EN BANC
[ A.M. No. RTJ-13-2361 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4144-RTJ]. February 02, 2016 ]
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, VS. PRESIDING JUDGE JOSEPH CEDRICK O. RUIZ, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 61, MAKATI CITY, RESPONDENT.
CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
This court resolves an administrative Complaint filed by the Office of the Court Administrator against respondent Judge Joseph Cedrick O. Ruiz, Presiding Judge of Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law, and for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, which are serious charges under Rule 140, Section 8 of the Rules of Court.
Informations for violation of Section 3(e)(l) of Republic Act No. 3019 and malversation of public funds were filed against respondent before the Sandiganbayan.1 The case was docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 27467-68.
It was alleged that respondent, as then Mayor of Dapitan City, conspired with and facilitated Police Inspector Pepe Nortal's withdrawal of P1 million from the Confidential and Intelligence Fund of the Mayor's Office and used it for his own benefit.2
On April 29, 2013, the First Division of the Sandiganbayan found respondent guilty beyond reasonable doubt.3 Respondent moved for reconsideration and new trial; however, the Sandiganbayan denied his Motions in its August 28, 2013 Resolution.4
On October 18, 2013, respondent filed before this court a Petition for Review on certiorari assailing his convictions in Criminal Case Nos. 27467-68. This was docketed as G.R. Nos. 209073-74.5
Respondent was found administratively liable. Respondent's convictions before the Sandiganbayan constitute serious charges under Rule 140, Section 8(2) and (5) of the Rules of Court:6
The respondent's convictions by the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and for malversation of public funds confirm that the administrative charges for which he may be found liable are serious charges under Section 8(2) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended. Malversation is likewise considered as a serious charge since it is a crime involving moral turpitude.7
In finding respondent administratively liable, the ponencia laid down the pieces of evidence amounting to substantial evidence that respondent committed the acts complained of and is, thus, guilty of serious charges.8
I concur with the finding of respondent's administrative liability. Rule 140, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides the sanctions a judge may suffer if he or she is found guilty of a serious charge:
Section 11. Sanctions.—A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations: Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.9
In National Bureau of Investigation v. Reyes,10 the respondent judge was dismissed from service and disbarred for being guilty of malfeasance through bribery, which is a serious charge under the Rules of Court. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Indar,11 the respondent judge was dismissed for issuing decisions without conducting judicial proceedings. This constituted a serious charge under Rule 14.0, Section 8 of the Rules of Court.12
However, I must clarify that the acts committed by judges or justices prior to their appointment to the judiciary must not be automatically taken to affect their standing or qualification as members of the judiciary.
The ponencia stated that:
In this determination, it is immaterial that the respondent was not yet a member of the Judiciary when he allegedly committed the acts imputed to him; judges may be disciplined for acts committed prior to their appointment to the judiciary. Our Rules itself recognizes this situation, as it provides for the immediate forwarding to the Supreme Court for disposition and adjudication of charges against justices and judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their appointment to the judiciary. It need not be shown that the respondent continued to do the act or acts complained of; it is sufficient that the evidence on record supports the charge/s against the respondent through proof that the respondent committed the imputed act/s violative of Code of Judicial Conduct and the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court.13 (Emphasis supplied)
While it is true that the acts of judges or justices committed prior to appointment to the judiciary may be a basis for disciplinary measures by this court, qualifications as to when a judge or justice may be removed must be made.1aшphi1
There may be situations where a closer review of the facts and corresponding charges or crimes is necessary. For example, the Judicial and Bar Council may have known about an applicant's pending case but chose to regard him or her as qualified. Before an applicant is appointed to the judiciary, he or she is subjected to the rigorous application and nomination procedure by the Judicial and Bar Council.14 The Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council prescribes the minimum requirements for nominations: constitutional and statutory qualifications; competence, which includes educational preparation, experience, performance, and other accomplishments; integrity; independence; and sound physical, mental, and emotional condition.15
In Rule 4, Section 5 of the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, persons are disqualified from being nominated for appointment to the judiciary when they have pending criminal or administrative cases before courts:
Section 5. Disqualification. - The following are disqualified from being nominated for appointment to any judicial post or as Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman:
1. Those with pending criminal or regular administrative cases;
2. Those with pending criminal cases in foreign courts or tribunals; and
3. Those who have been convicted in any criminal case; or in an administrative case, where the penalty imposed is at least a fine of more than P10,000, unless he has been granted judicial clemency.
By nominating an applicant for appointment, the Judicial and Bar Council gives its imprimatur to the applicant. It deems the applicant to have the "reputation for honesty, integrity, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards."16 If we do not carefully consider the prior acts of judges or justices in relation to their judicial functions and automatically find convictions or pronouncements of guilt as a reflection of the qualifications of the judge or justice, then we disregard the Judicial and Bar Council's nomination process. This disregard is even more apparent when the appointing authority—the President— appoints a nominee from the Judicial and Bar Council's list. To automatically dismiss a judge or justice based on the above grounds undermines the President's appointment.
In another situation, an applicant may not have any pending criminal or administrative charge when he or she applies for a post in the judiciary. After the applicant's appointment to the judiciary, a disgruntled party-litigant decides to look into the judge's past and files criminal charges against him or her. The case may or may not be relevant to the functions of the judge or may not constitute a crime of moral turpitude. However, damage to the judge's perceived integrity and probity has already been made.
The judiciary must find a balance between maintaining the integrity and competence of its judges, justices, and other personnel and protecting its members from harassment that aims to prevent the miscarriage of justice. As this court has said before:
[I]t is established that any administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always be examined with a discriminating eye, for its consequential effects are, by their nature, highly penal, such that the respondent judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal or disbarment. As aforementioned, the filing of criminal cases against judges may be used as tools to harass them and may in the long run create adverse consequences.17
ACCORDINGLY, I vote that respondent Judge Joseph Cedrick O. Ruiz, Presiding Judge of Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, be DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned and controlled corporations. Respondent should also be DISBARRED and his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
Footnotes
1 Ponencia, p. 2.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 3.
5 Id. at 4.
6 As amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC (2001).
Section 8. Serious charges.—Serious charges include:
1. Bribery, direct or indirect;
2. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. No. 3019);
3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;
4. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent court in an appropriate proceeding;
5. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
6. Willful failure to pay a just debt;
7. Borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the court;
8. Immorality;
9. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure;
10. Partisan political activities; and
11. Alcoholism and/or vicious habits.
7 Ponencia, p. 6.
8 Id. at 12.
9 As amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC (2001).
10 382 Phil. 872 (2000) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
11 685 Phil. 272 (2012) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
12 This was Judge Cader Indar's third offense.
13 Ponencia, p. 8.
14 See CONST., art. VIII, sec. 8 and 9.
15 See JBC - 009, Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (2000), as amended.
16 JBC - 009, Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (2000), as amended, Rule 4, sec. 1.
17 See Re: Judge Adoracion Angeles, A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC, 567 Phil. 189 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division], citing Emmanuel Ymson Velasco v. Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, 557 Phil. 1 (2007) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc] and Mataga v. Judge Rosete, 483 Phil. 235 (2004) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
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