G.R. No. 203335

Jose Jesus M. Disini v. The Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, 22 April 2014
♦ Resolution, Abad [J]
♦ Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, Sereno [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Brion [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Leonen [J]

JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P. MEDINA, JANETTE TORAL and ERNESTO SONIDO, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.

ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), HUKUMAN NG MAMAMAYAN MOVEMENT, INC., JERRY S. YAP, BERTENI "TOTO" CAUSING, HERNANI Q. CUARE, PERCY LAPID, TRACY CABRERA, RONALDO E. RENTA, CIRILO P. SABARRE, JR., DERVIN CASTRO, ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, represented by President Benigno Simeon Aquino III, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

SENATOR TEOFISTO DL GUINGONA III, Petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OFTHE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, and DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.

ALEXANDER ADONIS, ELLEN TORDESILLAS, MA. GISELA ORDENES-CASCOLAN, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., ROMEL R. BAGARES, and GILBERT T. ANDRES, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, AND THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE-DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Respondents.

HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON. ANTONIO TINIO, VENCER MARI CRISOSTOMO OF ANAKBAYAN, MA. KATHERINE ELONA OF THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGIAN, ISABELLE THERESE BAGUISI OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Benigno Simeon Aquino III, LEILA DE LIMA in her capacity as Secretary of Justice, Respondents.

BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR., National Artist BIENVENIDO L. LUMBERA, Chairperson of Concerned Artists of the Philippines, ELMER C. LABOG, Chairperson of Kilusang Mayo Uno, CRISTINA E. PALABAY, Secretary General of Karapatan, FERDINAND R. GAITE, Chairperson of COURAGE, JOEL B. MAGLUNSOD, Vice President of Anakpawis Party-List, LANA R. LINABAN, Secretary General Gabriela Women’s Party, ADOLFO ARES P. GUTIERREZ, and JULIUS GARCIA MATIBAG, Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, President of the Republic of the Philippines, PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, represented by SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., LEILA DE LIMA, Secretary of the Department of Justice, LOUIS NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, Executive Director of the Information and Communications Technology Office, NONNATUS CAESAR R. ROJAS, Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, D/GEN. NICANOR A. BARTOLOME, Chief of the Philippine National Police, MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

MELENCIO S. STA. MARIA, SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, AMPARITA STA. MARIA, RAY PAOLO J. SANTIAGO, GILBERT V. SEMBRANO, and RYAN JEREMIAH D. QUAN (all of the Ateneo Human Rights Center), Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE PAQUITO OCHOA in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HONORABLE LEILA DE LIMA in her capacity as Secretary of Justice, HONORABLE MANUEL ROXAS in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government, The CHIEF of the Philippine National Police, The DIRECTOR of the National Bureau of Investigation (all of the Executive Department of Government), Respondents.

NATIONAL UNION OF JOURNALISTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUJP), PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE (PPI), CENTER FOR MEDIA FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY, ROWENA CARRANZA PARAAN, MELINDA QUINTOS-DE JESUS, JOSEPH ALWYN ALBURO, ARIEL SEBELLINO AND THE PETITIONERS IN THE e-PETITION http://www.nujp.org/no-to-ra10175/, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE CYBERCRIME INVESTIGATION AND COORDINATING CENTER, AND ALL AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES OF GOVERNMENT AND ALL PERSONS ACTING UNDER THEIR INSTRUCTIONS, ORDERS, DIRECTION IN RELATION TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10175, Respondents.

PAUL CORNELIUS T. CASTILLO & RYAN D. ANDRES, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE HON. SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Respondents.

ANTHONY IAN M. CRUZ; MARCELO R. LANDICHO; BENJAMIN NOEL A. ESPINA; MARCK RONALD C. RIMORIN; JULIUS D. ROCAS; OLIVER RICHARD V. ROBILLO; AARON ERICK A. LOZADA; GERARD ADRIAN P. MAGNAYE; JOSE REGINALD A. RAMOS; MA. ROSARIO T. JUAN; BRENDALYN P. RAMIREZ; MAUREEN A. HERMITANIO; KRISTINE JOY S. REMENTILLA; MARICEL O. GRAY; JULIUS IVAN F. CABIGON; BENRALPH S. YU; CEBU BLOGGERS SOCIETY, INC. PRESIDENT RUBEN B. LICERA, JR; and PINOY EXPAT/OFW BLOG AWARDS, INC. COORDINATOR PEDRO E. RAHON; Petitioners,
vs.
HIS EXCELLENCY BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, in his capacity as President of the Republic of the Philippines; SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Senate President; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, represented by FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives; HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of Justice; HON. LOUIS NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, in his capacity as Executive Director, Information and Communications Technology Office; HON. NONNATUS CAESAR R. ROJAS, in his capacity as Director, National Bureau of Investigation; and P/DGEN. NICANOR A. BARTOLOME, in his capacity as Chief, Philippine National Police, Respondents.

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
HIS EXCELLENCY BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, in his official capacity as President of the Republic of the Philippines; HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his official capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her official capacity as Secretary of Justice; LOUIS NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, in his official capacity as Executive Director, Information and Communications Technology Office; NONNATUS CAESAR R. ROJAS, in his official capacity as Director of the National Bureau of Investigation; and DIRECTOR GENERAL NICANOR A. BARTOLOME, in his official capacity as Chief of the Philippine National Police, Respondents.

BAYAN MUNA REPRESENTATIVE NERI J. COLMENARES, Petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Respondent.

NATIONAL PRESS CLUB OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. represented by BENNY D. ANTIPORDA in his capacity as President and in his personal capacity, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRES. BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT AND ALL OTHER GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITIES WHO HAVE HANDS IN THE PASSAGE AND/OR IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLIC ACT 10175, Respondents.

PHILIPPINE INTERNET FREEDOM ALLIANCE, composed of DAKILA- PHILIPPINE COLLECTIVE FOR MODERN HEROISM, represented by Leni Velasco, PARTIDO LAKAS NG MASA, represented by Cesar S. Melencio, FRANCIS EUSTON R. ACERO, MARLON ANTHONY ROMASANTA TONSON, TEODORO A. CASIÑO, NOEMI LARDIZABAL-DADO, IMELDA MORALES, JAMES MATTHEW B. MIRAFLOR, JUAN G.M. RAGRAGIO, MARIA FATIMA A. VILLENA, MEDARDO M. MANRIQUE, JR., LAUREN DADO, MARCO VITTORIA TOBIAS SUMAYAO, IRENE CHIA, ERASTUS NOEL T. DELIZO, CRISTINA SARAH E. OSORIO, ROMEO FACTOLERIN, NAOMI L. TUPAS, KENNETH KENG, ANA ALEXANDRA C. CASTRO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, THE HEAD OF THE DO OFFICE OF CYBERCRIME, and THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CYBERCRIME INVESTIGATION AND COORDINATING CENTER, Respondents.

A number of petitioners seek reconsideration of the Court's February 18, 2014 Decision that declared invalid and unconstitutional certain provisions of Republic Act 10125 or the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 and upheld the validity of the others. The respondents, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, also seek reconsideration of portions of that decision. After going over their motions, however, the Court sees no substantial arguments from either side to warrant the reversal of its February 18, 2014 Decision.

The point about the legislative bicameral committee's insertions of certain provisions that were neither in the House bill nor in the Senate bill is something that the Court is not inclined to investigate since insertions are within the power of those committees to make so long as the passage of the law complies with the constitutional requirements.1 The Cybercrime Prevention Act went through both houses and they approved it. Any issue concerning alleged non-compliance with the governing rules of both houses regarding committee insertions have to be internally resolved by each house.

In any event, the Court will briefly address certain aspects of the decision that drew the most objections.

Section 6 of the cybercrime law imposes penalties that are one degree higher when the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code and certain special laws are committed with the use of information and communication technologies (ICT). Some of the petitioners insist that Section 6 is invalid since it produces an unusual chilling effect on users of cyberspace that would hinder free expression.

Petitioner Bloggers and Netizens for Democracy insist that Section 6 cannot stand in the absence of a definition of the term "information and communication technology".2 But petitioner seems to forget the basic tenet that statutes should not be read in isolation from one another. The parameters of that ICT exist in many other laws. Indeed those parameters have been used as basis for establishing government systems and classifying evidence.3 These along with common usage provide the needed boundary within which the law may be applied.

The Court had ample opportunity to consider the proposition that Section 6 violates the equal protection clause via the parties’ pleadings, oral arguments, and memoranda. But, as the Decision stressed, the power to fix the penalties for violations of penal laws, like the cybercrime law, exclusively belongs to Congress.

In any event, Section 6 of the cybercrime law merely makes the commission of existing crimes through the internet a qualifying circumstance that raises by one degree the penalties corresponding to such crimes. This is not at all arbitrary since a substantial distinction exists between crimes committed through the use of ICT and similar crimes committed using conventional means.

The United Nations Special Rapporteur,4 Frank La Rue, acknowledged the material distinction. He pointed out that "[t]he vast potential and benefits of the Internet are rooted in its unique characteristics, such as its speed, worldwide reach and relative anonymity." For this reason, while many governments advocate freedom online, they recognize the necessity to regulate certain aspects of the use of this media to protect the most vulnerable.5

Not infrequently, certain users of the technology have found means to evade being identified and for this reason have been emboldened to reach far more victims or cause greater harm or both. It is, therefore, logical for Congress to consider as aggravating the deliberate use of available ICT by those who ply their wicked trades.

Compared to traditional crimes, cybercrimes are more perverse. In traditional estafa for example, the offender could reach his victim only at a particular place and a particular time. It is rare that he could consummate his crime without exposing himself to detection and prosecution. Fraud online, however, crosses national boundaries, generally depriving its victim of the means to obtain reparation of the wrong done and seek prosecution and punishment of the absent criminal. Cybercriminals enjoy the advantage of anonymity, like wearing a mask during a heist.

Petitioners share the Chief Justice’s concern for the overall impact of those penalties, being one degree higher than those imposed on ordinary crimes, including the fact that the prescriptive periods for the equivalent cybercrimes have become longer.6

Prescription is not a matter of procedure over which the Court has something to say. Rather, it is substantive law since it assumes the existence of an authority to punish a wrong, which authority the Constitution vests in Congress alone. Thus, there is no question that Congress may provide a variety of periods for the prescription of offenses as it sees fit. What it cannot do is pass a law that extends the periods of prescription to impact crimes committed before its passage.7

It is pointed out that the legislative discretion to fix the penalty for crimes is not absolute especially when this discretion is exercised in violation of the freedom of expression. The increase in the penalty for online libel creates, according to this view, greater and unusual chilling effect that violates the protection afforded to such freedom.

But what the stiffer penalty for online libel truly targets are those who choose to use this most pervasive of media without qualms, tearing down the reputation of private individuals who value their names and community standing. The law does not remotely and could not have any chilling effect on the right of the people to disagree, a most protected right, the exercise of which does not constitute libel.

The majority of the movants believe that the Court’s decision upholding the constitutionality of Section 4(c)(4), which penalizes online libel, effectively tramples upon the right to free expression.1âwphi1 But libel is not a protected speech. There is no freedom to unjustly destroy the reputation of a decent woman by publicly claiming that she is a paid prostitute.

As early as 1912, the Court held that libel is a form of expression not protected by the Constitution.8 Libel, like obscenity, belongs to those forms of speeches that have never attained Constitutional protection and are considered outside the realm of protected freedom. As explained by the US Supreme Court in Champlinsky v. New Hampsire:9

Allowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words – those which, by their very utterance, inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.

It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. "Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that instrument." (Emphasis supplied)

The constitutional guarantee against prior restraint and subsequent punishment, the jurisprudential requirement of "actual malice," and the legal protection afforded by "privilege communications" all ensure that protected speech remains to be protected and guarded. As long as the expression or speech falls within the protected sphere, it is the solemn duty of courts to ensure that the rights of the people are protected.

At bottom, the deepest concerns of the movants seem to be the fact that the government seeks to regulate activities in the internet at all. For them, the Internet is a place where a everyone should be free to do and say whatever he or she wants. But that is anarchical. Any good thing can be converted to evil use if there are no laws to prohibit such use. Indeed, both the United States and the Philippines have promulgated laws that regulate the use of and access to the Internet.10

The movants argue that Section 4(c)(4) is both vague and overbroad. But, again, online libel is not a new crime. It is essentially the old crime of libel found in the 1930 Revised Penal Code and transposed to operate in the cyberspace. Consequently, the mass of jurisprudence that secures the freedom of expression from its reach applies to online libel. Any apprehended vagueness in its provisions has long been settled by precedents.

The parties' other arguments in their respective motions for reconsideration are mere reiterations that the Court already considered and ruled upon when it promulgated its earlier Decision.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES with finality the various motions for reconsideration that both the petitioners and the respondents, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed for lack of merit.

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.