G.R. No. 207132, December 6, 2016,
♦ Decision,
Brion, [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion,
Leonen, [J]
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 207132. December 06, 2016 ]
ASSOCIATION OF MEDICAL CLINICS FOR OVERSEAS WORKERS, INC., (AMCOW), REPRESENTED HEREIN BY ITS PRESIDENT, DR. ROLANDO VILLOTE, PETITIONER, VS. GCC APPROVED MEDICAL CENTERS ASSOCIATION, INC. AND CHRISTIAN CANGCO, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 207205]
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, PETITIONER, VS. GCC APPROVED MEDICAL CENTERS ASSOCIATION, INC. AND CHRISTIAN E. CANGCO, RESPONDENTS.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, J:
I concur in the result.
I.
The special civil actions filed with the Regional Trial Court were both for the issuance of a writ of certiorari and a writ of prohibition. Thus, in the very opening paragraph of the discussion of the Regional Trial Court in question:
The present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeks: a) the issuance of a writ of prohibition to enjoin and prohibit respondent Secretary from enforcing and implementing Department of Health (DOH) Order dated August 23, 2010 on the ground that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and b) the declaration of Paragraphs c.3 and c.4, Section 16, of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10022 and Section 1(c) and 1(d), Rule XI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) as unconstitutional for being contrary to the generally accepted principles of international law, i.e., the principle of sovereign equality and independence of states.1
The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court's questioned Decision2 reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. Accordingly, the writ of CERTIORARI is hereby issued declaring null and void ab initio the August 23, 2010 Order and November 2, 2010 reiterating Order of the respondent DOH secretary. A writ of Prohibition is likewise issued directing the respondent DOH Secretary and all persons acting on his behalf to cease and desist from implementing the assailed Orders against the petitioners. The August 1, 2011 writ of preliminary injunction is hereby made permanent. Civil Case No. 04-0670 is hereby dismissed for being moot and academic.3 (Emphasis supplied)
Section 21 of Batas PambansaNo. 129 provides:
Section 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction:
(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions[.1aшphi1] (Emphasis supplied)
The Regional Trial Court of Pasay had jurisdiction over the remedies invoked, which were petitions for a writ of certiorari and a writ of prohibition. However, it did not have jurisdiction to enjoin to issue the writs for its intended scope.
The Order of the Department of Health dated August 23, 20104 and its reiterative Order dated November 2, 20105 was nationwide in its scope. After all, the Department of Health is a nationwide agency. The respondent GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc. did not clearly and convincingly show that all its members were located only within the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.
For these reasons alone, the decision of the court a quo is null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction. Thus, the Petitions should be granted.
II.
In my view, it is not necessary to bifurcate the Special Civil Action for certiorari into a "traditional" track and an "expanded" mode. The present rules are already sufficient for this Court to exercise its fundamental power of judicial review described in part in Article VIII, Section 1.6
Neither would it be correct to limit any of our certiorari powers, even on an "expanded" basis, to questions, which only raise constitutional issues. An act of any government branch, agency, or instrumentality that violates a statute or a treaty is grave abuse of discretion. The Constitution does not distinguish the cause for grave abuse.7 Neither should this Court, unless, in the guise of promulgating rules of procedure, we wish to effect an amendment of the Constitution.
Finally, I express my reservations relating to the absolute necessity for a decision of this Court before any other organ of government can act on its rational belief in the bending nature of any customary international norms or a general principle of international law. Our constitutional adherence to international law is by virtue of incorporation through Article II, Section 28 or Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution.9 Judicial action is not required for these norms to be binding. Neither of these modes of incorporation require it.
III.
Fundamental to constitutional litigation is the assurance that judicial review should only happen when there is an actual case or controversy. That is, the judiciary is not an advisory body to the President, Congress, or any other branch, instrumentality, or agency of the government. Thus, absent any actual or sufficiently imminent breach, which will cause an injury to a fundamental right, a provision of law or an administrative regulation cannot be challenged. This Court is co-equal with the other branches of government.10 The Constitution is a legible, written document capable of being read by all. Its ambiguity may only be clarified through judicial review when it becomes apparent through the existence of an actual situation. The mere existence of subordinate norms - in the form of a statue, treaty or administrative rule - is not enough. There has to be parties who tend to be directly and substantially injured under a specific concrete set of facts.11
The confusion with certiorari in my view, is brought about by instances in the recent past where actions, which should have been considered as ones for declaratory relief, were acted upon by this Court as if they were certiorari actions. For example, in James M. Imbong, et al. v. Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al.12 or the Reproductive Health (RH) cases, this Court took cognizance of the Petitions even if there were still no Implementing Rules, no doctor or health practitioner threatened with sanctions, no couple or spouse whose prerogatives were to be curtailed. In my dissent, I pointed to the dangers of speculative arguments, mainly, that our imagination substituted for actual facts. Imagination took precedence over actual controversy.ℒαwρhi৷
The same with the case of Jose Jesus M. Disini, et al. v. The Secretary of Justice, et al.13 In that case, there was no cybercrime committed. There was no cybercrime threatened to be committed, no social media part removed, no advertising in cyberspace prohibited. Again, although denominated as certiorari actions, the petitions were in actuality actions for declaratory relief.
Petitions for certiorari as provided in Rule 65 are available only to correct acts done in a judicial or quasi-judicial procedure.14 This ensures that the power of judicial review can only be exercised when there is an actual controversy. No judicial action can happen without interested parties, who suffer injury and therefore ready to plead the facts that give actual rise to their real injury. This is the same with quasi-judicial actions.
Ministerial or administrative actions, which will cause or threaten to cause injury can be corrected through a Writ of Prohibition, not a Writ of Certiorari. In both cases, the requirement of the absence of a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law conforms with the deferential nature of judicial review in constitutional cases. The requirement in both cases that there be a clear finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction is sufficient to meet the scope of all our powers of judicial review.
The suggestion to expand the present rules on Petitions for Certiorari opens a very dangerous road towards changing our place in the Constitutional order. It will transform this Court to a virtual overload that will review legislative and executive acts, even without the presence of an actual controversy, simply because in our collective and subjective view, there may be some amorphous and undefined but gut feeling transcendental interest involved.
It is in this respect that I wage this Court to tread with an abundance of all caution even as I respect the erudite observations of Justice Arturo Brion. This Court must clothe itself with humility as it reviews its past cases in the light of a full understanding of our constitutional role if and when we do exercise our power to amend the rules.
In my view, discussions are thus premature.
IV.
In Restituto Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,15 this Court called a trial court to task when it hesitated to decide on the constitutionality of an Executive Order in the presence of a clearly pleaded actual case. After all, the plain text of Article VIII, Section 5 (2) (a) states:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
. . . .
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm an appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or the validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Emphasis provided)
To limit constitutional questions only for the determination of this Court at first instance and even in its "expanded" mode is not consistent with this provision. It may also be inconsistent with Article VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution:
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
As earlier pointed out, Section 21 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 grants jurisdiction to the Regional Trial Court in Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition. The only qualification is that the writs "... may be enforced in any part of their respective jurisdictions."16
For this Court to reduce this jurisdiction further is to amend Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, therefore breaching our solemn commitment to a Constitution that removes from us the power to prescribe jurisdiction.
V.
I join Justice Lucas Bersamin's observations that the issuance of a Cease and Desist Order does not per se mean that the actions taken by the Department of Health is quasi-judicial in nature. In my view, the executive department in applying and implementing the law does not only do so by mere advice or persuasion to those who do not follow its provisions. The executive is not without its own set of legally mandated coercive powers short of any kind of adjudication. The issuance of an order to cease and desist in the Petitioners' continuing violation of the law is one of them. The type of cease and order in the case was therefore an administrative act. If at all, the proper action to question its constitutionality is a Petition for a Writ of Prohibition not a Writ of Certiorari. However, due to the scope of the writ requested, it should have been filed with the Court of Appeals, not the Regional Trial Court.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the Petitions.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 56.
2 Id. at 56-66. The Regional Trial Court Decision was promulgated on August 10, 2012 and penned by Judge Maria Rosario B. Ragasa of Branch 108 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.
3 Id. at 66.
4 Id. at 19-20.
5 Id. at 20.
6 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 1 states:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
7 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 1.
8 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 1 states:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
9 CONST., art. VII, sec. 21 states:
Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
10 Jose Alejandrino v. Manuel L. Quezon, et al., 46 Phil. 83 (1924) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].
11 The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), 589 Phil. 387 (2008) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].
12 732 Phil. 1 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
13 727 Phil. 28 (2014) [Per J. Abad, En Banc].
14 RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, sec. 1 states that:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
15 232 Phil. 615 (1987) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].
16 Batas Blg. 129, sec. 21.
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