EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23559 October 4, 1971
AURELIO G. BRIONES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PRIMITIVO P. CAMMAYO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Carlos J. Antiporda for plaintiff-appellee.
Manuel A. Cammayo for defendants-appellants.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I concur.
I believe that this decision expresses the fair and just intent of our usury laws and sufficiently effectuates the public policy that should be pursued in usury.
I consider usury to be unchristian and inhuman, particularly because it thrives best in the misery of people by taking advantage of them when they are precisely in urgent need of money to save themselves from a tight situation. Usury has always been considered as a scourge everywhere in the world since the time of the Holy Scriptures. All these notwithstanding, I do not believe in condoning the whole indebtedness of a person who borrows money, only because he has been made to agree, directly or indirectly, to pay more interest than that authorized by law. It is my considered view that what the law prescribes and declares null and void is not the lending of money, but only the collection of excessive interest. There is nothing morally wrong in allowing a money-lender to get back the money he has loaned because, after all, the borrower has used the same for his own needs, and it is only fair that he should not be enriched at the expense of another. And this, to my mind, is obvious from the language of Article 1957 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Contracts and stipulations, under any cloak or device whatever, intended to circumvent the laws against usury shall be void. The borrower may recover in accordance with the laws on usury. (n)
Properly construed, the phrase "contracts and stipulations" in this provision does not contemplate the totality of the contract of loan but only the portion thereof that is "intended to circumvent the laws against usury," and that necessarily is no more than any term, "cloak or device" which results in the collection of interest in excess of the rate allowed by law. In fact, the same provision expressly provides that inspite of the nullity it ordains, "the borrower may recover in accordance with the laws on usury." In other words, instead of leaving the consequences of the declared nullity to be in accordance with general principles, the article itself spells out in black and white what should be done with the proceeds of the proscribed act, and it says that the special laws on usury shall be followed in that respect.
To the same effect is Article 1961 of the Civil Code. lt provides that:
Usurious contracts shall be governed by the Usury Law and other special laws, so far as they are not inconsistent with this Code. (n)
And I see no point of collision between the Civil Code and the Usury Law for the simple reason that even before Art.ℒαwρhi৷ 1957 declared usurious contracts and transactions null and void, Section 7 of the Usury Law already provided thus:
All covenants and stipulations, constrained in conveyances, mortgages, bonds, bills, notes, and other contracts or evidences of debts, and all deposits of goods or other things, whereupon or whereby there shall be stipulated, charged, demanded, reserved, secured, taken, or received, directly or indirectly, a higher rate or greater sum or value for the loan or renewal thereof or forbearance of money, goods, or credits than is hereinbefore allowed, shall be void: Provided, however, That no merely clerical error in the computation of interest, made without intent to evade any of the provisions of this Act, shall render a contract void: And provided, further, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the purchase by an innocent purchaser of a negotiable mercantile paper, usurious or otherwise, for valuable consideration before maturity, when there has been no intent on the part of said purchaser to evade the provisions of this Act and said purchase was not a part of the original usurious transaction. In any case, however, the maker of said note shall have the right to recover from said original holder the whole interest paid by him thereon and, in case of litigation, also the costs and such attorney's fees as may be allowed by the court.
In this connection, it is to be noted that Section 6 of the Usury Law provides:
Any person or corporation who, for any such loan or renewal thereof or forbearance, shall have paid or delivered a higher rate or greater sum or value than is hereinbefore allowed to be taken or received, may recover the whole interest, commissions, premiums penalties and surcharges paid or delivered with costs and attorney's fees in such sum as may be allowed by the court in an action against the person or corporation who took or received them if such action is brought within two years after such payment or delivery: Provided, however, That the creditor shall not be obliged to return the interest, commissions and premiums for a period of not more than one year collected by him in advance when the debtor shall have paid the obligation before it is due, provided such interest, and commissions and premiums do not exceed the rates fixed in this Act.
As a matter of fact, then, even as the Civil Code yields to the Usury Law in Articles 1957 and 1413, in reality there is no conflict between their corresponding provisions. To say that because these laws specify only the remedies in favor of the borrower, they impliedly deny to the lender any remedy to recover the principal of the loan is, I submit, a non sequitur. It appears to me more logical to construe the provisions allowing the borrower to recover all the interest he has paid, as Article 1413 of the Civil Code and Section 6 of the Usury Law have been construed together to mean in Angel Jose v. Chelda Enterprises, cited in the main opinion, as indicating that the borrower may not recover from the lender the amount he has paid as payment of his principal debt, and conversely, that the lender may collect the same if it has not been paid by the borrower.
In brief, my point is that while it is true that Article 1957 of the Civil Code declares that all usurious contracts and stipulations are void, this is nothing new, for such has been the law even under the Usury Law before the Civil Code went into effect, and, moreover, it is evident that the Civil Code itself yields to the Usury Law when it comes to the question of how much of the loan and interests paid by the borrower may be recovered by him, and the Usury Law is clear that he may recover only all the interests, including, of course, the legal part thereof, with legal interest from the date of judicial demand, without maintaining that he can also recover the principal he has already paid to the lender.
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