G.R. Nos. L-32613-4 April 30, 1974
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SIMEON N. FERRER, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch I; FELICIANO CO alias "Leoncio Co" alias "Bob" and NILO S. TAYAG alias "Romy Reyes" alias "Taba", respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. for petitioner.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., dissenting:
My dissent from the well-written opinion of Justice Castro in the decision promulgated on December 27, 1972 opened with this paragraph: "It is with regret that I find myself unable to join the rest of my brethren in the decision reached upholding the validity of the Anti-Subversion Act. It is to be admitted that the learned and scholarly opinion of Justice Castro has the impress of conscientious and painstaking scrutiny of the Constitutional issues raised. What is more, the stress in the concluding portion thereof on the basic guidelines that will assure in the trial of those prosecuted under such Act respect for their constitutional rights is to be commended. Nonetheless, my own reading of the decisions cited, interpreting the bill of attainder clause coupled with the fears, perhaps induced by a too-latitudinarian construction of the guarantees of freedom of belief and expression as well as freedom of association as to impermissible inroads to which they may be exposed, compels a different conclusion."1
It is beyond cavil that the present resolution bears the imprint of lucidity and comprehensiveness, characteristic of the opinions of Justice Castro. I regret however that the basic premise that precluded me from yielding concurrence to the decision is once again a bar to my conformity. There is no need then to repeal what was said by me before. It only remains to be added that the stress on the conspiracy principle in the resolution, to be sure in conformity with sound and settled concepts, does give rise to misgivings as to its too broad a scope. That is why I would like to express briefly my doubts on the matter.
For the purposes of this dissent, I adopt the characterization of Justice Jackson that conspiracy has in it the elements of the "elastic, sprawling and pervasive" resulting at times in "a serious threat to fairness in our administration of justice."2 His concurring opinion in Krulewitch continues: "The modern crime of conspiracy is so vague that it almost defies definition. Despite certain elementary and essential elements, it also, chameleon-like, takes on a special coloration from each of the many independent offenses on which it may be overlaid. It is always "predominantly mental in composition" because it consists primarily of a meeting of minds and an intent."3 Its relationship to political offenses was discussed by him in these terms: "The crime comes down to us wrapped in vague but unpleasant connotations. It sounds historical undertones of treachery, secret plotting and violence on a scale that menaces social stability and the security of the state itself. "Privy conspiracy" ranks with sedition and rebellion in the Litany's prayer for deliverance. Conspirational movements do indeed lie back of the political assassination, the coup d'etat, the putsch, the revolution, and seizures of power in modern times, as they have in all history."4
Along the same line are the comments of Professor Johnson on the dangers of conspiracy to freedom of thought and expression. Thus: "Prosecutions of political dissidents, including labor organizers, Communist Party leaders, and contemporary radicals, typically have been conspiracy prosecutions. The law of conspiracy is intended, after all, to make it easier to impose criminal punishment on members of groups that plot forbidden activity. Insofar as it accomplishes this end, it unavoidably increases the likelihood that persons will be punished for what they say rather than for what they do or for associating with others who are found culpable. Critics who are alarmed at the resulting threat to freedom of speech and freedom of association typically have proposed new constitutional doctrines derived from the first amendment to curtail the use of conspiracy charges in cases having some "political" element."5 For Professor Johnson, it does not suffice "to reform conspiracy legislatively by removing its most widely deplored overextensions, or to reform it judicially by engrafting new doctrines derived from the first amendment [freedom of speech and of the press]."6 He would expunge it from the corpus of the law. "The law of criminal conspiracy is not basically sound. It should be abolished, not reformed."7
Let there be no misunderstanding.ℒαwρhi৷ I am not prepared to go that far. It does occur to me, though, that with due recognition of the persuasive character of the resolution from the standpoint of defense against the dangers of subversion as well as the desire of my brethren to give the utmost protection to constitutional rights, under current conditions with the serious problems posed, still I find it difficult to dispel my grave doubts as to Republic Act No. 1700 suffering from the corrosion of constitutional infirmity, as set forth in some detail in my dissent.
Regretfully, I am compelled to do so again.
Footnotes
1 Fernando, J., dissenting.
2 Jackson, con., in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 US 440, 446 (1949).
3 Ibid, 446-447.
4 Ibid, 448.
5 Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 California Law Rev., 1137, 1139 (1973).
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
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