G.R. No. 209180




IPI No. 15-35-SB-J, February 23, 2016 ♦ Decision, Brion [J] ♦ Concurring & Dissenting Opinion, Bersamin [J] February 23, 2016 IPI No. 15-35-SB-J RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT DATED JULY 13, 2015 OF ALFONSO V. UMALI, JR., Complainant, vs. HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE, SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent. CONCURRING & DISSENTING OPINION BERSAMIN, J.: I wish so much not having to write this separate opinion because I am most willing tojoin the inexorable result so compellingly justified by Justice Brion. However, my attention has been seized by the following passage in the main opinion of Justice Brion, to wit: The relaxation of the hearsay rule in disciplinary administrative proceedings against judges and justices where bribery proceedings are involved is not a novel thought in this Court; it has been advocated in the Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Arturo D. Brion in the administrative case of Justice Ong before this Court. The Opinion essentially maintained that the Court could make a conclusion that bribery had taken place *when the circumstances -including those derived from hearsay evidence -sufficiently prove its occurrence. It was emphasized that [t]o satisfy the substantial evidence requirement for administrative cases, hearsay evidence should necessarily be supplemented and corroborated by other evidence that are not hearsay. In the present case, however, the hearsay allegations constituted the totality of Umali's evidence. The records did not contain any other piece of evidence to supplement the hearsay evidence. As earlier stated, Umali did not even attach any affidavit to the complaint relating to or tending to suppocy the alleged attempted extortion. Umali relied mainly on surmises and conjectures, and on the mere fact that the Sandiganbayan rulings penned by Justice Hernandez were adverse to him. Through this separate opinion, I simply wish to comment on the foregoing passage lest I be misperceived as departing from the standard on the admission and use as evidence of extrajudicial declarations* whose verity and accuracy are not within the personal knowledge of the declarant. I distinctly remember that I emphatically discoursed on the standard in my Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Re: Allegations Made Under Oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing Held on September 26, 2013 Against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan,1 as follows: The evidence required in administrative cases is concededly only substantial; that is, the requirement of substantial evidence is satisfied although the evidence is not overwhelming, for as long as there is reasonable ground to believe that the person charged is guilty of the act complained of. However, the substantial evidence rule should not be invoked to sanction the use in administrative proceedings of clearly inadmissible evidence.1âwphi1 Although strict adherence to technical rules is not required in administrative proceedings, this lenity should not be considered a license to disregard fundamental evidentiary rules. The evidence presented must at least have a modicum of admissibility in order for it to have probative value. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla; it means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In my opinion, administrative proceedings should not be treated differently under pain of being perceived as arbitrary in our administrative adjudications. The statements of Luy and Sula being relied upon were based not on the declarants' personal knowledge, but on statements made to them by Napoles. I find it very odd that the Majority would accord credence to such statements by Luy and Sula if they themselves did not personally acquire knowledge of such matters. I insist that elementary evidentiary rules must be observed even in administrative proceedings. A most basic rule is that a witness can only testify on matters that he or she knows of her personal knowledge. This rule does not change even if the required standard be substantial evidence, preponderance of evidence, proof beyond reasonable doubt, or clear and convincing evidence. The observations that the statements of Luy and Sula were made amidst the "challenging and difficult setting" of the Senate hearings, and that the witnesses were "candid, straightforward and categorical" during I the administrative investigation did not excise the defect from them. The concern of the hearsay rule is not the credibility of the witness presently testifying, but the veracity and competence of the extrajudicial source of the witness's information. To be clear, personal knowledge is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence to establish the truth of a disputed fact. The Court amply explained this in Patula v. People: To elucidate why xx x hearsay evidence was unreliable and untrustworthy, and thus devoid of probative value, reference is made to Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness can testify only to those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rulb of Court. The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of her information. In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another person say about the facts in dispute, the person from whom the witness derived the information on the facts in dispute is not in court and under oath to be examined and cross-examined. The weight of such testimony then depends nofupon the veracity of the witness but upon the veracity of the other person giving the information to the witness without oath. The information cannot be tested because the declarant is not standing in court as a witness and cannot, therefore, be cross-examined. It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to enter into any particular, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that she entrenches herself in the simple assertion that she was told so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or absent author. Thus, the rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The testimony may have been given under oath and before a court of justice, but if it is offered against a party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same. Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject to the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the accused uttered those words. This kind of utterance is hearsay in character but is not legal hearsay. The distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies. Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule that explains why testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing party to cross-examine the original declarant claiming to have a direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence. If hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied because the declarant is not in court. It is then to be stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse party's witness, being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, is essential to the administration of justice. To address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as evidence to establish the truth in a dispute while also safeguarding a party's right to cross-examine her adversary's witness, the Rules of Court offers two solutions. The first solution is to require that all the witnesses in a judicial trial or hearing be examined only in court under oath or affirmation. Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court formalizes this solution, viz: Section 1. Examination to be done in open court. - The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally. (1a) The second solution is to require that all witnesses be subject to the cross-examination by the adverse party. Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court ensures this solution thusly: Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. - Upon the termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue. (8a) Although the second solution traces its existence to a Constitutional precept relevant to criminal cases, i.e., Section 14, (2), Article III, of the 1987 Constitution, which guarantees that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall xxx enjoy the right xxx to meet the witnesses face to face xxx," the rule requiring the cross-examination by the adverse party equally applies to non-criminal proceedings. We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon serious concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence due to its not being given under oath or solemn affirmation and due to its not being subjected to cross-examination by the opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon whose reliability the worth of the out-of-court statement depends.2 In my humble view, the standard should stand to guide the courts in the admission and use of extrajudicial declarations of witnesses who are bereft of the personal competence to know the truth of the facts declared. NONETHELESS, I concur in the result. LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice Footnotes 1 A.M. No. SB-14-21-J, September 23, 2014, 736 SCRA 12, (per curiam). 2 Id. at 144-149 (bold unddrscoring is part of the original text). The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation