references above do not suffice for purposes of proving alienability and disposability, since under "all laws during the American regime, from the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 [RAC] up to and including [Commonwealth Act No. 141, only the Governor-General or President could classify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands."16
I do not dispute that the power to classify lands of the public domain was delegated to the DENR Secretary only in 1975, particularly, through Section 13 of PD 705 quoted above. To be sure, the parameters proposed herein merely intend to streamline the requirements in TA.N. in view of the passage of DENR AO 2012-09. As in T.A.N., these proposed parameters are similarly premised on the DENR Secretary's existing authority, under PD 705, to classify land as alienable and disposable.
Confirmation of title to property acquired through prescription
Citing Malabanan, the ponencia holds that Dumo failed to establish that the disputed property consists of private land susceptible of acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code, since she failed to submit any evidence of an express declaration made by the State converting the same to patrimonial property.17
Under Malabanan, the requirements for original registration under Section 14(2) are: (i) a declaration that the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable; (ii) an express government manifestation that said land constitutes patrimonial property, or is "no longer retained" by the State for public use, public service, or the development of national wealth; and (iii) proof of possession for the period and in the manner prescribed by the Civil Code for acquisitive prescription, reckoned from the moment the property subject of the application is released from the public dominion.
The second requirement above appears to proceed from the premise that all lands owned by the State, even if declared as alienable and disposable, still remain property of public dominion which cannot be subject of private ownership. Malabanan anchors this premise on the provisions of Republic Act No. 722718 (BCDA law) which declares certain portions of the public dominion as alienable and disposable, and earmarks the same for disposition to fulfill a specific purpose.
I submit that this premise contemplates only the specific properties identified under the BCDA law. Thus, it is not meant to be adopted in absolute terms.
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into five (5) categories — agricultural lands, forest lands, timber lands, mineral lands, and national parks. The provision states:
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks.
Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3 mandates that only lands classified as agricultural may be declared alienable, and thus susceptible of private ownership.
On the other hand, the Civil Code classifies property of the State into two (2) categories: (i) property of public dominion covered by Article 420; and (ii) patrimonial property covered by Articles 421 and 422, thus:
ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
ART. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property.
ART. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.
The Civil Code further classifies property of private ownership into three (3) categories: (i) patrimonial property of the State under Articles 421 and 422; (ii) patrimonial property of provinces, cities and municipalities as defined by Article 424; and (iii) property belonging to private individuals under Article 425, hence:
ART. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consist of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities.
x x x x
ART. 425. Property of private ownership, besides the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of all property belonging to private persons, either individually or collectively.
Harmonizing the classification of land under the 1987 Constitution and the Civil Code, the Court, in its 2013 Resolution in Malabanan,19 held:
Land, which is an immovable property, may be classified as either of public dominion or of private ownership. Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such character but no longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State.Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.20 (Emphasis supplied)
Verily, private ownership contemplates not only ownership by private persons, but also ownership by the State, provinces, cities, and municipalities, in their private capacity.21
Proceeding therefrom, property of the State may either be: (i) property of public dominion, or those held by the State in its public capacity for public use, public service or the development of national wealth for the common and public welfare;22 and (ii) patrimonial property, or those held by the State in its private capacity to attain economic ends.23
As the connotative terms suggest, the conversion of public land into alienable and disposable land of the public domain opens the latter to private ownership.24 At this point, (i.e., upon the declaration of alienability and disposability) the land ceases to be beyond the commerce of man, having assumed the nature of patrimonial property of the State, that is, property owned by the State in its private capacity.
Being private in nature, patrimonial property of the State are subject to alienation and disposition in the same way as properties of private individuals,25 and thus may be subject to prescription and be the object of ordinary contracts or agreements.26 Examples of patrimonial property of the State include those acquired by the government in execution sales and tax sales, friar lands, mangrove lands and mangrove swamps.27
In turn, patrimonial property of the State may be classified into two sub-categories:
(i) Those which are not property of public dominion or imbued with public purpose based on the State's current or intended use, and may thus be classified as patrimonial property "by nature", as covered or defined by Article 421; and
(ii) Those which previously assumed the nature of property of public dominion by virtue of the State's use, but which are no longer being used or intended for said purpose, and may thus be understood as "converted" patrimonial property, as provided by Article 422.
Thus, the proper interpretation of Article 422 in relation to Articles 420 and 421 is that "converted" patrimonial property can only come from property of public domain as defined under Article 420. Hence, "converted" patrimonial property should not be understood as a subset of patrimonial property "by nature" under Article 421.
There is no doubt that forest lands, timber lands, mineral lands, and national parks which are lands of the public domain under the Constitution all fall within the rubric of property of public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Agricultural lands also fall under Article 420(2). Clearly, therefore, public land that is classified as agricultural (and subject to the State's current or intended use) is property of public dominion. However, these agricultural lands, once declared as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, become "converted" patrimonial property of the State.28
Thus, as stated earlier, it is the declaration of alienability and disposability which constitutes indubitable proof of the withdrawal of public agricultural land from the mass of the State's property of public dominion under Article 420(2), Civil Code, and its "conversion" to patrimonial property. In turn, the clear intention of this conversion is precisely to open these agricultural lands to private acquisition or ownership.
Justice Edgardo L. Paras, distinguished civilist, explains:
x x x [P]ublic agricultural lands before being made available to the general public should also be properties of public dominion for the development of the national wealth (and as such may not be acquired by prescription); but after being made so available, they become patrimonial property of the [S]tate, and therefore subject to prescription. Moreover, once already acquired by private individuals they become private property x x x.29 (Emphasis supplied)
Once land of public dominion is classified by the State as alienable, it immediately becomes open to private acquisition, as "[a]lienable lands of the public domain x x x [form] part of the patrimonial propert[y] of the State."30 Thus, the operative act which converts property of public domain to patrimonial property is its classification as alienable and disposable land of the public domain, as this classification precisely serves as the manifestation of the State's lack of intent to retain the same for some public purpose.
Inalienability is an inherent characteristic of property of the public dominion — a characteristic which necessarily clashes with a declaration of alienability and disposability; meaning, the declaration operates precisely to rid the subject property of its inalienable characteristic, thus opening the same to private acquisition. Hence, a ruling which holds that public land which had already been declared alienable and disposable remains inalienable until it is transferred in favor of a private person perpetuates a flawed notion that unwarrantedly and erroneously negates the concept of patrimonial property set forth in the Civil Code, and that of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain explicitly recognized by the Constitution.
The case of Sps. Modesto v. Urbina31 (Modesto) lends guidance. In Modesto, the Court was called upon to determine which of the parties therein had the better right to possess a particular parcel of land situated in Lower Bicutan, Taguig City. As proof of his right of possession, respondent therein presented, among others, a Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) and tax declarations issued in his name which, in turn, trace his possession back to 1966. Petitioners argued, however, that the disputed property had yet to be declared alienable and disposable at the time respondent filed his MSA and secured his tax declarations; thus, respondent could not have legally possessed the disputed property at that time. Ruling in favor of petitioners, the Court held that private persons can only claim possessory rights over a particular property once it is declared alienable and disposable, thus:
Prefatorily, we observe that the subject property has not yet been titled, nor has it been the subject of a validly issued patent by the [Land Management Bureau (LMB)]. Therefore, the land remains part of the public domain, and neither Urbina nor the Modestos can legally claim ownership over it. This does not mean, however, that neither of the parties have the right to possess the property.
Urbina alleged that he is the rightful possessor of the property since he has a pending [MSA], as well as tax declarations over the property. He also relied, to support his claim of a better right to possess the property, on the admission on the part of the Modestos that they negotiated with him for the sale of the lot in question.
On the other hand, the Modestos anchored their right to possess the same on their actual possession of the property. They also questioned the legality of Urbina's [MSA], and his tax declarations over the property, arguing that since these were obtained when the land was still not alienable and disposable, they could not be the source of any legal rights.
After reviewing the records of this case, we find the reasoning of the Modestos to be more in accord with applicable laws and jurisprudence.
x x x x
From [the] LMB order, we consider the following facts established:
First, the lot in question, situated in Barangay Lower Bicutan, was part of the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation, and only became alienable and disposable after October 16, 1987, pursuant to Proclamation No. 172. x x x
Second, the Modestos are bona fide residents of the lot in question, being the actual residents of the lot and having built a house and chapel on the property.
Third, the Modestos have a pending Insular Government Patent Sales Application over the lot in question, filed after the property became alienable and disposable.
Taking these facts into account, we now make a distinction, based on the corresponding legal effects, between: (a) possession of the property before October 16, 1987, when the land was still considered inalienable government land, and (b) possession of the property after October 16, 1987, when the land had already been declared alienable and disposable.
x x x x
Unless a public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or actually alienated by the State to a private person, that piece of land remains part of the public domain, and its occupation in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights. It is only after the property has been declared alienable and disposable that private persons can legally claim possessory rights over it.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Court's ruling in Modesto is clear — once property of public dominion is declared alienable and disposable, it becomes subject of private rights (i.e., possessory claims), since such declaration operates to convert property of public dominion (i.e., inalienable property) to patrimonial property of the State (that is, property held by the State in its private capacity).
Despite the Court's unequivocal ruling in Modesto, the erroneous notion that a declaration of alienability and disposability does not, ipso facto, convert land to patrimonial property continues to persist, due to the Court's interpretation of the BCDA law in Malabanan, which, in turn, had been adopted in the subsequent case of Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. v. Bases Conversion Development Authority33 (Dream Village). Citing Malabanan, the Court, in Dream Village, held:
One question laid before us is whether the area occupied by Dream Village is susceptible of acquisition by prescription. In [Malabanan], it was pointed out that from the moment R.A. No. 7227 was enacted, the subject military lands in Metro Manila became alienable and disposable. However, it was also clarified that the said lands did not thereby become patrimonial, since the BCDA law makes the express reservation that they are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the former American bases in Clark and Subic. The Court noted that the purpose of the law can be tied to either "public service" or "the development of national wealth" under Article 420 (2) of the Civil Code, such that the lands remain property of the public dominion, albeit their status is now alienable and disposable. The Court then explained that it is only upon their sale to a private person or entity as authorized by the BCDA law that they become private property and cease to be property of the public dominion:
For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if [or] when it is "intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth."34 (Emphasis supplied)
I respectfully submit that the foregoing interpretation is confined only to the facts of that case, and contemplates the specific provisions found in the BCDA law which make the express reservation that the properties identified thereunder are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the former American bases in Clark and Subic. I submit that the ruling cannot be made to extend to situations or properties other than those envisioned or covered by the BCDA law.1âшphi1
To note, the relevant provision of the BCDA law provides:
SEC. 8. Funding Scheme. — The capital of the Conversion Authority shall come from the sales proceeds and/or transfer of certain Metro Manila military camps, including all lands covered by Proclamation No. 423 series of 1957, commonly known as Fort Bonifacio and Villamor (Nichols) Air Base, namely:
x x x x
The President is hereby authorized to sell the above lands, in whole or in part, which are hereby declared alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and regulations governing sales of government properties: Provided, That no sale or disposition of such lands will be undertaken until a development plan embodying projects for conversion shall be approved by the President in accordance with paragraph (b), Section 4, of this Act. However, six (6) months after approval of this Act, the President shall authorize the Conversion Authority to dispose of certain areas in Fort Bonifacio and Villamor as the latter so determines. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The properties earmarked under Section 8 of the BCDA law constitute portions of Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base, which formed part of the public dominion pursuant to Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. These properties were declared as alienable and disposable for the specific purpose of facilitating their sale and disposition in favor of private individuals to raise capital for the Conversion Authority. Such conversion was done precisely because the State is precluded from disposing inalienable lands of the public dominion. It is only in this factual milieu that the statement that "public lands only become private or patrimonial lands upon their sale or transfer to qualified private individuals" finds application.
To stress, properties owned by the State may either be alienable or inalienable in nature; properties of the State cannot assume the nature of both classes at the same time. Prior to their sale in favor of private individuals, the properties declared as alienable and disposable under Section 8 of the BCDA law partake the nature of patrimonial property of the State; hence, it is erroneous to hold that these properties "remain property of the public dominion albeit their status as alienable and disposable." There is no provision in the BCDA law which retains the properties identified under Section 8 as part of public dominion.
Pursuant to the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. To overcome this presumption, an applicant seeking registration is bound to establish that the property subject of his application is alienable and disposable. Once this fact is established, the presumption of State ownership is overcome. As explained, what precludes the conversion of property of public dominion to patrimonial property is an existing intention to utilize the same for public purpose. Where the property subject of the application had not been utilized by the State and the latter had not manifested any such intention, the burden to prove that the property is retained for public service or for the development of the national wealth, notwithstanding its classification as alienable and disposable, necessarily shifts to the State.
In cases, however, where the property subject of the application had been previously utilized by the State for some public purpose, then there must be proof of the abandonment of State use in order for the land to be held as having been withdrawn from public dominion. In these cases (i.e., where the property had been previously utilized for some public purpose), it is the applicant who has the burden of proving an express government manifestation that the land subject of his application has been withdrawn from public purpose/use so that it already constitutes "converted" patrimonial property. I submit that this is the correct understanding of Art. 422 of the Civil Code, and it is only within this context that the second requirement in Malabanan applies.
I am not unaware that this position is met with reservations, as it purportedly facilitates confirmation of title in favor of informal settlers who take possession of unoccupied land without just title. However, it is well to recall that extraordinary prescription, that is, public, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of real property for 30 years without need of title or of good faith,35 constitutes a mode of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. Hence, to my mind, this interpretation neither grants informal settlers any additional right so as to promote their proliferation, nor does it validate unscrupulous and baseless claims. Rather, this interpretation merely harmonizes Section 14(2) of PD 1529 with the provisions governing prescription as a mode of acquisition under the Civil Code.
1 578 Phil. 441 (2008) [First Division, Per J. Carpio].
2 605 Phil. 244 (2009) [En Banc, Per J. Tinga].
3 Ponencia, pp. 15-16.
4 Under the Guidelines for the Assessment and Delineation of Boundaries Between Forestlands, National Parks and Agricultural Lands [DENR AO 2008-24, December 8, 2008], land classification maps are defined as those which show "the classification of lands of the public domain based on the land classification system undertaken by the then Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, through the Bureau of Forestry, the Ministry of Natural Resources, through the Bureau of Forest Development, and the [DENR]." (DENR AO 2008-24, Sec. 4[h].)
5 757 Phil. 119 (2015) [Third Division, Per J. Peralta]. While the date of the CENRO certificate considered in Lualhati cannot be ascertained from the Court's decision, the fact that the same had been issued prior to the effectivity of DENR AO 2012-09 can be inferred from the date of the RTC and CA rulings assailed therein, that is, October 4, 2005 and March 31, 2008, respectively.
6 G.R. No. 181435, October 2, 2017. [First Division, Per C.J. Sereno]. While the date of the CENRO certificate considered in Nicolas cannot be ascertained from the Court's decision, the fact that the same had been issued prior to the effectivity of DENR AO 2012-09 can be inferred from the date of the RTC and CA rulings assailed therein, that is, July 31, 2002 and August 23, 2007, respectively.
7 BFDAOs declaring portions of the public forest as alienable and disposable are issued under the signature of the Secretary of Natural Resources upon the recommendation of the Director of the Bureau of Forest.
8 REVISING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 389, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE FORESTRY REFORM CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, May 19, 1975.
9 Based on BFDAO No. 4-2003 dated June 29, 1987.
10 RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 32 states:
SEC. 23. Public documents as evidence. — Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.
11 PROVIDING FOR THE REORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, RENAMING IT AS THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, June 10, 1987.
12 See EO 192, Sec. 5(d).
13 See id., Sec. 7(b), (c) and (e).
14 Id., Sec. 7(c) and (e).
15 EO 192 was issued by then President Corazon Aquino pursuant to her law-making powers prior to the convention of Congress on July 27, 1987. See generally Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) v. Torres, 296-A Phil. 427 (1993) [En Banc, Per J. Bellosillo].
16 Ponencia, p. 13.
17 Id. at 29.
18 BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1992, March 13, 1992.
19 717 Phil. 141 (2013) [En Banc, Per J. Bersamin].
20 Id. at 160.
21 See generally Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 451 Phil. 1, 52-73 (2003) [Separate Opinion, Concurring and Dissenting, Per J. Bellosillo].
22 See 2 Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines 30 (1992); II Edgardo L. Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated 33-34 (10th ed. 1981).
23 2 Arturo M. Tolentino, id. at 37. See also II Edgardo L. Paras, id. at 47.
24 Such as a patent, the latter being a contract between the State and the grantee.
25 I Eduardo P. Caguioa, Comments and Cases on Civil Law 485 (1961).
26 See CIVIL CODE, Art. 1113. See also I Eduardo P. Caguioa, id.; Ernesto L. Pineda, Law on Property 32-33 (2009).
27 I Eduardo P. Caguioa, id. at 484-485, citing Jacinto v. Director of Lands, 49 Phil. 853 (1926) and Commonwealth v. Gungun, 70 Phil. 194 (1940).
28 See Oswaldo D. Agcaoili , Property Registration Decree and Related Laws (Land Titles and Deeds) 647 (2015). See also 2 Arturo M. Tolentino, supra note 22, at 38; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, supra note 21 .
29 II Edgardo L. Paras, supra note 22, at 44.
30 Oswaldo D. Agcaoili, supra note 28.
31 647 Phil. 706 (2010) [Third Division, Per J. Brion].
32 Id. at 719, 724-725.
33 715 Phil. 211 (2013) [First Division, Per J. Reyes].
34 Id. at 233-234.
35 CIVIL CODE, Art. 1137.
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