SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
I concur in the result, although express certain reservations on the ponencia's application of the law of the case doctrine to reach the intended conclusion.
I.
The facts1 are as follows: petitioner Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) accepted bids for a ten (10)-year contract to operate as the sole cargo holder at the port of Nasipit, Agusan del Norte. Respondent Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc. (NIASSI) was proclaimed as the winning bidder. The second highest bidder filed a protest against the award to NIASSI. Despite the protest, PPA issued to NIASSI a Notice of Award, directing the latter to signify its concurrence by signing the conforme portion. PPA received notice of NIASSI's conformity on January 3, 2001.
The Notice of Award requires the parties to formally execute a written contract. Instead of executing the contract, NIASSI requested PP A to issue a Hold-Over Authority (HOA). PPA issued the HOA initially for three (3) months from August 1, 2001 or until the cargo-handling contract is awarded, whichever comes first. The HOA was extended several times upon NIASSI's request even after the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel issued an opinion affirming the validity of the award in NIASSI's favor.
Barely two (2) months after the last extension of the HOA was granted, PPA sent a letter revoking the extension. It allegedly received numerous complaints regarding the poor quality of NIASSI's services due to inadequately maintained equipment. Thus, PPA would take over the cargo-handling services at the port starting on December 10, 2004.
Aggrieved, NIASSI filed a petition for mandamus2 against PP A before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Branch 3 (RTC), praying that a writ of mandamus be issued compelling PP A to formally execute a written contract reflecting its right to operate the port.
II.
Ancillary thereto, NIASSI's petition included an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPMI),3 seeking that the cargo-handling operations of the said port be returned to it pending litigation of the main case.
The RTC initially granted NIASSI's application for the issuance of a WPMI in an Order dated March 18, 2005. However, on PPA's motion for reconsideration, it reversed itself and dissolved the WPMI, thus reinstating PPA's cargo-handling operations.4
The RTC's holding on this incident (i.e., the dissolution of the WPMI) was elevated by NIASSI to the Court of Appeals (CA) on certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00214. In a Decision5 dated August 8, 2006, the CA granted the certiorari petition, finding, among others, that NIASSI had "a clear legal right to continue its operations in the port":6
Verily, the Holdover Authority (HOA) granted by [PP A] and the series of extensions allowing [NIASSI] to operate provisionally the arrastre service confirm the perfection of their contract despite the delay in its consummation due to acts attributable to [PP A]. But it cannot be gainsaid that the series of extensions constitute partial fulfillment and execution of the contract of cargo handling services.
x x x x
It is therefore Our submission that a perfected contract of cargo handling services existed when [NIASSIJ won the bidding, given the Notice of Award and conformed to the conditions set forth in the Notice of Award because the requirements prescribed in the Notice of A ward have no bearing on the perfection of the contract. On the contrary, it amounted to a qualified acceptance of [NIASSI's] offer, a clear legal right to continue its operations in the port. x x x.7 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Accordingly, the CA went on to discuss the grounds and requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,8 and ultimately ruled that:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the petition for certiorari, the same is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Order dated 11 April 2005 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. Consequently, the Order dated 18 March 2005 granting the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction is hereby REINSTATED.9
This Court later affirmed the CA in PP A v. NIASSI,10 docketed as G.R. No. 174136.
With the WPMI reinstated, the case was remanded to the RTC for proceedings on the main. Instead of advancing to the pre-trial and trial stages of the proceedings, the RTC, after the parties' filing of their respective memoranda, dismissed the case on the ground of mootness. According to the RTC, the issue of whether or not PPA should be directed to formally execute a 10-year cargo-handling contract with NIASSI had been rendered moot and academic by the CA's ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 00214, that a contract had been perfected between the parties. As such, there was no more need for the parties to execute the 10-year contract.11
However, the RTC reversed itself upon reconsideration,12 and its reversal was later upheld by the CA on appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 04828- MIN.13 The CA held that the HOA is a separate agreement between the parties pending the issuance of the cargo-handling contract. Based on the language of the HOA, the hold-over permits do not constitute partial fulfillment of the unwritten contact. Thus, finding that NIASSI has a right to the 10-year cargo-handling contract in view of the Notice of Award and its compliance with the necessary requirements, PP A is bound to execute a formal contract.14 Notably, this ruling was an adjudication by the CA on the main case, whereby it granted the main relief prayed for by NIASSI in its mandamus petition.15 PPA now assails this CA ruling via the present petition.
III.
The ponencia stands to reverse the CA's ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 04828-MIN on the following grounds:
First, the CA's findings in CA-G.R. SP No. 00214 - more particularly, that a contract between PP A had been perfected - constitute the law of the case between the parties, and hence, binding, thereby rendering NIASSI's mandamus petition moot;16 and
Second, the 10-year term of the perfected contract between the parties had already expired, leaving the RTC with nothing to enforce.17
I agree with the ponencia's reversal of the aforesaid CA ruling. However, I find it unnecessary (and even improper) to apply the law of the case doctrine to reach this conclusion.
As above-intimated, the CA's findings in CA-G.R. SP No. 00214 were only made for the purpose of determining whether or not the WPMI, which the RTC previously dissolved, should be reinstated. In particular, the CA's holding that "a perfected contract of cargo handling services existed when [NIASSI] won the bidding, given the Notice of Award and conformed to the conditions set forth in the Notice of Award" was made relative to its conclusion that NIASSI had "a clear legal right to continue its operations in the port." The existence of a clear legal right is one of the requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. As enumerated by the CA itself in the same ruling:
The requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction are: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In taking cognizance of an application for a writ of preliminary injunction, a court has the duty to determine whether the requisites for the grant of an injunction are present in the case before it.18
Jurisprudence provides that in a proceeding to determine whether to issue a writ of preliminary injunction, the applicant must show that it has a clear legal right to be protected and that the other party's act against which the writ is to be directed violates that right.19 The Court, however, clarified that although a clear right is necessary, its existence need not be conclusively established.20 In fact, the evidence to be submitted need not be conclusive or complete but need only be a sampling to convince the court to issue the preliminary injunction pending the decision on the merits of the case.21 In more explicit terms, the applicant only needs to show that it has the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in the petition.22 Therefore, the issuance of a preliminary injunction does not conclusively determine the merits of the main case or decide controverted facts therein.23 This is because a preliminary injunction is merely an ancillary remedy to preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable harm until the merits of the main case resolving the rights of the parties are heard and decided.24
Verily, it is within the foregoing legal framework that we should treat and characterize the CA's findings in CA-G.R. SP No. 00214.
Again, the issue which the CA resolved in CA-G.R. SP No. 00214 was whether or not the WPMI, which the R TC previously dissolved, should be reinstated. The context, evidentiary parameters, and issue in CA-G.R. SP No. 00214 are clearly different from those that should apply in the adjudication of the main case.
In CA-G.R. SP No. 00214, the CA only resolved an incident pertaining to the issuance of a provisional relief, for which the parties need not submit complete or conclusive evidence. Only a sampling of evidence is required to determine the existence of an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for. This determination leads the issuing court to merely enjoin/restrain a particular conduct or preserve the status quo until the merits of the main case are fully heard and decided.
On the other hand, the resolution of the main case requires the parties to completely present their respective evidence during trial.1âwphi1 While hearings were conducted in the proceedings a quo, these were only meant to ascertain the merits of NIASSI's application for a WPMI. In the final analysis, the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 00214 did not determine, under the evidentiary standard of preponderance of evidence, whether or not to grant NIASSI's mandamus petition.
According to jurisprudence, the law of the case doctrine means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.25 In other words, when an appellate court passes on a question and remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings, the question settled therein becomes the law of the case upon subsequent appeal.26
What was irrevocably established by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 00214, as affirmed by this Court in PPA v. NIASSI, is that NIASSI was entitled to the reinstatement of the WPMI previously dissolved by the RTC. While the CA had to pass upon the question of whether or not a perfected contract already existed at the time of NIASSI's conformity to the Notice of Award, this sub-issue was resolved under the framework of preliminary injunctions, and hence, cannot bind the court in resolving the main case. Indeed, the CA's finding on the perfection of the said contract was made only for the limited purpose of determining whether NIASSI possessed an ostensible right to justify the reinstatement of the writ of preliminary injunction.
The ponencia supports its application of the law of the case doctrine by citing Timbol v. Philippine National Bank (Timbol).27 While Timbol presents a situation similar to this case, I, however, believe that the doctrine was misapplied. At the risk of repetition, it is my view that a court cannot take as conclusive on the actual main case a mere incidental adjudication on a provisional relief. As above-illustrated, the context, evidentiary parameters, and issues involved are simply different between the two proceedings. Moreover, from a practical standpoint, a party can shrewdly avert a full-blown trial on the main case's merits by simply invoking the law of the case doctrine after the issue on the propriety of an injunctive relief has been finally resolved on appeal. In this regard, the parties would not be accorded the benefit of presenting their complete evidence under the rigors of a civil trial, and courts would simply shortcut the adjudication process on the basis of prima facie determinations.
Contrary to the ponencia 's assertion,28 the fact that no other proceedings were conducted and no other evidence were presented after the Court reinstated the WPMI does not render conclusive in the main case the CA's primafacie factual findings in CA-G.R. SP No. 00214. I reiterate that the context in which the CA made those factual findings differs from the context in the main case. After the Court reinstated the WPMI, what was incumbent upon the RTC was to receive evidence on the issue in the main case, instead of short railing the proceedings by requiring the parties to submit their respective memoranda anent its misplaced perception of mootness. To my mind, the RTC's failure to follow the proper procedure (i.e., to proceed to trial) is not sufficient reason to elevate the status of the CA's factual findings in CA-G.R. SP No. 00214 from prima facie to conclusive on the main. Instead, the proper recourse would be to remand this case to the trial court for reception of evidence on the issue in the main case. However, as will be explained below, NIASSI's admissions in this case render the remand unnecessary, and thus, ultimately validates the ponencia's reversal of the CA's ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 04828-MIN.
In particular, although it appears that the RTC did not proceed to trial in the main proceedings, records show that NIASSI admitted that there was already a meeting of the minds between the parties when it signed the conforme of the Notice of Award.29 By this admission therefore, this Court can already derive the conclusion that the contract between the parties had already been perfected on January 3, 2001. In fact, NIASSI also admitted that it was allowed to operate the cargo-handling services at the port via the hold-over permits from August 1, 2001 until PP A took over the operations on December 10, 2004.30 However, NIASSI regained control of the operations of the cargo-handling services after the Court reinstated the WPMI.31 NIASSI did not dispute that it has been conducting such operations since the reinstatement of the writ until the present. Thus, these admissions - which therefore dispenses with the need for trial - indubitably establish that the contract was not only perfected at the time of NIASSI's conformity to the Notice of Award but also that the obligations therein had been performed as soon as NIASSI took over the operations even without a formal written contract.
The usual procedure under the PPA Rules32 is that the Philippine Ports Authority will issue the Notice of Award to the winning bidder and, thereafter, the parties will execute a cargo-handling contract to enable it to issue a Notice to Commence cargo-handling operations. Without the Notice to Commence, the winning bidder is prohibited from starting the cargo-handling operation.33 In the present case, NIASSI conducted operations by virtue of the HOA and its extensions prior to the execution of the written contract. Thus, the HOA and the extensions took the place of the Notice to Commence while no written contract has been executed. As the ponencia observed, NIASSI had control over the operations of the cargo-handling services at the port for a total period of 12 years, 3 months, and 15 days, which is clearly way beyond the 10-year period.34 Therefore, the cargo-handling contract between the parties has already expired and now, ceases to have any force and effect. Accordingly, the core issue in the main proceeding - whether PPA should be compelled by mandamus to execute a contract - is already moot and academic on this ground.
WHEREFORE, under these premises, I vote to GRANT the petition.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1 See ponencia, pp. 1-3.
2 Dated December 10, 2004. See rollo, pp. 66-73.
3 See Amended Petition dated December 22, 2004; id. at 75-83.
4 See ponencia, pp. 3.
5 Rollo, pp. 85-116. Penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario with Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia and Mario V. Lopez concurring.
6 Rollo, pp. 109-111.
7 Id. at 111.
8 Id. at lll-112.
9 Id. at 115.
10 595 Phil. 887 (2008).
11 See Resolution dated June 1, 2011, penned by Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr.; rollo, pp. 117-132.
12 Id. at l33-140.
13 See Amended Decision dated September 14, 2015, penned by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting with Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Pablito A. Perez concurring; id. at 41-45.
14 Id. at 44.
15 See Amended Petition dated December 22, 2004; id. at 82.
16 See ponencia, pp. 13-14.
17 Id. at 15.
18 Rollo, p. 112.
19 China Banking Corporation v. Spouses Ciriaco,690 Phil. 480, 488 (2012); Executive Secretary v. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc.,701 Phil. 64, 68-69 (2013).
20 Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Hontanosas, Jr.,737 Phil. 38, 56 (2014), citing Saulog v. CA, 330 Phil. 590, 602 (1996).
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 See BP Philippines, Inc. v. Clark Trading Corp.,695 Phil. 481, 491-492 (2012), citing Bacolod City Water District v. Labayen, 487 Phil. 335, 346-347 (2004).
25 Spouses Sy v. Young,711 Phil. 444, 449-450 (2013); Suarez-De Leon v. Estrella,503 Phil. 34, 41 (2005);Cucueco v. CA, 484 Phil. 254, 267 (2004).
26 Dela Cruz v. Sandiganbayan, 622 Phil. 908, 923-925 (2009); Cucueco v. CA, 484 Phil. 254, 267-268 (2004); Agustin v. CA, 338 Phil. 171, 176 (1997).
27 See G.R. No. 207408, April 18, 2016.
28 See ponencia, pp. 14-15.
29 Rollo, p. 188.
30 Id. at 190.
31 Id. at 198.
32 See PPA Administrative Order No. 03-2000, Revised Guidelines in the Conduct of Public Budding and Comparative Evaluation For Cargo Handling Services, February 15, 2000. (id. at 205-234) specifically Annex B or the template of Instruction to Bidders (id. at 228-234).
33 Id.
34 See ponencia, p. 15:
| Period |
Duration |
Basis |
| January 3, 2001 - December 9, 2004 |
3 years, 11 months, and 6 days |
Perfection of Contract until PPA's take over |
| March 28, 2005 -April 11, 2005 |
14 days |
Issuance of the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction until Dissolution |
| August 8, 2006 to December 3, 2014 |
8 years, 3 months, and 26 days |
Reinstatement of Preliminary Injunction to Institution of the present Petition |
| TOTAL |
12 years, 3 months, and 15 days |
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