Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 127073 January 29, 1998
JOSE P. DANS, JR., petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 126995 January 29, 1998
IMELDA R. MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
A man's signature, even if merely a flourish or even if indecipherable, may signify authority, agreement, acknowledgment and ownership. As indelible as his fingerprints, dental records or DNA genetic map, it denotes trust and honor. But the same trust and honor may be tainted by polluted intentions, as when signing is done in bad faith, or to perpetrate a fraud, to deceive others, or to commit a crime. The petitions at bar will illustrate how one's John Hancock can bring a man, or a woman for that matter, to ruin.
Sometime in 1984, then Minister of Human Settlements Imelda R. Marcos and then Transportation and Communications Minister Jose P. Dans, Jr., petitioners herein, entered into several contracts involving the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) and the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI). Concurrently and respectively, Marcos and Dans served as ex-oficio Chairman and ex-oficio Vice-Chairman of the LRTA, and as Chairman and Director of the Board of Trustees of the PGHFI. By virtue of these agreements, which were authorized and in fact ratified by the LRTA Board of Directors, two vacant LRTA lots consisting of a 7,340-square meter parcel of land located in Pasay City (the Pasay lot), and a 1,141.20-square meter lot in Carriedo, Sta. Cruz, Manila (the Sta. Cruz lot), were leased out to the PGHFI. Specifically, the LRTA and the PGHFI, represented by Dans and Marcos, respectively, approved three deeds, namely, an "Agreement for the Development of the Areas Adjacent to the Light Rail Transit System Stations and the Management and Operation of the Concession Areas Therein,"1 and two lease agreements2 dated June 8 and June 18, 1984, covering the Pasay and the Sta. Cruz lots. The terms of the lease agreements were identical except as to the price: the lease would be good for 25 years subject to an annual escalation of 7.5%; PGHFI had the right to sublease the lots; and the monthly lease was P102,760.00 for the Pasay lot and P92,437.20 for the Sta. Cruz lot. Within the same month, the Pasay lot was subleased by PGHFI, through Marcos to Transnational Construction Corporation (TNCC)3 for P734,000.00 a month, while the Sta. Cruz lot was allegedly4 subleased to Joy Mart Consolidated Corporation (Joy Mart)5 for P199,710.00 per month.
Because of these deeds, petitioners were charged on January 14, 1992, with a violation of Republic Act No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), to wit:
Criminal Case No. 17449
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer I, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR. of Violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, as amended, committed as follows:
That on or about September 8, 1982, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR., public officers, being then the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a government corporate entity created under Executive Order No. 603 of the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, while in the performance of their official functions, taking advantage of their positions and committing the crime in relation to their offices, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally conspiring with one another, enter on behalf of the aforesaid government corporation into an agreement for the development of the areas adjacent to the LRTA stations and the management and operation of the concession areas therein, with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), a private enterprise, under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 17450
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer I, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR. of Violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, as amended, committed as follows:
That on or about June 8, 1984, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR., public officers, being then the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a government corporate entity created under Executive Order No. 603 of the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, while in the performance of their official functions, taking advantage of their positions and committing the crime in relation to their offices, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally conspiring with one another, enter on behalf of the aforesaid government corporation into a Lease Agreement covering LRTA property located in Pasay City, with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), a private enterprise, under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 17451
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer I, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses IMELDA R. MARCOS of Violation of Section 3(d) of RA 3019, as amended, committed as follows:
That on or about June 8, 1984, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused IMELDA R. MARCOS, a public officer, being then the Chairman of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a government corporate entity created under Executive Order No. 603 of the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, while in the performance of her official functions, taking advantage of her position and committing the offense in relation to her office, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally accepted employment and/or acted as Chairman of (the) Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), a private corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippines, which private enterprise had, at that time(,) pending business transactions with the accused, in her capacity as Chairman of LRTA.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 17452
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer I, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses JOSE P. DANS, JR. of Violation of Section 3(d) of RA 3019, as amended, committed as follows:
That on or about June 8, 1984, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused JOSE P. DANS, JR., a public officer, being then the Vice-Chairman of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a government corporate entity created under Executive Order No. 603 of the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, while in the performance of his official functions, taking advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to his office, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally accepted employment and/or acted as Director of (the) Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), a private corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippines, which private enterprise had, at that time(,) pending business transactions with the accused, in his capacity as Vice-Chairman of LRTA.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 17453
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR. of Violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, as amended, committed as follows:
That on or about June 18, 1984, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR., public officers, being then the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a government corporate entity created under Executive Order No. 603 of the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, while in the performance of their official functions, taking advantage of their positions and committing the crime in relation to their offices, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally conspiring with one another, enter on behalf of the aforesaid government corporation into a Lease Agreement covering LRTA property located in Sta. Cruz, Manila, with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), a private enterprise, under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In short, Marcos and Dans were separately charged under Criminal Case Nos. 17451 and 17452 for accepting employment in and/or acting as Chairman and Director, respectively, of the PGHFI while the latter had pending business (the lease agreements) with the LRTA, which they both also headed. With regard to the other cases, Criminal Case Nos. 17449, 17450 and 17453, the accusations against both of them stemmed from the contracts they signed in representation of the LRTA and of the PGHFI which were allegedly entered into "under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government."
When arraigned, petitioners pleaded "not guilty" to all of the charges. Before trial could commence, Dans moved for the advance examination of defense witness Ramon F. Cuervo, Jr., a real estate broker, appraiser and friend of Dans who, as an expert witness, was in a position to inform court that the agreed lease prices stated in the subject agreements were fair based on standard industry valuation standards. The court a quo granted said motion, and Cuervo was allowed to testify on August 12, 13, and 19, 1992. During this time, Marcos never questioned Cuervo and later expressed that she had no desire to further examine him.6 Five days after the final hearing of Cuervo's testimony, the trial of the five cases opened with the formal offer of the prosecution's documentary evidence, which included, inter alia, the five agreements mentioned earlier. On November 23, 1992, the court issued an order admitting all the exhibits except Exhibits "D" and "E" as to Dans, who challenged the two sublease agreements, and Exhibit "E-1" as to Marcos, who, while accepting the validity of said sublease agreements, nevertheless questioned the authenticity of her signature thereon.
In Criminal Case No. 17543, Dans filed a Motion to Dismiss (demurrer to evidence) dated December 7, 1992, but the court denied the same, as well as his motion for reconsideration thereof.
By the time the case was submitted for decision, Marcos had neither submitted a formal offer of evidence, despite notice of the court's orders7 to do so, nor the required memorandum. She did file a motion for inhibition of the justices of the Sandiganbayan's First Division on the ground of pre-judgment of her case based on the court's denial of Dans' demurrer to evidence, but this was denied in the court's resolution of May 20, 1993.
On September 24, 1993, the court a quo rendered judgment,8 acquitting petitioners in Criminal Case Nos. 17449, 17451, and 17452, but convicting them in Criminal Case Nos. 17450 and 17453. The decretal portion of the assailed decision is reproduced hereunder:
WHEREFORE, judgment is now rendered.
1. ACQUITTING the accused IMELDA R. MARCOS and the accused JOSE P. DANS, JR. of the charge in Criminal Case No. 17449, there being no manifest and gross disadvantage brought about by the contract dated September 8, 1982.
2. ACQUITTING accused IMELDA R. MARCOS in Criminal Case No. 17451, it not having been demonstrated that the Information charging her had given her adequate notice of the acts for which she could be held liable under the law;
3. ACQUITTING accused JOSE P. DANS, JR. in Criminal Case No. 17452, it not having been demonstrated that the Information charging him had given him adequate notice of the acts for which he could be held liable under the law;
and considering that the charges against them have been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
4. CONVICTING accused IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR. in Criminal Case No. 17450 under Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and hereby imposes upon each accused the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of nine (9) years and one (1) day as minimum to twelve (12) years and ten (10) days as maximum.
Both accused shall also suffer the additional penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office as provided in Sec. 9 of R.A. No. 3019;
5. CONVICTING accused IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR. in Criminal Case No. 17453 under Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and hereby imposes upon each accused the penalty of imprisonment for the indeterminate period of nine (9) years and one (1) day as minimum to twelve (12) years and ten (10) days as maximum.
Both accused shall also suffer the additional penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office as provided in Sec. 9 of R.A. No. 3019.
The Ombudsman is given thirty (30) days from today within which to make a determination of whether or not the other members of the Board of Directors of the Light Rail Transit Authority during the relevant periods with respect to the lease contracts dated June 8, 1984 and June 18, 1984 executed by said Authority with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. may also be prosecuted under Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No 3019, and to report to this Court at the end of said period whatever determination he has made including the steps intended to be taken hereon towards a new preliminary investigation, if the same is appropriate.
The bonds posted for the provisional liberty of accused IMELDA R. MARCOS and accused JOSE P. DANS, JR. in Criminal Case No. 17449, No. 17451 and No. 17452 are hereby CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the court's decision on October 8, 1993. The Office of the Solicitor General also filed a motion for partial reconsideration on the same date, seeking civil indemnity for the People of the Philippines. On November 13, 1996, respondent court promulgated two resolutions, one denying the motion of Dans,9 and another denying that of Marcos and modifying the assailed September 24, 1993, decision with the addition of a sixth paragraph in the dispositive portion which dealt with the civil liability of petitioners, viz.: 10
6. Accused IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR. are hereby ordered jointly and solidarily to reimburse the Light Railway Transit Authority for the prejudice that they have accused to said Light Railway Transit Authority through the lease contracts which they executed.
(a) Under Criminal Case No. 17450, the sum of THIRTY TWO MILLION ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P32,172,000.00);
(b) Under Criminal Case No. 17453, the sum of NINETY TWO MILLION TWO HUNDRED SIXTY EIGHT THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY PESOS (P92,268840.00).
Aggrieved, petitioners separately elevated their case to this Court for a review on the following grounds:
G.R. No. 127073
I. Respondent Court erred in denying petitioner's demurrer to evidence in Criminal Case No. 17453 on the basis of baseless assumptions and conjectures not established by evidence. Worse, in violation of mandatory rules of evidence, the denial of the demurrer was made to rest on the advance, conditional testimony of defense witness Ramon Cuervo which had not yet been offered in evidence.
II. Respondent Court erred in concluding that the two lease contracts in question were manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government despite unrebutted evidence that their terms and conditions were fair and reasonable and did not prejudice the Government.
III. Respondent Court erred when it assumed without evidentiary basis that LRTA had put up or would put up buildings on the leased land.
IV. Respondent Court erred in holding that the lease contracts were also grossly disadvantageous to the Government because "non-payment of rentals . . . was not actionable unless the rentals were in arrears for one year", citing the stipulation. "Should there be a delay in any payment of the rental consideration equivalent to one year, the lessor shall have the right to take possession of the premises, the property and improvements thereon, the ownership of all improvements thereby accruing to the lessor. (Stip. II, par. 4).
V. Assuming without admitting that LRTA would receive less than fair rental under the disputed lease contracts, respondent Court erred when it considered injury to LRTA as necessarily an injury to the Government, notwithstanding that such supposed injury to LRTA was offset by the corresponding benefit enuring to the Philippine General Hospital (a government hospital funded by government funds), which is inconsistent with the theory that the disputed lease contracts were disadvantageous to "the Government." Under Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 which seeks to protect public interest in general by condemning contracts disadvantageous to the Government, the term "government" is used in its widest sense so as to include "the national government, the government-owned and government-controlled corporations, and all other instrumentalities or agencies of the Republic of the Philippines and their branches." [Sec. 2(a)].
VI. While respondent Court was duty-bound to be just and impartial, it failed to give petitioner a fair trial, who was thereby denied due process of law. Respondent Court was plainly biased against, if not downright hostile to, petitioner; it unfairly allied itself with the prosecution, which made it prosecutor and judge at the same time.
VII. Aside from the foregoing, the appealed decision is flawed by fatal infirmities which have effectively denied petitioner due process of law.
G.R. No. 126995
A. The questioned Decision is a nullity because Section 3 (g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, as amended) is unconstitutional for being, on its face, void for vagueness.
B. The questioned Decision is a nullity because Section 3 (g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, as amended) is unconstitutional for being a "rider."
C. The questioned Decision is a nullity because the Informations in SB Criminal Cases Nos. 17450 and 17453 did not state all the essential facts constituting the offense but instead stated conclusions of law, thereby denying the Petitioner her constitutional right to be informed of "the nature and the cause of the accusation" against her (Sec. 14 (2), Bill of Rights).
D. The questioned Decision is a nullity because the Information in said SB Criminal Cases Nos. 17450 and 17453 charged only two of the total number of members in the Board of Directors of the LRTA and the Board of Directors of the PGH Foundation, who had participated in the collective acts, thereby singling Petitioner and her companion for discriminatory prosecution, in violation of her right to Equal protection of the Laws, which violation existed from the filing of the information and cannot be cured by post hoc proceedings.
E. The questioned Decision is a nullity because of the participation therein of Mr. Justice Garchitorena, whose long-standing bias and hostility towards President Marcos and Petitioner Imelda R. Marcos prevented him from having the requisite "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," violation of her right as an accused person to procedural Due Process of Law.
F. The questioned Decision is a nullity because Petitioner was denied of her Constitutional Right to counsel.
1. Facts of record showing that Petitioner was deprived of and denied her Right to Counsel.
2. Under the circumstances of record, the absence of counsel resulting from imposition of suspension from the practice of law upon her retained counsel, constituted deprivation of or denial of the Right to Counsel.
3. Facts of record showing legal representation of Petitioner Imelda Marcos was not adequate.
G. The questioned Decision is premature and had disregarded the constitutional right of the Petitioner to present evidence in her behalf. Her right to testify in her own behalf is a guaranteed right, the exercise of which is her personal choice alone, and which counsel had no authority to waive in her behalf. Besides, counsel being suspended, he could not have made a waiver. This constitutional right "to be heard by himself and counsel" she is invoking now, as part of her right to due process (Sec. 14 (1) and (2), Bill of Rights).
H. The questioned Decision is a nullity for it was rendered in derogation of Petitioner's subsisting right to be heard and to submit evidence in her defense. The finding of waiver is a prejudicial error. The evidence thereof on the record is tenuous. A waiver by an accused person of the right to be heard in her defense, including her right to testify in her own behalf must be indubitable, and is valid only if personally exercised through her own manifestation in open court.
I. The questioned Decision is a nullity because the crime charged was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and the presumption of innocence was not overcome, which is required by Due Process.
1. There was no disadvantage to the Government.
i. PGH Foundation is part of the "Government".
ii. There was no disadvantage to the "Government" because the PGH, which is part of the Government benefitted.
iii. Facts of record, especially the questioned leases, show no disadvantage.
iv. Conviction was based on pure speculation.
v. Respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division) erred in holding the leases disadvantageous as to rental in absence of evidence existing at the time that higher rentals should have been paid.
vi. Respondent Sandiganbayan erred in holding that rentals for sub-leases were evidence of disadvantage when such sub-leases were made later and negotiated by a charitable foundation deserving of support through higher rentals.
2. Assuming arguendo alleged disadvantage, the same was not manifest nor gross.
3. Petitioner Marcos did not enter into the questioned lease contracts on behalf of the Government.
4. The charge of conspiracy was not proved hence no basis for liability.
5. Conviction was based on weakness of defense evidence and not (on) strength of prosecution's evidence.
J. The questioned Decision and Resolution are null and void because the Respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division) acted without jurisdiction in issuing the questioned Decision and Resolution since the records clearly show that the Court with jurisdiction over these cases is the Special Division of Five Justices created by Admin. Order 288-93 pursuant to Sec. 5 of PD 1606 as amended and not Respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division).
The Court resolved to consolidate the two cases inasmuch as they raise similar issues and seek the same reliefs. The questions may be stated thus:
1) Was respondent court correct in denying the demurrer to evidence of petitioner Dans in Criminal Case No. 17453?
After the prosecution had rested its case, Dans filed a Motion to Dismiss (Demurrer to Evidence) dated December 7, 1992, based on Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. 11 He argued that the prosecution failed to establish the fact that the lease agreement covering the Sta. Cruz lot (Exhibit "C") was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.12
On February 10, 1993, the court a quo denied the said motion in this wise:
Since per testimony of witness Ramon Cuervo, Jr. (tsn, pp. 20 to 26, August 13, 1992) that considering the nature of the terminal at the Sta. Cruz Station, which would be (the) subject of the lease contract between the Light Rail Transit Authority and the PGH Foundation, Inc. (Exhibit "C"), the rental of the premises in question could go up to P400,000.00 per month if the LRTA would put up the building as against the stipulated rental of P92,437.00 actually entered into between the parties, there would appear cause to believe that the lease contract in question was grossly disadvantageous for (sic) the government.
For this reason, the Demurrer to Evidence of accused Jose P. Dans, Jr. dated December 7, 1992, is DENIED for lack of merit.
Dans questioned the denial on the ground that the demurrer should have been resolved solely on the basis of the prosecution's evidence and even assuming that it could be resolved using the evidence for the defense, the latter must have been previously formally offered.13
These arguments are specious and must, therefore, be rejected.
Although a demurrer to evidence must be resolved based on the evidence of the prosecution, there is nothing in the rules which would bar the court from taking cognizance of any matter taken up during the trial or which has become part of the records of the case, especially in this instance where the disputed evidence was taken in advance at the request of the defendant himself . Additionally it is erroneous to suppose that Cuervo's testimony was not formally offered at the time because "(t)estimonial evidence is formally offered by the calling of the witness to the stand." 14 Thus, we find merit in the manner by which the trial court justified the denial of Dans' demurrer to evidence, 15
viz.:
First, the advance testimony of Mr. Cuervo taken at the instance of Engr. Dans on August 12 and 13, 1992, was already part of the record(s) in these cases when the Demurrer to Evidence was filed by Engr. Dans on December 7, 1992. The testimony was introduced into the record in exactly the same manner as any other testimony would be presented in evidence during trial. . . . .
Being already part of the record in these cases, the advance testimony of Mr. Cuervo could be taken judicial notice of.
x x x x x x x x x
. . . . (J)udicial notice takes the place of proof and is of equal force. As a means of establishing facts it is therefore superior to evidence. In its appropriate field it displaces evidence since, as it stands for proof, it fulfills the objects which the evidence is designed to fulfill and makes evidence unnecessary. 16 Consequently, "the party desiring to establish a fact is relieved, when judicial notice is taken of the fact, from introducing evidence to prove it."17
Second, having been given in the course of the proceedings in these cases, the testimony of Mr. Cuervo constitutes judicial admission of Engr. Dans who made it part of the record of these cases.
x x x x x x x x x
As in judicial notice of a fact, "admissions made in the course of the judicial proceedings are substitutes for, and dispense with, the actual proof of facts." 18 The party benefited by the admission is relieved of the duty of presenting evidence of the admitted fact and "(t)he court, for the proper decision of the case, may and should consider, without the introduction of evidence, the fact admitted by the parties."19
Third, since the advance testimony of Mr. Cuervo was given in open court and duly recorded, the Court could not just ignore the solemn declarations therein on the technicality that the testimony had not been formally offered evidence. . . .
In any event, even if the testimony of Cuervo were to be excluded, there was enough evidence proffered by the prosecution, particularly Exhibits "B" (the lease agreement in favor of the PGHFI) and "D" (the sublease agreement in favor of TNCC) which would have more than justified the denial of the demurrer. In other words, notwithstanding Cuervo's testimony, these exhibits constitute solid documentary proof of petitioners' liability under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, as will be shown later in our discussion of Issue No. 5, "Was the evidence properly appreciated by respondent court?"
2) Were the informations filed in Criminal Case Nos. 17450 and 17453 sufficient in form?
There appears to be no doubt that the questioned informations are reasonably adequate as to apprise Marcos on the nature and cause of the accusations against her. In the case of Luciano v. Estrella, 20 the Court had occasion to enumerate the elements of the crime under Section 3(g), R.A. No. 3019, namely, (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. The allegations in the two informations are hereby reproduced for quick reference:
That on or about June 8 [18], 1984, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR., public officers, being then the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a government corporate entity created under Executive Order No. 603 of the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, while in the performance of their official functions, taking advantage of their positions and committing the crime in relation to their offices, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally conspiring with one another, enter on behalf of the aforesaid government corporation into a Lease Agreement covering LRTA property located in Pasay City [Sta. Cruz, Manila], with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), a private enterprise, under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. 21 (Emphasis supplied).
As can be readily observed, the informations meet the minimum requirements for them to be upheld in court.
It is also alleged that "for a criminal complaint or information to sufficiency inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, all the essential facts constituting the offense must be stated therein, and not mere conclusions of law.22
Assuming that the matters which Marcos wanted to see alleged in the informations are not evidentiary in character, and that they are really vague and ambiguous, other courses of action could have been taken, such as filing a motion for a bill of particulars. This is what the Court precisely suggested in People v. Arlegui, 23
viz.:
A bill of particulars while provided for under Section 6 of Rule 116 is not a popular procedure among lawyers for the accused in criminal cases. For one thing, it may invite an amended information which is not only clearer but may also be stronger and more incriminating. However, it would have clarified and corrected at any early stage the kind of doubt which the accused in this particular case alleged to have entertained. Section 6 of Rule 116 provides:
Sec. 6. Bill of Particulars. — Defendant may, at any time on or before arraignment, mover for or demand a more definite statement or a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to plead or prepare for trial. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired.24
The more appropriate procedure under the circumstances would have been an order from the court directing the Fiscal to amend the information because the defect, if there aver was one, was curable by the simplest of amendments or clarifications. (Emphasis supplied)
In fact, the records reveal that Marcos did file such a motion. 25 After the prosecution had filed its answer thereto, she was given an opportunity to file a reply, but she did not, thereby indicating that she was satisfied with what was already stated in the answer.
3) Is Section 3(g), R.A. No. 3019, as amended, constitutional?
The validity of this provision is being assailed by petitioner Marcos on grounds of vagueness and superfluity. She claims that the phrase "manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government" is vague for it does not set a definite standard by which the court will be guided, thus, leaving it open to human subjectivity.
There is, however, nothing "vague" about the statute. The assailed provision answers the basic query "What is the violation?" Anything beyond this, the "how's" and the "why's," are evidentiary matters which the law itself cannot possibly disclose in view of the uniqueness of every case. The "disadvantage" in this instance is something that still has to be addressed by the State's evidence as the trial progresses. It may be said that the law is intended to be flexible in order to allows the judge a certain latitude in determining if the disadvantage to the government occasioned by the act of a public officer in entering into a particular contract is, indeed, gross and manifest.
The personal circumstances of an accused are, in this regard,
also immaterial, because of the nature of the statute. As the Court declared in Luciano.26
. . . In other words, the act treated thereunder partakes of the nature of a malum prohibitum; it is the commission of that act as defined by the law, not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. And this construction would be in consonance with the announced purpose for which Republic Act (No.) 3019 was enacted, which is the repression of certain acts of public officers and private persons constituting graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. Note that the law does not merely contemplate repression of acts that are unlawful or corrupt per se, but even of those that may lead to or result in graft and corruption. Thus, to require for conviction under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act that the validity of the contract or transaction be first proved would be to enervate, if not defeat, the intention of the Act.
We, therefore, affirm the constitutionality of Section 3(g) of R.A No. 3019, as amended.
4) Was petitioner deprived of her constitutional right to be heard by herself or counsel?
Marcos claims that she was not adequately represented by counsel at the trial due to the suspension from the practice of law of her counsel of record, Atty. Antonio Coronel. It appears from the records, however, that during the absence of Atty. Coronel and sometime thereafter, she was still represented by other lawyers, including Renato Dilag, Luis Sillano, Perfecto V. Fernandez, Jose and Cristobal Fernandez, Vicente D. Millora, Juan T. David, Balbino Diego, and the law firm of Manuel M. Lazaro and Associates. The representation of Atty. Millora and the Fernandezes subsisted even in this Court, where they were later substituted by Atty. Estelito Mendoza. In any event, at the time Atty. Coronel and his replacements withdrew their respective appearances, all evidence had already been presented. It is just that Marcos opted not to present any evidence for her defense, relying perhaps, on what she perceived to be glaringly weak prosecution evidence. Or it is not impossible or far-fetched that her refusal may have been due to her indifference to or open defiance of the justice system.
5) Was the evidence properly appreciated by respondent court?
In proclaiming his innocence, Dans relied only on his and Cuervo's testimony. Marcos, on the other hand, presented no evidence at all, claiming that she had been prejudged by respondent court. The prosecution submitted documentary evidence and nothing else. The question that must first be answered, thereto, is: Was the State's evidence sufficient to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that the accused, petitioners herein, committed the crimes for which they were held accountable?
Petitioners were charged with and found guilty of violating Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. It states thus:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x x x x x x x
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
It is clear that for liability to attach under the aforequoted provision, the public officer concerned must have entered into a contract which is "manifestly and grossly disadvantageous" to the Government. The court a quo phrased the focal issue in these petitions in this wise: "(A)re exhibits 'A,' 'B' and 'C', the Lease Agreements executed by the LRTA with the PGH Foundation over the LRT property at the stations in Pasay City and Sta. Cruz (Manila) 'manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government'?"
A perusal of the prosecution's documentary evidence would readily reveal, even from a layman's perspective, that the Government was seriously prejudiced in the transactions under review.
We concur with the observation of the court a quo that, by itself, Exhibit "A," the "mother contract" which initially granted the PGHFI a virtual exclusive license or franchise over the subject properties, "would neither be prejudicial (n)or beneficial to anybody," because it did not refer to any specific property or consideration. Hence, petitioners were correctly acquitted in Criminal Case No. 17449, which was based on this agreement.
With regard to Criminal Case Nos. 17450 and 17453, the Court is likewise constrained to agree with the trial court that the Government suffered a manifest and gross disadvantage with the execution of the two lease agreements, Exhibits "B" and "C." The facts in this regard are undisputed.
The monthly rental price agreed upon between the LRTA and the PGHFI for the lease of the Pasay lot was P102,760.00, and for the Sta. Cruz lot, it was P92,437.20. Barely ten days later, the very same properties were subleased by PGHFI to private entities for P734,000.00 (for the Pasay lot) and P199,710.00 (for the Sta. Cruz lot). The difference in the lease price is too enormous to ignore, for no market force could possibly have raised the rental cost in the same site by that margin in just over a week. Even by conservative estimates, the properties could have originally been leased out for at least P500,000.00 27 more. The Government was thereby deprived of at least an additional half a million pesos per month.
Indubitably, there was some kind of conflict of interest in the premises. Marcos and Dans, who were then Cabinet members, occupied the highest positions in the Boards of the LRTA and the PGHFI in a concurrent capacity at the time the questioned deals were made. They were, as it were, playing both ends; but on paper, one was acting for the lessor and the other for the lessee. The fact that petitioners were cleared of the charge that they acted improperly in accepting seats in the PGHFI Board of Trustees at the time when it had pending business transactions with the LRTA, of which they were also officers is of no moment. First, their acquittal in Criminal Case No. 17451 and No. 17452 was simply due to the insufficiency of informations. Second, the accusation in said informations have no bearing whatsoever on the subject matter of the other cases filed against them as signatories to the assailed lease agreements. Even Justice Garchitorena had occasion to advert to this conflict of interest in his resolution of November 13, 1996.28
The focus now shifts to the testimony of defense witness Ramon Cuervo. An examination of the pleadings filed in these petitions, including all their attachments, would demonstrate the confusion sown by Cuervo's expert opinion. Petitioners insist that Cuervo confirmed their allegation that the lease price stated in the questioned agreements was a fair valuation based on the comparative rental costs in the immediate vicinity of the subject properties. This inference was drawn from Cuervo's calculation of the fair monthly rental value of the Pasay lot at P73,400.0029 and the Sta. Cruz lot at P80,825.64, 30 using standard appraisal techniques in the industry.
The court, on the other hand, interpreted his testimony differently and arrived at a much higher valuation, that is, P210,000.00 a month for the Pasay lot and P400,000.00 monthly for the Sta. Cruz lot.
In view of this conflict in opinion, with petitioners and respondent court holding steadfast to their respective interpretations of Cuervo's testimony, this Court has no alternative but to fall back on the documentary evidence.
Dans, in his motion to dismiss dated December 7, 1992, actually made an implied recognition that the prosecution was able to establish the manifest and gross disadvantage to the government brought about by the lease agreement over the Pasay lot (Exhibit "B"), when he raised no objection to the presentation by the prosecution of the sublease agreement between the PGHFI and TNCC over the same property (Exhibit "D"). Just as he read the lease and sublease agreements over the Sta. Cruz lot (Exhibits "C" and "E") together in order to demonstrate to the court that the prosecution's evidence in Criminal Case No. 17453 was weak, Exhibit "B" must also be appreciated in connection with Exhibit "D" so that the "gross and manifest" disadvantage to the government in Criminal Case No. 17450 can be established.
It must be noted that Dans objected vigorously to Exhibit "E" on the ground that it was a mere photocopy of the original. Despite diligent efforts to locate an original duplicate or an authentic copy, the prosecution could not produce one, so that as to Dans, said exhibit was not admitted. The same cannot be said of Marcos who never challenged the authenticity of Exhibit "E," although she contested the validity of her signature thereon as representative of the PGHFI, the lessor
For a better appreciation of the evidence at hand, the lease agreements (Exhibits "B" and "C") must be read simultaneously with the sublease agreements (Exhibits "D" and "E"). While Dans signed the lease agreements in behalf of the LRTA, he apparently had no hand in the ensuing sublease of the properties, as indicated by the absence of his signature from the two subsequent agreements. Marcos, on the other hand, represented the PGHFI twice, first in the lease contract and later in the sublease agreements. Within the very brief period of time that separated the lease and the sublease of the LRTA's prime lots, Marcos inevitably generated a situation where the LRTA, a government corporation, 31 lost out to the, PGHFI, a private enterprise32 headed by Marcos herself.
But, considering that there is an allegation of conspiracy in the informations, the sufficiency of which we have earlier upheld, should the liability of Dans be the same as that of Marcos?
The court a quo entertained no doubt that the prosecution's evidence amply established a conspiracy between Dans and Marcos, thus:
. . . (T)he avowed purpose of both accused in entering into the Lease Agreements was not to earn additional income for the use of the LRTA in its operations, but to give financial assistance to the PGHF in the pursuit of its charitable objectives.
x x x x x x x x x
This expressly admitted purpose explains why the rentals stipulated in the Lease Agreements were so low that when compared with the rentals provided in the Sub-Lease Agreements, the latter deceivingly appear, to borrow the words of Mr. Cuervo, to be "extra-ordinarily high." To have fixed much higher rentals would have been to reduce the income which both the accused would like the PGHF to earn from the lease contracts. And the rentals in the Lease Agreements all the more became very low in light of the fact that the Agreement for the development of
the areas adjacent to the LRT stations was without any valuable consideration.33
x x x x x x x x x
In these cases, Engr. Dans and Mrs. Marcos had a common objective, namely, to lease in favor of the PGHF the Pasay City and Sta. Cruz properties under such terms and conditions so favorable to the PGHF as to result in manifest and gross disadvantage to the LRTA. This common purpose they pursued together and in concert with each other, being in the position to do so because they were both ranking officials of the LRTA and the PGHF.
Thus, on September 8, 1982, avowedly desirous to extend financial support to the PGHF (not to the PGH), Engr. Dans, representing the LRTA, and Mrs. Marcos, as chairman of the PGHF, executed an agreement wherein without any valuable consideration, the latter was granted (exclusive) authority to develop areas adjacent to the LRT stations and to operate commercial concessions therein.
In furtherance of their common design and pursuant to their intention to financially benefit the PGHF, Engr. Dans and Mrs. Marcos, acting in their said representative capacities, entered into a Lease Agreement on June 8, 1984, over the Pasay City area for P102,760.00 a month and another Lease Agreement ten days later over the Sta. Cruz Area for P92,437.20 per month. As already demonstrated, the monthly rentals and other stipulations in both contracts placed the LRTA in a manifestly and grossly disadvantageous position.
Engr. Dans and Mrs. Marcos were, therefore, both co-conspirators for having acted in conspiracy with each other and co-principals by direct participation for having taken direct part in the execution of the acts charged. Engr. Dans could not have committed the offenses without Mrs. Marcos and vice-versa.34
While these observations cannot be said to be flawed, they were made only after the trial, in fact, after the assailed decision was promulgated, and these conclusions are the court's alone. The prosecution never attempted to establish a connection between the two defendants in committing the acts for which they were charged. It is a fundamental rule, however, that a charge of conspiracy must be proven just like any other criminal accusation, that is, "independently and beyond reasonable doubt." 35 In this regard, therefore, this Court's opinion that the alleged conspiracy between the petitioners was not sufficiency established by the State's evidence.
6) Were the members of the Sandiganbayan's First Division biased against petitioners? Consequently, is the assailed decision dated September 24, 1993, valid?
Petitioners consider erroneous the active participation of the members of the Sandiganbayan's First Division during the hearing of Cuervo's testimony.⚖ - ℒαɯρhi৷ The records reveal that, indeed, the court a quo may have participated more actively than usual in the examination of Cuervo in order to elicit from him the information that would nail down the prosecution's basic theory, thus rendering unassailable the conclusions which are now being impugned by petitioners who argue that the extensive questioning of Cuervo 36 made the Sandiganbayan, particularly Justice Garchitorena, not only a judge, but a prosecutor as well.
To be sure, instead of being satisfied with Cuervo's testimonial affirmation of what it had all along considered to be the fair rental value of the properties, the court a quo relied on his responses to numerous postulated queries thereby concluding there was a "gross disparity" in the lease price, as agreed upon by the parties, and the projected rental price, as estimated by Cuervo. Indeed, if the trial court's conclusions were to be followed, the Pasay lot should fetch a monthly rental of P210,000.00 and the Sta. Cruz lot, P400,000.00. These figures are extrapolated from the potential rental price of the lots, considering its location.
Petitioners point out that the limitations on the right of judges to ask questions during the trial were not observed by the Sandiganbayan. They accuse Justice Garchitorena of acting more of a prosecutor than the impartial judge he is supposed to be, particularly during the examination of Cuervo. Lest we be distracted by this allegation of bias on the part of respondent court, it must be remembered that petitioners were never prejudiced by such questioning, 37 which is about the only thing that would make a string of queries by a judge objectionable. As the following discussion will reveal, the trial court's interpretation of Cuervo's testimony is immaterial because of the sufficiency of the documentary evidence of the questions prosecution to prove the charges against herein petitioners.
In view of the circumstances obtaining here, we find that the trial court's active role in this regard was necessary to clarify the mostly technical aspect of Cuervo's testimony.ℒαwρhi৷ Respondent court defended its action by declaring that:
It was precisely for the reason that Mr. Cuervo was merely asked by Engr. Dans' lawyer as to the fair and reasonable rentals of the leased premises as without improvements, without the LRT stations being adjacent thereto, and no parts of commercial centers, that the Court, through Presiding Justice Garchitorena, was constrained to propound questions on the fair and reasonable rentals of the leased areas by considering them as not ordinary parcels of land.38
The Court notes that while petitioners have been making such an outcry since the promulgation of the questioned judgment regarding the line of questioning followed by respondent court, none of them ever objected to such queries during the trial. Neither did they attempt to salvage the situation by asking questions on re-direct examination if they harbored the impression that the court's cross-examination seriously prejudiced their case. This observation was likewise made by the court a quo, to wit:
It is now too late in the day to object to the alleged leading, misleading, and badgering questions of the Presiding Justice Garchitorena and to ask (the court) to expunge the answers thereto from the record. Needless to say, Engr. Dans (and Marcos, for that matter) should have done so when the supposed objectionable nature of the questions and/or answers were propounded or given. (Section 36, Rule 132, 1985 Rules on Evidence). As it happened, he (and she) did not even raise his (and her) objections at the close of the testimony of Mr. Cuervo. He (and she) did not also ask re-direct questions to correct whatever mistakes or misimpressions allegedly crept into Mr. Cuervo's testimony. Instead, he formally offered the entire testimony without making any exceptions or reservations.39
We should stress that in affirming the conviction of petitioner Marcos, this Court relies mainly on the prosecution's documentary evidence showing the chasmic disparity between the P102,760.00 monthly rental stipulated in Exhibit "B" and the P734,000.00 monthly rental provided in Exhibit "D." The testimony of Cuervo is, at best, opinion only, but the amounts mentioned in the said two exhibits are facts which cannot be altered by opinion, however "expert." Regardless of Cuervo's expert opinion on the probable rental rate of the Pasay lot, the stubborn fact and cold reality is that the PGHFI was able to lease it out for an amount that was seven times more than what it stipulated to pay the government. The sublease (Exhibit "D") is the best monument to the "gross and manifest disadvantage" suffered by the government due to the willful actions of Marcos. Hence, even if the questions of Justice Garchitorena and the answers thereto of Cuervo were totally ignored by this Court, the prosecution's evidence would still firmly stand, and would definitely be more than sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Going further, petitioners insist that some impropriety attended the promulgation of the challenged decision. This allegation stems from the dissolution of the Special Division earlier created by Justice Garchitorena because of the lack of unanimity among the members of the First Division.
It appears from the records that Justice Narciso T. Atienza initially wanted to acquit the defendants in Criminal Case Nos. 17449, 17451 and 17452, while Justices Garchitorena and Balajadia wanted to convict them in Criminal Case Nos. 17450, 17451, 17452 and 17453. There was, therefore, no unanimous vote in Criminal Case Nos. 17451 and 17452. Thereupon, a Special Division was constituted, with the addition of Justices Augusto M. Amores and Cipriano A. del Rosario. Over an informal luncheon among the members of the newly-created Special Division, 40 however, where the merits of the cases were incidentally discussed, an understanding was reached whereby the two newly-appointed members agreed with Justice Atienza that the defendants should be cleared of the charges in Criminal Case Nos. 17451 and 17452. The stance of those present was that if the actual voting were to take place, the majority would acquit the defendants in Criminal Case Nos. 17451 and 17452. Consequently, Justices Garchitorena and Balajadia decided to change their opinions in said two cases, thus giving the First Division a unanimous vote in all the cases. There seemed to be no further need for the Special Division; hence, it was dissolved. The result is the assailed decision promulgated, as scheduled, on September 24, 1993.
Petitioners point out that once the Special Division was created, the First Division was thereby divested of jurisdiction to decide the case. They also maintain that the informal discussion of the merits of the cases inside a restaurant was unofficial business and, therefore, should have no binding effect.
While it is true that under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, when a unanimous vote is not reached by a division, two other justices shall be designated by the Presiding Justice to sit in a special division, and their majority vote shall be required to reach a valid verdict, this provision does not totally rule out a situation where all members of the 3-justice division eventually come to a common agreement to reach a unanimous decision, thus, making another division's participation in these cases redundant. This is exactly what transpired in this case. The change of heart of Justices Garchitorena and Balajadia, though reached unofficially, may be perceived as a supervening event which rendered the Special Division's functions superfluous. In any case, the fact that Justice Atienza signed his concurrence cured the defect, if any, in the questioned judgment; again, an illustration of the "curative" effect of one's signature. Petitioners are of the impression that this chain of events was meant to 'railroad' their conviction, thus making the magistrates concerned vulnerable to criticism. While the Court is averse to encouraging this kind of behavior in judges, it is of the view, however, that the assailed decision is in harmony with the basic right of an accused to a speedy disposition of his case. This, to our mind, is more important than any consideration of technical impropriety in resolving a case.
Summing up, was the guilt of petitioners proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution?
We distinguish.
In Criminal Case No. 17453, we do not concur with the conclusions reached by the court a quo. The culpability of petitioners in this case stems from their entering into the lease agreement (Exhibit "C") over the Sta. Cruz lot under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, which, in this instance, is the LRTA. To prove this assertion, the prosecution presented in evidence the sublease agreement (Exhibit "E") over the same property showing the disparity in the rental price. While the authenticity of Exhibit "D," which was used to prove the manifest and gross disadvantage to the government occasioned by Exhibit "B," was admitted by the court and by the parties themselves, the validity of Exhibit "E" cannot, even up to this point, be determined with certainty because it is a mere uncertified photocopy of the original. Thus, the "gross and manifest" disadvantage to the government, which Exhibit "E" was supposed to engender, remains an allegation which cannot be proved by other direct evidence. The fact that only Dans objected to its admissibility does not mean that it is valid as to Marcos. As a result, both petitioners should be, as they are hereby, acquitted in Criminal Case No. 17453 on ground of reasonable doubt.
In Criminal Case No. 17450, we must further qualify our judgment.
As regards petitioner Dans, the Court is of the opinion that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt in committing the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt. We believe that his liability, if any, could only stem from a knowledge of the terms of the sublease agreements, Exhibits "D" and "E," which formed the core of the Court's appraisal of the manifest and gross disadvantage to the government. Exhibit "E," as already discussed, was correctly disregarded by the court a quo for being unauthenticated. Even though he was a Board Director of the PGHFI, Dans denied any knowledge of the execution of Exhibits "D" and "E," and his denial was never disproved by the prosecution. In fact, his signature does not appear in either sublease agreements. Neither was the alleged conspiracy between him and Marcos established by the prosecution.
It is this Court's opinion, however, that the guilt of petitioner Marcos was proved by the State beyond reasonable doubt. She was charged with violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, for executing a lease agreement (Exhibit "B") in behalf of the PGHFI, a private enterprise of which she was the Chairman, over a lot located in Pasay City owned by the LRTA, a government corporation of which she was undeniably also the Chairman. The consideration therefor was shown to be unfair and unreasonable upon comparison with the rental price stipulated in the sublease agreement (Exhibit "D") which she subsequently signed for the PGHFI in favor of TNCC. That she should be held responsible is shown by the presence of her signature in Exhibits "A" to "E," where she acts in different capacities. She cannot, under these circumstances, claim ignorance of the great disparity between the rental price stipulated in the lease and the sublease agreements. Consequently, in Criminal Case No. 17450, the conviction of petitioner Marcos should be, as it is hereby, upheld.
Finally, the Court observes that the Sandiganbayan awarded damages to the People in the amount of P32,172,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 17450 and P92,268,840.00 in Criminal Case No. 17453. This must be accordingly corrected.
Considering that petitioners were acquitted in Criminal Case No. 17453 due to lack of evidence, the Court deems them likewise free from any civil liability since the fact from which such liability might arise no longer exists.41
On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. 17450, the Court observes that an error has been committed in the computation of the damages to be awarded to the People. The trial court based its figures on the amount it perceived to be the fair rental value of the Pasay lot, as estimated by Cuervo, less the rental price stated in Exhibit "B." Thus, it deducted P102,760.00 (the stipulated monthly rental for the Pasay lot) from P210,000.00 (Cuervo's estimate, as interpreted by the court a quo) to arrive at a difference of P107,240.00, which was multiplied by 12 months to reach an "annual loss" of P1,286,880.00. 42 This amount was then multiplied by the life span of the lease contract, which is 25 years, to come up with the final award of P32,172,000.00.43
Since the estimates of Cuervo were found to be mere "estimates," it is difficult to imagine why the trial court used them as basis for its calculation of damages. As we have already demonstrated, the gross and manifest disadvantage to the government in Criminal Case No. 17450 was determined by comparing Exhibits "B" and "D." The conviction of Marcos was predicated on the nexus between these two documents, as well as on her obvious conflict of interest in entering into them. By the same token, her civil liability must also be made to depend on these two pieces of evidence. The correct figures should be those stated in Exhibits "B" and "D," to wit: P734,000.00 (the stipulated monthly sublease rental for the Pasay lot) less P102,760.00 (the agreed monthly lease price for said property) times 12 months times 25 years. Thus, P734,000.00 - P102,760.00 = P631,240.00 x 12 months = P7,574,880.00 x 25 years = P189,372,000.00.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) AFFIRMING the CONVICTION of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos in Criminal Case No. 17450, with the modification that said petitioner is hereby ordered to pay the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) the amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE MILLION, THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY-TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P189,372,000.00), as and by way of reimbursement for the prejudice caused thereto resulting from the execution of the lease contract dated June 8, 1984; and
2) REVERSING the CONVICTION of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos in Criminal Case No. 17453 and of petitioner Jose P. Dans, Jr. in Criminal Case No. 17450 and No. 17453, on ground of reasonable doubt.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. and Panganiban, J., concur.
Footnotes
1 Exhibit "A.."
2 Exhibits "B" and "C."
3 Exhibit "D."
4 The prosecution failed to submit an authenticated copy of the sublease agreement (see Fn 5).
5 Exhibit "E."
6 Petitioner Marcos' "Reply to Comment," p. 81, Rollo in G.R. No. 126995, p. 586; Original records, p. 153.
7 January 26, February 16, and April 2, 1993.
8 Penned by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena, with Balajadia and Atienza, JJ., concurring.
9 Dated November 8, 1996, and penned by Jose S. Balajadia, J., with Garchitorena and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concurring. Annex "B," Rollo in G.R. No. 127073, p. 173.
10 Undated, and penned by Garchitorena, J., with Balajadia and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concurring. Annex "B," Rollo in G.R. No. 126995, p. 250.
11 Sec. 15. Demurrer to evidence. — After the prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.
12 It must be noted that respondent court did not admit in evidence as against Dans sublease agreement between the PGHFI and Joy Mart (Exhibit "E") and the addendum thereto (Exhibit "E-2"), on which the prosecution relied to prove that Exhibit "C" was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the LRTA.
13 Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court states that, "The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
14 II Regalado, 1989, p. 437.
15 Rollo in G.R. No. 127073, pp. 142-146.
16 Citing 5 Moran, 1963 ed., p. 32.
17 Citing Underhil's Criminal Evidence, 5th ed., Vol. 1, pp. 91-97.
18 Citing 29 Am. Jur. 2d p. 669.
19 Citing Asia Banking Corporation v. Walter E. Olson & Co., 48 Phil. 529, Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 567 (1991)
20 34 SCRA 769 (1970).
21 The allegations in Criminal Case No. 17450 are identical with those in Criminal Case No. 17453, except as otherwise indicated in brackets.
22 Rollo in G.R. No. 126995, p. 43.
23 128 SCRA 556 (1984).
24 Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, this provision has been amended to read as follows:
Sec. 10. Bill of particulars. — Accused may, at or before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead or prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects and the details desired.
25 Records, Vol. I, pp. 25-27.
26 Supra.
27 Simple mathematics would yield a difference of P631,240.00 for the Pasay lot and P107,272.80 for the Sta. Cruz lot, or a sum of P738,512.80.
28 Rollo in G.R. No. 126995, p. 213.
29 TSN, August 13, 1992, p. 27.
30 Ibid., p. 23.
31 Under Section. 2(a) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, the term "'Government" includes the national government, the local governments, the government-owned and controlled corporation, and all other instrumentalities or agencies of Republic of the Philippines and their branches.
32 While the PGHFI is a private foundation which happens to count with some government officials on its Board of Trustees, the PGH is undoubtedly a State-run hospital.
33 Rollo in G.R. No. 127073, pp. 151-152.
34 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
35 People v. Cuizon, 256 SCRA 325 (1996).
36 TSN, August 13, 1992, pp. 17-26.
37 Am Jur 2d, Trial, Sec. 272, citing U.S. v. Kelly (CA3 NJ) 329 F2d 314; Woodring v. U.S. (CA8 Mo) 311 F2d 417, cert den 373 US 913, 10 L Ed 2d 414, 83 S Ct 1304.
38 Rollo in G.R. No. 127073, p. 154.
39 Ibid., p. 163.
40 With Justice Regino C. Hermosisima, Jr., a non-member of either the First or the Special Division, in attendance.
41 Section 2(b) of Rule 111 states that: "Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist."
42 Rollo in G.R. No. 126995, pp. 195-196.
43 Ibid., p. 247.
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