G.R. No. 106244 January 22, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, VICTOR AFRICA, LOURDES AFRICA, NATHALIE AFRICA, JOSE ENRIQUE, AFRICA, PAUL DELFIN AFRICA, ROSARIO ARELLANO RACQUEL DINGLASAN, VICTORIA N. LEGARDA, ANGELA N LOBREGAT, MANUEL V. NIETO, BENITO NIETO, MA. RITA N. DE LOS REYES, EVELYN ROMERO, ROSARIO SONGCO, CARMEN N. TUAZON and RAFAEL V. VALDEZ, respondents.
DISSENTING OPINION
VITUG, J., dissenting:
The real point of controversy is whether or not respondent Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in declaring the orders/writ of sequestration issued by the PCGG over the ETPI shares of private respondents to have been AUTOMATICALLY LIFTED due to PCGG's failure to file the corresponding judicial action against them within the period prescribed by Section 26, Article. XVIII, of the Constitution.
In the various PCGG sequestration cases, promulgated on 23 January 1995,1 this Court has responded in the affirmative to the crucial question of whether or not the inclusion in the complaints filed by the PCGG before the Sandiganbayan of specific allegations of corporations being "dummies" or under the control of the defendants named therein and used as instruments for acquisition, or as being depositaries, of ill-gotten wealth, or the annexing to said complaints of a list of said firms, but without actually so impleading them as defendants, would satisfy the constitutional requirement. This Court has said that there is no particular description or specification of the kind and character of the judicial action or proceeding contemplated, let alone an explicit requirement of the impleading of the corporations sequestered, or of the ostensible owners of property suspected to be ill-gotten. The only modifying or qualifying requirement in the constitution is held to be that the action or proceeding should be filed with regard or in relation to, in respect of, or in connection with, or concerning orders of sequestration.
The majority view would stress that there is a material difference between the factual circumstances, on the one hand, in the 21 sequestration cased2 and, on the other hand, in the case at bench. The majority points out that in the PCGG sequestration cases, judicial actions have been initiated against individuals suspected to be "dummies" whose shares of stock in various corporations the Goverment has sought to recover, while in the instant case, no such judicial action is claimed to have been instituted against private respondents.
I, most regretfully, find myself unable to join my respected colleagues in giving too much significance to the supposed factual variance. I fail to see why there should be one rule for corporate entities and a contrary rule for the individual stockholder. There is here, in any case, Civil Case No. 0009 of the Sandiganbayan in which herein private respondents have intervened3 and whose interventions have been allowed. Civil Case No. 0009, instituted by the Republic, is for the reversion, reconveyance and accounting of all ill-gotten ETPI shares. ETPI is included in the list (of firms owning ill-gotten shares) appended to the complaint in the civil case in which corporation private respondents are said to be holding ETPI shares on behalf of the named defendants in Civil Case No. 0009, namely Jose Africa, Manuel Nieto, Jr., Roberto Benedicto, Ferdinand Marcos, et al. The intervention has resulted in bringing private respondents into the court action and having thus submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, they must now lay their claims before that court for adjudication and determination.4 Most importantly, the omission to initially implead private respondents in the complaint should be treated as a technical, not a fatal, defect that is correctable under applicable adjective rules. Thus, in its 23rd January 1995 decision in the PCGG sequestration cases, the Court has ruled.
Even in those cases where it might reasonably be argued that the failure of the Goverment to implead the sequestered corporations as defendants is indeed a procedural aberration, as where said firms were allegedly used, and actively cooperated with the defendants, as instruments or conduits for conversion of public funds or property or illicit or fraudulent obtention of favored Government. contracts, etc., slight reflection would nevertheless lead to the conclusion that the defect is not fatal, but one correctible under applicable adjective rules — e.g., Section 10, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court [specifying the remedy of amendment during trial to authorize or to conform to the evidence]; Section 1, Rule 20 [governing amendments before trial], in relation to the rule respecting the omission of so-called necessary or indispensable parties, set out in Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. it is relevant in this context to advert to the old. familiar doctrines that the omission to implead such parties "is a mere technical defect which can be cured at any stage of the proceedings even after judgment"; and that, particularly in the case of indispensable parties, since their presence and participation is essential to the very life of the action, for without them no judgment may be rendered, amendments of the complaint in order to implead them should be freely allowed, even on appeal, in fact even after rendition of judgment by this Court, where it appears that the complaint otherwise indicates their identity and character as such indispensable parties.5
Verily, the PCGG should be given an opportunity to adduce its evidence to show, among other things, that it has a prima facie determination for its sequestration order and that it can provide sufficient factual basis for the continued sequestration of ETPI shares held by private respondents.ℒαwρhi৷ The Sandiganbayan may, in time, be called upon to adjudicate the claims of all contending parties. While the above matters and, eventually, the issue of ownership over the sequestered shares remain unresolved, the lifting of sequestration over the ETPI shares in the names of private respondents would appear to be precipitate.
In PCGG vs. International Copra Export Corporation6 it might be pointed out, this Court had first remanded the case (G.R. No. 86989) to the Sandiganbayan for the reception of evidence but the PCGG, despite the opportunity, failed to present any proof to justify a further sequestration of therein respondent corporations. On the contrary, the respondents were there able to show that International Copra Export Corporation was organized as early as 1961, that Interco Manufacturing Corporation was established in 1976, and that the two corporations were and remained to be family corporations of the Luy family.7
Given all the foregoing I am constrained to vote for setting aside the resolutions, dated 26 November 1991 and 08 June 1992, of respondent Sandiganbayan and directing the latter in Civil Case No. 0009 to have the issue of whether or not private respondents are the legitimate and bona fide owners of the sequestered shares of stocks, as well as all other incidental and related questions such as whether or not there is prima facie factual basis for the sequestration of private respondents' ETPI shares, properly adjudicated.
Footnotes
1 240 SCRA 376.
2 Republic of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan, 240 SCRA 376.
3 Amended Motion for Leave of Court to Enter a Special Intervention so as to Receive their Cash Dividends dated 8 November 1988, Rollo, pp. 230-236; Formal Motion for Leave to Intervene dated 28 December 1990, Rollo, pp. 241-245.
4 It could be worthy to recall the old case of Ventosa vs. Fernan (10 SCRA 59), sequestration being akin to the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment, or receivership ("As thus described, sequestration, freezing and provisional takeover are akin to the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment, receivership." [Baseco Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 150 SCRA 181]), where the Court said:
"Having thus submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the respondent court by his intervention, petitioner necessarily became a party to civil case No. 4994. He must lay his cards before the said court, for adjudication and determination.
. . . The procedure in the presentation of claims against a receivership is either by motion or petition in the same proceeding, or by way of intervention. . . . But whichever procedure is followed, all parties is Interest must be notified of each claim, which shall be determined not in a summary manner, but after regular hearing."
5 At pp. 470-471.
6 G.R. No. 92755, 26 July 1991; see also Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, Sipalay Trading, etc., G.R. No. 112708-09, 29 March 1996.
7 At p.5.
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