Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 182894 April 22, 2014
FE FLORO VALINO, Petitioner,
vs.
ROSARIO D. ADRIANO, FLORANTE D. ADRIANO, RUBEN D. ADRIANO, MARIA TERESA ADRIANO ONGOCO, VICTORIA ADRIANO BAYONA, and LEAH ANTONETTE D. ADRIANO, Respondents.
DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
We will all die. But what may matter to many of us is how we live and how our life is kept in the memories of those we leave behind. This case is not about whether a common-law wife has more rights over the corpse of the husband than the latter's estranged legal spouse. This case is about which between them knows his wishes.
Therefore, I respectfully disagree with the ponencia in denying this petition.
I vote to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 2, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 61613, which directs petitioner Fe to have the remains of Atty. Lope Adriano exhumed, and orders respondents to transfer, transport, and inter, at their expense, the remains of the decedent from Manila Memorial Park to the family plot in Holy Cross Memorial Park in Novaliches, Quezon City. I vote to sustain the decision dated October 1, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77 in Civil Case No. Q-93-15288, dismissing respondents' complaint for damages.
I disagree with the position that in the determination of how Atty. Adriano should be buried, "the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano,"1 in accordance with Article 3052 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 1993 of the Family Code.
I am of the opinion that Article 305 should only be considered when, first, the deceased left no explicit instructions on how he wishes to be interred, and second, when none among the deceased’s surviving relations are willing to make the funeral arrangements and a conflict arises. In these situations, the conflict must be settled according to the order of preference stated in Article 199. In any other case, it should be the express wishes of the deceased which should take precedence.
This view, in fact, is embodied in Article 307 of the Civil Code, which states:
Article 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased. In the absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall be decided upon by the person obliged to make arrangements for the same, after consulting the other members of the family. (Emphasis supplied)
It is the ponencia’s opinion that the wishes of the deceased contemplated in Article 307 only governs the "form of the funeral" and that the duty and, more specifically, the right to make arrangements for the funeral remains with the persons specified in Article 305 in relation to Article 199. It is my submission, however, that Article 307 should be interpreted to mean that the right to determine one’s funeral, including the right to determine how and where one wishes to be buried, remains with the deceased, and it is only in the absence of his express wishes, or in the absence of his religious beliefs and affiliations, or if there is doubt as to his wishes, that other persons may assume the right to decide the funeral arrangements.
This right, like other rights pointed out by the ponencia,4 must not be considered waived or renounced except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end. There is neither indication nor have there been any allegations that Atty. Adriano did not freely and voluntarily relay his last wishes to his common-law wife, petitioner Fe. Atty. Adriano, therefore, did not waive his right to determine where he should be buried, in favor of the persons indicated in Article 305 in relation to Article 199.
Accordingly, it was improper to cite in the ponencia Tomas Eugenio, Sr. v. Judge Velez.5 In Eugenio, Tomas Eugenio, Sr. claimed the right to bury his common-law wife, arguing that he should be considered a "spouse" under Article 305 in relation to Article 199. The assertion led this court to expound on the interpretation of Article 305 in relation to Article 199 and conclude that:
x x x. Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally "married" in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by law, authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted however that with respect to 'spouse', the same must be the legitimate 'spouse' (not common-law spouses…)."
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.6
In the present case, petitioner Fe has not asserted that she be considered a "spouse" under Article 305 in relation to Article 199 with the right and the duty to make funeral arrangements for Atty. Adriano. What she asserts is that she was Atty. Adriano’s constant companion for a long time who was constantly by his side, showing him the love and devotion as a wife would have, who took care of him in his final moments and gave him a proper burial. As such, there is a presumption that she would be in the best position to relay his final wishes.
The trial court in its decision dated October 1, 1998 reached the same conclusion, thus:
Atty. Lope Adriano’s wish was established at the trial and shown in the following testimony of the defendant, to wit:
"ATTY. PIZARRAS:
Madam witness, what was the wish of Atty. Lope Adriano regarding his burial?
WITNESS:
He wanted to be buried at Manila Memorial.
Q: Why do you say that?
A: We have discussed it long before.
Q: When did you first discuss this?
A: The first time we went to Manila Memorial. He wanted that his lawn type lot be upgraded to estate type. He doesn’t want that people will step on his grave.
Q: What happened to this request if his lawn type lot to be upgraded to estate type?
A: It did not take long. I had it upgraded."
(TSN, May 7, 1997, pp. 4-5; underscoring supplied)
This crucial fact remained unrefuted.
Moreover, considering the very, very long time that the defendant and the deceased lived like husband and wife prior to his death, it can be reasonably assumed that it is the defendant who really knows the wishes of the deceased. And it appears that it was the express wish of the deceased that he be interred at the Manila Memorial Park.7
The ponencia also noted there was "animosity" between Atty. Adriano and respondents when he was still alive. He and his legal spouse, respondent Rosario, have been separated-in-fact for more than thirty (30) years, and he has not been in contact with his children, the other respondents, for about the same period of time. They did not even visit him when he fell ill and was on his deathbed; it was only after he died that they came, asserting their rights to his remains.
It is unfortunate that the ponencia would rather uphold the wishes of his estranged family rather than give the deceased his final request. Part of life is the ability to control how one wishes to be memorialized, and such right should remain with the deceased. It is only when the deceased has not left any express instructions that the right is given to the persons specified under the law.
Given the circumstances, the remains of Atty. Adriano should remain in the Floro family mausoleum at the Manila Memorial Park.
The law reaches into much of our lives while we live. It constitutes and frames most of our actions. But at the same time, the law also grants us the autonomy or the space to define who we are. Upon our death, the law does not cease to respect our earned autonomy. Rather, it gives space for us to speak through the agency of she who may have sat at our bedside as we suffered through a lingering illness.
I am of the view that it is that love and caring which should be rewarded with the honor of putting us in that place where we mark our physical presence for the last time and where we will be eternally remembered.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition should be GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61613, reversing the October 1, 1998 decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Quezon City, must be SET ASIDE.
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1 Ponencia, p. 6.
2 Article 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in accordance with the order established for support, under Article 294. In case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right.
3 Article 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)
4 Ponencia, p. 6.
5 263 Phil. 1149 (1990) [Per J. Padilla, En Banc].
6 Id. at 1159-1160. See also ponencia, pp. 5-6.
7 Rollo, p. 129.
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