Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 188385 October 2, 2013
BENITO E. LORENZO, Petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (DepEd), Respondents.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
BRION, J.:
I concur with the ponencia that petitioner Benito E. Lorenzo is not entitled to receive death benefits under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 626 (The Employees' Compensation Law) for the demise of his wife, Rosario Lorenzo. I submit this Separate Concurring Opinion to state my own views and observations on the factual issue-whether Rosario's working conditions increased her risk of contracting leukemia - at hand.
I base my concurrence with the ponencia's conclusions on the following grounds:
a) This Court cannot review the uniform factual findings of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) that there is no reasonable connection between Rosario's leukemia and her employment as a teacher in a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari.
b) Benito failed to adduce substantial evidence that would show that Rosario's working conditions increased her risk of contracting leukemia. The presumptions of compensability and aggravation that subsisted during the effectivity of Act No. 3428 (The Workmen's Compensation Act) no longer apply under PD 442 (The Labor Code of the Philippines), as amended by PO 626.
As a general rule, the Supreme Court can only review questions of law in a petition for review on certiorari
While I agree with the ponencia’s conclusion, I am of the position that this Court should have denied the petition on the mere ground that it cannot review questions of fact in a Rule 45 petition. As a general rule, the factual findings of the appellate court are conclusive and binding on the parties when supported by substantial evidence, and are not reviewable by this Court.1
"Moreover, findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi- judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect but finality when affirmed by the CA."2
However, we may probe and resolve questions of fact in a Rule 45 petition as exceptions to the general rule, to wit:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of facts are conflicting;
(6) when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court;
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs, are not disputed by the respondent;
(10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and
(11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.3
None of these exceptions are present in this case. Thus, the ponencia should have restrained itself from reviewing the factual issue at hand because this is beyond the Court’s scope of review. The ponencia should not have reviewed and evaluated the pieces of evidence all over again in the present case.
Benito failed to show by substantial evidence that Rosario’s risk of contracting leukemia was increased by her working conditions
Despite my apprehension to the ponencia’s review of the factual issue in this case, I fully agree with the ponencia that Benito failed to adduce substantial evidence that would show that Rosario’s working conditions increased her risk of contracting leukemia. Benito’s assertion that Rosario’s leukemia was aggravated by her exposure to harmful chemicals, contained in muriatic acid, floor wax and paint, and to the smoke belch of the vehicles which passed along Manggahan Elementary School is insufficient to establish substantial evidence required by law, as fully discussed below.
A. The Presumptions of Compensability and Aggravation are Abandoned in the Present Labor Code
There are two classifications of "sickness" under Article 167(l),Chapter I, Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code.4 The first classification is any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the ECC. The second classification is any illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. In the current case, Benito’s claim for death benefits under the first classification cannot prosper because Annex A of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation lists leukemia as a compensable disease only among operating room personnel due to anesthetics.5 Consequently, Benito can only successfully base his claim on the basis of the increased risk doctrine under the second classification.
During the effectivity of Act No. 3428,6 the Court adhered to presumptions of compensability and aggravation in applying the increased risk doctrine. The law presumed that the claim for compensation falls within the provisions of the law if the illness arose out of and in the course of employment. In effect, the employee did not have to prove the causation between the illness and the working conditions under the old law. In other words, the employer had the burden of proving that the employee’s illness did not arise out of or in the course of employment. Necessarily, the employee or his family had to litigate his right to compensation against the employer who would oppose the claim.7
On January 1, 1975, PD 442, as amended by PD 626, discarded these presumptions and, instead, adopted a system based on social security principles.8 Currently, this system is administered by social insurance agencies — the GSIS and the Social Security System — under the ECC. In this setup, we have a social insurance scheme where employers pay regular premiums to a trust fund. In turn, claims are paid from the trust fund to those who can prove entitlement under the law.9
Unlike the old law, the employee does not have to litigate his right to compensation under the present Labor Code. The employee or his family simply files a claim with the ECC which determines whether compensation may be paid.
The lopsided situation between the employer and the employee is now absent since the former no longer opposes the latter’s claim for compensation. Thus, presumptions of compensability and aggravation cease to have importance and are no longer applicable in claims for compensation.10
B. The Burden of Proof Required in Claims for Compensation is Substantial Evidence
In our new Labor Code, the degree of proof required in claims for compensation is merely substantial evidence, which means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.11 Substantial evidence is not equivalent to direct causal relation. What the law requires is merely a reasonable connection between the illness and the working conditions.12
Congruent with the required degree of proof is the consideration that it is the trust fund that suffers if benefits are paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law. The reason is that the trust fund’s integrity would be endangered if we inadvertently or recklessly include diseases not covered by law. It is thus this Court’s duty to ensure the stability of the fund and make certain that the system can pay benefits when due to all who are entitled and in the increased amounts fixed by law.13
My concurrence with the ponencia lies on my position that the liberal interpretation of employees’ compensation does not dispense with the requirement that the employee or his family should present substantial proof that his risk of contracting an illness was increased by his working conditions. In other words, this Court cannot rely on Benito’s mere enumeration of chemicals to which Rosario was allegedly exposed precisely because exposure to these chemicals is not inherent in the nature of her profession. We cannot take judicial notice that teachers are constantly exposed to chemicals because this would open the floodgates for thousands of unwarranted similar claims and deplete the trust fund. To reiterate, Rosario was a teacher, and not a factory worker, an anesthesiologist or a chemist. Thus, in Bravo v. ECC,14 we pronounced that mere enumeration of chemicals to which Evelio Bravo was allegedly exposed and reliance on the probability that those chemicals caused his cancer of the colon do not meet the substantial evidence required by law.
On this point, I would wish to emphasize the settled rule that this Court cannot rely on surmises and conjectures in awarding claims for compensation. For this Court to allow Benito’s claim on the ground that medical experts cannot trace the exact etiology of leukemia is contrary to the legal requirement that substantial proof must be adduced. This Court as a court of law should not presume the existence of an otherwise non-existent proof.15 If we show compassion for the victims of diseases not covered bylaw, we then ignore the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to which the tens of millions of employees and their families look for compensation whenever covered accidents, salary and deaths occur.16
C. Nemaria v. Employees’ Compensation Commission is not the Controlling Doctrine in the Present Case
In his petition, Benito posits that the Court should apply Nemaria v. Employees’ Compensation Commission (Nemaria)17 to the present case. To briefly summarize the highlights of that case,
Rosario Nemaria, a teacher, died of severe abdominal pains, anorexia, weight loss and jaundice, indicative of liver cancer, duodenal ulcer and breast cancer. Her illness was discovered in 1978. Subsequently, her spouse, Flaviano Nemaria, filed a claim for death benefits based on the theory of increased risk with the GSIS. The GSIS and the ECC denied the claim on the ground that the predisposing factors deemed largely responsible for the development of her illnesses were not peculiar to her employment as a teacher.
In a decision dated October 28, 1987, the Court found the petition meritorious. It stated that the uncertainty on Rosario Nemaria’s cause of illness cannot eliminate the probability that her cancer was work-connected. It theorized that it is possible that she ate food with hepatic carcinogens while working in a far-flung rural area. It declared that a claimant must show a reasonable connection between the illness and the working conditions in cases where the cause of the illness can be determined or proved. However, a claimant is not duty bound to prove the work-connection where the cause of the illness is unknown or cannot be ascertained. For certainly, the law cannot demand an impossibility.18
Contrary to Benito’s position, we cannot apply Nemaria to the present case. First , although the factual circumstances of that case occurred during the effectivity of the present Labor Code, we applied the presumptions of compensability and aggravation in that case because we took account of the possibility that her cancer developed prior to January 1, 1975 or during the effectivity of Act No. 3428. Second, we expressly abandoned Nemaria in Raro v. Employees’ Compensation Commission (Raro), an en banc ruling which was promulgated on April 27, 1989. We thus stated in Raro:
For the guidance of the administrative agencies and practicing lawyers concerned, this decision expressly supersedes the decisions in Panotes v. Employees' Compensation Commission [128 SCRA 473(1984)]; Mercado v. Employees' Compensation Commission [127 SCRA664 (1984)]; Ovenson v. Employees' Compensation Commission [156SCRA 21 (1987)]; Nemaria v. Employees' Compensation Commission [155 SCRA 166 (1987)] and other cases with conclusions different from those stated above.19 (emphasis ours; italics supplied)
Raro is the landmark case where we finally settled that the presumptions of compensability and aggravation no longer apply in the present Labor Code. In that case, we denied Zaida Raro’s claim for benefits on the ground that there was no substantial evidence that would show that her employment as a clerk in the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences increased her risk of contracting brain tumor. We emphasized that the Labor Code requires "the claimant to prove a positive thing-the illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions."20 We thus unequivocally abandoned the presumptions of compensability and aggravation in cases where the claimant cannot prove the work-connection of the illness because its cause is unknown.
D. The Supreme Court Still Adheres to Raro
Subsequently, this Court promulgated GSIS v. Court of Appeals, et al. (GSIS)21 on January 28, 2008. The case, a First Division ruling, reverted to presumptions of compensability and aggravation in cases where the cause of the illness was unknown. In that case, Abraham Cate was employed as a member of the Philippine Navy in 1974. Thereafter, he transferred to the Philippine Constabulary in 1986. He was subsequently absorbed as a member of the Philippine National Police from 1991 until his retirement in1994. In 1993, Abraham suffered from Osteoblastic Osteosarcoma which eventually resulted in his demise in 1994.
Prior to his death, Abraham filed a claim for income benefits with the GSIS. He alleged that he was exposed to virus when he did some dirty jobs during his stint in the Philippine Navy. However, the GSIS denied his claim on the ground that there was no proof that his duties increased his risk of contracting Osteoblastic Osteosarcoma. Subsequently, Abraham’s surviving spouse and two children appealed the denial to the ECC. The ECC, however, affirmed the GSIS’ denial of the claim.
On appeal, the CA reversed the ECC ruling. In so ruling, the CA cited the dissenting opinions of Justices Abraham Sarmiento and Edgardo Paras in Raro. It stated that Abraham’s failure to present evidence showing the work-connection of his illness was due to the absence of available proof. It held that to deny compensation to Osteoblastic Osteosarcoma victims for their inability to produce proof is unrealistic.
The Court adopted the CA’s position and affirmed the CA’s ruling. It declared:
Considering, however, that it is practically undisputed that under the present state of science, the proof referred by the law to be presented by the deceased private respondent claimant was unavailable and impossible to comply with, the condition must be deemed as not imposed.
For this reason, the CA held, thus:
x x x x
It is not the intention of this decision to challenge the wisdom of the Raro case. What is being hoped for is to have a second look on the issue of compensability of those inflicted with osteosarcoma or like disease, where the origin or cause is still virtually not ascertained. The protection of the stability and integrity of the State Insurance Fund against non-compensable claims, is much to be desired. Nonetheless, to allow the presumption of compensability to Osteosarcoma victims, will not adversely prejudice such state policy. xxx. We believe that in the meantime that osteosarcoma’s cause and origin are not yet unearthed, the benefit of the doubt should be resolved in favor of the claim.
In main, We subscribe to the more compassionate and humane considerations contained in the dissenting opinions of Justices Sarmiento and Paras in the same Raro case xxx.
Stated otherwise, before the amendment, the law simply did not allow compensation for the ailment of respondent. It is under this set-up that the Raro case was decided. However, as the ECC decision noted, the law was amended and now "the present law on compensation allows certain diseases to be compensable if it is sufficiently proven that the risk of contracting is increased by the working conditions." It, therefore, now allows compensation subject to requirement of proving by sufficient evidence that the risk of contracting the ailment is increased by the working conditions.
As earlier noted, however, in the specific case of respondent, the requirement is impossible to comply with, given the present state of scientific knowledge. The obligation to present such as an impossible evidence must, therefore, be deemed void. Respondent, therefore, is entitled to compensation, consistent with the social legislation’s intended beneficial purpose.22 (emphases and underscores ours; citations omitted)
In so ruling, the Court reverted to the discarded presumptions of compensability and aggravation in cases where the cause of the illness was unknown. However, GSIS is merely a stray case which did not overturn Raro, for the following reasons:
First, Section 4(3), Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc." Consequently, GSIS which is a division ruling cannot overturn Raro which is an en banc ruling.
Second, the Court erred when it stated in GSIS that Raro was decided during the effectivity of Act No. 3428.1âwphi1 As we have discussed earlier, Raro was decided under the present Labor Code. It is also the landmark case which specifically declared that the claimant must show a positive proof where the cause of the illness is unknown. Furthermore, what Raro requires is the presentation of substantial evidence and not impossible evidence. As we have explained, the claimant is not required to show a direct causal link between the illness and the working conditions where the cause of the illness is unknown.
Third, Article 167(l), Chapter I, Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code clearly provides that reliance on the increased risk doctrine is subject top roof that the risk of contracting the illness is increased by working conditions. Indeed, this Court cannot revive the discarded presumptions of compensability and aggravation lest we engage in judicial legislation.
Lastly, there is no reason for the Court to revert to the lenient rule established in Nemaria because the current scheme in the Philippines remains an insurance system.
Our recent promulgation of Government Service Insurance System v. Bernadas (Bernadas)23 on February 11, 2010 confirms my stand that this Court still adheres to the doctrine laid down in Raro. In Bernadas, we stated that Rosalinda Bernadas has the burden of proving that her profession as a teacher increased her risk of contracting melanoma, a cancer of the skin. We observed that Rosalinda failed to show that she had a chronic long-term exposure to the sun like farmers, fishermen, or lifeguards.
This is not to say, however, that we are abandoning the liberality of the law in favor of labor, with the rejection of the presumptions of compensability and aggravation. No less than the Constitution itself, under the social justice policy, calls for a liberal and sympathetic approach to legitimate appeals of disabled public servants.24 However, what we are emphasizing in the present case is that this liberality does not dispense with the legal requirement that a claimant should establish his entitlement to benefits under PD 626 by substantial evidence. To rule that awards of compensation can rest on speculations would result in the drain of the trust fund that is specifically created for the protection of labor.
For all these reasons, I vote to deny the petition.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1 New City Builders, Inc. v. NLRC, 499 Phil. 207, 212-213 (2005), citing The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 79.
2 Gatus v. Social Security System, G.R. No. 174725, January 26, 2011, 640 SCRA 553, 564, citing Ortega v. Social Security Commission, G.R. No. 176150, June 25, 2008, 555 SCRA 353.
3 New City Builders, Inc. v. NLRC, supra note 1, at 213.
4 Article 167 (l2), Chapter I, Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code provides: "Sickness" means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. For this purpose, the Commission is empowered to determine and approve occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that may be considered compensable based on peculiar hazards of employment.
5 Annex A of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation provides:
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES
For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all of the following conditions must be satisfied:
(1) The employee’s work must involve the risks described herein;
(2) The disease was contracted as a result of the employee’s exposure to the described risks;
(3) The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it;
(4) There was no notorious negligence on the part of the employee.
x x x x
Occupational Diseases Nature of Employment
x x x x
15. Leukemia and lymphoma Among operating room personnel due to anesthetics
6 The Workmen’s Compensation Act took effect on June 10, 1928.
7 Raro v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, 254 Phil. 846, 853-855 (1989); and Jimenez v. Court of Appeals, 520 Phil. 20, 33-35 (2006), citing Orate v. Court of Appeals, 447 Phil. 654, 660 (2003).
8 The ECC was created under PD 442 on November 1, 1974. It, however, became operational with the issuance of PD 626 which took effect on January 1, 1975. PD 626 amended Title II of Book IV on Employees' Compensation and State Insurance Fund of PD 442.
9 Raro v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, supra note 7, at 853.
10 Id. at 853-854, citing Sarmiento v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, 244 Phil. 323.
11 RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Section 5.
12 Government Service Insurance System v. Besitan, G.R. No. 178901, November 23, 2011, 661SCRA 186, 194.
13 Raro v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, supra note 7, at 855.
14 227 Phil. 93 (1986).
15 Raro v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, supra note 7, at 852.
16 Id. at 856.
17 239 Phil. 160 (1987).
18 Id. at 167.
19 Supra note 7, at 856.
20 Id. at 852; italics supplied.
21 566 Phil. 361 (2008).
22 Id. at 368-371.
23 G.R. No. 164731, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 221.
24 GSIS v. CA, 349 Phil. 357, 365 (1998), citing Diopenes v. GSIS, G.R. No. 96844, January 23,1992, 205 SCRA 331.
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