G.R. No. L-52451 - Concurring Opinion

G.R. No. L-52451, March 31, 1981,
♦ Decision, Aquino, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, De Castro, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Fernando, [CJ]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Teehankee, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Abad Santos, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Melencio-Herrera, [J]

ZACARIAS A. TICZON, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

ZACARIAS A. TICZON, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF SAN PABLO CITY and ANTONIO B. COSICO, respondents,
CESAR P. DIZON, intervenor.

RAMON ARMEDILLA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CESAR P. DIZON, respondents.

I concurr. I wish, however, to write this separate opinion not so much to place its weight behind one of the contending parties and there advance his cause against the other, but more to raise a voice of defense of Comelec, which came under t scathing attack in the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee (hereafter referred to for brevity as "dissent") which, to me, is unkind and undeserved.

I assuredly am one with my brethren who would fee serious concern and strong displeasure for any act of disrespcet, disregard or disobedience to any court order, writ or process. But looking at the instant case with an absolutely objective eye and serenity, not with a mind agitated with anger and a hear heavy with frustration, I see no cause for an outburst of severe denunciation against the COMELEC for what is seen in the "dissent" as willful, oppressive and brazen disregard of three restraining orders of this Court, and other alleged acts of arbitrariness committed by the COMELEC. A constitutional body like the Supreme Court, the COMELEC should, I believe, even with some faults or errors it is susceptible of committing, be spared that kind of stinging castigation that might quite properly be visited upon on lesser in appropriate instances or occasions, except perhaps when a measure of severity of condemnations is, with undisputable propriety, unavoidably and compelling called for.

In the present instance, I see no "gross disregard or violation" of the restraining order issued by this Court on February 5, 1980 against the enforcement of a directive dated February 1, 1980 of the COMELEC to stop "until further orders," the canvass of the votes of city mayor, vice-mayor and members of the Sangguniang Panglusod in San Pablo City, and directed the San Pablo city Board of Canvassers to proceed with the canvass of the election returns. When the COMELEC, before the restraining order could be served on it, issued Resolution of February 6, 1980 for the suspension of the canvass and proclamation, or in the alternative, the annulment of the election in San Pablo City, it could not have disregarded the Court's restraining order. The grounds of the petition were all of grievous nature, and COMELEC could not have left it unacted upon without a feeling of guild for dereliction of duty. All that COMELEC did was to discharge its duty on the premises in the best light that dawned on it, and the actions it took did not violate, even in the slightest, our restraining order of February 5, 1980.

In changing the members of the city board of canvassers, COMELEC acted clearly within its power of having direct control and supervision over the board of canvassers, to relieve them for cause, and substitute them even motu proprio.1 Two members of the city board of canvassers, the City Fiscal and School Superintendent, were denounced as partial by Dizon, and the charge was properly investigated by COMELEC which thereupon acted as it saw fit and proper.

When COMELEC also directed the canvass to be held in its Session Hall in Manila, and ordered the canvass to include the returns already canvassed by the old board, the order was issued only after an investigation into the charges contained in the aforementioned verified petition filed by Dizon. Again, the Commission acted well within its powers in dutiful fulfillment of its grave responsibility to insure clean, honest and orderly elections, likewise violating no directive of the restraining order. Transfer of venue of canvass had been ordered as in the case of Mandaluyong municipality involving mayoralty candidates, and Batangas province, involving the gubernatorial aspirants therein.

The very plain terms, therefore, of the restraining order of February 5, 19780, the main thrust of which is only for the canvass to proceed and proclamation to follow thereafter, do not justify branding the issuance of February 6 Resolution of the COMELEC as "arbitrary," much less "in gross disregard and violation" of Our first restraining order of February 5, 1980, for neither the reconstitution of the board nor the recanvassing was expressly, or even impliedly, prohibited by said restraining order.

It was when Ticzon came again to this Court that We issued on February 14, 1980 a second restraining order against the canvass of the election returns in Manila by the new City Board of Canvassers.ℒαwρhi৷ This is a clear inference that before this restraining order of February 14, 1980, the canvassing of the election returns by a newly formed board of canvassers in the premises of the COMELEC was not prohibited since indeed all that this Court had ordered in its first restraining order was for the canvass to proceed.

Parenthetically, the order of COMELEC on February 1, 1980, which suspended canvassing and proclamation, was not arbitrary. It apparently considered the move necessary and well-advised because in all good faith, as its must be assumed, it felt that it was its inescapable duty to decide the pre-election disqualification cases against both Ticzon and Dizon before the canvassing and proclamation, considering the distinct possibility that one of the two opposing candidates, or even both of them, may be found disqualified to run for the elective office they sought. The Commission must have seen the propriety and wisdom of first resolving the pre-election disqualification controversies quickly to avoid what may amount to a virtual grabbing of proclamation by one not qualified to hold the elective office, excluding the legally entitled aspirant from assuming the position. So, as early as February 12, 1980, after due hearing which ended on February 6, 1980, when the case was submitted for decision, COMELEC issued a resolution finding Ticzon disqualification on ground of "turncoatism". It also found the evidence against Dizon for a similar charge insufficient, and it, accordingly, dismissed the petition for his disqualification on February 13, 1980, after the case had been submitted on the pleadings. This led to the votes of Ticzon being considered stray, as expressly so ordained by the Election Code of 1980,2 and paved the way for the proclamation of Dizon as the remaining unopposed candidate, late in the afternoon on February 15, 1980, before our second restraining order of the same date could be served on the Board of Canvassers that proclaimed Dizon.

It is all too evident, therefore, that when Ticzon came to this Court with his second petition for certiorari praying for the setting aside of the COMELEC resolution disqualifying him, it was a bit too late, even if on the same day after 5:00 o'clock p.m., this Court issued a third restraining order enjoining of Ticzon and the city board of canvassers from proclaiming Dizon, for the latter was already proclaimed before the restraining order could actually be served on the Board of Canvassers.

The foregoing are the salient facts to consider in deciding these related cases, in all of which the crucial issue, consistent with the limited certiorari jurisdiction of this Court over the COMELEC3 is whether said body acted with grave abuse of discretion or with lack or in excess of its jurisdiction, or otherwise against the law; questions of facts being deemed settled by the COMELEC itself beyond Our interference, except in case of denial of due process or evident arbitrariness4 which, as I said at the outset, and with due respect, I fail to see with a calm and objective mind.

We need not look as far back as the order of February 1, 1980 of the Commission suspending the canvassing of the election returns, which it issued manifestly because of the tendency of the pre-election disqualification cases against the two opposing candidates, Dizon and Ticzon, as well as the sworn letter and verified petition of Dizon filed on January 31, 1980. For as soon as the first restraining order of February 5, 1980 was served on it, the Commission took steps towards the canvassing of the election returns, in compliance therewith It only had to change the original membership of the board of canvassers, on being made to appear to it that, as charged by Dizon, and after its own investigation, the City Fiscal and School Superintendent were not impartial members, the first, for having owed his position to Ticzon's counsel, ex-Congressman Manuel Concordia, and the second, for having campaigned for Ticzon, on the sly, as Justice Aquino said in his main opinion. It also changed the venue of the canvassing to Manila within its office premises, obviously to free the proceedings from possible extraneous illegal influences or pressures, certainly not to manipulate the canvass to favor one of the candidates, which, if COMELEC had done so, would deserve the severest censure and indictment. The Commission's power of control and supervision over the Board of Canvassers leaves absolutely no room for doubt as to the legality of its action, without any vestige of grave abuse of discretion or arbitrariness. A motive other than one related to the goal and in the interest, of a free, honest and orderly elections to the end that the legitimate will of the people is given effect not being demonstrable to have influenced the Commission, and also considering the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions, a strongly critical thrust against the COMELEC is, to my mind, clearly unkind and unwarranted.

In any case, when the Commission ordered the suspension of the canvass on February 1, 1980, there was yet not ruling of this Court on whether such a suspension based on the tendency of pre-election or pre-proclamation disqualification cases against both opposing candidates for Mayor, or either of them, is proper or not. A direct ruling on the impropriety of COMELEC suspension of proclamation (not canvassing) due to tendency of a disqualification suit was handed down in Singco vs. COMELEC, et al.,5 and possibly other earlier cases before it , but positively not before the question order of the COMELEC. Even the case of Pimentel vs. COMELEC, et al,6 G.R. No. 53581-83, which annulled the suspension of the proclamation of Pimentel because of the invalidity of the COMELEC resolution of is disqualification for having been issued in violation of procedural due process, was decided on February 21, 1980. The COMELEC suspending the canvass of the election returns of San Pablo City, therefore, does not deserve so castigating a stricture as the "dissent" appears to be bristling with.

But should We annul Dizon's proclamation in the same way that We did Ong's proclamation in the Singco case? Or stated differently, should We order the proclamation of Ticzon as We did order the proclamation of Pimentel in the Pimentel case?

Dizon's proclamation on February 15, 1980 came after COMELEC had pronounced Ticzon's disqualification in a resolution issued on February 12, 1980, before proclamation of the winner. Unlike in the Pimentel case, the resolution disqualifying Ticzon is not vitiated by any violation of due process, as this Court has found, at least with no member, except Justice Teehankee, expressly holding that the disqualification of Ticzon is not valid for lack of due process, or being contrary to the evidence. In the case of Singco, his proclamation was suspended by COMELEC because it found him disqualified. On certiorari, We found the resolution disqualifying Singco void as We did in Pimentel, for lack of procedural due process. Hence, there was no legal obstacle to their proclamation since the canvassing showed them to be the winners.

From the foregoing observations, the answers to the questions earlier propounded should be clear and unmistakable. However, I need not elaborate on them, for this separate opinion is primarily intended, as I have stated at the outset, in defense of the COMELEC from the virulent attack against its credibility, competence, and impartiality, as I sense it from the vigorous language used in the "dissent". Its effect on either of the opposing candidates by way of advancing his cause, is thus only incidental, insofar as the real objective of this separate opinion as just pointed out once more, is concerned.

At this juncture, may I be permitted to state a few words on the following portion of the "dissent":

The disqualification suits against both Ticzon and Dizon were pre-election controversies. As earlier intimated, the Commission must have felt, in all good faith, backed by the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions, that is was its duty to resolve them as quickly as possible to prevent the proclamation of a disqualified candidate which would be not only a futile ceremony, but also unfair to the qualified candidate who actually would be a victim of "grabbing of proclamation", so well exemplified by the case of Santos vs. Comelec, et al., G.R. No. 52390, March 31, 1981. There, Santos was declared disqualified by COMELEC before the elections, but was nevertheless allowed to run because of a restraining order issued by this Court, when he came to this Court for a review of the COMELEC resolution disqualifying him. We affirmed the resolution of the COMELEC disqualifying Santos, but not after he was proclaimed winner and has held office for more than a year, to the prejudice of the qualified candidate who should have been unopposed since Santos was declared disqualified by COMELEC as early as before the election.

It is apparently to prevent occurrence of cases where there would be "grabbing of proclamation" that COMELEC would not want proclamations to be rushed. What would have happened if Ticzon had been proclaimed and allowed to assume office because COMELEC had not suspended the proclamation "until further orders?" Dizon who actually was the only candidate qualified to be elected would have had to oust Ticzon through quo warranto proceedings which may take years before it could finally be decided, Would not Ticzon have grabbed the proclamation? Certainly, Dizon cannot be pointed to as the culprit, He did not exclude Ticzon cannot be pointed to as the culprit, He did not exclude Ticzon from lawfully assuming the position of Mayor of San Pablo City, for Ticzon is legally barred from the position.

How then can the act of the Commission in deciding a disqualification case before the completion of the canvass and of the proclamation, be considered "arbitrary" specially when, as it now turns out, the Supreme Court, in its decision herein, has found no reason to annul the COMELEC resolution of disqualification against Ticzon? The Commission's action on the premises would precisely achieve the aim of policy that condemns "grabbing the proclamation" by one who, by the people's will, as expressed in the Constitution in its "innovative and mandatory" provision against 'turncoatism,' is disqualified from running fro an elective office. The fully qualified candidate voted for, even with less votes than those obtained by the disqualified candidate, which are legally "stray" votes, justly deserves to be proclaimed. He would not be the loser who continues to fraudulently represent the people", as Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said in the case of Aratuc vs. COMELEC,7 cited in the "dissent", for had the disqualified candidate not run as the people would not have wanted him to, the so-called "loser" would unquestionably have been elected, At least, he could not be said to have grabbed the proclamation unlawfully, or to continue representing the people fraudulently

In the above-quoted portion of the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee, the case of Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238, is cited for the proposition that even if Ticzon is disqualified, Dizon is not entitled to be proclaimed. A different ruling appears to have been enunciated much later in the case of Monsale vs. Nico, 83 Phil. 758, cited in the main opinion (p. 14) In any case Dizon as the only remaining candidate and therefore the legally proclaimed winner may be ousted only at the instance of possibly the Vice-Mayor-elect who may have a valid claim to the position of Mayor is himself disqualified, in a quo warranto proceedings seasonably filed.

The crux of the present controversy, therefore, actually hinges on no other question than whether the Resolution of COMELEC disqualifying Ticzon is a valid or not, Dizon having already been proclaimed and had since acted as City Mayor. If its validity is upheld, all other issues would be moot. The proclamation of Dizon would be legal, and his continuance in office can be tested only in a quo warranto proceedings, not by an election protest by Ticzon whose disqualification, as herein pronounced, would bar him from such remedy, nor that of quo warranto , not being qualified to make a lawful claim on the position. This is of course on the premise that Dizon is not disqualified as so demonstrated with convincing lucidity, in the main opinion, to which I do not propose to add anything more. To do so might deviate from the primary object of this separate opinion. But because in assailing the validity of the COMELEC resolution disqualifying Ticzon, the "dissent" is equally vigorous in lashing at the poll body for what it alleges to be whimsical and capricious acts committed with apparent bias and evident arbitrariness, in the evaluation of the evidence as well as the application of the law relative to the cause of the disqualification, I would like to put in a few words too on the matter.

Ticzon's violation of the constitutional prohibition against so-called "turncoastsim" is premised on his having been with no other party than the Liberal Party, but he became a Nacionalista just days before the last election. He tried to overcome the adverse effect of this switch of party by claiming to have been expelled from the Liberal Party when he ran as a rebel Liberal candidate for Mayor of San Pablo City in 1971 and therefore the had no party to switch from. His claim of expulsion is sought to be proven by an affidavit of his own counsel, Atty. Manuel Concordia, who had been the Liberal Party Chairman in one of the congressional districts of Laguna, and a certification of former Senator Gerardo Roxas as President of the Liberal Party, presented on rebuttal during the hearing By way of counter evidence, an affidavit of a former Liberal Party Vice-Mayor, Pedro Magcase, firmly attests to Ticzon having always remained with the Liberal Party. At one manifest is that ex-Congressman Concordia, as counsel of Ticzon, cannot be as unbiased or disinterested a witness as Pedro Magcase who affidavit, accordingly deserves more faith and credence.

As President of the Liberal Party, former Senator Roxas, likewise, could not be as reliable as Magcase in his knowledge of Ticzon's standing as a Liberal Party man. His duties and concern as the Liberal Party head are nationwide in scope and extent. He, therefore, could not have been so intimately aware of the status of Ticzon, as a fellow Liberal as Magcase was. Both Ticzon and Magcase belong to the same City chapter of the party. As Liberals of some prominence in their locality, they certainly have been in frequent personal contracts with each other , which Senator Roxas may never have had at all with Ticzon.

Even assuming that Ticzon was expelled from the Liberal Party, his expulsion was only a punishment for being perhaps an undisciplined party man, but that does to necessary mean that he had to give up his adherence, to, and belief in, the Ideals and objectives of that party if he wanted to stick to them even outside, of the party. What is condemned by the Constitution is to adopt and adhere to the Ideals and objectives of a political party different from those of the party to which one had always affiliated himself. This is what Ticzon did when he turned Nacionlista from a different party that he had been before within the prohibited period before an election as specified in the Constitution.

Moreover, Ticzon's readmission to the Liberal Party soon after the 1971 elections, in preparation of the 1973 presidential elections, could be a very strong probability, not a mere possibility, if we consider the well-known and simple political dictum of one of Our most loved and revered politicians, Don Eulogio (Amang) Rodriguez, Sr., That " politics is addition not subtraction." This observation would give even more credence to Magcase's affirmation that Ticzon had always been a liberal of good standing. Ticzon's alleged expulsion by it. A declaration of a "free zone" When two candidates of the same party are bent on running is usually what is done, instead of expulsion to preserve the strength of the party. In any case, Ticzon's expulsion could have been so momentary, for the party was always willing, for practical reasons, to forgive him and to take him back, that Magcase did not even know Ticzon was ever expelled.

I can neither subscribe to the Idea or proposition that the Liberal Party has become inexistent for its not participating in both 1978 and 1980 elections. Its non-participation in said election petitions was more an evidence of its well-disciplined existence, and solid organizational compactness as shown by its boycott of the past two elections which can be only under a strong unity of decision of the Party, than as showing its disintegration or -dissolution. No strongly viable party of pre-martial law vintage like the Liberal Party appears to have dissolved itself. This would be an act so contrary to the simple political aphorism that "politics is addition not subtraction" as earlier advert to. This is a fact easily borne out by recent events in the political scene, with the organization of the UNIDO in which the Liberal Party President, former Senator Gerardo Roxas, is Co-Chairman, an undeniable evidence of the party's continued and healthy existence.

Pursuing, further, the main purpose of this opinion, I would like to say that I cannot agree with the accusation against COMELEC implicit in the statement in the "dissent" that "Ticzon case was arbitrarily, whimsically and discriminately plucked by the COMELEC from hundred of pending disqualification cases in order to select the losers as the winners with no opponent by disqualifying the elected winners and not counting their votes as stray votes." The action of COMELEC is one done purely in administering the laws relative to the conduct of elections. For this Court to rebuke the COMELEC for this simple and pure act of administration would be to overstep the bounds of its reviewing authority over the Commission, no law having been violated by COMELEC in this regard, administrative discretion only being involved — fixing priorities among cases pending before it.

It must be emphasized that the resolution disqualifying Ticzon was before the proclamation of any winner. The case was submitted for decision on February 6, 1980, after Ticzon has presented rebuttal evidence, thus negating any claim of absence of procedural due process. If the Commission picked the Ticzon case for an early disposition together with the Dizon disqualification case, it evidently was because of the petition of Dizon for the suspension of the canvass and pro- clamation, or the annulment of the election in San Pablo City, filed on January 31, 1980 with the COMELEC, just after the election day. A decision on either or both of the cases finding "turncoatism" to have disqualified either or both respondents therein would obviously render the Dizon petition moot. By and large, the Commission cannot be blamed for finding an ex-way of quickly solving so grave a problem as that posed before it by the Dizon petition. COMELEC has shown thereby its thorough grasp of its priorities and responsibilities, and its capacity for sound and efficient administration of its massive and multifarious activities and affairs. An act purely one of administration, it may be repeated, does not come within the certiorari authority of this Court, to permit it to castigate the COMELEC for any error committed by it, which is one, not of jurisdiction but only of judgment or discretion.

It must, likewise, be stressed that in deciding the two disqualification cases against both Ticzon and Dizon, the first having been submitted on February 6, 1980, but decided on February 12, 1980 again negating any suggestion of "railroading" the COMELEC did so before proclamation of a winner. It thus, fully adhered to the ruling in Arcenas vs. COMELEC,8 where it was stated that "it is now the prevailing doctrine that after an election duly held and a proclamation thereafter made, a pre-proclamation controversy should no longer be viable." Did not COMELEC, therefore, act correctly and wisely in deciding the disqualification cases of both Ticzon and Dizon before proclamation for thereby it relieved itself of what otherwise would have the taken much of its precious time, and also this Court to which the petition will, in all likelihood, be eventually elevated for review? City elective position being involved, COMELEC had, with commendable foresight, wisely gave priority to these disqualification cases in San Pablo mayoralty for once decided by it and its decision finally passed by the Supreme Court on review, it has disposed of two cases with most salutary effect in its concern for an expeditious disposition of the numerous cases before it.

On the supposed assurance of COMELEC, given to its counsel, then Asst. Solicitor General Vicente Mendoza, (not to this Court) that the officials of the COMELEC would not implement the questioned order to proclaim Dizon as the only remaining candidate, then Asst. Solicitor General Mendoza could have been a little precipitate, if not indiscreet, in making the manifestation of said assurance to this Court, since it does not appear that COMELEC wanted or asked him to pass on the same assurance to this Court as to make it feel solemnly bound not to implement the order on Dizon's proclamation. It could also be that the Board of Canvassers had not been timely advised not to proclaim Dizon because of oversight or inadvertence on the part of the COMELEC, the officials thereof at the time being under tremendous pressure of work all to be attended to with utmost urgency. A realization of this fact evidently was the reason why the motion for contempt later filed with this Court against COMELEC was not entertained which, if it was, would have given the COMELEC officials concerned the opportunity to explain their side. Condemning now COMELEC without hearing would not be in keeping with our ever zealous concern for the solemn observance of the right of procedural due process.

At all events, any sign of disregard of any of the courts restraining orders as the "dissent" would see in the actuations of the COMELEC, which hopefully, has been erased by this humble opinion, need no longer excite so much fury and frustration, for with the ultimate disposition of this case as the I plurality decision", would have it, finding Ticzon disqualified for "turncoatism" absolutely no prejudice was inflicted on him by said actuation except perhaps that from his personal standpoint, not from that of the electorate which undoubtedly holds to stronger allegiance to the Constitution, had he been proclaimed, he should have held the position and exercised the prerogatives and enjoyed the privileges thereof. But surely, the COMELEC cannot be condemned that by its actuations, in the sound exercise of its discretion and wise application of its powers, such an eventuality did not come to pass, for this would have been a Constitutional transgression.

Of no practical value then would it be to propose, as the dissent " does at this stage, even in the name of justice, to undo everything that has already been done, for what is allegedly in gross violation and disregard of the restraining orders issued in this case by the COMELEC, (which is not clearly or indisputably so, as herein above demonstrated) only for the sake of asserting the court's authority to uphold its restraining orders. For this may not be done now without transgressing or violating the Constitution by allowing a disqualified person to hold an elective office. Injustice would also be inflicted on Dizon, for the allegedly arbitrary acts committed not by him but by COMELEC, whose enjoined acts would have been perfectly lawful without the restraining orders. Incidentally this Court has not set aside any proclamation except only when the person proclaimed had before the election or the proclamation been found by COMELEC to be disqualified, and the disqualification had been affirmed, as it had to be so affirmed, by this Court after the proclamation.9

Another point raised in the "dissent" is the question of whether P.D. 1661 is ex post facto if made to apply to Ticzon, or even to Dizon. The "dissent" still insists on said decree being ex post facto, and should not be given retroactive effect despite that in the case of Santos vs. COMELEC, et al, supra this Court already held that P.D. No. 1661 is not "banned under the ex post facto clause of the Constitution", for if it were, all disqualification cases would have all been brushed aside on this account by one stroke of the pen.

The high regard I hold for democratic tenets and processes would make my personal sympathy go for Ticzon if he had indeed obtained more votes than Dizon, without fraud or any other election irregularity as those charged by Dizon, and yet unable to assume office by reason of disqualification. The will of the people, however, as expressed in the Constitution against "turncoatism" may not be disregarded, even if only momentarily in order to give effect to the supposedly winning votes cast by the electorate of a given locality in favor of a certain candidate. The constitutional prohibition, like all constitutional provisions, is mandatory and unyielding. It constitutes a basic, permanent and continuing expression of the will of the people, unlike a passing fancy or preference for, certain candidates expressed at intervals of time when elections are held. Hence, my commitment as a member of the Supreme Court, the judicial guardian of the Constitution, leaves me with no choice but to subordinate my personal sympathy to the supremacy of the fundamental law.

I have always felt that it might be doing a disservice to the cause of effective government if the different agencies created by the Constitution were to treat each other with distrust and suspicion, and not with benign confidence and gentle faith that all of them are equally striving to fulfill their responsibility in their respective domain with the highest degree of integrity, competence, impartiality and good faith, entirely without malice, bias or prejudice for or against any person or party. The same spirit that animated me to write a separate opinion in the case of Aratuc vs. COMELEC, et al,.10 has moved me to write this opinion, in a desire to maintain the faith and trust of the people in the COMELEC, not to contribute, even if only unwittingly, to their erosion as might happy when its good faith and impartiality is placed under a cloud of doubt for whatever error it may have committed, to which like this Court itself and all other human institutions, it is susceptible, not be- ing endowed with the attribute of infallibility. Thus, I said in the Aratuc case where certain official actuations of COMELEC were also placed under severe scrutiny before this Court after the 1978 elections:

It must be to the credit of COMELEC that it has just recently proclaimed NP Candidate Elias B. Lopez as Mayor of Davao City, whose proclamation it has suspended on petition of KBL Candidate Luis T. Santos, on the ground that numerous voters were unable to vote because of rampant terrorism which it found to be well-founded. It ordered a new election to be held in a widely affected area, and the Supreme Court affirmed its decision for a new election to be held, but only in some portions of said area. This the COMELEC did after realizing the impracticability of holding the new elections, because the state of peace and order of the affected area has not improved but worsened. By this act, COMELEC had clearly demonstrated its capacity for fairness, justice and impartiality which, from the very start, as may be gleaned from the above quoted portion of the very first separate opinion I wrote upon my joining this Court, I have nurtured hopes, would con- continually mark and unceasingly characterize its work and service to the nation. It is my well-considered opinion that the Commission has not failed in that hope and in the expectation of the people at large.