G.R. No. L-52451, March 31, 1981,
♦ Decision,
Aquino, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion,
De Castro, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion,
Fernando, [CJ]
♦ Dissenting Opinion,
Teehankee, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion,
Abad Santos, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion,
Melencio-Herrera, [J]
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-52451 March 31, 1981
ZACARIAS A. TICZON, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. L-52678 March 31, 1981
ZACARIAS A. TICZON, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF SAN PABLO CITY and ANTONIO B. COSICO, respondents,
CESAR P. DIZON, intervenor.
G.R. No. L-53393 March 31, 1981
RAMON ARMEDILLA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CESAR P. DIZON, respondents.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., dissenting.:
It must be admitted that there is support for the conclusion reached based on the appraisal of the facts as set forth in the majority opinion penned with his usual clarity by Justice Aquino. It cannot be denied either that once there be acceptance of the proclamation of respondent Dizon, reliance on the now prevailing doctrine given full expression in Aguinaldo v. Commission on Elections leads to such a result. Nonetheless, I find myself unable to yield my assent in view of what I consider to be the failure of respondent Commission on Elections to heed and comply with a restraining order issued by this Court as early as February 6, 1980. Without, therefore, joining dissenting Justices Teehankee and Abad Santos in their condemnation in strongly-worded terms of the actuation of respondent Commission on Elections, it is my belief that it could have acted with more prudence and circumspection on the matter and thus avoid what on its face was a failure to abide by what was ordered by this Court. In therefore, dissenting from the exhaustive and able opinion of the Court, I am inclined to follow the approach taken by Justice Melencio- Herrera. I reach the same conclusion as she did that for the present, it would be premature for either petitioner Ticzon and respondent Dizon to discharge the functions of city mayor. I shall explain why.
1. There is still need it seems, to recall fundamentals at times. This is one of them. The categorical affirmation of Chief Justice Marshal in the landmark decision, Marbury v. Madison, comes to mind "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."1 That is the basis for the exercise of the function of judicial review, which is a corollary to the cardinal postulate that the Constitution is the fundamental law. In the leading case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, Justice Laurel spoke of this peculiarly American doctrine imposing upon the judiciary the duty of enforcing the Constitution in the determination of actual cases and controversies.2 Such a principle is the necessary consequence of the supremacy of the Constitution, with the Supreme Court, in the last analysis, as its guardian.ℒαwρhi৷ There is this caveat. It can act as such only when it exercises its judicial function. This Tribunal then cannot avoid its sworn duty to give effect to its mandates.3 It must not sanction a constitutional breach.4 It should strike down legislative or executive acts in conflict with the fundamental law.5 It can, of course, on the other hand affirm their validity. The function of judicial review has thus both a checking and a legitimating aspect.
2. Nor is the fundamental concept of the Supreme Court as the ultimate arbiter on questions of law limited only to issues of constitutional dimensions. In all other cases where it has to rule on a legal question, it can speak authoritatively. It may change its view as it has the right to. As long, however, as a resolution issued by this Tribunal stands in force and unreversed, it must be obeyed. If it were otherwise, the rule of law becomes a myth. It would, at the very least, erode respect for jural norms as traditionally conceived in all legal systems. An excerpt from an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Albert v. Court of First Instances6 has relevance. Thus: "Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme Court, by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justiciable controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings."7 That such a principle obtains in the United States is quite evident upon a cursory perusal of such recent American Supreme Court decisions as Cooper v. Aaron, Baker v. Carr,9 Powell v. McCormack,10 and United States v. Nixon.11 It is worth noting that in Aaron, the opinion of the Court was quite unique. It is not only chat it is a unanimous decision but also that the nine Justices of the Court from Chief Justice Burger down to the most Junior Justice, Justice Whitaker were ponentes.
3. Let there be no misunderstanding. There is no thought of interfering in any wise of form with the prerogative vested by the Constitution in the Commission on Elections.ℒαwρhi৷ Its in. dependence must be preserved — but not to the extent of allowing it to follow a course of conduct contrary to an order of this Court. For the wide discretion it enjoys is subject to this specific provision of the Constitution: "Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof.12 When, therefore, a case is properly before us, it must ever be alert to avoid the slightest suspicion that it pays no heed to what this Court has required it to do. There must be awareness that this Tribunal is entitled to and must insist on obedience to its judgments or resolutions. Any other view would entail pernicious consequences to the rule of law. Confronted as it was by the February 5, 1980 Resolution with its restraining order, it should have filed a petition with this Court to have it lifted. Then it would have avoided the serious predicament in which it finds itself at present. There is plausibility, it must be conceded, to its submission that such restraining order came too late. At the most, that would only be indicative of its good faith. Thereafter, knowing that this Court had assumed jurisdiction, the proper and lawful thing to do was to avoid any hasty action which could be characterized as a failure to accord this Court the respect due it. So constitutionalism mandates.
Hence my concurrence in the dissent of Justice Melencio-Herrera, coupled with the hope that respondent Commission, perhaps not laboring under the time pressure that plagued it in the 1980 election would not, in the future, be found lacking in that degree of care and circumspection to avoid a recurrence of this deplorable situation.
Footnotes
1 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803).
2 Cf. Angara v. electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 1369, 158 (1936)
3 People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937)
4 Laurel, dissenting, Government v. Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, 66 Phil. 483 (1939).
5 Laurel, concurring, Zandueta v. De la Costa, 66 Phil. 615 (1938).
6 L-26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948.
7 Ibid, 961.
8 358 US 1 (1958).
9 369 US 486 (1969).
10 395 US 486 (1969).
11 418 US 683 (1974)
12 Article XII, C, Sec. 11 of the Constitution
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
