G.R.No. 37201-02, March 3, 1975,
♦ Decision,
Fernandez, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion,
Castro, Teehankee, Fernando [JJ]
♦ Concurring Opinion,
Antonio, [J]
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-37201-02 March 3, 1975
CLEMENTE MAGTOTO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MIGUEL M. MANGUERA, Judge of the Court of First Instance (Branch II) of Occidental Mindoro, The PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, IGNACIO CALARA, JR., and LOURDES CALARA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-37424 March 3, 1975
MAXIMO SIMEON, LOUIS MEDNATT, INOCENTES DE LUNA, RUBEN MIRANDA, ALFONSO BALLESTEROS, RUDOLFO SUAREZ, MANUEL MANALO, ALBERTO GABION, and RAFAEL BRILL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, in his capacity as Judge of the Criminal Circuit Court of Pasig, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. L-38929 March 3, 1975
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE ASAALI S. ISNANI, District Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, Branch II, VICENTE LONGAKIT, and JAIME DALION, respondents.
Felipe S. Abeleda for petitioner Clemente Magtoto.
Joaquin L. Misa for petitioners Maximo Simeon, et al.
Alan L. Roxas for respondents Ignacio Calara, Jr., et al.
Organo Law Office for respondent Vicente Longakit, et al.
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor General Vicente V. Mendoza for respondent and petitioner People of the Philippines.
Separate Opinions
ANTONIO, J., concurring:
I
The constant doctrine of this Court has always been in favor of the admissibility of statements obtained from a defendant under police custodial interrogation where the same has been obtained freely and voluntarily.1 We have always held that it will suffice for the admission of an extrajudicial confession of an accused that it appears to have been given under conditions which accredit prima facie its admissibility, leaving the accused at liberty to show it was not voluntarily given or was obtained by undue pressure, thus destroying its weight,2 and that a presumption of law favors the spontaneity and voluntariness of a statement given by the defendant in a criminal case and the burden is upon him to destroy that presumption.3 We have also declared that an extrajudicial confession is not rendered inadmissible by reason of failure to caution the accused that he need not talk and that if he does, what he says will be used against him, even though such extrajudicial confession was under oath.4
The concept in voluntariness seems to be used by the courts as a shorthand to refer to practices which are repugnant to civilized standards of decency or which, under the circumstances, are thought to apply a degree of pressure to an individual which unfairly impairs his capacity to make a rational choice. We explained in People v. Carillo5 that "the conviction of an accused on a voluntary extrajudicial statement in no way violates the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. What the above inhibition seeks to protect is compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts. While there could be some possible objections to the admissibility of a confession on grounds of its untrustworthiness, such confession is never excluded as evidence on account of any supposed violation of the constitutional immunity of the party from self-incrimination. ... The use of voluntary confession is a universal, time-honored practice grounded on common law and expressly sanctioned by statutes." In People v. Jose,6 a unanimous Court rejected the contention that a confession obtained during custodial interrogation without the assistance of counsel is inadmissible, notwithstanding the argument based on Messiah v. U.S. (377 U.S. 201), Escobedo v. Illinois (378 U.S. 478), and Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436) that the presence of counsel in an in-custody police interrogation is an adequate protective device to make the process of interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege against self-incrimination. This Court declared that the right of the accused to counsel under Article III, Section 7, paragraph (17) of the Constitution refers to proceedings before the trial court from arraignment to rendition of the judgment, and that the only instances where an accused is entitled to counsel before arraignment, if he so requests, are during the second stage of the preliminary investigation. Thus, We rejected the applicability of the principles enunciated in Messiah, Escobedo and Miranda on the ground that "the rule in the United States need not be unquestionably adhered to in this jurisdiction, not only because it has no binding effect here, but also because in interpreting a provision of the Constitution, the meaning attached thereto at the time of the adoption thereof should be considered.
The law enforcement officers of the government and the courts have relied upon these doctrines and followed their commands. Hundreds, if not thousands, of cases, were finally decided on the basis of such doctrines. To assert, therefore, that Article IV, Section 20, of the New Constitution - which renders any confession in violation of said section inadmissible in evidence - is a confirmation, ratification and promulgation of a pre-existing rule, is to indulge in a historical fallacy.
II.
The purpose of requiring the presence of counsel in police custodial investigations in Section 20, of Article IV, of the New Constitution, is to serve as an effective deterrent to lawless police action. We cannot say that this purpose would be advanced by making the requirement retrospective. If any misconduct had been committed by the police in connection with the taking of statements of suspects during custodial interrogation prior to the effectivity of the New Constitution, it will not be corrected by making this proscription retroactive.
III.
There are interests in the administration of justice and the integrity of the judicial process to consider. To make the proscription in Article IV, Section 20, of the New Constitution retrospective would certainly impair the effective prosecution of cases and tax to the utmost the administration of justice.
Custodial interrogation has long been recognized as an essential tool in effective law enforcement.ℒαwρhi৷ The detection and solution of crime is a difficult and arduous task requiring determination and persistence on the part of all responsible officers charged with the duty of law enforcement. The line between proper and permissible police conduct and methods that are offensive to due process is, at best, a difficult one to draw. It must be noted that in most areas, police investigators are without modern and sophisticated instruments for criminal investigation. Many grave felonies have been unsolved because of the absence or unavailability of witnesses. In such cases, it is obvious that the custodial interrogation of suspects would furnish the only means of solving the crime. It must be noted also that the law enforcement officials of the national and local governments have heretofore proceeded on the premise that the Constitution did not require the presence of counsel to render admissible statements obtained during police custodial interrogations. All of the courts of the land, in reliance on Our settled doctrines, have heretofore considered as admissible confessions obtained freely and given voluntarily by the declarant even in the absence of counsel. To insert such constitutional specific on cases already pending in court before the ratification of the New Constitution may well undermine the administration of justice and the integrity of the judicial process. Recognition of this fact should put us on guard in promulgating rules that are doctrinaire. To apply this new rule retroactively would have an impact upon the administration of criminal law so devastating as to need no elaboration. Exclusion of this kind of evidence in a retrospective manner would increase the burden on the administration of justice, would overturn convictions based on fair reliance upon existing doctrines, and would undercut efforts to restore civil order. The trial of cases already terminated, where the main evidence consists of extrajudicial statements of accused obtained during police custodial interrogation, would have to be re-opened. It would be idle to expect under such circumstances that the police could still produce evidence other than those submitted, in order that the prosecution of the case could be maintained.
IV
It is a fundamental rule in the construction of constitutions that constitutional provisions should not be given a retrospective operation, unless that is the unmistakable intention of the words used or the obvious design of the authors.7 In short, the rule is prospectivity; the exception, retrospectivity.
There is no indication in the language used that Section 20 of Article IV (Bill of Rights), of the New Constitution, is intended to operate retrospectively. Note the plain language of the of the provision, which reads:têñ.£îhqwâ£
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Section 8 of Article XVII (Transitory Provisions), of the New Constitution, however, provides as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
All courts existing at the time of the ratification of this Constitution shall continue and exercise their jurisdiction, until otherwise provided by law in accordance with this Constitution, and all cases pending in said courts shall be heard, tried, and determined under the laws then in force. The provisions of the existing Rules of Court not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative unless amended, modified, or repealed by the Supreme Court or the National Assembly. (emphasis supplied.) .
The law existing at the time of the adoption of the New Constitution, as construed by this Court in People v. Jose,8 considered admissible extrajudicial statements of accused obtained during custodial interrogation, without assistance of counsel. This decision formed part of the legal system in this jurisdiction.9
Considered as an expression of public policy, Section 8 of Article XVII, to my mind, lays down the guidelines to be observed by the courts in the trial and determination of cases pending at the time of the ratification of the New Constitution. Indeed, this was necessary in view of the considerations heretofore adverted to and to avoid confusion in the resolution of such cases, considering that there are new rules enunciated in the New Constitution, one of which is the evidentiary exclusionary rule in Section 20 of Article IV. To my view, with respect to those cases still pending as of January 17, 1973 (the date the New Constitution was ratified), the admissibility of the extrajudicial statements of the accused notwithstanding its adjective character, should be decided in accordance with the provisions of the 1935 Constitution as construed in the existing jurisprudence.
The foregoing construction of Section 20 of Article IV in relation to Section 8 of Article XVII, is not only in accord with the settled rules of statutory construction, but is an interpretation which is in accordance with the clear provisions, spirit and intent of the Constitution.
V
It is, however, asserted that under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, any incriminatory statements given by a person detained, in the course of a police custodial interrogation, is inadmissible in evidence, if the same is done without the assistance of the declarant's counsel. This novel theory cannot be squared either with the clear wordings of the statutory provision or with the existing jurisprudence on the matter. While it may be conceded that Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code requires the detaining officer to inform the person detained the cause of his detention and of his right, if he so desires, to communicate and confer with his counsel, it does not necessarily follow that an additional obligation is imposed upon said officer to allow the suspect to be assisted by his counsel during the custodial interrogation. Neither does it provide that any incriminatory statement given by him, even if voluntary, would be inadmissible in evidence, if the same was done without the assistance of counsel. Such a construction finds no basis in the clear and plain wordings of the statute. Where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, the Court should not indulge in speculation as to the probable or possible qualifications which might have been in the mind of the legislature.
VI
The final authority of this Court rests upon public respect for its decisions. That public respect is based upon an image which represents this Court as declaring legal principles with an authority and certainty that the people may place upon it their bona fide reliance and reasonable expectations. To hold now that public officers, who have acted in justifiable reliance on Our aforecited doctrines, have transgressed the Constitution, would certainly not strengthen public respect on the authority of Our judgments.
Where there has been justifiable reliance on Our decisions, and those who have so relied may be substantially harmed if retroactive effect is given, where the purpose of the new rule can be adequately effectuated without giving it retroactive operation, or where retroactive operation might greatly burden the administration of justice, then it is Our duty to apply the new rule prospectively.
The factual and textual bases for a contrary rule, are at best, less than compelling. Relevant is the Court's duty to assess the consequences of Its action. More than the human dignity of the accused in these cases is involved. There is the compelling realization that substantial interests of society may be prejudiced by a retrospective application of the new exclusionary rule. Thus, the values reflected transcend the individual interests of the herein accused, and involve the general security of society. The unusual force of the countervailing considerations strengthens my conclusion in favor of prospective application. To the extent consistent with this opinion, I, therefore, concur in the opinion of Justice Fernandez.
Barredo and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët
Footnotes
1 U.S. v. Castillo, 2 Phil., 17; U.S. v. Lio Team, 23 Phil., 64 U.S. v. Ching Po, 23 Phil., 578; U.S. v. Corrales, 28 Phil., 362; People v. Hernane, 75 Phil., 554.
2 U.S. v. Zara, 42 Phil., 308.
3 People v. Garcia, L-8298, May 29, 1957.
4 U.S. v. Agatea, 40 Phil., 596; People v. Hernane, supra.
5 77 Phil., 572.
6 37 SCRA 450.
7 See Black on Interpretation of Laws, Hornbook Series, Sec. 12, p. 26; 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sec. 40, pp. 80-81; Drennen v. Bennett, 322 S.W. 2d 585.
8 Supra.
9 Article 8, Civil Code.
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