Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30158 January 17, 1974
LORENZO G. VALENTIN, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE ANDRES SANTA MARIA, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch II; YOLANDA MATIAS, being represented by JOSE ARCILLAS, and LEOPOLDO C. PALAD, Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, respondent.
Dakila F. Castro and Associates for petitioner.
Rosendo J. Tansinsin for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
The invocation of People v. Soria,1 promulgated in 1968, did suffice for this Court to entertain this certiorari and mandamus proceeding filed on February 10, 1969. It was the ruling therein that a judge who had qualified and assumed office in one district could not thereafter validly issue an order of dismissal in a criminal case formerly heard by him while holding such office in another. In this suit, petitioner's contention that the decision of December 20, 1963 of the then Judge Samuel F. Reyes at a time he had already qualified and assumed office in the Rizal Court of First Instance disposing of a civil case tried by him in Bulacan as well as the orders subsequently issued by respondent Judge Andres Santa Maria of Bulacan denying a motion to disregard such judgment should be declared null and void in accordance with the Soria holding. Whatever merit there might have been to a petition of this character no longer attaches to it as of January 31, 1973, when this Court, in People v. Donesa,2 declined in a decision unanimously arrived at to give retroactive effect to Soria, thus sustaining an order of dismissal of the then Judge Donesa handed down after he had ceased to be such in Abra, having taken over his new post in the Tagaytay Court of First Instance. What poses an even greater obstacle to petitioner being sustained is that in a concurring opinion by Justice Teehankee, to which were affixed the votes of five other justices,3 he categorically affirmed: "The present decision signifies the abandonment and overturning of the contrary ruling in the case of People v. Soria and other cases therein cited, ... which should be so stated plainly for the guidance of the bench and bar as well as of litigants in general."4 This Court, now sitting en banc, after a thorough consideration of the matter, adopts such a view. As a consequence, Soria is bereft of any authoritive force. It is overruled. The petition must be, as it is hereby, dismissed.
The relevant facts are beyond dispute. Petitioner Lorenzo G. Valentin was the defendant in a civil case of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan with private respondent Yolanda Matias as plaintiff.5 A decision was rendered on December 20, 1963 in favor of the private respondent as plaintiff declaring null and void Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-32568 in the name of the defendant, now petitioner, who was likewise considered as a possessor in bad faith and thus must account for the fruits of the property from May 2, 1961, in addition to paying private respondent as plaintiff the amount of P1,000.00 as attorney's fees and the cost of the proceedings. The Register of Deeds of Bulacan was likewise thereby ordered to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-32568 of his office, reinstate Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15329 in the name of Petra Gatmaytan and thereafter cancel it and issue a new one in favor of private respondent after the payment of the corresponding fees. As noted, it was a decision of Judge Samuel F. Reyes.6 It was duly appealed to the Court of Appeals,7 which affirmed it in toto an May 13, 1968.8 There was a motion for reconsideration by petitioner as defendant-appellant therein, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals on July 19, 1968.9 Subsequently, on October 26, 1968, upon discovering that when Judge Samuel F. Reyes promulgated the decision dated December 20, 1963, he had already assumed office as District Judge for the Province of Rizal and the Cities of Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan, Branch X, and in view of the ruling in People of the Philippines v. Simpliciano Soria,10 petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan with respondent Judge Santa Maria a "Motion to Disregard Judgment of December 20, 1963 and to Render Judgment Anew."11 There was on October 29, 1968, a pleading of private respondent in opposition.12 Respondent Judge, on December 12, 1968, denied said motion.13 After a denial of a motion for reconsideration, petitioner came to this Court.14
Had there been no Donesa decision of January 31, 1973, the judicial path of duty is clear. Petitioner was on the right track, the one indicated by Soria. That was so before. It no longer holds true now. This petition, as earlier set forth, must be dismissed.
1. In People v. Donesa,15 the undisputed facts were culled from the petition thus: " As shown in the petition: 'That on March 7, 1962, an information was filed charging the respondent, Lapaz Tuanquin with Homicide and Serious Physical Injuries through reckless imprudence for the death of the late Evaristo Bramaje and hospitalization of Antonio Tejada on December 23, 1960, said information docketed as Criminal Case No. 266 of the Court of First Instance of Abra, then presided over by herein respondent judge; That after presentation of its evidence, the prosecution ... rested its case on October 15, 1963, whereupon, the accused ... immediately made known her desire to file a motion to dismiss; That on April 23, 1964, respondent Lapaz Tuanquin through her lawyers, filed a motion to dismiss, and on August 7, 1964, petitioner People of the Philippines, filed its opposition to the motion to dismiss, and on August 12, 1964, a motion to reopen the case for purposes of having some exhibits translated from the Ilocano dialect to English was submitted, ...; That while respondent judge was still the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Abra, he was nominated to his present position, which nomination was subsequently confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, and he qualified as District Judge of Cavite to preside at Branch IV of the Court of Tagaytay City on July 13, 1964, long before the opposition to the motion to dismiss and motion to reopen the case were filed, ...; That on January 12, 1965, respondent judge issued an order dismissing Criminal Case No. 266 on the flimsy ground that the prosecution failed to present one witness, a witness whose presentation was made unnecessary in view of the admission of the accused-respondent as evidenced by her sworn statement and submitted during the course of presentation of evidence by the prosecution. ... The order of dismissal is dated November 27, 1964."16 On the above facts, the petition for certiorari was dismissed.17 It was admitted in the unanimous opinion of the Court that a serious jurisdictional question would have arisen if the doctrine in People v. Soria were deemed controlling."18 Why it was not considered applicable was next taken up in that portion of the opinion in these words: "There, this Court, through J.B.L. Reyes, ruled: 'It may be noted therefrom that the signing or writing of judgments outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court where the cases are pending, is allowed when the judge leaves the province "by transfer or assignment to another court of equal jurisdiction," or "expiration of his temporary assignment." In other words, the rule contemplates of a temporary occupancy by the judge of either the post he has left or of the one he is going to assume.' Under such a doctrine, respondent judge certainly would be devoid of jurisdiction to issue the challenged order of dismissal. It should not, however, be made to apply. The Soria decision was promulgated on March 1, 1968.<äre||anº•1àw> The two cases cited therein, Ong Siu v. Paredes and Jimenez v. Republic, were respectively decided on July 26, 1966 and January 31, 1968. The order of dismissal here was issued on November 27, 1964. Since, realistically, a judicial decision speaks as of the date it is handed down, Soria ought not to be given retroactive force and effect. For to do so, in a situation like the present, would amount to a deprivation of constitutional right which certainly is objectionable and should not be allowed. That is why, in whatever manner viewed, this petition cannot prosper."19
There was, as mentioned earlier, a separate concurrence by Justice Teehankee which, again as previously stated, elicited approval from the then Justice, now Chief Justice. Makalintal and Justices Castro, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra.20 The stand of Justice Teehankee was set forth thus: "I concur in the result of the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando, but believe that such result should not be reached on the principal ground of double jeopardy as therein invoked but rather by meeting frontally the fundamental issue of respondent judge's authority and jurisdiction to still act on and grant the motion to dismiss bearing on the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt respondent's guilt submitted to him in the Abra court after and notwithstanding his appointment and assumption of the office of district judge of the Cavite court (by virtue of said dismissal motion having been submitted to him and his having "totally heard" the case before his subsequent appointment and permanent transfer to the Cavite court of first instance)."21 After mentioning Soria, the concurrence was for what it characterized as "the contrary interpretation now adopted by the court that a district judge who has left the court of his original assignment or appointment by permanent (not merely temporary) transfer or assignment to another court of equal jurisdiction without having decided a case totally heard by him and which was duly argued or opportunity given for argument to the parties or their counsel may lawfully prepare and sign his decision in said case anywhere within the Philippines and send the same by registered mail to the clerk of the court to be filed in the court as of the date when the same was received by the clerk, in the same manner as if the judge had been present in the court to direct the filing of the judgment, as duly provided by section 51 of the Judicially Act above-quoted."22 In its view, therefore, the Donesa decision "signifies the abandonment and overturning, of the contrary ruling in the case of People v. Soria and other cases therein cited ... ."23 The purpose, according to Justice Teehankee, for stating the matter thus plainly and unequivocally, is "for the guidance of the bench and bar as well as of litigants in general."24
2. As made clear in the opening paragraph of this opinion, it is the ruling of this Court en banc that for reasons to be more fully set forth, Soria should be overruled.ℒαwρhi৷ In the language of Justice Laurel, it no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle."25 There should not be any doubt therefore that it could no longer be relied upon. It has been stripped of any authoritative force. This is not to deny that on purely conceptual grounds, our ruling may raise some questions. It may be argued that a decision speaks as of the moment of its promulgation. Unless the judge then still is authorized to do so, he is legally precluded from acting on such a case. His permanent transfer to another district then poses such a barrier. Such a view finds support from the standpoint of legal theory. Consistency in the application of jural norms would require such a conclusion. There is, as Cardozo did point out, a misuse of logic, "when its methods and its ends are treated as supreme and final."26 For if it were otherwise, law remains merely a closed self-contained system of abstract rules independent of human needs and values. It should not be thus. Nor may there be neglect and indifference to things as they are. A court, no less than the general public, must not close its eyes to the realities of the situation. The law's efficacy then requires awareness of what actually transpires. The social facts upon which it must be grounded and to which it is applied cannot be ignored. The important question is not so much a norm's conformity with jural consistency, but how it functions. In the apt language of Justice Tuazon, "we test a rule by its results."27
Why Soria cannot survive under such an approach is made clear in the concurrence of Justice Teehankee thus: "Compelling considerations support such abandonment of Soria and a reversion to the old rulings cited in the main opinion that the public interest and the speedy administration of justice will be best served if the judge who heard the evidence (although he may have been permanently transferred to another province or station) renders the decision rather than to leave a mountain of evidence and transcripts for the perusal and appreciation of a new judge totally unfamiliar with the case and who did not have the opportunity of hearing the witnesses and observing their deportment for purposes of gauging their credibility and appraising their testimony."28 Nor is there any offense to the sense of right, nor any affront to the cause of justice. More than the successor, the judge who heard the witnesses testify, who presumably had pored over the documentary evidence, certainly is in a much better position to appraise the facts and thereafter to apply the statute or codal provision involved. A litigant's expectation as to his suit being adjudged with care and thoroughness has greater chances then of being satisfied under such circumstances. This is so even on the assumption that the one who succeeds him on the bench is much more skillful and penetrating in his scrutiny of the proof and much more proficient in the jurist's art. Independently then of the social consideration involved, the notion of law as a reflection of reason and given expression under conditions that assure an impartial and thorough adjudicative process is more likely to be served when the one who hears the case renders the decision himself.
3. The members of this Court, who in Donesa, gave their conformity to the concurring opinion, were not unaware of the possibility that under the specific provision of the Judiciary Act,29 it could happen that after a new incumbent had been qualified to the position thus vacated, an abandonment of Soria could result in a situation where two judges would be legally competent to promulgated a decision. To avoid such an undesirable state of affairs, they likewise were in full agreement with what was said on the matter by Justice Teehankee: "The only qualification that I would add — of purposes of avoiding any unnecessary conflict in case another judge has already been appointed to his former court and the same is no longer vacant or unoccupied (although in the case at bar, it appears that respondent judge's former court remained vacant) — is that in line with the statutory proviso therein governing cases 'heard only in part,' as well as with the first paragraph of the cited section providing for detail of judges, the interested parties should obtain from this Court the corresponding authorization for the permanently transferred judge who heard in toto the case and the evidence to render the decision thereon, in the same manner as temporarily transferred or assigned judges on detail."30 Such a view commends itself to the entire Court.
4. If appears, therefore, that both from the standpoint of the juristic process as justice and as social control, and with only the slightest departure from the demands of strict logic, the definitive abandonment of Soria has much to recommend it. Insofar as this particular proceeding is concerned, then, it is manifest that it is bereft of any support in law.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is dismissed. With costs against petitioner.
Zaldivar, J., concurs.
Footnotes
1 L-25175, March 1, 1968, 22 SCRA 948.
2 L-24162, January 31, 1973, 49 SCRA 281.
3 The then Justice, now Chief Justice, Makalintal, and Justices Castro, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra.
4 49 SCRA 281, 294.
5 Petition, par. II. The case, No. 2586 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, is entitled Yolanda Matias v. Lorenzo G. Valentin.
6 Ibid, par. III.
7 C.A. G.R. No. 34166-R.
8 Petition, par. IV.
9 Ibid, par V.
10 L-25175, March 1, 1968, 22 SCRA 948.
11 Petition, par. VII.
12 Ibid, par. VIII.
13 Ibid, par. IX.
14 Ibid, par. X.
15 L-24162, January 31, 1973, 49 SCRA 281.
16 Ibid, 285.
17 Ibid, 291.
18 Ibid, 290.
19 Ibid, 290-291.
20 All five Justices likewise concurred with the main opinion.
21 Ibid, 291-292.
22 Ibid, 294.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Cf. Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 70 Phil. 340, 360 (1940).
26 Cardozo, Nature of Judicial Process 47 (1921).
27 Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368, 376 (1949).
28 49 SCRA 281, 295.
29 Section 51, Rep. Act No. 296 (1948).
30 49 SCRA 281, 294.
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