Manila
EN BANC
[ A.M. No. 07-6-6-SC, February 26, 2010 ]
RE: NON-OBSERVANCE BY ATTY. EDEN T. CANDELARIA, CHIEF OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES (OAS), OF EN BANC RESOLUTION A.M. NO. 05-9-29-SC DATED SEPTEMBER 27, 2005 AND EN BANC RULING IN OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (G.R. NO. 159940 DATED FEBRUARY 16, 2005),
D E C I S I O N
ABAD, J.:
This administrative matter is about the possible liability of the Court's Chief of Administrative Services as a consequence of the Civil Service Commission's (CSC's) denial on June 1, 2007 of the two coterminous appointments of Joseph Raymond Mendoza as Chief of the Management and Information Systems Office (MISO).
The Facts and the Case
On September 27, 2005 the Court en banc issued a resolution in A.M. 05-9-29-SC, classifying as highly technical or policy-determining the position of Chief of MISO, a permanent item in the Court's list of personnel. On March 14, 2006 the Court additionally issued a resolution in A.M. 06-3-07-SC, establishing the qualification standards for Chief of MISO, including a Bachelor's Degree in Computer Science or any equally comparable degree with Master in Science Degree in Computer Science or Information Technology. The CSC approved these standards.
Subsequently or on June 20, 2006 the Court lowered the educational requirement to Bachelor's Degree in Computer Science or any equally comparable degree, with post-graduate level (at least 18 units) in Computer Science or Information Technology and submitted the same to the CSC for approval.
On August 8, 2006, pending CSC approval of the lowered standards, then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban appointed Mendoza as MISO Chief. Since the latter did not then meet the approved March 14, 2006 qualification standards, it was thought best that his appointment be made coterminous with the Chief Justice's tenure that was to end on December 7, 2006.
With the retirement of Chief Justice Panganiban and acting on the recommendation of the Project Management Office (PMO) and Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Chair of the Computerization and Library Committee, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno directed the preparation of the reappointment paper of Mendoza as MISO Chief. But the Chief Justice set it to last for six months.
The Office of the Administrative Services (OAS), through its Chief, Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, prepared the paper, stating in it that Mendoza's reappointment was coterminous with Chief Justice Puno but he was to serve for only six months from December 7, 2006. On January 4, 2007 the OAS submitted this and the earlier coterminous appointments of Mendoza to the CSC for approval.
Four months later or on May 8, 2007 the PMO recommended the permanent appointment of Mendoza as Chief of MISO after he passed the Career Service Professional Exams. But action on this was deferred to first await the CSC's approval of Mendoza's coterminous appointments. On June 1, 2007, however, the CSC disapproved Mendoza's coterminous appointments on the ground that the CSC had no occasion to declare the position of Chief of MISO as primarily confidential, highly technical, or policy-determining as to qualify Mendoza to a coterminous appointment. The CSC letter to the Court stated in part:
In a letter dated September 1, 2006 to CSC, [Atty. Candelaria] represented that except for the positions of Executive Assistant III and Chauffer, all the positions in the MISO are permanent in nature.
Sec. 12 (9), Chapter 3, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 states in part the following:
Sec. 12. Powers and Functions.1aшphi1-- The Commission shall have the following powers and functions: x x x
(9) Declare positions in the Civil Service as may properly be primarily confidential in nature, highly technical or policy-determining.
Item 7(a) Part I of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 12, s. 2003 likewise provides:
7. The Commission may allow agencies to establish qualification standards for their positions belonging to the following categories:
a. Positions declared by the Commission as primarily confidential in nature are exempted from the qualification standards requirements prescribed in the Qualification Standards Manual x x x.
Records are bereft of any showing that the position of Chief of MISO has been declared by the Commission as primarily confidential, highly technical or policy-determining to qualify as coterminous in nature.
In view thereof x x x the coterminous appointments of [Mendoza] are disapproved.1
On June 12, 2007 Justice Carpio wrote a Memorandum to Chief Justice Puno, recommending the taking of disciplinary action against Atty. Candelaria for gross neglect of duty, gross incompetence in the performance of official duties, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as follows:
(a) She violated the Court's resolution in A.M. 05-9-29-SC and its 2005 ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Civil Service Commission2 when she submitted Mendoza's appointments and all other Supreme Court third level appointments to the CSC for approval when this was not legally required;
(b) She failed to inform the CSC Assistant Commissioner when she met the latter that the Court had already classified the position of Chief of MISO as highly technical or policy-determining; and
(c) She indicated in Mendoza's second appointment paper a "coterminous" appointment instead of a six-month appointment as the Chief Justice directed.
Justice Carpio points out, relying on the Court's resolution in A.M. 05-9-29-SC and its ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Civil Service Commission, that the Court en banc, as the appointing power under the Constitution, may appoint, without need of CSC approval, employees in the judiciary to third level positions classified as highly technical or policy-determining. Once so classified, the CSC has a ministerial duty to accept such appointments. Consequently in submitting them to the CSC for approval, she undermined the independence of the judiciary. She also embarrassed the Court when the CSC disapproved the appointments and made it appear that the Court was not following its own en banc resolution and ruling.
Justice Carpio also imputed the CSC's disapproval of Mendoza's appointments to Atty. Candelaria's failure to inform the CSC Assistant Commissioner that the Court had already classified the position of Chief of MISO as highly technical or policy-determining when she met with the Assistant Commissioner to discuss Mendoza's appointment papers two days before the disapproval of the appointments.
On being required, Atty. Candelaria submitted on July 10, 2007 her comment. She denied committing the offenses charged. She said that she submitted Mendoza's appointments to the CSC for approval in compliance with the Civil Service Law and implementing rules and that she would have faced administrative sanction if she had not.
Atty. Candelaria pointed out that, although the Court classified certain third level positions in its organization as highly technical or policy-determining, this merely exempted them from a Career Executive Service (CES) eligibility requirement. The status of the positions as permanent remained and did not make them primarily confidential, resulting in the disapproval of Mendoza's appointments.
Although Atty. Candelaria does not deny that she did not tell the CSC Assistant Commissioner that the position of Chief of MISO was a highly technical or policy-determining position when they met, she pointed out that she had earlier informed the CSC about it officially and that she had attached to Mendoza's first appointment a certification that the position of MISO's Chief had been classified as highly technical.
In answer to Justice Carpio's charge of incompetence for stating in Mendoza's second appointment paper that it was a "coterminous" appointment rather than a six-month appointment as the Chief Justice directed, she pointed out that she indicated the appointment as "coterminous" based on the recommendation of the PMO and Justice Carpio himself. The first appointment was also coterminous and the reappointment could not just deviate from it.
The Issue Presented
The issue in this administrative matter is whether or not there are sufficient grounds to discipline Atty. Candelaria for gross neglect of duty, gross incompetence in the performance of official duties, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service:
1. For submitting to the CSC for approval the Court's appointments to third level positions, which the Court previously determined as highly technical or policy-determining like the position of the Chief of MISO;
2. For failing to inform the Assistant Commissioner of CSC whom she met shortly before it disapproved Mendoza's appointments that the Court had already classified as highly technical or policy-determining or both the position of Chief of MISO; and
3. For grievously erring in indicating in Mendoza's second appointment that it was "coterminous" with the term of the Chief Justice rather than simply that it was for a term of six months as the Chief Justice directed.
The Court's Rulings
One. Justice Carpio points out that Atty. Candelaria should be made administratively liable for submitting to the CSC for approval appointments to third level positions when that was unnecessary since the Court had previously determined those positions as highly technical or policy-determining like the position of the Chief of MISO, thus undermining the independence of the Judiciary.
But, with few exceptions, all appointments to the civil service have to be submitted to the CSC for approval. Section 9(h) of the Civil Service Law bestows on the CSC the power and function to approve all such appointments and to disapprove the appointments of those who do not possess the required qualifications and eligibility. Section 9(h) states:
SECTION. 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. - The Commission shall administer the Civil Service and shall have the following powers and functions:
x x x x
(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service, except those of presidential appointees, members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces, firemen, and jailguards, and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess the appropriate eligibility or required qualifications. An appointment shall take effect immediately upon issue by the appointing authority if the appointee assumes his duties immediately and shall remain effective until it is disapproved by the Commission, if this should take place, without prejudice to the liability of the appointing authority for appointments issued in violation of existing laws or rules: Provided, finally, That the Commission shall keep a record of appointments of all officers and employees in the civil service. All appointments requiring the approval of the Commission as herein provided, shall be submitted to it by the appointing authority within thirty days from issuance, otherwise, the appointment becomes ineffective thirty days thereafter; x x x.
To implement the above and in exercise of its rule-making power, the CSC requires in Section 1, Rule VI of its rules3 all government agencies and their personnel officer, Atty. Candelaria in the case of the Supreme Court, to submit to the CSC all appointments in the civil service under pain of administrative sanction for neglect of duty.
Since Congress has enacted no law superseding the above provisions of the Civil Service Law or its implementing rules and since the Supreme Court has rendered no decision annulling the same, Atty. Candelaria, the officer charged with the duty to submit all appointments from the Court, had no choice but to abide by them and submit Mendoza's appointments to the CSC for its approval. Historically, this has been done in all past Court appointments and she received no instruction in this particular case from the Court to depart from the practice. Consequently, no ground exists for sanctioning her action.
The Court did not say in Office of the Ombudsman v. Civil Service Commission cited by Justice Carpio that appointments to the third level of the civil service do not have to be submitted to the CSC for approval. The issue raised in that case was whether or not the CSC encroached on the Ombudsman's appointing authority when it refused to change the third level appointee's appointment from temporary to permanent just because he did not have Career Service Executive Eligibility (CSEE) or CES eligibility.
Section 2(2), Article IX-B of the Constitution provides that appointment to positions in the civil service, which are policy-determining, highly technical, or primarily confidential (classified as third level positions), are exempt from the requirement that they be made based on merit or fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, by competitive examinations. These kinds of positions are non-competitive. Merit and fitness for the same are determined by other than competitive examinations.
The Court held that the CSC's authority under Section 9(h) to approve appointments in the civil service is limited to determining whether or not the appointee has the legal qualifications and the appropriate eligibility. Since the Ombudsman's appointee had all the basic qualifications for the position, except the CSEE or CES eligibility which was no longer required for a permanent appointment to third level positions, the CSC had the ministerial duty to grant the change of status of the appointee from temporary to permanent.
Still, the Court's ruling implies that the CSC still has the power and the duty to pass upon the subject appointments, if only to determine whether the appointees meet the qualification standards adopted by and approved for that agency. Nothing in the decision in the Ombudsman case says that CSC's approval of appointments to third level positions has been dispensed with. It merely says that CSEE or CES eligibility is no longer required for those positions.
Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, who dissents from the Court's opinion, cite in support of Justice Carpio's position the 2007 identically titled case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Civil Service Commission.4 In that case, the Office of the Ombudsman sought the CSC's approval of its amended qualification standards for a Director II position. The amendment reduced the requirement from CSEE or CES eligibility to that of Career Service Professional or other relevant eligibility for second level position, invoking the Court of Appeals ruling in Inok v. Civil Service Commission5 that the letter and intent of the law is to restrict the CES eligibility to CES positions in the Executive Department. The CES governed by the CES Board, it was claimed, did not cover the Office of the Ombudsman. But the CSC disapproved the amendment, saying that the CES covered the Director II position being a third level position.
This Court disagreed. It reiterated that the CES covers presidential appointees only. Since Director II appointees are appointed by the Ombudsman, they are neither embraced in the CES nor do they need to possess CES eligibility. The Court upheld the Ombudsman's administrative control and supervision of its Office, including the authority to determine and establish the qualifications, duties, functions, and responsibilities of its various services. The Ombudsman, said the Court, possesses the authority to establish reasonable qualification standards for the personnel of the Office. The CSC cannot substitute its own standards for those of the department or agency, its role being limited only to assisting the department or agency with respect to these qualification standards and approving them.
The dissenting opinion interprets the above ruling as doing away with the requirement of approval by the CSC of the qualification standards set by the department or agency, concluding that the qualification standards are effective as of the date of their issuance by the department or agency.
But, although the law vests in the department or agency concerned the responsibility for establishing, administering, and maintaining its qualification standards, such standards have to be drawn with the assistance and approval of the CSC and in consultation with the Wage and Position Classification Office.6 The Court's ruling in the 2007 Ombudsman case affirms this.7 The CSC approval is still a must since it remains the government's clearing house for all appointments in the civil service. The duty to enforce the laws on the selection, promotion, and discipline of civil servants primarily rests in the CSC. Once approved, the qualification standards serve as guide for new appointments and for adjudicating contested appointments.8
Contrary to the view expressed in the dissenting opinion, the 2007 Ombudsman case did not do away with the requirement of CSC approval of appointments. It merely said that in passing upon and approving qualification standards, the CSC should not substitute its own standards for those of the department or agency concerned. Indeed, the dispositive portion of the decision directed the CSC to approve the Ombudsman's amended qualification standards for Director II.
The requirement of CSC approval of qualification standards is demonstrated in Paredes v. Civil Service Commission,9 where the Court held that the CSC was in error in applying qualification standards that it had not previously approved. Not even the exigencies of the service can justify the use of unapproved qualification standards. Said the Court:
Without a duly approved Qualification Standard it would be extremely difficult if not impossible for the appointing authority to determine the qualification and fitness of the applicant for the particular position. Without an approved Qualification Standard the appointing authority would have no basis or guide in extending a promotional or original appointment in filling up vacant positions in its department or agency. Public interest therefore requires that a Qualification Standard must exist to guide the appointing authority not only in extending an appointment but also in settling contested appointments.10
The applicable qualification standards for the position of Chief of MISO at the time of Mendoza's first appointment included a requirement for a Bachelor's Degree in Computer Science or any equally comparable degree with Master in Science Degree in Computer Science or Information Technology. Mendoza simply did not have this qualification. Chief Justice Panganiban thus gave him a coterminous appointment, not a permanent one, as Chief of MISO, trusting that the CSC would approve it. Chief Justice Puno followed suit, but with the further limitation that it was to last for six months. These are not the circumstances contemplated by the 2007 Ombudsman ruling.
At any rate, whether or not the CSC was correct in denying Mendoza's appointments is of course irrelevant to the charge against Atty. Candelaria. She is not answerable to the Court for the decision of the CSC no matter if that decision is perceived to be wrong. All that she did was submit those appointments to that constitutional body as the law and the rules required of her.
Parenthetically, the CSC apparently did not deny Mendoza's coterminous and temporary appointments because it disagreed that the position was highly technical, which it was, by any reckoning. But the position of Chief of MISO is a permanent position, he being the head of an office that performs a vital and continuing function in the work of the Court. Yet, his appointments as recommended were to be coterminous with the tenure of the Chief Justice or for six months, whichever ended first. This uncertain or diminutive tenure does not seem to make sense in the light of the constitutionally protected right to security of tenure of government personnel under the civil service system.
Two. Justice Carpio claims that Atty. Candelaria failed in her duty to inform the Assistant Commissioner of CSC, whom she met shortly before that body disapproved Mendoza's appointments, that the Court had already classified as highly technical or policy-determining the position of Chief of MISO.
Atty. Candelaria does not deny failing to tell the Assistant Commissioner at that meeting that the Court already classified the position of Chief of MISO as policy-determining or highly technical. But, as the record shows, her office sent a copy of the Court's resolution in A.M. 05-9-29-SC embodying that classification to the CSC earlier on October 18, 2005. Indeed, the CSC wrote back to say that it had placed on record the Court's classification for guidance and reference. Further, Atty. Candelaria's office also attached to Mendoza's first appointment a certification that the Court had classified the position of Chief of MISO as highly technical. These rendered it unnecessary for Atty. Candelaria to reiterate the matter to the CSC Assistant Commissioner at their meeting.
Still, Atty. Candelaria should have immediately taken up with the Court the result of her meeting with the Assistant Commissioner of the CSC. It seems likely that the latter gave her an inkling of the position that the CSC might take on Mendoza's appointments. Of course, neither Atty. Candelaria nor the Assistant Commissioner had control of the actions of the CSC but, by the nature of the bureaucracy, the outright denial of Mendoza's appointments could have been aborted and the matter negotiated to the satisfaction of the two Constitutional bodies. Since this is not a step prescribed by the rules, however, it cannot be said that Atty. Candelaria had violated a duty enjoined on her by law.
The dissenting opinion would have Atty. Candelaria held to answer for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for having met, sub rosa, with the CSC Assistant Commissioner, thereby undermining the judiciary's independence. The dissenting opinion attacks Atty. Candelaria's comment as eerily silent regarding the nature and details of the meeting.
But, first, the charge against Atty. Candelaria is about her failure to inform the Assistant Commissioner of CSC that the Court had already classified as highly technical or policy-determining the position of Chief of MISO. Justice Carpio did not charge her of improperly meeting sub rosa with the CSC Assistant Commissioner. The Court cannot punish Atty. Candelaria for an alleged wrong of which she has not been charged nor given the opportunity of a hearing.
Second, under the rules of evidence, a party's silence only amounts to admission when he is accused of some wrongdoing that naturally calls for comment if not true.11 Here, Justice Carpio censured Atty. Candelaria solely for something she failed to tell the CSC Assistant Commissioner at that meeting and she commented on this, defending her omission. The censure did not call for her to defend the meeting itself or disclose its other details. Consequently, it would not be fair to infer that Atty. Candelaria had chosen to be "eerily silent" regarding those other details.
The dissenting opinion of course insists that the technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied to administrative proceedings. This may be true but only with respect to those rules that are really "technical" like a party's failure in a petition for review to state the correct evidence of the identity of the person who signed the certification of non-forum shopping. Rules of evidence that are founded on fairness, such as the rule that a party's silence only amounts to admission when he is accused of some wrongdoing that naturally calls for comment if not true, are not technical rules that can be thrown out when convenient--even in administrative proceedings.
Third, even Justice Carpio, who appeared stunned and despaired by the CSC's disapproval of Mendoza's appointments and had information about the circumstances of the subject meeting, was critical of it only because Atty. Candelaria did not tell the CSC Assistant Commissioner that the Court had already classified the position of Chief of MISO as highly technical or policy-determining. Justice Carpio did not make out a case of treachery against her.
There is no evidence for instance that the meeting took place at the wee hours of the night behind some trees at the Luneta Park. Justice Carpio, who seems to know what the two talked about at that meeting, did not characterize it as done secretly or sub rosa. Many court employees are required by their jobs to meet and transact business with those from other government agencies. That these employees give no prior briefing to the Court about the purposes of such meetings cannot justify an assumption that those meetings took place sub rosa.
Further the dissenting opinion recalls that Atty. Candelaria had disagreed with the Court's position that coterminous appointments can be made for permanent positions. The dissenting opinion speculates that her views may have, through discussions with its Assistant Commissioner, influenced the CSC's opinion regarding the propriety of Mendoza's appointments. But such speculation places an unfairly low esteem on the competence of the CSC and its head, experts in the legal requirements of all sorts of appointments. It cannot be assumed that the CSC would give more weight to the opinion of a subordinate like Atty. Candelaria than to the opinion of the Court and its Chief Justice.
Besides, honest difference in opinion cannot be a cause for unfavorable inference or speculation. If this were so, the Court itself would have no reason for being. Honest disagreements are catalysts of sound ideas especially in democratic institutions like the Court.
Three. Justice Carpio claims that Atty. Candelaria exhibited gross incompetence when she stated in Mendoza's second appointment that it was "coterminous" with the term of the Chief Justice rather than simply that it was for a term of six months as the Chief Justice directed.
But, firstly, in making that statement in the second appointment, Atty. Candelaria merely echoed the Court's stand respecting the nature of Mendoza's appointment as coterminous. The Court originally adopted this idea on recommendation of the PMO and Justice Carpio when Chief Justice Panganiban issued Mendoza's first appointment. The Court had done nothing since then to change that stand.
And, secondly, Chief Justice Puno signed the renewal of the appointment, which renewal contained the same coterminous proviso and his additional instruction to limit the particular appointment to six months, thus showing his acceptance of those two conditions of the appointment.
The dissenting opinion suggests that Mendoza's second appointment paper could have been better facilitated had it indicated a "temporary" status rather than a "coterminous" one, especially since the Chief Justice's marginal note on Memorandum PMO-PDO 12-08-200612 directed the issuance of a "six-month appointment" to him.
But in a temporary appointment, the appointee meets all the requirements for the position except the appropriate civil service eligibility. At the time of his second appointment, Mendoza did not meet even the lowered qualification standards that the Court set for his position. The lesser standards wanted a bachelor's degree holder with a major in computer science. Mendoza's transcript of records from the Philippine Military Academy showed that he had a bachelor's degree but not the required major. He took a master's course in computer science at the Ateneo Information Technology Institute but his transcript there does not show that he finished the course or had been conferred a master's degree in Computer Science.13 Consequently, the Court could not give Mendoza a temporary appointment as Chief of MISO.
The coterminous appointment that the PMO and Justice Carpio recommended for Mendoza was also apparently problematical since the Court and the CSC had always regarded his position as permanent, not dependent on the tenure of the appointing power. The job of the Chief of MISO does not fit the usual descriptions of primarily confidential positions that call for trust and confidence above anything else.
In sum, no sufficient ground exists to take disciplinary action against Atty. Candelaria for gross neglect of duty, gross incompetence in the performance of official duties, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. At most, she may be admonished in regard to the results of her meeting with the CSC Assistant Commissioner.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to NOTE Atty. Eden T. Candelaria's Comment dated July 10, 2007 and to ADMONISH her for failing to take up with the Court the results of the meeting she had with the Assistant Commissioner of the Civil Service Commission.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., no part. complainant.
Corona, J., vote to exonerate Atty. Eden Candelaria. Received the right to write a separate opinion.
Carpio Morales, J., pls. see separate opinion.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 28-29.
2 491 Phil. 739 (2005).
3 Memorandum Circular 40, series of 1998.
4 G.R. No. 162215, July 30, 2007, 528 SCRA 535.
5 Cited as G.R. No. 148782, July 2, 2002.
6 Sec. 22, par. 1, Ch. 5, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V, Administrative Code.
7 Office of the Ombudsman v. Civil Service Commission, supra note 4, at 545.
8 Paredes v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 88177, December 4, 1990, 192 SCRA 84, 95.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 96.
11 Section 32, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Evidence.
12 Rollo, p. 26.
13 Id. at 70..
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