G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997,
♦ Decision, Mendoza, [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Puno, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion, Romero, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Vitug, [J]

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997 ]

JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEÑA, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, AND RONALDO B. ZAMORA, PETITIONERS, VS. JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENTS.

CONCURRING OPINION

VITUG, J.:

When the 1987 Constitution has embodied, in its circumscription of judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII, of the Constitution, the determination of whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government, the Supreme Court, upon which that great burden has been imposed, could not have been thought of likewise being thereby tasked with the awesome responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. The term grave abuse of discretion has long been understood in our jurisprudence as, and confined to, a capricious and whimsical or despotic exercise of judgment as amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

I see nothing of that sort in the case at bar. Absent a clear case of grave abuse of discretion, like the patent disregard of Constitutional proscription, I would respect the judgment of Congress under whose province the specific responsibility falls and the authority to act is vested.ℒαwρhi৷ To do otherwise would be an unwarranted intrusion into the internal affairs of a co-equal, independent and coordinate branch of government. At no time, it would seem to me, has it been intended by the framers of the fundamental law to cause a substantial deviation, let alone departure, from the time-honored and accepted principle separation, but balanced, powers of the three branches of government. There is, of course, a basic variant between the old rule and the new Charter on the understanding of the term “judicial power.” Now, the Court is under mandate to assume jurisdiction over, and to undertake judicial inquiry into, what may even be deemed to be political questions provided, however, that grave abuse of discretion – the sole test of justiciability on purely political issues – is shown to have attended the contested act.

All taken, I most humbly reiterate my separate opinion in Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance and companion cases (G.R. No. 115455, etc., 235 SCRA 630) and vote to deny the instant petition.


The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation