G.R. No. 211140 - Separate Opinions

Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco Vs. Hon. Speaker Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 211140, January 12, 2016
♦ Decision, Leonardo-De Castro [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Brion [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Perez [J] Leonen [J]

LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP AND REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Respondents.

Before the Court is the petition for mandamus 1 filed by Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco2 (Velasco) against Hon. Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., (as Speaker of the House of Representatives, Speaker Belmonte), Secretary General Marilyn B. Barua-Yap (Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap), and Representative Regina Ongsiako-Reyes (Reyes).

The petition seeks to compel: Speaker Belmonte to administer the proper oath in favor of Velasco and allow him to assume office as Representafive for Marinduque and exercise the powers and prerogatives attached to the office; and Sec. Gen Barua-Yap to remove the name of Reyes, and register his name in her place, in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives (HOR). It also seeks to restrain Reyes from further exercising the powers and prerogatives attached to the position and to direct her to immediately vacate it.

Velasco asserts· that "he has a well-defined and clear legal right and basis to warrant the grant of the writ of mandamus." He argues that the final and executory resolutions of the Commission on Elections ("Comelec") in SPA No. 13-053 and SPC No. 13-010 and of the Court in GR No. 207264, with his proclamation as Representative of Marinduque, grant him this clear legal right to claim and assume the congressional seat.

Because of this clear legal right, Velasco reasons out that Speaker Belmonte has the ministerial duty to "administer the oath to [him] and allow him to assume and exercise the prerogatives of the congressional seat x xx." Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap, on the hand, has the ministerial duty to "register [his] name xx x as the duly elected member of the [HOR] and delete the name of respondent Reyes from the Roll of Members." Velasco cites Codilla v. De Venecia3 to support his claim.

He claims that Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap are unlawfully neglecting the performance of these ministerial duties, thus, illegally excluding him from the enjoyment of his right as the duly elected Marinduque Representative.

As regards Reyes, Velasco asserts that the "continued usurpation and unlawful holding of such position by respondent Reyes has worked injustice and serious prejudice to [him] in that she has already received the salaries, allowances, bonuses and emoluments that pertain to the [office] since June 30, 2013 up to the present xx x."

For these reasons, he argues that a writ of mandamus should be issued to compel Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to perform their ministerial duties; and that a TRO and a writ of permanent injunction should also be issued to restrain, prevent, and prohibit Reyes from usurping the position that rightfully belongs to him.

The ponencia grants the petition; it views the petition merely as a plea to the Court for the enforcement of what it perceives as clear legal duties on the part of the respondents.

To the ponencia, any issue on who is the rightful Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque has been settled with the finality of the rulings in GR No. 207264, SPA No. 13-035, and SPC No. 13-010.

Recognizing it settled that Velasco is the proclaimed winning candidate for the Marinduque Representative position, the ponencia concludes that the administration of oath and the registration of Velasco in the Roll of Members of the HOR are no longer matters of discretion on the part of Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap. Hence, the writ of mandamus must issue.

I submit this Dissenting Opinion to object to the ponencia's GRANT of the petition, as I disagree with the ponencia's premises and conclusion that Velasco is entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus. I likewise believe that Velasco's petition should be dismissed because:

Needless to state, the HOR may very well have its own views about the admission of its Members and can conceivably prefer its own views to those of the Court on matters that it believes are within its competence and jurisdiction to decide as an equal and separate branch of government.

Additionally, as I reminded the Court in my writings on the cases affecting Velasco, the Court should be keenly aware of the sensitivity involved in handling the case. Velasco is the son of a colleague, Associate Justice Presbitero Velasco, who is also the Chair of the HRET. Thus, we should be very clear and certain if we are to issue the writ in order to avoid any charge that the Court favors its own.

Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person, requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed, or from operation of law.4

The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy issued only in cases of extreme necessity where the ordinary course of procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and speedy relief to one who has a clear legal right to the performance of the act to be compelled.5

As a peremptory writ, mandamus must be issued with utmost circumspection, and should always take into consideration existing laws, rules and jurisprudence on the matter, particularly the principles underlying our Constitution.

Moreover, the remedy of mandamus is employed to compel the performance of a ministerial duty after performance of the duty has been refused. As a rule, it cannot be used to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion; if at all, the obligated official carrying the duty can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act in a particular way. The courts can only interfere when the refusal to act already constitutes inaction amounting to grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, palpable excess of authority, or other causes affecting jurisdiction.6

In this jurisdiction, the remedy of mandamus is governed by Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 3, mandamus is the remedy available when "a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, [and], there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. "

The person aggrieved by the unlawful neglect or unlawful exclusion of the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person may file the petition for mandamus with the proper court.

"Discretion," when applied to public functionaries, means the power or right conferred upon them by law of acting officially, under certain circumstances, uncontrolled by the judgment or sense of propriety of others. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how and when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial.7

In contrast, a purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs under a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment on the propriety or impropriety of the act done.8 The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.9

A ministerial act is one as to which nothing is left to the discretion of the person who must perform. It is a simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law. It is a precise act accurately marked out, enjoined upon particular officers for a particular purpose.10

In the light of its nature, the writ of mandamus will issue only if the following requirements are complied with:

First, the petitioner has a clear and unmistakable legal right to the act demanded.

The clear and unmistakable right that the writ of mandamus requires pertains to those rights that are well-defined, clear and certain. The writ contemplates only those rights which are founded in law, are specific, certain, clear, established, complete, undisputed or unquestioned, and are without any semblance or color of doubt.11

In situations where the right claimed, or the petitioner's entitlement to it, is unclear, the writ of mandamus will not lie. The writ of mandamus will not issue to establish a right or to compel an official to give to the applicant anything to which he is not clearly entitled. Mandamus never issues in doubtful cases, or to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or to which substantial doubt exists.12

Second, it must be the duty of the respondent to perform the act because it is mandated by law.

The act must be clearly and peremptorily enjoined by law or by reason of the respondent's official station. It must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required.13

Third, the respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law or unlawfully excludes the petitioner from the use or enjoyment of the right or office.

Fifth and last, there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

IV.C. Velasco's petition and the requirements for the issuance of the writ of mandamus

Velasco failed to comply with all five requirements for the issuance of a writ of mandamus.

Velasco failed to show that he has a clear, established, and unmistakable right to the position of Representative of Marinduque. Any right that Velasco may claim to hold is, at most, substantially doubtful or is in substantial dispute; in either case, the existence of doubt renders the Court unjustified in issuing a writ in Velasco' s favor.

Velasco's cited legal grounds for the issuance of the writ of mandamus in his favor are the final rulings in the following cases: SPA No. 13-053 and Reves v. Comelec, and SPC No. 13-010. Thus, a look into what these cases really are and what they say is in order.

IV.C.1.a. SPA No. 13-053 (Socorro B. Tan v. Regina Ongsiako-Reyes) and Reyes v. Comelec, GR No. 207264

SPA No. 13-053 involved the petition filed by Socorro B. Tan before the Comelec to deny due course to or cancel Reyes' CoC on the ground of the alleged material misrepresentations Reyes made. Velasco was not a partv to this case.

The Comelec cancelled Reyes' CoC in its May 14, 2013 resolution (in SPA No. 13-053). Note should be taken of the fact that this May 14, 2013 Comelec ruling became final and executory only on May 19, 2013 or ''five (5) days after its promulgation" per Section 13, Rule 18 of the 1993 Comelec Rules of Procedure, in relation with Paragraph 2, Section 8 of Resolution No. 9523; and that the Comelec itself did not enjoin Reyes' proclamation. As a result, the Comelec, itself, proclaimed Reyes on May 18, 2013.

I point out that in the June 25, 2013 resolution in Reyes v. Comelec, this Court expressly characterized SPA No. 13-053 to be summary in nature.14

Reyes assailed the Comelec rulings in SPA No. 13-053 before this Court via a petition for certiorari, docketed as GR No. 207264 (Reyes v. Comelec or "Reyes"). The Court's majority, in this June 25, 2013 resolution, dismissed respondent Reyes' petition outright based solely on the face of the petition and its annexes.

Thus, any legal effect that these rulings carry should not be extended to matters outside of the issues and matters specifically addressed by these rulings, as these extraneous rulings are obiter dicta.

Specifically, these rulings and their legal effects cannot extend to Reyes' election, returns, and qualification as Marinduque Representative. Nor should these rulings vest in Velasco the title to hold the position, even assuming that petitioner Reyes' CoC was properly cancelled.

In resolving the present mandamus petition, the Court must appreciate that Velasco' s cited rulings are simply summary determinations of the alleged material misrepresentation committed by Reyes in her CoC, and cannot be used as basis for the requested issuance of the writ.

Eight. In the outright dismissal of Reyes' certiorari petition, the Court's majority declared that the Comelec retained its jurisdiction over respondent Reyes and the CoC cancellation proceeding against her because respondent Reyes was not a member of the HOR over whom the HRET can exercise its jurisdiction.

The majority reasoned out that a candidate is considered a Member of the HOR only after the candidate has been proclaimed, has taken the proper oath, and has assumed office.

This declaration is noteworthy because of the intervening factual developments that significantly altered the consequent legal effects of: (1) the Comelec's rulings in SPC No. 13-053 and of the Court's rulings in Reyes v. Comelec; and (2) the subsequent Comelec actions and rulings affecting respondent Reyes' right to hold her congressional seat.

These intervening factual developments, more fully discussed below, is another reason why the Court cannot issue the writ of mandamus for the reason alone that the rulings in SPC No. 13-053 and in Reyes v. Comelec had become final and executory.

Lastly, the Court should sit up and take notice because of the Reyes' pronouncement on the jurisdictional divide between the HRET and the Comelec, a matter more extensively discussed below.

IV.C.1.b. SPC No. 13-010 (Rep. Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco vs. New Members/Old Members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers [PBOC] of the Lone District of Marinduque and Regina Ongsiako-Reyes)

SPC No. 13-010 was the petition that Velasco filed before the Comelec on May 20, 2013, to declare respondent Reyes' May 18, 2013 proclamation void.

On July 9, 2013, however, the Comelec issued a resolution reversing its June 19, 2013 resolution; this reversal declared void and without legal effect respondent Reyes' proclamation.

In between these dates - i.e., from May 20, 2013, when Velasco initiated SPC No. 13-010 before the Comelec, and the Comelec's July 9, 2013 resolution - respondent Reyes had already taken her oath (on June 7, 2013) and had assumed office on June 30, 2013. Significantly, as of June 30, 2013, when respondent Reyes assumed office, the challenge to respondent Reyes' proclamation stood dismissed by the Comelec and was entered in its records.

Thus, as of June 30, 2013, respondent Reyes was the candidate the Comelec recognized as the duly proclaimed winner of the Marinduque congressional seat. She was proclaimed pursuant to the electorate's mandate through the majority of the votes cast in Marinduque. More importantly, at the time Reyes assumed the office on June 30, 2013 - after she had been proclaimed and had taken her oath - there was no standing challenge against her proclamation.

Significantly, the records of Reyes show that soon after assumption to office on June 30, 2013, she started discharging the functions of her office by filing bills with the HOR.

These developments and dates are pointed out because of their critical significance. In resolving the present petition, the Court cannot simply undertake a mechanistic reading of the cited rulings and on this basis rely on the finality doctrine. The Court must appreciate that at the time respondent Reyes assumed office on June 30, 2013, the Comelec had cast aside the challenge to her proclamation and her oath was properly taken.

To be sure, the Comelec eventually declared respondent Reyes' proclamation void, but this reversal happened only on July 9, 2013, and only after Reyes had taken her oath and assumed office based on a standing proclamation. The proclamation, oath, and assurpption effectively altered the legal situation as respondent Reyes - instead of being a mere candidate waiting for proclamation - had already become a Member of the HOR whose election, returns, and qualification are subject to the jurisdiction of the HRET.

This altered legal situation cannot but affect how the petition for mandamus should be resolved.

IV.C.1.c. The intervening factual developments; Reyes v. Comelec versus the present petition

Another critical point the Court should not fail to consider in determining whether Velasco has a clear legal right to a writ of mandamus are the various factual developments that intervened (from the Comelec's rulings in SPA No. 13-053 and the Court's ruling in Reyes v. Comelec, to the filing of the present petition) that substantially and substantively differentiate the present mandamus case from Reyes v. Comelec.

First, while respondent Reyes took her oath and assumed the office of Representative of Marinduque after the Comelec cancelled her CoC in SPA No. 13-053, she did not simply accept the cancellation and forthwith proceeded to question it before this Court through a petition for certiorari entitled Reyes v. Comelec. This petition was still pending at the time respondent Reyes took her oath and assumed office (on June 30, 2013); by then the case was pending based on the motion for reconsideration that respondent Reyes filed against the Court's June 25, 2013 Resolution. As a result, Reyes had already assumed office even before Reyes v. Comelec became final and executory.

It must be noted, too, that respondent Reyes' oath and assumption to office also occurred before the Comelec (in SPC No. 13-010 filed by Velasco) declared void respondent Reyes' proclamation as Marinduque Representative. The Comelec ruling only came on July 9, 2013. As discussed above, respondent Reyes took her oath and assumed office (on June 30, 2013) when the standing Comelec ruling in SPC No. 13-010 (to cancel respondent Reyes' proclamation) was the June 19, 2013 dismissal of the Velasco petition.

Thus, as of June 30, 2013, Reyes had taken her oath and had assumed office based on a subsisting proclamation. The Comelec declared her proclamation void only on July 9, 2013; prior to this declaration, there was no pending legal challenge that could have impeded her oath and assumption of office.

Second, the Comelec granted Tan's motion for execution, in SPA No. 13-053, and directed the proclamation of Velasco as the duly elected Representative of Marinduque, only on July 10, 2013. Velasco was proclaimed by the new PBOC much later - on July 16, 2013.

These dates are stressed because when the Comelec took actions to enforce SPA No. 13-053 and to proclaim Velasco as the duly elected Representative of Marinduque, Reyes was already a member of the HOR - she had by then been proclaimed, taken her oath, and assumed office.

Significantly, these developments were not considered in Reyes v. Comelec; neither were they considered in SPC No. 13-010. In these lights, I submit that this mandamus petition is not.a continuation of Reyes v. Comelec and should not be resolved on the basis of the bare finality of SPA No. 13-053 and Reyes v. Comelec, and of SPC No. 13-010.

Since the present case substantially and substantively differs from Reyes v. Comelec, the latter's finality (as well as the finality of the Comelec rulings in SPA No. 13-053 that Reyes v. Comelec passed upon) should not control the resolution of the present petition and must not be determinative of Velasco' s right to the issuance of a writ of mandamus.

Moreover, as I stated above, these intervening factual developments significantly altered the consequent legal effects of the Comelec's rulings in SPC No. 13-053 and of this Court's rulings in Reyes v. Comelec, the Comelec's ruling in SPC No. 13-010, and the subsequent Comelec actions and rulings affecting respondent Reyes' right to hold her congressional seat.

IV.C.1.d. The proper appreciation of SPA No. 13-053, Reyes v. Comelec and SPC No. 13-010 vis-a-vis the intervening factual developments in the context of the present petition

If only for emphasis, I call attention again to the fact that as of June 30, 2013, Reyes had been proclaimed, had taken her oath, and assumed office as the elected and proclaimed Representative of Marinduque.

Section 1 7, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the Electoral Tribunal of the HOR shall be the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of [its] Members. "16

I highlight, too, that in Reyes v. Comelec, the majority declared that a winning candidate becomes subject to the jurisdiction of the HRET only after he or she becomes a member of the HOR. The majority stressed that a candidate becomes a member of the HOR only after he or she has been proclaimed, taken his or her oath, and assumed the office.

In other words, the majority in Reyes v. Comelec required the concurrence of all three events - proclamation, oath, and assumption to office - to trigger the jurisdiction of the HRET over election contests relating to the winning candidate's election, returns, and qualifications. All three events duly took place in the case of respondent Reyes, such that the HRET at this point should have jurisdiction over questions relating to respondent Reyes' election, even on the basis of the majority's own standards.

(Note in this regard that in my Dissent in Reyes v. Comelec, I considered this majority action a "major retrogressive jurisprudential development that can emasculate the HRET."

I still maintain that the proclamation of the winning candidate - the last operative act in the election process that is subject to Comelec jurisdiction - triggers and opens the way for the HRET' s own jurisdiction.

This was the position I took, backed up by jurisprudence,17 in my Dissent in Reyes v. Comelec. I said:

[T]he proclamation of the winning candidate is the operative fact that triggers the jurisdiction of the HRET over election contests relating to the winning candidate's election, returns and qualifications x x x the proclamation of the winning candidate divests the Comelec of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation and the party questioning the qualifications of the winning candidate should now present his or her case in a proper proceeding (i.e., quo warranto) before the HRET, who, by constitutional mandate, has the sole jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving the election, returns and qualifications of members of the [HOR]).

Thus, even by the Court majority's own standard18 as defined in Reyes v. Comelec, respondent Reyes became a member of the HOR as of June 30, 2013. To reiterate, respondent Reyes was proclaimed on May 16, 2013. She then took her oath on June 7, 2013, and assumed office on June 30, 2013, pursuant to a subsisting proclamation. The Comelec ruling that declared respondent Reyes' proclamation void came only after she had already fully complied with Reyes v. Comelec's defined standard.

In these lights, the Comelec had already been divested of jurisdiction over any issue that may have affected respondent Reyes' proclamation (including all consequent legal effects her proclamation carries) at the time the Comelec declared her proclamation void on July 9, 2013. As well, the Comelec was already without jurisdiction when it granted Tan's motion for execution on July 10, 2013, and proclaimed Velasco (through the new PBOC) as the duly elected Marinduque Representative on July 16, 2013.19

Under Section 2(2), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the Comelec has the "exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials x x x. " In other words, the Constitution vests the Comelec this exclusive jurisdiction only with respect to elective regional, provincial, and city officials. The Comelec, by express constitutional mandate, has no jurisdiction over the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the HOR (or of the Senate) as Article VI vests this jurisdiction with the HRET (or the SET).

The validity of the proclamation of respondent Reyes who became a member of the HOR on June 30, 2013, and the right of either respondent Reyes or Velasco to hold the contested congressional seat are election contests relating to a Member's election, returns, and qualifications. By Reyes v. Comelec's own defined standard, the jurisdiction over these election contests affecting respondent Reyes already rested with the HRET beginning June 30, 2013.

To be sure, the validity of this Comelec resolution in SPC No. 13-010 was never challenged before this Court such that the ruling lapsed to finality. Under existing legal principles, the Court cannot pass upon the validity of this Comelec ruling without violating the doctrine of finality of judgments and the principle of separation of powers with the principle of judicial non-interference that it carries.

Nonetheless, the Court also cannot and should not simply rely on this Comelec ruling to grant Velasco' s present mandamus petition and compel the HOR to admit him as its member. The fact that these Comelec rulings and actions all occurred after Reyes had fully complied with the restrictive Reyes v. Comelec standard creates substantial doubt on their validity and efficacy. In view of these substantial doubts, the Court should consider them with utmost caution.

In this respect, I submit that any legal significance the Court may accord to the Comelec's ruling in SPC No. 13-010 (as well as its July 10, 2013 execution order) in considering Velasco's present move to compel, via mandamus, the HOR to admit him as its member must be limited to:

Any other legal significance which these rulings may have on the right of either Reyes or Velasco to the congressional seat must now be left to the judgment and discretion of the HRET which must appreciate them in a properly filed action.

Additionally and finally on this point, the HRET now has jurisdiction to rule upon all questions relating to respondent Reyes' election, returns, and qualifications that may still be fit and proper for its resolution in accordance with existing laws and its own rules of procedure. This Court itself cannot assume jurisdiction over any aspect of HRET jurisdiction unless it relates to a matter filed or pending with us on a properly filed petition, taking into account the clear conferment and delineation of the Court's jurisdiction and those of the HRET under the Constitution.

In sum, the Comelec's rulings in SPA No. 13-053 and SPC No. 13-010, and the Court's rulings in Reyes v. Comelec did not establish a clear and unmistakable right in Velasco's favor to the position of the Representative of Marinduque.

At most, Velasco's right to hold the congressional seat based on these rulings is substantially doubtful. Unless this substantial doubt is settled, Velasco cannot claim as of right any entitlement, and cannot also compel the respondents to admit him, to HOR membership through the Court's issuance of a writ of mandamus.

In the absence of any other clear and unmistakable legal source for his claimed right to the contested congressional seat, Velasco' s petition must necessarily fail.

IV.C.1.e. Reyes' holding of the office could not have worked injustice and seriously prejudiced Velasco with her receipt of the salaries, allowances, bonuses, and emoluments that pertain to the office.

Finally, I find tenuous Velasco's claim that Reyes' continued holding of the contested Congressional seat has "worked injustice and serious prejudice to [him] in that she has already received the salaries, allowances, bonuses and emoluments that pertain to the [office] since June 30, 2013 up to the present x x x. "

This argument clearly forgets that public office is a public trust.20 Public service and public duty are and must be the primary and utmost consideration in entering the public service. Any remuneration, salaries, and benefits that a public officer or employee receives in return must be a consideration merely secondary to public service.

Accordingly, any salary, allowance, bonus, and emoluments pertaining to an office must be received by one who is not only qualified for the office, but by one whose right to the office is clearly and unmistakably without doubt and beyond dispute. In the case of an elective public office, this right is, at the very least, established by the mandate of the majority of the electorate. More importantly, of course, the right to receive the salaries, allowances, bonuses, and emoluments that pertain to an office must be received by one who actually perform the duties called for by the office.

Here, Velasco may be qualified for the office. His right to hold the congressional seat, however, is at most substantially doubtful or in substantial dispute; worse, he has not performed the duties of the office. In short, Reyes' receipt of the salaries, etc. that pertain to the congressional seat obviously could not have worked injustice to and seriously prejudiced him.

IV. C.2. Clear, established, and specific legal duty and unlawful neglect in the performance of ministerial acts

For the same factual and legal reasons discussed above, I submit that Velasco likewise failed to show that Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap have the clear and specific duty, founded in law, to administer the required oath, to allow Velasco to assume the duties of the office, and to register his name in the Roll of Members as the duly elected Representative of Marinduque. He also failed to show that the respondents unlawfully refused or neglected to admit him as member.

At the very least, he failed to show that the respondents have the clear and specific legal duty to allow a second-placer candidate like him whose right to the contested congressional seat is substantially doubtful, to assume the office until such time that all doubts are resolved in his favor.1âwphi1

Thus, in the absence of any law specifically requiring Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to act, and to act in a particularly clear manner, the Court cannot compel these respondents to undertake the action that Velasco prays for via a writ of mandamus.

Additionally, the HOR in this case simply acted pursuant to law and jurisprudence when it admitted respondent Reyes as the duly elected Representative of Marinduque. After this admission, the HOR and its officers cannot be compelled to remove her without an order from the tribunal having the exclusive jurisdiction to resolve all contests affecting HOR members, of which Reyes has become one. This tribunal, of course, is the HOR's own HRET.

Lastly, I submit that Velasco failed to show that there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law to secure to him the congressional seat.

I reiterate and emphasize once more that respondent Reyes became a Member of the HOR on June 30, 2013, after her proclamation, oath, and assumption to office. Whether the Court views these circumstances under the restrictive standard of Reyes v. Comelec to be the legally correct standard or simply the applicable one21 under the circumstances of the petition, respondent Reyes undoubtedly has complied with the conditions for HOR membership that Reyes v. Comelec laid down.

Since Reyes is a member of the HOR, any challenge against her right to hold the congressional seat or which may have the effect of removing her from the office - whether pertaining to her election, returns or qualifications - now rests with the HRET.

Viewed by itself and . in relation to the surrounding cited cases and circumstances, Velasco' s present petition cannot but be a challenge against respondent Reyes' election, returns, and qualifications, hiding behind the cloak of a petition for mandamus. In other words, although presented as a petition that simply seeks to enforce a final Court ruling, the petition is an original one that ultimately seeks to oust Reyes from the congressional seat. The relationships between and among the cited cases and the present case, read in relation with the relevant developments, all point to this conclusion.

Thus, rather than recognize this roundabout manner of contesting respondent Reyes' seat, the Court should recognize this kind of challenge for what it really is - a challenge that properly belongs to the domain of the HRET and one that should be raised before that tribunal through the proper action. The Court, in other words, should acknowledge that it has no jurisdiction to act on the present petition.

Under the 2011 Rules of the HRET,22 the proper actions in coming before the HRET are: (1) a verified petition of protest (election protest) to contest the election or returns of the member; or (2) a verified petition for quo warranto to contest the election of a member on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.23 Both petitions should be filed within fifteen (15) days after the proclamation of the winner,24 save in the case of a petition for quo warranto on the ground of citizenship which may be filed at any time during the member's tenure.25 The failure to file the appropriate petition before the HRET within the prescribed periods will bar the contest.26 These are the rules that must guide Velasco in his quest for a remedy.

To be sure, though, this remedy has been within Velasco's knowledge and contemplation as on May 31, 2013,27 he filed an election protest before the HRET, docketed as HRET Case No. 13-028.28 Very obviously, he recognized that, as early as May 31, 2013, any challenge against respondent Reyes' s election, returns, or qualifications should be raised before the HRET - the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of HOR members.

Why he now appears to have glossed over this legal reality in the present petition (especially since Reyes is now a clearly recognized member of the HOR after satisfying the restrictive Reyes v. Comelec standard) is a question I would not dare speculate on; only the attendant facts and the legal realities can perhaps sufficiently provide the answer.29

In reality, two other cases - both of them quo warranto petitions - were subsequently filed against Reyes. The first is HRET Case No. 13-036 entitled "Noeme Mayores Tan and Jeasseca L. Mapacpac v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes." The second is HRET No. 13-037 entitled "Eric Del Mundo v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes. "

On March 14, 2014, the HRET issued a resolution in HRET Case No. 13-036 and HRET No. 13-037 stating that "the proclamation of Representative Reyes as the winning candidate for the position of Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque is and remains valid and subsisting until annulled by HRET"

In a modified ponencia circulated on January 11, 2016 (for deliberation on January 12, 2016), it was alleged that the HRET promulgated a Resolution on December 14, 2015, dismissing HRET Case Nos. 13-036 and 13-037 - the twin petitions for quo warranto filed against Reyes.

Allegedly, the HRET held that "the final Supreme Court ruling in G.R. No. 207264 is the COGENT REASON to set aside the September 11, 2014 Resolution." The HRET ruling allegedly reversed its own ruling of September 11, 2014 that ordered the dismissal of the petition of Victor Vela Sioco in the twin petitions for quo warranto for "lack of merit," and for the hearings in the petitions against Reyes to proceed.

Under these attendant facts, the circumstances surrounding the Reyes-Velasco dispute becomes more confused and all the more should this Court refrain from acting on the present petition.

If indeed there is already a HRET ruling as alleged, then the proper remedy now is for the HRET to present this ruling, certified as a final and executory one, to the HOR for that body's action in light of its own Tribunal's decision.

To state the obvious, the admission of a member and his or her exclusion is primarily an internal affair that the HOR should first resolve before this Court should step in through the coercive power of a writ of mandamus. The principles of separation of powers and judicial non-interference demand that the Court respect and give due recognition to the HOR in its internal affairs.

By granting the petition and issuing a writ of mandamus, the Court, not only disrespects the HOR, but sows confusion as well into the HRET's jurisdiction - a jurisprudential minefield in the coming elections.

IV.D. The Separation of Powers Principle Demands the Dismissal of the Present Petition.

An issue that the Court cannot but recognize in the present case is whether it can, under the circumstances of this case, compel a House of Congress - a co-equal branch - to act. The resolution of this issue calls for the consideration of several principles, foremost of which is the principle of separation of powers that underlie our governmental structure.

The Constitution does not specifically provide for the principle of separation of powers. Instead of a distinct express provision, the Constitution divides the governmental powers among the three branches - the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary. Under this framework, the Constitution confers on the Legislature the duty to make the law, on the Executive the duty to execute the law, and on the Judiciary the duty to construe and apply the law.30

Underlying the principle of separation of powers is the general scheme that each department is supreme within their respective spheres of influence, and the exercise of their powers to the full extent cannot be questioned by another department. Outside of these spheres, neither of the great governmental departments has any power; and neither may any of them validly exercise any of the powers conferred upon the others.31

Thus, as a fundamental principle, the separation of powers provides that each of the three departments of our government is distinct and not directly subject to the control of another department. The power to control is the power to abrogate; and the power to abrogate is the power to usurp.32 In short, for one branch to control the other is to usurp its power. In this situation, the exercise of control by one department over another would clearly violate the principle of separation of powers.

In this light, the question that we ask next is: whether the Court can compel Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap - who are admittedly officers of the HOR - to perform the acts specifically prayed for by Velasco via mandamus. To properly answer this question, we must hark back to our earlier discussion of mandamus, and consider it in the context of the principle of separation of powers.

Over and above the usual requirements of mandamus earlier discussed, it must be appreciated that the remedy of mandamus is essentially a discretionary remedy that is contingent upon compelling equitable grounds for its grant. As a peremptory writ, a presumption exists strongly against its grant; it will and must issue only in the most extraordinary of circumstances and always with great caution.

In the context of the separation of powers principle, I submit that the Court must proceed with greater caution before issuing the writ against a co-equal branch, notwithstanding the concurrence of the requirements.

As a general rule, mandamus will not lie against a coordinate branch.33 The rule proceeds from the obvious reason that none of the three departments is inferior to the others; by its very nature, the writ of mandamus is available against an inferior court, tribunal, body, corporation, or person. With respect to a coordinate and co-equal branch, the issuance can be justified only under the Court's expanded jurisdiction under Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution34 and under the most compelling circumstances and equitable reasons.35

I submit that no grave abuse of discretion intervened in the present case to justify resort to the Court's expanded jurisdiction. Neither are there compelling and equitable reasons to justify a grant as there is a remedy in law that was available to petitioner Velasco (for reasons of his own, he has failed to pursue the remedy before the HRET to its full fruition) and that is available now - to present the final rulings in the cited HRET cases to the HOR for its own action on an internal matter it zealously guards.

The Comelec petition to contest respondent Reyes' proclamation was filed by Velasco, but this was a case solely addressing respondent Reyes' proclamation and voiding it. Beyond this, the ruling made no other directive. But even given all these, there is indisputably the live question of whether the Comelec still had jurisdiction when it issued its rulings as Reyes had by then become a member of the HOR. At the very least, this complication leaves the continued validity of the Comelec ruling in doubt.

Another point to consider is the filing and withdrawal by Velasco of an election protest case with the HRET against respondent Reyes. By doing this and despite the withdrawal of his petition, Velasco recognized the jurisdiction of the HRET. Can he now tum around and simply say that the Comelec and the Court are, after all, correct in its rulings and that he would now avail of these rulings although he was never a party to them? I provide no answers but again this development effectively brings the propriety of Velasco' s use of mandamus within the realm of doubt.

A further point to consider is that Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap are officers of the HOR chosen by its members.36 As HOR officers, their acts made in the performance of their duties and functions are acts of the HOR. The acts Velasco wants this Court to compel Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to perform pertain to their official positions. Hence, any mandamus that will be issued against them is a mandamus issued against the HOR. As I have stated before, mandamus does not and will not lie against a coordinate branch.

Notably, under the attendant facts, significantly altered by the intervening factual developments and the consequent legal considerations, the acts sought to be performed - the exclusion of sitting members and the admission of replacement members - are not ministerial acts for which mandamus will lie. That much is implied, if not directly held, as early as Angara v. Electoral Commission,37 and many other cases relating to this situation followed.38 Their common thread is that Congress takes the admission (or exclusion) of its members as a very serious concern that is reserved for itself to decide, save only when a superior law or ruling with undoubted validity intervenes. Such freedom from doubt, however, is not apparent in the present petition.

Appeal to "compelling and equitable circumstances" that call for the application of the equitable remedy of mandamus is, at best, a murky proposition in light of the circumstances surrounding the May 2013 Marinduque election situation as a whole.

It should not be forgotten that Reyes won by a convincing margin over Velasco, but the latter chose to fight his electoral battle in the Comelec, bypassing thereby the verdict against him of the people of Marinduque. The merits of the Comelec ruling is likewise not beyond doubt from the point of view of the imputed due process violations, as the Dissent in Reyes and the close vote in Court showed.

In any case, mandamus is, by its nature, a discretionary remedy that can be denied when no compelling equitable grounds exist. In particular, in situations where the constitutional separation-of-powers principle is involved, mandamus, as a rule, will not lie against a co-equal branch notwithstanding the petitioner's compliance with the requirements necessary for its grant, as discussed above. To justify the issuance of the writ, the petitioner must not only comply with the requirements; the petitioner must, more importantly, show that mandamus is demanded by the most compelling reasons or circumstances and by the demands of equity. These exception-inducing factors, as discussed above, are simply not present in this case.

Thus, the Court cannot dictate action under the present petition without committing gross usurpation of power. The risk for the Court in ruling under these circumstances is to be accused of ruling under a situation of doubt and uncertainty in favor of the son of a colleague. In a worse scenario, Congress - even if it does not frontally rebuff the Court - may raise issues that would effectively disregard the writ issued by the Court. While no constitutional crisis may result, the Court would have tested the limits of its constitutional powers and failed. The situation does not bode well for the Court's integrity, reputation, and credibility - the essential attributes that allow it to occupy the moral high ground in undertaking its functions within the Constitution's tripartite system.

The better view, under the circumstances and as posited above, is to allow internal matters within the HOR to take their natural course. This position best addresses the confused situation that is the Marinduque May 2013 elections, while respecting the interests of all concerned parties, including those of the Court's.

In sum, the present petition for mandamus must be dismissed as petitioner Velasco failed to comply with all five requirements for the issuance of the writ of mandamus. Most importantly, the petitioner's speedy remedy to address his situation lies with the HRET and the HOR, not with the Court. In any case, the remedy of mandamus does not lie against the HOR, a co-equal branch, under the circumstances of the case and would be an unwarranted intrusion and impermissible usurpation by this Court of the authority and functions of the HOR and of the HRET.

The ponencia, upon which this concurrence hinges, postulates that the administration of oath and the registration of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Velasco (Velasco) in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of respondents House Speaker Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr. (Belmonte) and Secretary General Marilyn B. Barua-Yap (Barua-Yap ).1 Hence, the petition for mandamus must be granted.

Preliminarily, the theory of respondent Regina Ongsiako Reyes (Reyes) - that the instant petition is in actuality an election contest, a veiled action for quo warranto - is rejected.

While quo warranto and mandamus are often concurrent remedies, there exists a clear distinction between the two. The authorities are agreed that quo warranto is the remedy to try the right to an office or franchise and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, while mandamus only lies to enforce clear legal duties.2 In the case at bench, I concur with the ponencia that the present petition seeks the "enforcement of clear legal duties" as it does not seek to try disputed title.3 It no longer puts in issue the validity of Reyes's claim to office - a question that has long been resolved by the Court in its twin Resolutions in the antecedent case of Reyes v. COMELEC (Reyes),4 docketed as G.R. No. 207264, wherein the Court sustained the polling commission's cancellation of respondent Reyes' Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) on the ground that she does not possess the necessary eligibility to hold elective office as a member of Congress. In Reyes, the Court pronounced in no less than categorical terms that:5

As to the issue of whether the petitioner failed to prove her Filipino citizenship, as well as her one-year residency in Marinduque, suffice it to say that the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding her ineligible for the position of Member of the House of Representatives.

Our edict became final and executory, as a matter of course, upon denial of Reyes' motion for reconsideration on October 22, 2013. There is, consequently, no "disputed title" to speak of which ought to be resolved through a quo warranto proceeding.

Instead, the primordial issue, in this case for mandamus, is whether or not respondents Belmonte and Barua-Yap can and should be compelled (1) to swear in petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the lone legislative district of Marinduque, and (2) to include petitioner's name and delete that of Reyes' in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives, respectively. Petitioner asserts that in the aftermath of Reyes, his clear and enforceable legal right to assume office must be recognized.

It is a fundamental precept in remedial law that for the extraordinary writ of mandamus to be issued, it is essential that the petitioner has a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act reguired.6 As will be demonstrated, it is beyond cavil that the dual elements for the mandamus petition to prosper evidently obtain in the case at bar.

Well-settled is that the legal right of the petitioner to the performance of the particular act which is sought to be compelled by mandamus must be clear and complete. A clear legal right within the meaning of this rule means a right clearly founded in, or granted by law; a right which is inferable as a matter of law.7

Here, petitioner indubitably established his right to be acknowledged as a member of the House of Representatives. To elucidate, there were only two (2) candidates in the 2013 congressional race for the Lone District of Marinduque: petitioner Velasco and respondent Reyes. In the initial canvassing results, Reyes garnered more votes than Velasco.8 Before she could be proclaimed the winner, however, the COMELEC First Division, acting on the Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy9 filed by one Joseph Socorro Tan and docketed as SPA No. 13-053,10 by Resolution dated March 27, 2013, cancelled Reyes' Coe.11 Borrowing the words of the Court in Reyes:

The COMELEC First Division found that, contrary to the declarations that she made in her COC, [Reyes] is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the requirements of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, namely: (1) to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; and (2) to make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. In addition, the COMELEC First Division ruled that she did not have the one-year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, she is ineligible to run for the position of Representative for the lone district of Marinduque. (Emphasis and words in brackets added)

The division ruling, in no time, was elevated to the COMELEC en banc, only to be affirmed on May 14, 2013.12 Reyes would receive a copy of the en banc Resolution two (2) days later on May 16, 2013. Nevertheless, she would only assail the ruling via petition for certiorari with the Court on June 7, 2013. Needless to say, no injunctive writ was issued by the Court in the interim. There was, effectively, no restraint against the enforcement of Reyes' disqualification, a legal bar to a valid proclamation. As held in Reyes:13

It is error to argue that the five days should pass before the petitioner is barred from being proclaimed. Petitioner lost in the COMELEC as respondent. Her certificate of candidacy has been ordered cancelled. She could not be proclaimed because there was a final finding against her by the COMELEC. She needed a restraining order from the Supreme Court to avoid the final finding. After the five days when the decision adverse to her became executory, the need for Supreme Court intervention became even more imperative. She would have to base her recourse on the position that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling her certificate of candidacy and that a restraining order, which would allow her proclamation, will have to be based on irreparable injury and demonstrated possibility of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC. In this case, before and after the 18 May 2013 proclamation, there was not even an attempt at the legal remedy, clearly available to her, to permit her proclamation. What petitioner did was to "take the law into her hands" and secure a proclamation in complete disregard of the COMELEC En Banc decision that was final on 14 May 2013 and final and executory five days thereafter.

SPA No. 13-053 eventually made its way to this Court (the Reyes case), docketed as G.R. No. 207264, but We dismissed Reyes' petition and subsequent motion for reconsideration questioning the findings of the COMELEC for lack of merit on June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013, respectively.14 Undeterred, Reyes, on November 27, 2013, filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File and Admit Motion for Reconsideration, which was treated as a second motion for reconsideration, a prohibited pleading. Unavoidably, the motion was denied on December 3, 2013, serving as the final nail in the coffin, laying the highly-contested issue regarding Reyes' eligibility to rest.15

Upon resolving with finality that Reyes is ineligible to run for Congress and that her CoC is a nullity, the only logical consequence is to declare Velasco, Reyes' only political rival in the congressional race, as the victor in the polling exercise. This finds basis in the seminal case of Aratea v. COMELEC (Aratea),16 wherein it was held that a void CoC cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes.17 H"ence, as concluded in Aratea:18

Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled, because he was ineligible or not qualified to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections - Antipolo, who therefore received the highest number of votes.

Thus, notwithstanding the margin of votes Reyes garnered over Velasco, the votes cast in her favor are considered strays since she is not eligible for the congressional post, a non-candidate in the bid for the coveted seat of Representative for the Lone District of Marinduque. Following the doctrinal teaching in Aratea, Velasco, as the only remaining qualified candidate in the congressional race, is, for all intents and purposes, the rightful member of the lower house.

Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Justice Leonen), however, echoing the position of the OSG and that of the respondents, asserts in his Dissent that Velasco is a second-placer during the elections who is not entitled to hold the subject position. The honorable Justice suggests that petitioner cannot seek refuge under the Court's pronouncements in Aratea and the subsequent cases of Jalosjos v. COMELEC19 and Maquiling v. COMELEC20 because the positions involved in the said cases were not for members of Congress.21

What the Dissent failed to take into account though is the most significant similarity of the present petition to the above-mentioned cases - that there exists a final and executory decision of the COMELEC ordering the cancellation of the CoC of the candidate who committed false material representations therein and declaring them ineligible to hold public office. In all these cases, and as it should likewise be in this case, the Court ruled that the CoC was deemed void ab initio and as such:

"If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from the very beginning. x x x"22

Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an election.

Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.

As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.

The electorate's awareness of the candidate's disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate's disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.

That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.23

x x x. Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins. To state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that an election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements.

In the process, the rule of law suffers; the clear and unequivocal legal command, framed by a Congress representing the national will, is rendered inutile because the people of a given locality has decided to vote a candidate into office despite his or her lack of the qualifications Congress has determined to be necessary.

In the present case, Velasco is not only going around the law by his claim that he is registered voter when he is not, as has been determined by a court in a final judgment. Equally important is that he has made a material misrepresentation under oath in his COC regarding his qualification. For these violations, he must pay the ultimate price - the nullification of his election victory. He may also have to account in a criminal court for making a false statement under oath, but this is a matter for the proper authorities to decide upon.

We distinguish our ruling in this case from others that we have made in the past by the clarification that COC defects beyond matters of form and that involve material misrepresentations cannot avail of the benefit of our ruling that COC mandatory requirements before elections are considered merely directory after the people shall have spoken. A mandatory and material election law requirement involves more than the will of the people in any given locality. Where a material COC misrepresentation under oath is made, thereby violating both our election and criminal laws, we are faced as well with an assault on the will of the people of the Philippines as expressed in our laws. In a choice between provisions on material qualifications of elected officials, on the one hand, and the will of the electorate in any given locality, on the other, we believe and so hold that we cannot choose the electorate will. The balance must always tilt in favor of upholding and enforcing the law. To rule otherwise is to slowly gnaw at the rule of law.24

Therefore, considering that Reyes' CoC was cancelled and was deemed void ab initio by virtue of the final and executory decisions rendered by the COMELEC and this Court, Velasco is a not second-placer as claimed by the Dissent; rather, Velasco is the only placer and the winner during the May elections and thus, for all intents and purposes, Velasco has a clear legal right to office as Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.

Unconvinced, Justice Leonen would protest in his Dissent that petitioner Velasco, a non-party to SPC No. 13-053 and G.R. No. 207264, is a stranger to the case and cannot be bound by Our factual findings and rulings therein.25

Sec. 1, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, pertinently reads:

Section 1. Ground for Denial or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy. - A verified Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy for any elective office may be filed by any registered voter or a duly registered political party, organization, or coalition of political parties on the exclusive ground that any material representation contained therein as required by law is false. xxx (emphasis added)

By lodging a petition for denial or cancellation of CoC, a voter seeks to ensure that the candidate who purports to be qualified to represent his or her constituents is indeed eligible to do so. Such petition, therefore, is for and in benefit of the electorate, and not for one's personal advantage. This is in clear consonance with the afore-quoted rule, which never required the petition to be filed by a candidate's political rival. Otherwise stated, it is not required for petitioner Tan in SPA No. 13-053 to have a claim to the contested electoral post to be permitted by law to challenge the validity of Reyes' CoC. At the same time, petitioner Velasco herein is not under any legal obligation to intervene in SPA No. 13-053 and G.R. No. 207264 before he could benefit directly or indirectly from the ruling. Unlike civil cases which only involve private rights, petitions to deny or cancel certificates of candidacy are so imbued with public interest that they cannot be deemed binding only to the parties thereto. Indeed, it would be an absurd situation, after all, to declare Reyes ineligible only insofar as Tan is concerned, and presumed eligible as to the rest of the Marinduqueños, including Velasco.

Furthermore, for a petition for mandamus to prosper, Sec. 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Petition for mandamus. - When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.

Apparently, there is nothing in foregoing provision which requires that the person applying for a writ of mandamus should establish that he or she was the prevailing party litigant to a prior case (i.e. a petitioner, respondent or an intervenor) to be entitled to the writ's issuance. Contrary to the opinion espoused in the Dissent, Sec. 3, Rule 65 merely requires the applicant to establish a clear legal right to the ministerial function to be performed, without distinction on whether this right emanates from a final judgment in a prior case or not. Thus, there is no basis to the opinion that Velasco should have been a party in Reyes in order for this Court to grant a of writ of mandamus in his favor.

Anent the second element for mandamus to lie, it is critical that the duty the performance of which is to be compelled be ministerial in nature, rather than discretionary. A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.26 The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.27

Without a doubt, petitioner herein seeks the performance of a ministerial act, without which he is unjustly deprived of the enjoyment of an office that he is clearly entitled to, as earlier discussed. It must be borne in mind that this petition was brought to fore because, despite repeated demands from petitioner and their receipt of the "Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of Winning Candidate for the position of Member of House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque, " respondents Belmonte and Barna-Yap refused to allow Velasco to sit in the Lower House as Marinduque Representative

The non-discretionary function of respondents Belmonte and Barua-Yap is underscored in Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia (Codilla),28 wherein the Court held that the House Speaker and the Secretary General of the Lower House are duty-bound to recognize the legally elected district representatives as members of the House of Representatives. In the concluding statements of Codilla, the Court, speaking through retired Chief Justice Reynato Puno, instructs that:

In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin who only got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en bane has not been challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final and executory.

In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte has been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion.29 (Emphasis in the original)

As in Codilla, the fact of Reyes' disqualification can no longer be disputed herein, in view of the consecutive rulings of the COMELEC and the Court in SPA No. 13-053, G.R. No. 207624, and SPA No. 13-010. Reyes' ineligibility and Velasco's consequent membership in the Lower House is then beyond the discretion of respondents Belmonte and Barua-Yap, and the rulings upholding the same must therefore be recognized and respected. To hold otherwise - that the Court is not precluded from entertaining questions on Reyes' eligibility to occupy Marinduque's congressional seat - would mean substantially altering, if not effectively vacating, Our ruling in Reyes that has long attained finality, a blatant violation of the immutability of judgments. Under the doctrine, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately be struck down.30 Justice Leonen, however, urges this Court to revisit, nay re-litigate, Reyes two (2) years after the date of its finality and abandon the same, in clear contravention of the doctrine of immutability and finality of Supreme Court decisions.

It matters not that respondents Belmonte and Barua-Yap are non-parties to Reyes. It is erroneous to claim that Our final ruling therein is not binding against Belmonte and Barua-Yap on ground that that they were neither petitioners nor respondents in the said case,31 and that they were not given the opportunity to be heard on the issues raised therein.32 Again, SPA No. 13-053, G.R. No. 207264, and SPA No. 13-010 are not civil cases and do not involve purely private rights which requires notice and full participation of respondents Belmonte and Barua-Yap. It must also be noted that the said case originated as petition to deny or cancel Reyes' COC, which does not require the participation of the Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives. In fact, there is nothing in BP 881, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, nor in Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which requires that the Speaker and Secretary General to be included either in the original petition for cancellation of CoC or when the case is elevated to this Court via petition for certiorari. In any event, the fact that they were not made parties in Reyes does not mean that the public respondents are not bound by the said decision considering that the same already form part of the legal system of the Philippines.33

The Dissent endeavors to divert our attention to the peculiarities of Codilla that allegedly preclude the Court from applying its doctrine in the case at bar. It was noted that (i) the petitioner in Codilla acquired the plurality of votes, which according to the dissent is the primary reason for the grant of the petition;34 (ii) that respondent Reyes' proclamation was never nullified in SPA 13-053;35 and (iii) that the second placer rule was not yet abandoned when Codilla was promulgated.36

With all due respect, the arguments are bereft of merit. Their rehashed version fails to persuade now as they did before in Reyes.

First, the ruling on Codilla was not primarily hinged on the plurality of votes acquired by petitioner therein, but on the certainty as to who the lawfully elected candidate was. To reiterate the holding in Codilla: "the issue of who is the rightful Representative xxx has been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. " (Emphasis added) Hence, it became ministerial on the part of then House Speaker Jose de Venecia and then Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno of the House of Representatives to swear in and include the name of petitioner Eufrocino Codilla (Codilla) in the Roll of Members.

Acquiring the plurality of votes may be one way of asserting one's claim to office, but the cancellation of the CoC of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes is likewise a viable alternative in light of Aratea. Thus, in spite of the initial determination that Velasco failed to obtain the plurality of votes, he could still validly claim that his right to be seated as Marinduque's Representative in Congress has been settled by virtue of Reyes' disqualification.

Second, the ruling in Reyes may have been silent as to the validity of her proclamation, but the Dissent failed to take into account the developments in SPC No. 13-010, wherein Velasco assailed the proceedings of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) and prayed before the COMELEC that the May 18, 2013 proclamation of Reyes be declared null and void.37

On June 19, 2013, the COMELEC would deny Velasco's petition. But on reconsideration, the COMELEC en banc, on July 9, 2013, made a reversal and declared null and void and without legal effect the proclamation of Reyes, and, in the very issuance, declared petitioner Velasco as the winning candidate.38 And so it was that on July 16, 2013, Velasco would be proclaimed by a newly constituted PBOC as the duly elected member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque, in congruence with the COMELEC's rulings in SPA No. 13-053 and SPC No. 13-010.39 This proclamation was never questioned by Reyes before any judicial or quasi-judicial forum.

This sequence of events bears striking resemblance with the factual milieu of Codilla wherein Codilla, on June 20, 2001, seasonably moved for reconsideration of the June 14, 2001 order for his disqualification and additionally questioned therein the validity of the proclamation of Ma Victoria Locsin (Locsin). On the next day, he would lodge a separate petition challenging the validity of Locsin's proclamation anew. The petition, however, would suffer the same fate of being initially decided against his favor. It will not be until August 29, 2001 when the COMELEC en banc, by a 4-3 vote, would reverse the rulings that disqualified Codilla and upheld the validity of Locsin's proclamation. Notably, Locsin did not appeal from this Resolution annulling her proclamation and so the COMELEC en banc's ruling then became final and executory.

Thereafter, on September 6, 2001, the COMELEC en banc reconstituted the PBOC of Leyte to implement its August 29, 2001 Resolution, and to proclaim the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes in the district as the duly elected Representative of the 4th Legislative District of Leyte. So it was that on September 12, 2001, petitioner Codilla was proclaimed winner of the congressional race.

With the finality of the COMELEC ruling disqualifying Locsin and nullifying her proclamation, and the consequent proclamation of Codilla as the lawfully elected Representative of the 4th District of Leyte, the Court saw no legal obstacle in directing then House Speaker Jose de Venecia and then Secretary General Roberto Nazareno of the House of Representatives to swear in and include petitioner Codilla's name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives. This very same outcome in Codilla should be observed in the present case.

Third, that the second placer rule was not yet abandoned when Codilla was decided is inconsequential in this case. As earlier discussed, what is of significance in Codilla is the certainty on who the rightful holder of the elective post is. It may be that when Codilla was decided, plurality of votes and successional rights, in disqualifications cases, may have been the key considerations, but as jurisprudence has been enriched by Aratea and by the subsequent cases that followed,40 the qualified second placer rule was added to the enumeration. Synthesizing Aratea with Codilla, petitioner Velasco may now successfully invoke the qualified second placer rule to prove the certainty of his claim to office, and compel the respondent Speaker and Secretary General to administer his oath and include his name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives.

With the presence of the twin requirements, the extraordinary writ of mandamus must be issued in the case at bar.

The Dissent cites the cases of Tañada v. COMELEC (Tañada), Limkaichong v. COMELEC (Limkaichong), and Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC (Vinzons-Chato), to persuade Us to revisit the ruling in Reyes v. COMELEC, and divest the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over the issue of Reyes' qualification in favor of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). Similarly, respondents raised the issue of jurisdiction arguing that the proclamation alone of the winning candidate is the operative act that triggers the commencement of HRET's exclusive jurisdiction,41 and insisted that to rule otherwise would result in the clash of jurisdiction between the HRET and the COMELEC.42

On the outset, I express my strong reservations on revisiting herein the issue on the HRET's jurisdiction, which has already been settled with finality in Reyes, for it is not at issue in this petition for mandamus. I SHARE THE OBSERVATION BY THE PONENCIA THAT RESPONDENTS ARE TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THIS PETITION TO RE-LITIGATE WHAT HAS BEEN SETTLED IN REYES AND DOES NOT SEEM TO RESPECT THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT THAT HAS BEEN ISSUED THEREIN ON OCTOBER 22, 2013. Nevertheless, assuming in arguendo that there is no impropriety in taking a second look at the issue in this case, I see no irreconcilability between Reyes, on the one hand, and the cases cited in the Dissent, on the other.

As a review, the doctrine in Reyes is that the HRET only has jurisdiction over Members of the House .of Representatives. To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, the following requisites must concur: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.43

Our ruling in Reyes does not run in conflict with Tañada, which was decided by the Court en bane by a unanimous vote, as our esteemed colleague pointed out. As held in Tañada:

In the foregoing light, considering that Angelina had already been proclaimed as Member of the House of Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province on May 16, 2013, as she has in fact taken her oath and assumed office past noon time of June 30, 2013, the Court is now without jurisdiction to resolve the case at bar. As they stand, the issues concerning the conduct of the canvass and the resulting proclamation of Angelina as herein discussed are matters which fall under the scope of the terms "election" and "returns" as above-stated and hence, properly fall under the HRET's sole jurisdiction. (Emphasis added)

Hence, the Court's ruling in Tañada, disclaiming jurisdiction in favor of the HRET, is premised on the concurrence of the three (3) requirements laid down in Reyes. In any case, Tañada is a Minute Resolution not intended to amend or abandon Reyes, as was made evident by the subsequent case Bandara v. COMELEC,44 to wit:

It is a well-settled rule that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of representatives, the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) over election contests relating to his/her election, returns, and qualification ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. Consequently, the instant petitions for certiorari are not the proper remedies for the petitioners in both cases to question the propriety of the National Board of Canvassers' proclamation, and the events leading thereto.

Limkaichong is even more blunt as the Court decided the case with the following opening statement:45

Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal begins. xx x. (Emphasis in the original)

x xx [I]n an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the people's mandate. (Emphasis added)

Verily, Reyes delineated the blurred lines between the jurisdictions of the COMELEC and the HRET, explicitly ruling where one ends and the other begins. Our ruling therein was not wanting in jurisprudential basis and is in fact supported by cases cited by in the Dissent no less.

Certainly, the principle in Reyes does not offend Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution nor does it undermine the adjudicatory powers of the HRET. On the contrary, it strictly adheres to the textual tenor of the constitutional provision, to wit:

Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (Emphasis added)

It has to be emphasized that the Court, in deciding Reyes, did not divest the Senate and House of Representative Electoral Tribunals of their jurisdiction over their respective members, but merely set the parameters on who these "Members" are. The jurisprudence earlier reviewed are in unison in holding that to be considered a "Member" within the purview of the constitutional provision, the three indispensable elements must concur.

As to the alleged clash of jurisdiction, the Court, in its October 22, 2013 Resolution in Reyes, explained:

"11. It may need pointing out that there is no conflict between the COMELEC and the HRET insofar as the petitioner's being a Representative of Marinduque is concerned. The COMELEC covers the matter of petitioner's certificate of candidacy, and its due course or its cancellation, which are the pivotal conclusions that determines who can be legally proclaimed. The matter can go to the Supreme Court but not as a continuation of the proceedings in the COMELEC, which has in fact ended, but on an original action before the Court grounded on more than mere error of judgment but on error of jurisdiction for grave abuse of discretion. At and after the COMELEC En Banc decision, there is no longer any certificate cancellation matter than can go to the HRET. In that sense, the HRET' s constitutional authority opens, over the qualification of its MEMBER, who becomes ~o only upon a duly and legally based proclamation, the first and unavoidable step towards such membership. The HRET jurisdiction over the qualification of the Member of the House of Representatives is original and exclusive, and as such, proceeds de novo unhampered by the proceedings in the COMELEC which, as just stated has been terminated. The HRET proceedings is a regular, not summary, proceeding. It will determine who should be the Member of the House. It must be made clear though, at the risk of repetitiveness, that no hiatus occurs in the representation of Marinduque in the House because there is such a representative who shall sit as the HRET proceedings are had till termination. Such representative is the duly proclaimed winner resulting from the terminated case of cancellation of certificate of candidacy of petitioner. The petitioner [Reyes] is not, cannot, be that representative. And this, all in all, is the crux of the dispute between the parties: who shall sit in the House in representation of Marinduque, while there is yet no HRET decision on the qualifications of the Member.47 (Emphasis and words in brackets added)

It thus appears that there is no conflict of jurisdiction, and that if a quo warranto case should be filed before HRET as espoused by the respondents and in the Dissent, it cannot be one against Reyes who never became a member of the House of Representatives over whom the HRET could exercise jurisdiction.

The Dissent also claims that when respondent Reyes was proclaimed by the PBOC as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque of May 18, 2013, petitioner Velasco should have continued his election protest via a quo warranto petition before the HRET.48

This suggestion is legally flawed considering that the HRET is without authority to review, modify, more so annul, the illegal acts of PBOC. On the contrary, this authority is lodged with the COMELEC and is incidental to its power of "direct control and supervision over the Board of Canvassers."49 Therefore, the COMELEC is the proper entity that can legally and validly nullify the acts of the PBOC. As held by this Court held in Mastura v. COMELEC:50

"Pursuant to its administrative functions, the COMELEC exercises direct supervision and control over the proceedings before the Board of Canvassers. In Aratuc v. Commission on Elections51 we held -

"While nominally, the procedure of bringing to the Commission objections to the actuations of boards of canvassers has been quite loosely referred to in certain quarters, even by the Commission and by this Court . . . as an appeal, the fact of the matter is that the authority of the Commission in reviewing such actuations does not spring from any appellate jurisdiction conferred by any specific provision of law, for there is none such provision anywhere in the Election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control and supervision endowed to it by the above-quoted provisions of Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too well settled postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a superior body or office having supervision and control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done. xxxx"

Furthermore, the illegal proclamation of the PBOC cannot operate to automatically oust the COMELEC of its supervisory authority over the PBOC. As clearly explained in Reyes:

"More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy - that before the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner's lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioner's qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of Representative. We will inexcusably disregard this fact if we accept the argument of the petitioner that the COMELEC was ousted of jurisdiction when she was proclaimed, which was four days after the COMELEC En Banc decision. The Board of Canvasser which proclaimed petitioner cannot by such act be allowed to render nugatory a decision of the COMELEC En Banc which affirmed a decision of the COMELEC First Division."52 (Emphasis supplied.)

It must likewise be noted that the COMELEC en banc's May 14, 2013 Decision in SP A No. 13-053 was already final as "there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioner's qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of Representative," and in the absence of a restraining order from this Court, it became executory. Thus, as held in Reyes, it was an error for the PBOC to proclaim Reyes, a non-candidate, on May 18, 2013. As aptly observed by Chief Justice Sereno in her Concurring Opinion in the said case:53

"On 14 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already resolved the Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy filed against Reyes. Based on Sec. 3, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, this Resolution was already final and should have become executory five days after its promulgation. But despite this unrestrained ruling of the COMELEC En Banc the PBOC still proclaimed Reyes as the winning candidate on 18 May 2013.

On 16 May 2013, petitioner had already received the judgment cancelling her Certificate of Candidacy. As mentioned, two days thereafter, the PBOC still proclaimed her as the winner. Obviously, the proclamation took place notwithstanding that petitioner herself already knew of the COMELEC En Banc Resolution.

It must also be pointed out that even the PBOC already knew of the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner when it proclaimed her. The COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated 9 July 2013 and submitted to this Court through the Manifestation of private respondent, quoted the averments in the Verified Petition of petitioner therein as follows:

xxx While the proceedings of the PBOC is suspended or in recess, the process server of this Honorable Commission, who identified himself as PEDRO P. STA. ROSA II ('Sta. Rosa,' for brevity), arrived at the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Marinduque where the provincial canvassing is being held.1âwphi1

xxx The process server, Sta. Rosa, was in possession of certified true copies of the Resolution promulgated by the Commission on Elections En Banc on 14 May 2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) entitled Joseph Socorro B. Tan vs. Atty. Regina Ongsiako Reyes' and an Order dated 15 May 2013 to deliver the same to the Provincial Election Supervisor of Marinduque. The said Order was signed by no less than the Chairman of the Commission on Elections, the Honorable Sixta S. Brillantes, Jr.

xxx Process Server Pedro Sta. Rosa II immediately approached Atty. Edwin Villa, the Provincial Election Supervisor (PES) of Marinduque, upon his arrival to serve a copy of the aforementioned Resolution dated 14 May 2013 in SPA No. 13-05 3 (DC). Despite his proper identification that he is a process server from the COMELEC Main Office, the PES totally ignored Process Server Pedro Sta. Rosa II.

xxx Interestingly, the PES likewise refused to receive the copy of the Commission on Elections En Banc Resolution dated 14 May 2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) despite several attempts to do so.

xxx Instead, the PES immediately declared the resumption of the proceedings of the PBOC and instructed the Board Secretary to immediately read its Order proclaiming Regina Ongsiako Reyes as winner for the position of Congressman for the Lone District of Marinduque.

This narration of the events shows that the proclamation was in contravention of a COMELEC En Banc Resolution cancelling the candidate's Certificate of Candidacy.

The PBOC, a subordinate body under the direct control and supervision of the COMELEC, cannot simply disregard a COMELEC En Banc Resolution brought before its attention and hastily proceed with the proclamation by reasoning that it has not officially received the resolution or order.

The PBOC denied the motion to proclaim candidate Velasco on the ground that neither the counsel of petitioner nor the PBOC was duly furnished or served an official copy of the COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated 14 May 2013 and forthwith proceeded with the proclamation of herein petitioner, whose Certificate of Candidacy has already been cancelled, bespeaks mala fide on its part.

As early as 27 March 2013, when the COMELEC First Division cancelled petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy, the people of Marinduque, including the COMELEC officials in the province, were already aware of the impending disqualification of herein petitioner upon the finality of the cancellation of her Certificate of Candidacy. When the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy on the day of the elections, but before the proclamation of the winner, it had the effect of declaring that herein petitioner was not a candidate.

Thus, when the PBOC proclaimed herein petitioner, it proclaimed not a winner but a non-candidate.

The proclamation of a non-candidate cannot take away the power vested in the COMELEC to enforce and execute its decisions. It is a power that enjoys precedence over that emanating from any other authority, except the Supreme Court, xx x." (Emphasis supplied.)

Hence, at that moment, the COMELEC is not only bestowed with the authority, but more so, duty-bound to rectify the PBOC's mistake. Consequently, the COMELEC En Banc, in its July 9, 2013 Resolution in SPC No. 13-010, nullified the proclamation of Reyes, proceeded to constitute a special PBOC and on July 9, 2013, proclaimed Velasco as the winning Representative for the Lone District of Marinduque for the 2013-2016 term. As emphasized in the ponencia,this proclamation of Velasco was never questioned before this Court and likewise became final and executory. 54

The Dissent makes much of the cases questioning Reyes' eligibility that are pending before the HRET, and argues that the Court should deny the instant petition and defer to the action of the electoral tribunal.55

It is of no moment that there are two quo warranto cases currently pending before the HRET that seek to disqualify Reyes from holding the congressional office. 56 These cases cannot oust the COMELEC and the Court of their jurisdiction over the issue on Reyes' eligibility, which they have already validly acquired and exercised in SPA No. 13-053 and Reyes. The petitioners in the quo warranto cases themselves recognize the enforceability of the COMELEC and the Court's ruling in SPA No. 13-053 and Reyes, and even invoked the rulings therein to support their respective petitions. They seek not a trial de nova for the determination of whether or not Reyes is eligible to hold office as Representative, but seek the implementation of the final and executory decisions of the COMELEC and of the High Court. Interestingly, Reyes merely prayed for the dismissal of these cases, but never asked the HRET for any affirmative relief to counter the executory rulings in SPA No. 13-053, G.R. No. 207264, and SPA No. 13-010.

All told, We cannot turn a blind eye to the undisputed fact that the Court's pronouncements in Reyes and the pertinent resolutions of the COMELEC have established that the title and clear right to the contested office belongs to petitioner. In reinforcing this conclusion, the ponencia aptly observed that:57

xxx In this case, given the present factual milieu, i.e. the final and executory resolutions of this Court in G.R. No. 207264, the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) cancelling Reyes' Certificate of Candidacy, and the final and executory resolution of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-010 declaring null and void the proclamation of Reyes and proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque, it cannot be claimed that the present petition is one for the determination of the right of Velasco to the claimed office.

It has thus been conclusively proven that Velasco is the winning candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone District of Marinduque during the May 2013 Elections. As a consequence, when respondents Belmonte and Barua-Yap received the "Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of Winning Candidate for the position of Member of House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque" issued by the COMELEC in favor of the herein petitioner, they should have, without delay, abide by their respective ministerial duties to administer the oath in favor of the petitioner and to register his name in Roll of Members of the House of Representatives for the 2013-2016 term. Upon their unlawful refusal to do so despite repeated demands from petitioner, the extraordinary writ of mandamus ought to lie.

In the end, Reyes has no legal basis whatsoever to continue exercising the rights and prerogatives as the Lone District Representative of Marinduque as there is at present no pending action or petition which was instituted by her either before the HRET or the Court challenging petitioner Velasco's proclamation. Respondents Belmonte and Barua-Yap must thus honor the rights of petitioner and execute the final COMELEC and Supreme Court Resolutions in accordance with and furtherance of the rule of law.

In what was in all ill designed as a master stroke, Reyes, after all have been said and done by this Court in the petition, she herself filed, submitted a motion to withdraw that petition, G.R. No. 207264, Regina Ongsiako Reyes v. COMELEC and Tan.58 I had the opportunity to say, in the Court's denial of her motion to reconsider the dismissal of her petition, that:

The motion to withdraw petition filed AFTER the Court has acted thereon, is noted. It may well be in order to remind petitioner that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties, but continues until the case is terminated. When petitioner filed her Petition for Certiorari, jurisdiction vested in the Court and, in fact, the Court exercised such jurisdiction when it acted on the petition. Such jurisdiction cannot be lost by the unilateral withdrawal of the petition by petitioner.

More importantly, the Resolution dated 25 June 2013, being a valid court issuance, undoubtedly has legal consequences. Petitioner cannot, by the mere expediency of withdrawing the petition, negative and nullify the Court's Resolution and its legal effects. At this point, we counsel petitioner against trifling with court processes. Having sought the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, petitioner cannot withdraw her petition to erase the ruling adverse to her interests. Obviously, she cannot, as she designed below, subject to her predilections the supremacy of the law.

I cannot be moved one bit away from the conclusion, then as now, that parties to cases cannot trifle with our Court processes. If we deny the petition at hand, we will ourselves do for Reyes what we said in judgment cannot be done by her.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, I register my vote to GRANT the petition.

The quo warranto cases1 filed before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal have been dismissed in the Resolution2 dated December 14, 2015. The proper constitutional body, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, has already ruled on the basis of Lord Allan Jay Velasco' s (Velasco) claim to a seat in Congress. There is thus no pending proceeding nor matter that bars this court from issuing the writ of mandamus in favor of Velasco.

Under the situation attendant in this case, I therefore concur in the grant of the Petition for Mandamus.

Election contests assailing Regina Ongsiako Reyes' (Reyes) title as a member of the House of Representatives were filed. Velasco filed an electoral protest before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.3 For reasons only he understood, he opted to withdraw his case against Reyes before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and, instead, after Reyes had taken her oath and proceeded to represent the Lone District of Marinduque, filed the present Petition for Mandamus.

However, three quo warranto cases were also filed against Reyes before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.4

When Velasco filed this Petition for Mandamus, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal had yet to rule on Velasco' s title to a seat in Congress. The quo warranto cases were still pending before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.

While election contests were pending before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, this Petition for Mandamus was, in effect, an election contest.5 It was a procedural vehicle to raise "contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications"6 of a Member of the House of Representatives. This action set up the title of Velasco to a public office. Velasco claims a clear and better legal right as against the occupant. An election contest is a suit that can be filed by a candidate to question the title of an incumbent to a public office.7

The power to be the "sole judge"8 of all these contests is vested by our Constitution itself in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal to the exclusion of all others.9

SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.10

warranto,12 is a remedy "to dislodge the winning candidate from office"13 and "to establish who is the actual winner in the election."14 The action puts in issue the validity of the incumbent's claim to the office.

A contest contemplated by the Constitution settles disputes as to who is rightfully entitled to a position.15 It is not this court but the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal that has sole jurisdiction of contests involving Members of the House of Representatives. This can be filed through (a) an election protest under Rule 16 of the 2011 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; and (b) quo warranto under Rule 17 of the 2011 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.

Thus, while the petitions for quo warranto were pending before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, this court did not have the jurisdiction to rule on this Petition for Mandamus. A grant of the writ of mandamus would have openly defied the Constitution and, in all likelihood, would muddle the administration of justice as it would have rendered the quo warranto cases properly pending before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal moot and academic. We would have arrogated upon ourselves the resolution of then pending House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal cases.

Notwithstanding the pendency of the quo warranto cases before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Velasco relies on the Decision in Reyes v. Commission on Elections16 upholding the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections and affirming the Resolution of the Commission on Elections cancelling Reyes' Certificate of Candidacy for the grant of the writ of mandamus.

The Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration in Reyes v. Commission on Elections17 was denied by a divided court.18 Five justices19 voted to deny the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Reyes, and four justices20 voted to grant the Motion for Reconsideration.

On the same day that the Resolution was promulgated, this court En Banc decided Tanada, Jr. v. Commission on Elections21 by a unanimous vote.22 In Tanada, this court once again upheld the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal "over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed representative[.]"23 The issue on the validity of the proclamation of a Member of Congress is included in the term "returns." We said:

Case law states that the proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests the COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed representative in favor of the HRET. The phrase "election, returns, and qualifications" refers to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee's title. In particular, the term "election" refers to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; "returns" refers to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and "qualifications" refers to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his CoC.24 (Citation omitted)

Petitioners (in G.R. Nos. 179120, 179132-33, and 179240--41) steadfastly maintained that Limkaichong's proclamation was tainted with irregularity, which will effectively prevent the HRET from acquiring jurisdiction.

The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as in this case, was alleged to have been tainted with irregularity does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction. The Court has shed light on this in the case of Vinzons-Chato, to the effect that:

In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent Unico has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of the House of Representatives (Thirteenth Congress); hence, the COMELEC correctly ruled that it had already lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chato' s petition. The issues raised by petitioner Chato essentially relate to the canvassing of returns and alleged invalidity of respondent Unico's proclamation. These are matters that are best addressed to the sound judgment and discretion of the HRET. Significantly, the allegation that respondent Unico's proclamation is null and void does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction:

x x [I]n an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the people's mandate.

Further, for the Court to take cognizance of petitioner Chato's election protest against respondent Unico would be to usurp the constitutionally mandated functions of the HRET.

In fine, any allegations as to the invalidity of the proclamation will not prevent the HRET from assuming jurisdiction over all matters essential to a member's qualification to sit in the House of Representatives.

Accordingly, after the proclamation of the winning candidate in the congressional elections, the remedy of those who may assail one's eligibility/ineligibility/qualification/disqualification is to file before the HRET a petition for an election protest, or a petition for quo warranto, within the period provided by the HRET Rules. In Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections, we ruled that where the candidate has already been proclaimed winner in the congressional elections, the remedy of petitioner is to file an electoral protest with the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives.26 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET' s own jurisdiction begins. Stated in another manner, where the candidate has already been proclaimed winner in the congressional elections, the remedy of the petitioner is to file an electoral protest with the HRET.28 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

When Reyes was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque on May 18, 2013, Velasco should have continued his election protest or filed a quo warranto Petition before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.29 Instead, Velasco filed a Petition to annul the proceedings of the Provincial Board of Canvassers and the proclamation of Reyes on May 20, 2013 before the Commission on Elections.30 At that time, the Commission on Elections no longer had jurisdiction over the Petition that was filed after Reyes' proclamation.

Any alleged invalidity of the proclamation of a Member of the House of Representatives does not divest the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal of jurisdiction.31

Should there have been pending cases at the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, we should have deferred to the action of the constitutional body given the competence to act initially on the matter. Thus, in the Dissenting Opinion in Reyes v. Commission on Elections:

In case of doubt, there are fundamental reasons for this Court to be cautious in exercising its jurisdiction to determine who the members are of the House of Representatives. We should maintain our consistent doctrine that proclamation is the operative act that removes jurisdiction from this Court or the Commission on Elections and vests it on the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

The first reason is that the Constitution unequivocably grants this discretion to another constitutional body called the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET). This is a separate organ from the Judiciary.

The second fundamental reason for us to exercise caution in determining the composition of the House of Representatives is that this is required for a better administration of justice. Matters relating to factual findings on election, returns, and qualifications must first be vetted in the appropriate electoral tribunal before these are raised in the Supreme Court.32

The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of contests involving Members of the House of Representatives.33 This is a power conferred by the sovereign through our Constitution.

This Court may obtain jurisdiction over questions regarding the validity of the proclamation of a candidate vying for a seat in Congress without encroaching upon the jurisdiction of a constitutional body, the electoral tribunal. "[The remedies of] certiorari and prohibition will not lie in this case [to annul the proclamation of a candidate] considering that there is an available and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; [that is, the filing of an electoral protest before the electoral tribunals]." These remedies, however, may lie only after a ruling by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal or the Senate Electoral Tribunal.35 (Emphasis supplied)

However, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal already ruled on the two quo warranto cases against Reyes that were consolidated.36 The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal held that it had no jurisdiction to resolve the petitions for quo warranto relying on this court's Decision in Reyes v. Commission on Elections. 37 In their Resolution, the House of Representatives pronounced:

Such element is obviously absent in the present cases as Regina Reyes' proclamation was nullified by the COMELEC, which nullification was upheld by the Supreme Court. On this ground alone, the Tribunal is without power to assume jurisdiction over the present petitions since Regina Reyes "cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives," as declared by the Supreme Court En Banc in G.R. No. 207264.38 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)

The tribunal dismissed the quo warranto cases holding that the Commission on Elections' cancellation of Reyes' certificate of candidacy resulted in the nullification of her proclamation.39 Thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the September 23, 2014 Motion for Reconsideration of Victor Vela Sioco is hereby GRANTED. The September 11, 2014 Resolution of Tribunal is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the present Petitions for Quo Warranto are hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.40 (Emphasis in the original)

In effect, the decision by the sole judge of all electoral contests acknowledges Reyes' lack of qualifications. While maintaining my dissent in Reyes v. Commission on Elections, I now acknowledge that there is no other remedy in law or equity to enforce a final decision of this court except through mandamus.

Applying Codilla, Sr. v. Hon. de Venecia,41 this Petition for Mandamus should be granted.

Aratea v. Commission on Elections71 qualified the second-placer rule. The candidate receiving the next highest number of votes would be entitled to the position if the Certificate of Candidacy of the candidate receiving the highest number of votes had been initially declared valid at the time of filing but had to be subsequently cancelled.72 Additionally, if the Certificate of Candidacy of the candidate receiving the highest number of votes was void ab initio, the votes of the candidate should be considered stray and not counted.73 This would entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to the position.74 Thus:

Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible should be limited to situations where the certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from the beginning. This is the more equitable and logical approach on the effect of the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of candidacy void ab initio can operate to defeat one or more valid certificates of candidacy for the same position.75 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

The Decision in Aratea was subsequently reiterated in Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections76 and Maquiling v. Commission on Elections.77