CONCURRING OPINION
VELASCO, JR. J.:
The present case involves the extraordinary remedy of a Writ of Kalikasan. Under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (RPEC), the writ is an extraordinary remedy covering environmental damage of such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.1 As distinguished from other available remedies in the ordinary rules of court, the Writ of Kalikasan is designed for a narrow but special purpose: to accord a stronger protection for environmental rights, aiming, among others, to provide a speedy and effective resolution of a case involving the violation of one's constitutional right to a healthful and balanced ecology2 that transcends political and territorial boundaries;3 to provide a stronger defense for environmental rights through judicial efforts where institutional arrangements of enforcement, implementation and legislation have fallen short;4 and to address the potentially exponential nature of large-scale ecological threats.5 Thus, Section 1, Rule 7, Part III of the RPEC provides:
Section 1. Nature of the writ. - The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law, people's organization, non-governmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity, involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
Given the substantially grand intentions underlying the RPEC, it would be a disappointment to rely on the technical principle of the hierarchy· of courts to justify the refusal to issue the writ of kalikasan. Though there are grounds to deny the instant petition praying for the issuance of the writ, I agree with the ponencia that the alleged violation of the principle on hierarchy of courts is not one of them. And as one who was privy to the preparation of the Rules, I deem it best to write my own opinion on the issue.
Section 3, Rule 7, Part III of the RPEC provides the venue where petitions for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan may be filed. It plainly states, viz.:
SEC. 3 Where to file. - The petition shall be filed with the Supreme Court or with any of the stations of the Court of Appeals.6
It is clear that Section 3 uses the word "or," which is a disjunctive article indicating an alternative,7 not successive, character of the right or duty given. The use of "or" in the RPEC indicates that the petitioner/s are given "the choice of either, which means that the various members of the enumeration are to be taken separately, with the term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from each of the other things enumerated."8 Thus, under Section 3 of the RPEC, the petitioner/s are given the right to freely choose between this Court and the different stations of the appellate court in filing their petitions. Claiming otherwise based on the nebulous procedural principle of the hierarchy of courts is a deviation from the basic text of the adverted section. Such departure from the ordinary meaning of the text deprives ordinary citizens of the fair expectation that the procedural rules issued by this Court mean what they say and say what they mean.
Further, the absence of any mention of the first level courts-the municipal trial courts, metropolitan trial courts, and the regional trial courts- is indicative of the exceptional nature of a writ of kalikasan and the non-application of the principle to petitions for its issuance. This palpable absence marks the difference from the other special civil actions available under the other rules where this Court is given concurrent jurisdiction not only with the Court of Appeals (CA) but also with the trial courts.
For instance, Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court9 specifically identifies the R TC as one of the courts where the petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus may be filed. Section 2 of Rule 102 on Habeas Corpus10 likewise names the trial court as a venue where the petition therefor may be filed. In a similar manner, Section 3 of The Rule on Habeas Data11 lays down at the outset that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over petitions for Habeas Data and states that this Court only has jurisdiction over petitions concerning public data files of government offices. Notable too is Section 3 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo,12 which includes the Regional Trial Court, the Sandiganbayan, and the Court of Appeals in the list of for a with jurisdiction over petitions for the writ of amparo.
The omission of the trial courts with limited jurisdiction in Section 3, Rule 7, Part III of the RPEC was not by mere oversight. Rather, the limitation of the venues to this Court and the CA, whose jurisdiction is national in scope, is the intended solution to controversies involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the "inhabitants in [at least] two or more cities or provinces."
Surely, the scale of impact of the ecological problems sought to be addressed by a writ of kalikasan sets it apart from the other special civil actions under the other rules issued by this Court. Thus, to insist on the application of the technical principle on hierarchy of courts will only negate the emphasis given to this difference and the acknowledgement that environmental challenges deserve the immediate attention by the highest court of the land, even at the first instance. At the very least, the magnitude of the ecological problems contemplated under the RPEC satisfies at least one of the exceptions to the rule on hierarchy of courts, i.e., direct resort to this court is allowed where it is "dictated by the public welfare."
In environmental cases, this Court cannot afford to be self-important and promptly deny petitions on the cliched ground that Ours is the "court of last resort" that cannot be "burdened with the task of dealing with cases in the first instance." We must take stock and bear to recall that the rule on hierarchy of courts was created simply because this Court is not a trier of facts. Accordingly, in cases involving warring factual allegations, we applied this rule to require litigants to "repair to the trial courts at the first instance to determine the truth or falsity of these contending allegations on the basis of the evidence of the parties."13 Under the RPEC, however, this Court burdened itself to resolve factual questions so that the rule finds no application.
Indeed, that petitions for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan involve factual matters cannot, without more, justify the claim that the petition must first be filed with the CA on the ground that this Court is not a trier of facts. The RPEC deviates from the other rules on this matter. After all, even if the petition has been initially lodged with the appellate court, the appellant may still raise questions of fact on appeal. Section 16, Rule 7, Part III of the RPEC explicitly says so:
SECTION 16. Appeal. - Within fifteen (15) days from the date of notice of the adverse judgment or denial of motion for reconsideration, any party may appeal to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The appeal may raise questions of fact.14
Notably, unlike in the other civil actions, ordinary or special, Section 2(d), Rule 7, Part III of the RPEC requires not only the allegations of ultimate facts but the allegations and attachment of all relevant and material evidence to convince the court to issue the writ. Consequently, should the factual allegations in the petition be found insufficient, as stated by the ponencia, the denial of the petition must not be anchored on the violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts but on non-compliance with the said requirement. Certainly, an insufficient petition cannot be granted even when first filed with the appellate court and not this Court.
With that said, let it be stated that in the instances where this Court referred the petition to the CA for hearing and reception of evidence, it did so not because of the insufficiency of the petition 15 as it had, in fact, issued the writs prayed for. Such practice does not impose another level of bureaucracy given the facilitation by this Court in transferring the records with all the evidence and attachments to the CA. On the other hand, arbitrarily enforcing the rule on hierarchy of courts, denying the petition, insisting that it be filed first with the CA, compelling the reprinting of pleadings and the re-attaching of evidence-all at the expense of the petitioner/s-only to entertain the same case on a possible appeal after the filing of yet another petition (this time under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court) can only enliven the bureaucratic spirit.
On the issue for the issuance of a continuing mandamus thus prayed in the petition, I concur with the ponencia that mandamus does not indeed lie to compel a discretionary act. It cannot be issued to require a course of conduct. Thus, I cannot endorse the issuance of a continuing mandamus to compel the enforcement of the bifurcation of roads. As the ponencia has stated, such action amounts to requiring the respondents to act in a particular way in the implementation of the Road Sharing Principle adopted in EO 774 andA0254.
While a continuing mandamus cannot, however, be used to oblige the respondents to act one way or the other, it can be used to compel the respondents to act and implement the Road Sharing Principle in whatever manner they deem best. In other words, the implementation of the Road Sharing Principle itself, as opposed to the bifurcation of the roads, is an act that can be the subject of continuing mandamus under the RPEC. On this point, I digress from the ponencia.
Nonetheless, the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents, enumerated programs that supposedly serve to implement the Road Sharing Principle, 16 refuting the petitioners' allegation of unlawful neglect on the part of the respondents in the implementation of the principle. Thus, while the sufficiency or wisdom of these programs is not established, I concede that there is no unlawful neglect that constrains the issuance of the extraordinary remedy of continuing mandamus in the present case.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1 LNLArchipelagoMinerals, Inc. v. Agham Party List, G.R. No. 209165, April 12, 2016.
2 Paje v. Casino, G.R. Nos. 207257, 207276, 207282 & 207366, February 3, 2015, Velasco, Jr., concurring.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
7 Vargas v. Cajucom, G.R. No. 171095, June 22, 2015, citing Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, G.R No. 171101, November 22, 2011, 660 SCRA 525, 550-551, quoting PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. Giraffe-X CreativeImaging, Inc., 554 Phil. 288, 302 (2007).
8 Id.
9 SECTION 4. Where Petition Filed. -The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. Emphasis supplied.
10 SECTION 2. Who may grant the writ. - The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Co!!tl, or any member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district.
11 A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, February 2, 2008; SECTION 3. Where to File. -The petition may be filed with the Regional Trial Court where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored, at the option of the petitioner.
The petition may also be filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan when the action concerns public data files of government offices.
12 A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, September 25, 2007; SECTION 3. Where to File. -The petition may be filed on any day and at any time with the Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred, or with the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court, or any justice of such courts. The writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
When issued by a Regional Trial Court or any judge thereof, the writ shall be returnable before such court or judge.
When issued by the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of their justices, it may be returnable before such court or any justice thereof, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred.
When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be returnable before such Court or any justice thereof, or before the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of their justices, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred.
13 Agan v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., G.R. No. 155001, January 21, 2004.
14 Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
15 See Paje v. Casifio, supra note 2; Cosalan v. Domogan, G.R. No. 199486, January 17, 2012; West Tower Condominium Corp. v. First Phil. Industrial Corp., G.R. No. 194239, June 16, 2015.
16 Rollo, pp. 334-335. "Respondent MMDA has been implementing various structural and nonstructural projects to help alleviate the heavy traffic in Metro Manila while trying to improve the condition of the environment. Its structural projects include: footbridges, rotundas, MMDA Mobile Bike service Program (MMDA Bike-Kadahan), Southwest Integrated Provincial System, MMDA New Traffic Signal System and Command, Control and Communications Center, Revival of the Pasig River Ferry System, Bus Management Dispatch System (Enhanced Bus Route System)."
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CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
I concur with the ponencia of my colleague, Justice Caguioa, that the petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan should be denied. In addition, I wish to reiterate my view that the parties, who brought this case, have no legal standing, at least as representative parties in a class suit. Petitioners fail to convince that they are representative enough of the interests of the groups they allegedly speak for, some of whom have yet to exist and could therefore have not been consulted.
In their Petition for the issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan and Continuing Mandamus, petitioners declared themselves as the representatives of the following groups:
Victoria Segovia, Ruel Lago, Clariesse Jami Chan represent the CARLESS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, who comprise about 98% of the Filipino people.
Gabriel Anastacio represented by his mother Grace Anastacio, Dennis Orlando Sangalang represented by his mother May. Alili Sangalang, Maria Paulina Castaneda represented by her mother Atricia Ann Castaneda, stand for the CHILDREN OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
CHILDREN OF THE FUTURE (CHILDREN). The children are the persons most vulnerable to air poisoning, vehicular accidents, and assault because of the unsafe and wasteful car-centric transportation policies of respondents.
Renato Pineda, Jr., Aron Kerr Menguito, May Alili Sangalang, and Glynda Bathan Baterina represent CAR-OWNERS who would rather not own, use and maintain a car if only good public transportation and other non-motorized mobility options, such as clean, safe and beautiful sidewalks for walking, bicycle lanes, and waterways, were available.
Petitioners bring this suit as citizens, taxpayers and representatives of many other persons similarly situated but who are too numerous to be brought to this court. All of them stand to be injured by respondents' unlawful neglect of the principle that "Those who have less in wheels must have more in the road" (Road Sharing Principle) as directed by law.1
In the ponencia, Justice Caguioa noted the respondent's position that petitioners represented an amorphous group, who failed to show they suffered a direct injury. More than failing to show a concrete interest or injury, petitioners also failed to prove that they are true agents of the groups they represent in this action.
Locus standi or the standing to sue cannot be easily brushed aside for it is demanded by the Constitution. Lozano v. Nograles2 reminds us:
The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a constitutional requirement derived from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which mandates courts of justice to settle only "actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable."3 (Emphasis in the original)
Fundamentally, only parties who have sustained a direct injury are allowed to bring the suit in court.1âwphi1 Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the person who would benefit or be injured by the court's judgment. This person is known as the real party in interest.4 In environmental cases, this rule is in Rule 2 section 4 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which provides:
Section 4. Who may file. - Any real party in interest, including the government and juridical entities authorized by law, may file a civil action involving the enforcement or violation of any environmental law.
There are three instances when a person who is not a real party in interest can file a case on behalf of the real party: One, is a representative suit under Rule 3 section 3 of the Rules of Court where a representative files the case on behalf of his principal:5
Section 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of a case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.
A class suit is a specie of a representative suit insofar as the persons who institute it represent the entire class of persons who have the same interest or who suffered the same injury. However, unlike representative suits, the persons instituting a class suit are themselves real parties in interest and are not suing merely as representatives. A class suit can prosper only:
(a) when the subject matter of the controversy is of common or general interest to many persons;
(b) when such persons are so numerous that it is impracticable to join them all as parties; and
(c) when such persons are sufficiently numerous as to represent and protect fully the interests of all concerned.6
These requirements are found in Rule 3, Section 12 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 12. Class suit. - When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to protect his individual interest.
Lastly, there is a citizen suit where a Filipino can invoke environmental laws on behalf of other citizens including those yet to be born. This is found under Rule 2 Section 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which state:
SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws.
Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.
This rule is derived from Oposa v. Factoran,7 where the Court held that minors have the personality to sue on behalf of generations yet unborn:
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.8
It is my view that the Oposa Doctrine is flawed in that it allows a self-proclaimed "representative," via a citizen suit, to speak on behalf of a whole population and legally bind it on matters regardless of whether that group was consulted. As I have discussed in my Concurring Opinion in Arigo v. Swift,9 there are three (3) dangers in continuing to allow the present generation to enforce environmental rights of the future generations:
First, they run the risk of foreclosing arguments of others who are unable to take part in the suit, putting into question its representativeness. Second, varying interests may potentially result in arguments that are bordering on political issues, the resolutions of which do not fall upon this court. Third, automatically allowing a class or citizen's suit on behalf of minors and generations yet unborn may result in the oversimplification of what may be a complex issue, especially in light of the impossibility of determining future generation's true interests on the matter.10
This doctrine binds an unborn generation to causes of actions, arguments, and reliefs, which they did not choose.11 It creates a situation where the Court will decide based on arguments of persons whose legitimacy as a representative is dubious at best. Furthermore, due to the nature of the citizen's suit as a representative suit,12 res judicata will attach and any decision by the Court will bind the entire population. Those who did not consent will be bound by what was arrogated on their behalf by the petitioners.
I submit that the application of the Oposa Doctrine · should be abandoned or at least limited to situations when:
(1) "There is a clear legal basis for the representative suit;
(2) There are actual concerns based squarely upon an existing legal right;
(3) There is no possibility of any countervailing interests existing within the population represented or those that are yet to be born; and
(4) There is an absolute necessity for such standing because there is a threat or catastrophe so imminent that an immediate protective measure is necessary."13
I find objectionable the premise that the present generation is absolutely qualified to dictate what is best for those who will exist at a different time, and living under a different set of circumstances. As noble as the "intergenerational responsibility" principle is, it should not be used to obtain judgments that would preclude and constrain future generations from crafting their own arguments and defending their own interests.14
It is enough that this present generation may bring suit on the basis of their own right. It is not entitled to rob future generations of both their agency and their autonomy.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 5.
2 Lozano v. Nograles, 607 Phil. 334 (2009) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
3 Id. at 343.
4 RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, sec. 2 provides:
Section 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. (2a)
5 RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, sec. 3 provides:
6 Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Paje v. Casino, G.R. Nos. 207257, 207276, 207282 & 207366, February 3, 2015 <http://sc.judiciary.gov. ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2015/february2015/207257 Jeon en.pdt> 6 [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc].
7 Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., 296 Phil. 694 (1993) [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc].
8 Id. at 711.
9 Concurring Opinion of J. Leonen in Arigo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, September 15, 2014 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=jurisprudence/2014/september2014/206510 leonen.pdf> [Per J. Villarama, Jr., En Banc].
10 Id. at 10-11.
11 ld. at 2.
12 Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Paje v. Casifio, G.R. Nos. 207257, 207276, 207282 & 207366, February 3, 2015 <http://sc.judiciary.gov .ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20 l 5/february20 l5/207257 leonen.pdf> 4 [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc].
13 Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Paje v. Casino, G.R. Nos. 207257, 207276, 207282 & 207366, February 3, 2015 <http:/ /sc.judiciarv.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html'?fi le=/jurisprudence/20 l 5/february20 l 5/207257_leonen.pdf> 5-6 [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc].
14 Concurring Opinion of J. Leonen in Arigo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, September 15, 2014 <http://sc.judiciary.gov. ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/september2014/206510 leonen.pdf> 13 [Per J. Villarama, Jr., En Banc].
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