EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 122250 & 122258, July 21, 1997 ]
EDGARDO C. NOLASCO, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS, MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, AND EDUARDO A. ALARILLA, RESPONDENTS. FLORENTINO P. BLANCO, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND EDUARDO A. ALARILLA,RESPONDENTS.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
I find difficulty in concurring with the majority that the COMELEC order disqualifying Blanco is based on substantial evidence; therefore I vote to set aside that order. I however join the majority opinion that, as a result of the disqualifying of Blanco, the Labo doctrine 1 should apply.
The law on vacancies and succession of elective local officials is very clear. Section 44 (a), Chapter 2, R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991, provides that “[i]f a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the x x x mayor, the x x x vice mayor concerned shall become the x x x mayor.” Paragraph 2 of the same provision states that “a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official x x x fails to qualify xxxx These provisions are echoed in Art. 83 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code of 1991.
When the language of the law is clear, explicit and unequivocal, it admits no room for interpretation, but simply application. This is a basic legal precept. In the issue at hand, I find no necessity to make distinctions as the applicable law is clear. Accordingly, considering that Blanco has been adjudged by the majority to be disqualified, he comes within the purview of “fail(ing) to qualify” for the said office. And since a “permanent vacancy” has occurred in the office of the mayor, Nolasco who is the duly elected vice mayor, and who now occupies the position of mayor in an acting capacity, should succeed as provided for by law. And this is in consance with the pronouncements of this Court in Geronimo v. Ramos 2 and Topacio v. Paredes 3 which were reiterated in Labo v. COMELEC 4
x x x it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a plurality of legal votes cast in the election (20 Corpus Juris 2nd,§243, p.676).
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office x x x x
The rightful assumption of Nolasco to the Office of mayor is however only a consequence of the disqualification of Blanco to which I dissent. For, I do not agree with the submission that the COMELEC order disqualifying Blanco is based on substantial evidence. While the dossier of evidence submitted by Alarilla to show that Blanco committed massive vote-buying may appear at first blush to be overwhelming, a careful scrutiny of each piece of evidence does not measure up. I simply find no evidence to link Blanco to the alleged vote-buying. Consequently, I agree with Commissioner Maambong that Alarilla has failed to substantiate his allegation that Balnco engaged in or had knowledge of and consented to the buying of votes.
Alarilla relies on several affidavits narrating incidents to prove that Blanco supposedly bought votes. But aside from the inaccuracies and the doubtful origin of these affidavits, which were executed only about a month after the petition to disqualify Blanco was filed, using fill-in-the-blanks forms, none of the affiants was presented before respondent COMELEC to substantiate the allegations. 5 At the very least, some affiants should have been presented in the hearings supposedly conducted.
In his Petition (to disqualify Blanco), Alarilla alleged that “[w]hen the said PNP composite team examined the ten (10) black plastic bags, they found out that each bag contained ten (10) shoe boxes. Each shoe box when examined contained 200 pay envelopes, and each pay enveloped when opened contained the amount of P1,000.00. When questioned, respondent’s brother (Mariano P. Blanco) and respondent’s wife allegedly admitted to the raiding team that the total amount of money in the ten (10) plastic bags is (was) P10,000,000.00.6
But Alarilla has miserably failed to substantiate his allegations. He merely presented the sworn statement of Orlando Mauricio y Labora who claims to have filmed the raid.ℒαwρhi৷ But the statement of Mauricio are not even consisted with the allegations of Alarilla in his Petition to disqualify Blanco. In his Petition, Alarilla claims that each “pay envelope” contained P1,000.00, 7 while in the affidavit of Mauricio it is stated that there were envelopes which contained P2,000.00 (Exh. “A-3”). Alarilla should have presented at least one (1) member of the PNP raiding team who supposedly examined the ten (10) black plastic bags and questioned Blanco’s brother and wife as to the amount of the supposed money. In the absence of a credible testimony, the alleged admission of the brother and wife of Blanco that” he total amount of money in the ten (10) plastic bags is P10,000,000.00" becomes quite doubtful. For the imputed admission is simply contrary to human nature and experience. If there really was P10,000,000.00 in the plastic bags, there was no need to divulge the amount to the raiding team. The Blancos could have just kept quiet and let the raiding team count the money.
The video tape marked Exh. “A-1” could not be of any help to Alarilla as its content were not even viewed by the COMELEC, 8 neither the photograph of a cover of one of the shoe boxes with the words ”LAWA” and “TEACHERS” (Exh. “C”), nor the photograph of an envelope with the inscription “VOTE!!! TINOY!!!” (Exh. “D”), which by themselves mean nothing. Suffice it to say that these pieces of evidence are miserably insufficient to link Blanco to the alleged vot-buying. The same is true with the MTB identification card with perforation in the middle portion with the inscription “Office Copy” on the right half of the card (Exh. “E”); it connot by itself be evidence of vote-buying. On its face it is simply an evidence of membership with the Movement for Tinoy Blanco Volunteers and the “Office Copy” may only be for the files of the office. Certainly it may be speculated that these identification cards may somehow be used to carry out a vote-buying scheme. But speculations that they are, it is still difficult to surmise how they could ensure that the cardholders would surely vote for Blanco.
Even the uniform claim of the nine (9) individuals who filled out computerized print-outs stating that they received MTB identification cards and envelopes containing P300.00 each from the henchmen of Blanco and for the “Office Copy” of their respective MTB cards, and that petitioner Blanco himself promised to give them additional P200.00 in exchange for the other half of their MTB cards after the elections, if he won as Mayor (Exh. “E-2” to “E-10”), deserves scant consideration. These statements are contrary to the allegations in the petition to disqualify Blanco where it is alleged that MTB cardholders were intially given P500.00 and promised another P500.00.9
I connot disagree with the observations of Commissioner Maambong that the affidavits appear contrived as they are “1. Form Affidavits (computerized print-outs) in Pilipino, containing the same wordings, except the blank spaces in paragraph 1 and paragraph 2, filled up with the same date ‘April 17’ and ‘May 17’, respectively, notarized by the same Notary Public (Donato G. Mabbayao, Jr.) on the same date (June 4, 1995 [about a month after the elections]).”10
The “handwritten admissions” of alleged flying voters Ponciano Velasquez and Lito Ramirez stating that they were paid P300.00 each to vote for Blanco (Exh. “F-3” and “F-4”) are likewise doubtful. Save for the names of the supposed flying voters, the wordings of the two “handwritten admissions” are exactly the same, including the alleged residence of the said flying voters, i.e., Bo. Malhacan, Maycauayan, Bulacan. However, both the criminal complaints and the affidavit of Barangay Captain Romeo Garcia state that Ponciano Velasquez is a native of Lupacan, Tiaong, Quezon, and a resident of Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan, while Lito Ramirez is a native of Rosario, Batangas, and a resident of Zamora, Maycauayan, Bulacan. It is thus apparent that they are not actually residents of Bo. Malhacan, Maycauayan, Bulacan, as stated in their respective “handwritten admissions.” Could it then be that the “handwritten admissions” were dictated or were actually written by other persons, for how could Ponciano Velasquez and Lito Ramirez make a mistake with their respective addresses?
For sure, the affidavit of Barangay Captain Romeo C. Garcia stating that he retrieved two (2) envelopes with P300.00 each from flying voters Ponciano Velasquez and Lito Ramirez and turned them over to the police (Exh, “F-5”) is not an evidence that Blanco engaged in or knew about and consented to the alleged vote-buying.
Thus even the affidavit of Romeo Burgos executed before Notary Public Donato G. Mabbayao, Jr., together with all the other affidavits sworn before the same Notary Public, spawns serious doubt as it was notarized only on 4 June 1995 – almost a month after the petition to disqualify Blanco was filed.
In fine, I do not find any competent substantial evidence to link Blanco to the alleged vote-buying, much less the alleged massive vote-buying. At best respondent Alarilla would indulge in presumptions which, unfortunately, cannot be sufficient basis to unseat his political rival who obtained 29,753 votes as against his 23,038 votes. The pieces of evidence presented by Alarilla, to my mind, are too inadequate to support his stance. It may be true that the electoral aspect of vote-buying may be determined in an administrative proceeding that is summary in character and where technical rules of evidence may not be applied rigorously. Yet, caution should not be thrown to the winds especially here where the two opposing factions that have been hotly contesting the same post are known to have formidable followers, for it would not be difficult to manufacture spurious affidavits and even real evidence. It is imperative to scrutinize carefully the evidence presented by Alarilla to determine whether they are relevant evidence which a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support the conclusion that Blanco indeed bought votes.
The disqualification of Blanco should come from the strength of the evidence of Alarilla, not from the weakness of the former’s defense. Upon scrutiny, I submit that the pieces of evidence submitted by Alarilla have not met the mandated standard. The evidence presented in my opinion falls on its own weight as it fails to show that Blanco himself bought votes or that he was aware of and consented to any vote-buying.
In view of the foregoing, I VOTE TO SET ASIDE AND REVERSE THE RESOLUTION OF RESPONDENT COMELEC DISQUALIFYING PETITIONER BLANCO AS A CANDIDATE FOR THE OFFICE OF MAYOR OF MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, for having allegedly violated Sec. 261, par. (a), BP 881.
It is my view that respondent COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it based its findings on unfounded assumptions and unsubstantiated allegations.
Footnotes
1 G.R. No. 86564, 1 August 1989, 176 SCRA 1, 21.
2 G.R. No. 60504, 14 May 1985, 136 SCRA 435.
3 23 Phil. 238 (1912).
4 See note 1.
5 See Dissenting Opinion of Commissioner Maambong, p.23; Rollo of G.R. No. 122258, p. 142
6 Petition ( to disqualify Meycauayan, Bulacan, mayoralty candidate Florentino P. Blanco), par. 13, p.4; Rollo, G.R.No.122250, p. 26.
7 Ibid.
8 See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Commisioner Maambong in the Resolution of 15 August 1995 of the COMELEC, (First Division), p. 3; Rollo, G.R. No. 122258, p. 63.
9 See Note 5.
10 Id., p. 43; Id., p. 103.
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