G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997,
♦ Decision, Mendoza, [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Puno, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion, Romero, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Vitug, [J]

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997 ]

JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEÑA, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, AND RONALDO B. ZAMORA, PETITIONERS, VS. JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENTS.

SEPARATE OPINION

ROMERO, J.:

In filing this separate opinion for the dismissal of the instant petition, I am not backtracking from the dissent which I expressed in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance.1 I am somewhat bothered that if I do not elaborate, the vote which I cast today might be wrongly construed as an implied abandonment of, and inconsistent with, my firm stance in Tolentino.

The landmark case of Tolentino, just like the one under consideration, involved a similar challenge to the constitutionality of a significant tax measure namely, Republic Act No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax (EVAT) Law. There, a number of issues, both substantive and procedural, were posed by petitioners, each of which was discussed by the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza who, incidentally, is also the ponente of instant decision. At any rate, it is worth noting that I did not entirely disagree with each and every argument of the opinion, most especially those touching upon substantive issues. My main objection in Tolentino, it will be recalled, focused instead on what I perceived was a substantial breach and disregard by the Legislature of vital constitutional requirements ordaining the procedures to be followed in the passage of a bill which, in my opinion, the majority seemed to have cavalierly put to rest by hiding under the cloak of the enrolled bill theory2 and precept the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of internal legislative rules allegedly violated.3 To me, the position taken by the majority exhibited blind adherence to otherwise sound principles of law which did not, however, fit the facts as presented before the Court. Hence, I objected, not so much because I found these principles unwise or obsolete, but rather because they were applied, or misapplied, to a case which I believe did not call for their application.

When I differed from the majority opinion which applied the enrolled bill theory, I was very careful to emphasize that reliance thereon is not to be discontinued but that its application must be limited to minor matters relating more to form and factual issues which do not materially alter the essence and substance of the law itself. Thus:

"As applied to the instant petition, the issue posed is whether or not the procedural irregularities that attended the passage of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630, outside of the reading and printing requirements which were exempted by the Presidential certification, may no longer be impugned, having been ‘saved’ by the conclusiveness on us of the enrolled bill. I see no cogent reason why we cannot continue to place reliance on the enrolled bill, but only with respect to matters pertaining to the procedure followed in the enactment of bills in Congress and their subsequent engrossment, printing errors, omission of words and phrases and similar relatively minor matters relating more to form and factual issues which do not materially alter the essence and substance of the law itself.

Certainly, courts cannot claim greater ability to judge procedural legitimacy, since constitutional rules on legislative procedure are easily mastered. Procedural disputes are over facts – whether or not the bill had enough votes, or three readings, or whatever – not over the meaning on the constitution. Legislators, as eyewitnesses, are in a better position than a court to rule on the facts. The argument is also made that legislatures would be offended if courts examined legislative procedure.

Such a rationale, however, cannot conceivably apply to substantive changes in a bill introduced towards the end of its tortuous trip through Congress, catching both legislators and the public unawares and altering the same beyond recognition even by its sponsors.

This issue I wish to address forthwith.”4

As regards the principle that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of internal legislative rules, both the majority and I were actually of one mind such that I was quick to qualify the extent of the Court’s review power in respect of internal procedures in this wise:

I wish to consider this issue in light of Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution which provides that ‘(j)udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice x x x to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.’ We are also guided by the principle that a court may interfere with the internal procedures of its coordinate branch only to uphold the Constitution.”5

I differed, however, from the majority insofar as that principle was applied. In this respect, I showed that the introduction of several provisions in the Bicameral Conference Committee Report did not only violate the pertinent House and Senate Rules defining the limited power of the conference committee but that the Constitutional proscription against any amendment upon the last reading of a bill was likewise breached. Hence, in view of these lapses, I thought that judicial review would have been proper in order to uphold the Constitution. This majority, however, disregarded invoking the same principle which should have justified the Court in questioning the actuations of the legislative branch.

At this juncture, I wish to reiterate my continuing adherence to the aforesaid reasons I cited in the Tolentino dissent. At the same time, I realize that the arguments I raised in my dissent would not hold true in the instant petition.7!ᕼdMᗄ7

For one thing, unlike in Tolentino, the rules of the House of Representatives allegedly violated by respondents in the instant petition are purely internal rules designed for the orderly conduct of the House’s business. They have no direct or reasonable nexus to the requirements and proscriptions of the Constitution in the passage of a bill which would otherwise warrant the Court’s intervention. Likewise, the petitioners are not in any way complaining that substantial alterations have been introduced in Republic Act No. 8240. The thrust of petitioner’s arguments in attacking the validity of the law is merely with respect to the fact that Rep. Joker Arroyo was effectively prevented from invoking the question of quorum and not that the substance thereof offends constitutional standards. This being the case, I do not feel called upon to invoke my previous argument that the enrolled bill theory should not be conclusive as regards “substantive changes in a bill introduced towards the end of its torturous trip through Congress,” when it is palpably unwarranted under the circumstances of instant petition.


Footnotes

1 235 SCRA 630.

2 Id., at p. 672: “ Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved in its favor. Our cases manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also it its due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed constitutional amendment was invalid because the requisite votes for its approval had not been obtained or that certain provisions of a state had been ‘smuggled’ in the printing of the bill have moved or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a coequal branch of the government. There is no reason now to depart from this rule.

No claim is her made that the ‘enrolled bill’ rule is absolute. In fact in one case we ‘went behind’ an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate in view of the fact that the President of the Senate himself, who had signed the enrolled bil, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no longer an enrolled bill to consider.

But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee ‘surreptitiously’ inserted provision into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the ‘enrolled bill’ rule in such cased would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our government.”

3 Id., at p. 675: “Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal Rules. To the contrary, as we have already ruled, ‘parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern.’ Our concern is with the procedural requirements of the Constitution for the enactment of laws. As far as these requirements are concerned, we are satisfied that they have been faithfully observed in these cases.”

4 Id., pp. 778-779; emphasis supplied.

5 Id., p. 780; emphasis supplied; compare to note 3, supra.
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